Why the UK PREVENT Strategy Does Not Prevent Terrorism

The Wrong Reasons, the Wrong People, the Wrong Methods, the Wrong Consequences: Why the UK PREVENT Strategy Does Not Prevent Terrorism

The Preventing Violent Extremism (Prevent) strategy is the British government’s main programme for preventing violent extremism at its root, and a central component of its wider counter-terrorism strategy. Core to this strategy is the perception that in order to prevent ‘Al-Qaeda inspired’ terrorism, which they see as the greatest threat facing the United Kingdom (UK),[1] they must prevent ‘vulnerable’ Muslim individuals being ‘radicalised’ into violent extremism.[2] Under this strategy, local communities are to be enabled, as the main actor, to tackle this challenge.[3] A central part of this policy is to “build [the] resilience” of these communities to violent extremism.[4] For this reason, Prevent is supposedly the more ‘soft’ approach to the government’s wider counter-terrorism strategy. In line with the perceived importance of these measures, Prevent’s funding in 2008/09 was 140 million pounds.[5]

This essay will argue not only that this strategy is unlikely to achieve its aims, but also that it is counter-productive. In the first section, it will argue that the theory of ‘radicalisation’, on which Prevent relies, suffers from a lack of conceptual clarity as to what this process actually is, and that it is unable to explain why some resort to violence while others do not. As a result of this, the counter-terrorism community is likely to overlook the actual causes of violent extremism. In the following section, two main arguments will be made. It will argue that the Prevent strategy creates a situation in which all Muslims are seen as potential terrorists and as complicit with any terrorism perpetrated by Muslims. This, it will argue, is leading to a situation in which the necessary focus on the actual sources of terrorism is lost, as well as creating a ‘suspect community’. This section will also argue that the lack of focus on extremism perpetrated by individuals without a Muslim background means that the counter-terrorism community is likely to overlook many potential sources of extremism. The third section, for its part, will argue that the methods employed as part of the Prevent strategy are counter-productive. It will here argue that the decision to fund local authorities only according to the proportion of Muslims in their area shows a disregard for other extremisms and, more so, contributes to the creation of this ‘suspected community’. Furthermore, it will argue that the decision to ‘spy’ on Muslims in general is leading to the alienation of sections of the Muslim population and the creation of a ‘suspect community’. This section will also argue that the aim to change attitudes among Muslims is likely to alienate these individuals, as well as contribute to the creation of the ‘suspect community’. Finally, in the fourth section, it will argue that this creation of a ‘suspect community’ is likely to result in a lack of support for the strategy among Muslims, increased recruitment to both Islamist and anti-Muslim extremism, as well as increased anti-Muslim sentiments in general.

The Wrong Reasons

Arguably, the most important theory underlying Prevent is that of ‘radicalisation’, which is seen as being “the process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then to join terrorist groups”.[6] A central tenet to this theory is that ideologues are attempting to “indoctrinate vulnerable members of society”,[7] who are “at risk” of being recruited into violent extremism.[8] This process is perceived as being based on these ‘radicalisers’ indoctrinating individuals into, or exploiting their belief in, an ideology which is grounded on a mistaken interpretation of religion,[9] as well as exploiting personal issues; real or perceived grievances; and an absence of resilience to, or even support of, violent extremism in ‘vulnerable’ communities.[10] In sum, these individuals will come to believe in ‘radical’ ideas and support violent extremism,[11] meaning that it influences both how they think and act.[12]

However, there are at least two reasons for arguing that the ‘radicalisation’ theory is a flawed one. Firstly, there has not been, in Richards’ words, any “consistent notion of what is meant by ‘radicalization’…”[13] The concept described above is only vaguely explained in the Prevent strategy, and it is apparent that even senior police offers involved in Prevent do not know what it means.[14] This lack of conceptual clarity has resulted in a confused approach by those involved in the strategy.[15] Thus, ‘radicalisation’ is seemingly a buzz word, which no-one knows the meaning of. This seriously harms this strategy.

More importantly, however, the concept is not based on any empirical evidence, but merely on ‘conventional wisdom’.[16] We are, as Githens-Mazer and Lambert argue, unable to predict who will become a terrorist and who will not.[17] In arguing this, the two scholars are drawing on the example of the Adam brothers, Rahman and Lamine, one of whom attempted to carry out a terrorist attack. Lamine, the elder brother, was the most ‘radicalised’, thoroughly influenced by Islamic thinking, and, thus, seemingly should have been the one employing violent means. However, it was Rahman, the less influenced but more passionate and risk-seeking, who attempted to carry out a terrorist act.[18] It is, furthermore, mistaken to argue that ‘radicalisation’, whatever its meaning, necessarily leads to violence. Horgan, for example, has in his research found few disengaged terrorists who were also ‘deradicalised’, meaning that there is no clear link between ‘radicalisation’ and acts of terrorism.[19] Thus, it is impossible, based on ‘radicalisation’ theory, to explain why some use the means of terrorism and others do not. Thus, this sole focus on ‘radicalisation’ increases the potential for overlooking important causes of violent extremism. As we shall see in the next section, in addition to this focus on the wrong causes of terrorism, there is an obvious focus on the wrong groups of people.

The Wrong People

In at least two ways, the British government is also focusing its counter-terrorism strategy on the wrong group of people, namely its targeting of all Muslims and only Muslims. In terms of the first, the government has argued that the aim of the strategy is to create “a situation where Muslim communities reject and actively condemn violent extremism and seek to undermine and isolate violent extremists”.[20] This clearly demonstrates that all Muslims are expected to play a part in preventing extremism, a demand that is not directed towards other segments of the British population. Furthermore, a core aim of the strategy is for “demonstrable changes in attitudes among Muslims…” to take place.[21] This must be seen in relation to the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism’s (OSCT) argument that even all those who are negative towards the British state are “complicit with” acts of terrorism.[22] Lastly, as we shall see in the next section, funding is distributed to local authorities in perfect correlation with the number of Muslims in their area.[23] These arguments demonstrate that they take for granted not only that most violent extremists are Muslims,[24] but also that attitudinal changes must take place among all Muslims, and that all those who happen to be somewhat negative towards the state, which arguably many others also are, are responsible for acts of terrorism. This is evidence of the government seeing all British Muslims as responsible for whatever is done by a tiny minority of Muslims.

In addition to seeing all Muslims as responsible for terrorism, Prevent labels all Muslims as potentially “at-risk” of becoming violent extremists, as the Institute for Policy Research and Development has pointed out.[25] This demonstrates that there is a confusion of Islam and extreme Islamism at the very base of the government’s counter-terrorism strategy, and also that there is the belief that all Muslims are potentially dangerous. These factors all contribute to at least two major flaws at the core of the government’s strategy for preventing violent extremism. Firstly, by fearing that all Muslims may be dangerous, they lose the necessary focus on preventing terrorism from those who actually may use violent means. Secondly, by arguing that all Muslims might be ‘at risk’ of using violent means, the government is again creating a ‘suspect community’, which, as we shall see in the final section of this essay, is likely to alienate Muslims, possibly fuelling both Islamist and anti-Muslim extremism, and create a belief among the population as a whole that British Muslims are dangerous.

Another problem with the Prevent strategy is that it attempts to prevent violent extremism only from Muslim members of society,[26] ignoring other extremist groups by leaving them to less funded and less focused programmes.[27] This sole focus on ‘Al-Qaeda inspired terrorism’ is based on the argument that this form of terrorism is the greatest threat to the UK, including in terms of terrorism plots.[28] However, this is a highly questionable contention, given official statistics by the European Union’s (EU) law enforcement agency, Europol, demonstrating that between 2006 and 2011 only nine of a total of 2313 “failed, foiled and successfully executed [terrorist] attacks” in the EU were classified as Islamist, meaning that these were responsible for only 0.39 percent of the total number.[29] This shows that the sole focus on Muslims in the Prevent strategy is empirically flawed.

This can be seen in connection with the Communities and Local Government Committee’s argument that there is “persuasive evidence” of a far-right threat,[30] and an insufficient focus on far-right extremism in the Prevent strategy.[31] There are a number of reasons for paying closer attention to the far-right. There are, for example, a number of far-right extremists currently serving prison sentences for terrorism-related offences, including Terence Gavan, who was found with firearms and more than 50 explosives in May 2009.[32] Furthermore, with the rise of the English Defence League (EDL), which frequently attracts more than 1000 to its demonstrations,[33] a new ‘gateway’ for right-wing terrorism has been established.[34] It is, thus, problematic that the best-funded counter-terrorism strategy of its sort is aimed only at one group of extremists. There are no doubts that there are potential terrorists among non-Muslim members of British society, and ignoring this threat is counter-productive. It is also worth questioning how important the Islamist threat is, given the very small number of planned terrorist attacks that were classified as belonging to this category. Lastly, if the Prevent strategy is to be successful, it must, for example, see Islamist and anti-Muslim extremism in relation to each other.[35] However, it is not only the concept of ‘radicalisation’ and the sole focus on Muslims (and all Muslims) that is mistaken. As we shall see in the next section, also the ways in which the government is attempting to prevent terrorism are unlikely to yield much success.

The Wrong Methods

The methods employed to prevent violent extremism are highly flawed. One of these flawed methods is that funding from the Prevent project is awarded to all local authorities with with more than 2000 Muslims in their area.[36] There is, furthermore, a strong correlation between the number of Muslims in an area and the amount awarded, “irrespective of other factors”.[37] This is an inappropriate use of funding for a number of reasons, including the fact that the actual risk of terrorism has not been taken into account when funding is allocated. It also shows that the risks of other sources of extremism are ignored. Furthermore, this is likely to contribute to the creation of the ‘suspect community’, as it gives the impression that all Muslims are potential extremists.

Furthermore, there is also widespread perception that resources from Prevent are being used to ‘spy’ on Muslims.[38] For example, youth workers and teachers are expected to give information to the police on the general political opinions of youths and the workings of Muslim communities as a whole.[39] The government also seemingly expect local authorities to gather information on entire ethnic groups.[40l] This suspicion that one of the intentions of the Prevent strategy is to gather intelligence, including mostly on innocent people, is strengthened based on the similar requirements established in official government documents.[41] There are a number of problems with this form of intelligence-gathering. Firstly, to seemingly gather intelligence on such a wide range of individuals is to misuse public resources, which instead could have been spent on more constructive counter-terrorism and counter-extremism policies. Secondly, this seeming requirement of people trusted by youths to gather information on them is likely to alienate young Muslims, the very people Prevent is attempting to get on its side. Finally, as we shall see in the next section, this contributes to the creation of a ‘suspect community’, which not only alienates Muslims, but also is likely to fuel anti-Muslim extremism, thus adding to another major problem.

As we recall, one of the aims of Prevent is to change attitudes among Muslims.[42] Building on this, it wants to challenge views that, although lawful, are counter to “our shared values”,[43] whatever they may be. The realities of this requirement are questionable, however nice the idea of ‘shared values’ sounds. There have been attempts from the governments to brand those who reject ‘our shared values’ as ‘extremists’,[44] attempting to change the values of Muslims so as to make them more ‘British’.[45] Furthermore, there is a tendency to define as ‘extremists’ those who oppose government policies, who, then, risk losing their funding.[46] This strategy is a seemingly challenge to what can be branded ‘thought-crimes’, believing that in order to prevent violent extremism, everyone must share ‘our’ beliefs and values, and support government policies. This attempt to change individuals’ values is likely to lead to nothing but alienating those they are attempting to get ‘on their side’. Thus, also this method is likely to be counter-productive. To add to all the mistakes discussed so far, the following section will discuss the consequences of making British Muslims a ‘suspect community’.

The Wrong Consequences

Over the past decade, British Muslims have become a ‘suspect community’, in which the assumptions underlying Prevent arguably has had an influence. Although this concept was first used to explain the situation of the Irish in the UK,[47] it is highly valuable in explaining the situation of British Muslims today. This means that a certain ‘category of people’, in this context Muslims, are being looked upon with suspicion, not because of their behaviour, but because of their assumed membership in this ‘category’, and are treated differently from the rest of the population based on this.[48]

This concept has been criticised on a number of grounds by Greer,[49] whose criticisms all are based on misunderstandings of the concept. One of these arguments is that there is not a ‘Muslim community in Britain’.[50] In this, he is entirely correct, pointing out an issue that too many overlook. However, his argument is a mistaken one, given that British Muslims are treated as if they were one community, as Prevent targets all Muslims irrespective of their behaviour. Another of Greer’s criticisms is that most Muslims are not officially suspected of anything by the police, thus meaning that the concept of a ‘suspected community’ does not apply to them.[51] However, as we have seen, all those who are negative towards the British state are seen as ‘complicit with’ terrorism. Furthermore, the way in which Prevent is used to ‘spy’ on Muslims irrespective of their behaviour demonstrates that Muslims in general are under suspicion for potential future terrorism.

This creation of British Muslims as a ‘suspect community’ is harming counter-terrorism efforts and British society in general. It is likely to alienate British Muslims, harming counter-terrorism efforts in at least three ways. Firstly, this is likely to make information-gathering on potential threats more difficult, as information from those closest to the potential threats is needed. By creating such a distrust through ‘spying’ on Muslims in general and imagining the Muslims as an ‘Other’, a community to which all extremists belong and in which all members are potential future extremists, those among the Muslim population that would be able to assist the police with information are likely to stay away from doing this, as also they may be viewed as potential extremists. Secondly, it is likely to diminish support for the British state in general, meaning that many British Muslims are unlikely to support the measures the government is taking in the future, including those to prevent potential extremism. Finally, this alienation of members of the British Muslim population opens up a new base of recruitment for extreme Islamist organisations, who can exploit the grievances of Muslim youths and young adults.[52] This may prolong problems in the same way as the Troubles were prolonged by the creation of the Irish as a ‘suspect community’.[53] For these reasons, Prevent is counter-productive.

Furthermore, the creation of this ‘suspect community’ is also likely to fuel anti-Muslim extremism. By basing an entire strategy on the seeming assumption that ‘all Muslims are (potential) extremists and all extremists are Muslims’, or even that ‘not all Muslims are extremists[54] but all extremists are Muslims’, the government is justifying the cause of anti-Muslim extremists. It has been argued that the next wave of terrorism in Europe will come from anti-Muslim groups,[55] and Prevent might in fact contribute to this wave in the UK. Furthermore, by creating fear of the entire Muslim population, we are also likely to see more anti-Muslim sentiment in general, which partly has manifested itself in the rise of the EDL in the past few years.[56] This, too, is likely to lead to increased alienation of the UK’s Muslim population, which can be exploited by Islamist extremists. For these reasons, Prevent is likely to be counter-productive, potentially leading to more extremism in the future.

Conclusion

Not only is Prevent unlikely to achieve its aims, but it is also counter-productive, for many reasons. Firstly, the theory of ‘radicalisation’, on which it relies, is neither understood by those involved in Prevent nor established empirically. It has neither been established that ‘radicalisation’, whatever its meaning, necessarily leads to violence. Furthermore, this focus on ‘radicalisation’ as a cause of extremism leads to the counter-terrorism community overlooking the actual causes of extremism. Secondly, its focus on all and only Muslims as potential extremists is counter-productive. It leads to a lack of focus on those very few individuals who may decide to use violence to reach their aims; it creates a ‘suspect community’ and alienates British Muslims; and it results in the counter-terrorism community overlooking the many potential non-Muslim extremists, which in Europe as a whole were responsible for more than 249 out of every 250 planned acts of terrorism. Thirdly, Prevent’s methods are both wasteful and counter-productive. The decision to fund local authorities based on the number of Muslims in their area does not only result in resources not being used where they could make the most use, but it also, again, creates a ‘suspect community’, by giving the impression that all Muslims are potential threats. The use of Prevent funding to ‘spy’ on many British Muslims, for its part, is likely to be counter-productive, as it alienates the individuals whose support is needed. It is also likely to contribute to the impression that one must keep an eye on all Muslims, as they are potential extremists, thus contributing to the ‘suspect community’. Also the attempt to change the values of Muslims is likely to alienate these individuals, as well as contributing to the ‘suspect community’ through implying that there is something dangerous about the values of Muslims. Finally, the ‘suspect community’ that is being created is likely to harm counter-terrorism efforts. Not only does it alienate British Muslims, resulting in a lack of support for the strategy, as well as the potential for ‘pushing’ Muslims into extreme Islamist milieus, but it also leads to more anti-Muslim sentiments and potential anti-Muslim extremism. For these reasons, the Prevent strategy is attempting to prevent terrorism from the wrong people, for the wrong reasons, in the wrong ways, with the wrong consequences, and is likely to harm counter-terrorism efforts for years to come.

Footnotes

[1] Department for Communities and Local Government, ‘Preventing violent extremism – Winning hearts and minds’ (London, Department for Communities and Local Government, 2007), p. 4. This document will henceforth be referred to as ‘Preventing violent extremism – Winning hearts and minds’.

[2] Department for Communities and Local Government, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund: Guidance Note for Government Offices and Local Authorities in England (London, Department for Communities and Local Government, 2007); ‘Preventing violent extremism – Winning hearts and minds’; and HM Government, ‘Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism (London, HM Government, 2009). The former document will henceforth be referred to as ‘PVE Pathfinder Fund’, while the latter will be referred to as ‘Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare’.

[3] ‘Preventing violent extremism – Winning hearts and minds’; and ‘PVE Pathfinder Fund’.

[4] ‘PVE Pathfinder Fund’, p. 7.

[5] ‘Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare’, p. 83.

[6] ‘Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare’, p. 82.

[7] PVE Pathfinder Fund’, p. 7; cf. ‘Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare’, p. 89; and Briggs, R. ‘Community engagement for counterterrorism: lessons from the United Kingdom’. International Affairs, 86:4 (2010), pp. 971-981, here p. 973.

[8] ‘PVE Pathfinder Fund’, p. 7; and ‘Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare’, pp. 80, 83, 89.

[9] ‘Preventing violent extremism – Winning hearts and minds’, p. 10; ‘Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare’, p. 83; and Blears, H., cited in Home Affairs Committee, ‘Terrorism and Community Relations: Sixth Report of Session 2004-05: Volume I: Report, together with formal minutes and appendix’ (London, House of Commons, 2005), p. 46.

[10] ‘Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare’, pp. 83, 89.

[11] ‘Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare’, p. 82.

[12] Richards, A. ‘The problem with ‘radicalization’: the remit of ‘Prevent’ and the need to refocus on terrorism in the UK’. International Affairs, 87:1 (2011), pp. 143-152, here p. 146.

[13] Richards, ‘The problem with ‘radicalization’’, here p. 143.

[14] Richards, ‘The problem with ‘radicalization’’, here p. 152.

[15] Richards, ‘The problem with ‘radicalization’’, here p. 143.

[16] Githens-Mazer, J. and Lambert, R. ‘Why conventional wisdom on radicalization fails: the persistence of a failed discourse’. International Affairs, 86:4 (1010), pp. 889-901; and Richards, ‘The problem with ‘radicalization’’.

[17] Githens-Mazer and Lambert, ‘Why conventional wisdom on radicalization fails’, here p. 893.

[18] Githens-Mazer and Lambert, ‘Why conventional wisdom on radicalization fails’, here pp. 892-897.

[19] Horgan, J. ‘Individual disengagement: A psychological analysis’, in Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement, edited by Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan (Abingdon, Routledge, 2009), pp. 17-29, here pp. 27-28.

[20] ‘PVE Pathfinder Fund’, p. 3. Emphasis added.

[21] ‘PVE Pathfinder Fund’, p. 7. Emphasis added.

[22] Farr, C., cited in Home Affairs Committee, ‘Project CONTEST: The Government’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Ninth Report of Session 2008-09: Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence’. (London, House of Commons, 2009), p. Ev 29.

[23] ‘PVE Pathfinder Fund’, p. 6; and Kundani, A. ‘Spooked! How not to prevent violent extremism’ (London, Institute of Race Relations, 2009), pp. 12-14.

[24] Cf. Blears, H., cited in Home Affairs Committee, ‘Terrorism and Community Relations’, p. 46.

[25] Institute for Policy Research and Development, cited in Communities and Local Government Committee, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism: Sixth Report of Session 2009-10: Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence’ (London, House of Commons, 2010), p. 9.

[26] ‘Preventing violent extremism – Winning hearts and minds’; and ‘Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare’; cf. Kundani, ‘Spooked!’, pp. 23-27, 33.

[27] See for example the ‘Connecting communities’ programme for a strategy towards far-right extremism. Department for Communities and Local Government, ‘John Denham – Connecting communities’. Department for Communities and Local Government (online), 14 October 2009. Available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.communities.gov.uk/news/localgovernment/1357218 (Accessed 7 May 2012).

[28] Denham, J., cited in Communities and Local Government Committee, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’, p. 20; cf. Blears, H., cited in Home Affairs Committee, ‘Terrorism and Community Relations’, p. 46.

[29] Europol, ‘TE-SAT 2007: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report’ (The Hague, European Police Office, 2007), p. 13; Europol, ‘TE-SAT 2008: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report’ (The Hague, European Police Office, 2008), p. 10; Europol, ‘TE-SAT 2009: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report’ (The Hague, European Police Office, 2009), p. 12; Europol, ‘TE-SAT 2010: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report’ (The Hague, European Police Office, 2010), p. 12; Europol, ‘TE-SAT 2011: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report’ (The Hague, European Police Office, 2011), p. 26; and Europol, ‘TE-SAT 2012: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report’ (The Hague, European Police Office, 2012), p. 36.

[30] Home Affairs Committee, ‘Roots of violent radicalisation: Nineteenth Report of Session 2010-12: Volume I: Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence’ (London, House of Commons, 2012), p. 20; cf. the warnings from the British anti-terrorism community of a growing threat from the far-right, see Goodwin, M. ‘Norway attacks: We can no longer ignore the far-right threat’. Guardian (online), 24 July 2011. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/24/norway-bombing-attack-far-right (Accessed 4 May 2012).

[31] Communities and Local Government Committee, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’, p. 20.

[32] HM Government ‘Prevent Strategy’ (London, HM Government, 2011), pp. 15, 15n2; and Gable, G. and Jackson, P. Lone wolves: myth or reality? (Ilford, Searchlight, 2011), pp. 32-33.

[33] Copsey, N. ’The English Defence League: challenging our country and our values of social inclusion, fairness and equality (Faith Matters, 2010), pp. 27-29.

[34] Jackson, P. ‘Solo actor terrorism and the mythology of the lone wolf’, in Gable, G. and Jackson, P. Lone wolves: myth or reality? (Ilford, Searchlight, 2011), pp. 79-88, here p. 86; and the Community Security Trust, cited in Lowles, N. ‘It’s time to act against the EDL’. Searchlight (London), August 2011, pp. 14-15.

[35] Cf. Walker, P. ‘Protests damage community relations in Luton’. Guardian (online), 11 January 2010. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/11/luton-protests-fallout-community-relations (Accessed 7 May 2012); and Taylor, M. and Davis, R. ‘EDL stages protest in Luton’. Guardian (online), 5 February 2011. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/feb/05/edl-stage-protest-luton (Accessed 7 May 2012).

[36] Kundani, ‘Spooked!’, p. 12; cf. ‘PVE Pathfinder Fund’, p. 6.

[37] Kundani, ‘Spooked!’, pp. 12-14.

[38] Communities and Local Government Committee, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’, pp. 3, 11-14; Kundani, ‘Spooked!’, pp. 28-34; and Dodd, V . ‘Government anti-terrorism strategy ‘spies’ on innocent’. Guardian (online), 16 October 2009. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/oct/16/anti-terrorism-strategy-spies-innocents (Accessed 8 May 2009).

[39] Kundani, ‘Spooked!’, pp. 28, 30; cf. Department for Children, Schools and Families, ‘Learning together to be safe: A toolkit to help schools contribute to the prevention of violent extremism’ (Nottingham, Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2008), p. 8.

[40] Department for Communities and Local Government, ‘N.I. 35 – Building Communities Resilient to Violent Extremism Assessment Framework’ (London, Department for Communities and Local Government, 2008). Available at http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/747537.pdf (Accessed 8 May 2012); and Kundani, ‘Spooked!’, p. 29. The former document will henceforth be referred to as ‘N.I. 35’.

[41] ‘N.I. 35’; Department for Children, Schools and Families, ‘Learning together to be safe’, pp. 4, 8; and Association of Chief Police Officers, ‘Police PREVENT Strategy – Partners Briefing’ (London, Association of Chief Police Officers, 2008), pp. 8-9, 11. Available via WikiLeaks at http://wlstorage.net/file/uk-police-prevent-strategy-2008.pdf (Accessed 8 May 2012).

[42] ‘PVE Pathfinder Fund’, p. 7.

[43] ‘Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare’, p. 87.

[44] ‘Pursue Prevent, Protect, Prepare’, p. 87.

[45] Blears, H. ‘Many Voices: understanding the debate about preventing violent extremism’, lecture at the London School of Economics, 25 February 2009. Available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/
http://www.communities.gov.uk/speeches/corporate/manyvoices
(Accessed 8 May 2012); and Kundani, ‘Spooked!’, p. 39.

[46] Kundani, ‘Spooked!’, pp. 35; 40.

[47] Hillyard, P. Suspect Community: People’s Experience of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain (London, Pluto Press, 1993).

[48] Hillyard, Suspect Community, pp. 257-261; cf. Pantazis, C. and Pemberton, S. ‘From the ‘Old’ to the ‘New’ Suspect Community: Examining the Impacts of Recent UK Counter-Terrorist Legislation’. British Journal of Criminology, 49:5 (2009), pp. 646-666, here pp. 646-651.

[49] Greer, S. Review of Suspect Community: People’s Experience of The Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain, by Paddy Hillyard. British Journal of Criminology, 34:4 (1994), pp. 510-511; Greer, S. ‘Human Rights and the Struggle against Terrorism in the UK’. European human rights law review, 2 (2008), pp. 163-172; and Greer, S. ‘Anti-Terrorist Laws and the United Kingdom’s ‘Suspect Muslim Community’: A Reply to Pantazis and Pemberton’. British Journal of Criminology, 50 (2010), pp. 1171-1190.

[50] Greer, ‘Human Rights’, here p. 169; and Greer, ‘Anti-Terrorist Laws’, here pp. 1178-1179; cf. Greer, Review of Suspect Community, here p. 510.

[51] Greer, ‘Human Rights’, here pp. 169-170; cf. Greer, Review of Suspect Community, here p. 511.

[52] Communities and Local Government Committee, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’, pp. 8, 13.

[53] Pantazis and Pemberton, ‘From the ‘Old’ to the ‘New’ Suspect Community’, here p. 661.

[54] ‘Preventing violent extremism – Winning hearts and minds’, pp. 9, 10; and ‘PVE Pathfinder Fund’, p. 1.

[55] Goodwin, ‘Norway attacks’.

[56] Copsey, ‘The English Defence

Written by: Erik Eriksen
Written at: Aberystwyth University
Written for: Dr Charlotte Heath-Kelly
Date written: 05/2012

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