What is deemed ‘reasonable’ is not abstract and objective, but malleable. Due to this conflicting definition of what was ‘reasonable’, it became impossible for the warring sides to be reconciled. Both sides in the political struggle ultimately, and successfully, portrayed and interpreted the conflict as one of self-defence. Thus, by extension, all action taken was viewed to be necessary, and therefore reasonable.

In the contemporary world, the role of elites is crucially important in every political system and every phase of state development, and forms the deciding factor in settling ethnic conflicts and post-conflict reconstruction. This paper will be based on two recent conflicts, Northern Ireland and Bosnia and Herzegovina, culminating in the Good Friday Agreement and Dayton Accords, respectively.

The Iraq War has not gone according to plan. The Bush administration’s intention to swoop down from the sky, finish off a regime, pull back and reload the shotgun ready for the next target stalled as Iraq took far longer and was far more complex than was anticipated. However, democracy has been established in Iraq. Depending on how successfully the democratic institutions grow, it might well become a ‘bright beacon’ in the region which may potentially help to create regional peace and stability.

Nuclear Proliferation is both an enduring critical matter in international security and a source of heated debate amongst the various ideological schools of thought in international relations. Although specific disputes can be assessed based upon which one is side is more effective with their argument, the general debate is much more ambiguous.

Ethno-nationalism has become a potent force in international and domestic politics. Gradually, norms have developed favouring a right of self determination for national groups seeking self-government. The application of these norms, however, has not been entirely consistent This paper will argue that norms do not restrict the freedom of action of states with the power to act unilaterally, or impose their views on less powerful states.

Few can deny that in many ways the contemporary political landscape only sparsely resembles that of past decades. Do the ways in which modern government leaders frame conflicts actually differ from historical examples? Specifically, does George W. Bush’s rhetorical framing of the “War on Terror” conform to standard discourse regarding the practice of dehumanizing one’s enemies in times of war?

The concept of security is changing. The critical approaches that have emerged to challenge traditional ones in recent decades have earned significant support. A definitive characteristic that binds these critical security schools is their rejection of realism. In security language, critical approaches agree that the state does not deserve the privilege of being the solitary referent object of security studies.

Roosevelt had a wide reaching and aggressive plan for planning post-war Europe. The formation of a strong Anglo-American alliance was critical for both parties during and after the war. For the United States, Britain was necessary in promoting democratic ideals and policing the states of Europe, something it was in a better geographical position to do. The signing of the Atlantic Charter in the early 1940’s cemented the partnership that has continued up to present times.

The Truman doctrine was a manifestation of foreign policy resulting from the insecurities and fears of Soviet power filling the vacuum in Europe. Together with the Marshall Plan, it solidified the Western nations of Europe into accepting the reality of a divided Europe, indeed a divided world in which two distinct economic, ideological and political systems were in conflict.

Fundamental problems, both structural and political, continue to characterise the EU-NATO relationship as one of ‘contending coalitions’. Yet, recent shifts in the attitudes of major actors coupled with success in simultaneous operations suggest there is potential for a ‘strategic partnership’ to emerge.