What is the impact of the United States (US) on the European Union’s (EU) positions towards Turkey? This is a highly pertinent question, frequently asked by policy-makers, academics and pundits alike, yet whose answer remains elusive. In view of the importance of Turkey for both the US and the EU and more precisely the relevance of EU-Turkey relations for all actors involved, confirmed by President Obama’s choice to fly to Turkey so early in his office, it is imperative to discern the factors influencing this relationship. EU-Turkey relations are determined above all by internal developments within Turkey and the EU, namely Turkey’s own domestic and foreign policy evolution and the EU’s internal divisions and positions regarding the Turkey question. At the same time however, there have also been external factors shaping the relationship: first and foremost the US policies towards Turkey and the EU, as well as US foreign policies in the Middle Eastern and Eurasian regions. These have had indirect but nonetheless important influences on EU-Turkey relations.

This article analyses the differentiated impact of US policy on EU-Turkey relations across a set of different time periods. Washington has exercised, and continues to exercise different forms of pressure and influence on its EU allies, contributing to shaping the idea of what Turkey is and where it should belong in the minds of Europeans.

The analysis is divided into three time-periods in particular, bringing to the fore different forms of US influence. Prior to Turkey’s entry into the accession process in 1999, US influence was primarily direct as well as effective, contributing first to the signature of the Customs Union agreement (1995), and secondly to the EU’s granting of Turkey’s candidacy (1999). However, the very success of US efforts to promote Turkey’s entry into the accession process led to a transformation of the US’s influence in the post 1999 period. Indeed post-1999, Washington’s efforts to exert direct pressure on the EU to proceed with Turkey’s accession process started bearing fewer fruits. A further turn took place in 2003, in view of the war in Iraq, which led to one of the deepest crises in the history of US-Turkey as well as transatlantic relations. The indirect consequences of US policy in the Middle East since 2003 on EU-Turkey relations are complex and difficult to disentangle. One of the key consequences however, has been Turkey’s rising foreign policy activism in the region, which, while observed with interest in the EU, has not necessarily contributed to furthering Turkey’s EU accession process.

The Pre-1999 Context: an effective and direct US influence on EU-Turkey relations

Before Turkey gained EU candidacy at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, its relations with the EU were a matter of foreign policy for both Turkey and for Europe. In view of this, the direct influence exercised by the US on this relationship was rather effective. Despite the end of the Cold War and thus the end of the joint European-US prerogative to contain Soviet influence through key allies such as Turkey, the US remained steadfast in its support for Turkey’s European bid, justifying it, primarily if not exclusively, on geo-economic and geo-strategic grounds. However, up until the late 1990s, from the Western European perspective, Turkey was “an important outsider…with whom relations ought to be developed on an arm’s length basis barring full integration”, rather than a natural insider.^[1]

One of the reasons for the EU’s scepticism regarding Turkey’s membership rested precisely in the long and consolidated cooperation between Turkey and the US, particularly on security and military questions, which fanned the so-called “Trojan Horse Syndrome”: that is the perception and concern that US support for Turkey was motivated by the American desire to shape from within – i.e. through Turkey – the EU’s internal evolution according to US interests.

Despite these European concerns, US lobbying efforts bore fruits in the mid-1990s. Europe proceeded with its relationship with Turkey on the path traced by the US. After an intense lobbying activity by the White House backed by European Social Democrats, the European Parliament endorsed in 1996 the Custom Union Agreement between Turkey and the EU, signed in March 1995,^[2] which represented “an important qualitative step, in political and economic terms” in EU-Turkey relations.^[3]

The Clinton administration, through its envoy Richard Holbrooke’s shuttle diplomacy, also successfully prevented an armed conflict in the Aegean between Greece and Turkey over Imia/Kardak in 1996, which would have seriously imperilled EU-Turkey relations and the very conclusion of the customs union deal. Alongside this, the US government sought to help all parties reach a durable and mutually agreed solution in Cyprus. As put by Dana Bauer, Deputy Director of the State Department Office of Southern Europe in July 1998: “The administration is concentrating heavily on achieving a settlement in Cyprus, working with the parties directly involved and coordinating closely with our European allies and with the UN”^[4].

Thereafter the US was also pivotal in overcoming the crisis generated in the aftermath of the December 1997 Luxembourg European Council, which denied Turkey candidacy. To overturn this decision, the Clinton administration exploited all channels at its disposal, formal and informal ones, and President Clinton himself made several calls to European leaders to persuade them to revise their previous opinion, as indeed happened at the December 1999 Helsinki European Council^[5].

Hence, in the pre-1999 period the direct American influence on EU-Turkish relations was effective and strong. The US was successful both in egging the EU to press forward its relations with Turkey and in contributing to a more favourable climate in the Eastern Mediterranean which in turn eased an EU-Turkey rapprochement. Indeed in this period no European leaders openly objected to US support for Turkey’s European integration process, at least publicly, despite the perception of the US own interests in furthering Turkey’s EU course.

From the Helsinki European Council  (1999) to the second war in Iraq (2003): direct influence wanes

The decision taken at the Helsinki European Council in 1999 represents a fundamental turning-point in US-Turkey-EU relations, because from that date on, Turkey will concern Europeans primarily as a matter of domestic policy, as a country which has been recognised officially as a candidate to EU accession, thus opening the prospects of Turkey’s membership on a par with member states such as France and Germany. The criteria governing the evolution of EU-Turkey relations then started directly depending on  issues such as democracy, minorities, human rights and freedoms and economic performance. Yet the US seemed not to acknowledge this paradigm shift:  pressing on the geopolitical and geoeconomic arguments in favour of Turkey’s EU membership.

The terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001, in Spain on March 2004 and in London on July 2005, led to a hyper-securitization of the international system. In turn, Washington sought to reinforce its ties with Ankara on the traditional core of the relationship: security. Hence, Mark Parris, former US ambassador to Turkey, pointed out that even after the end of the Cold War Turkey proved its security importance for US policy: “From a security perspective, the military dimension of the relationship proved as important as during the Cold War. Turkish participation in peacekeeping actions in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia demonstrated to the Pentagon and White House planners Ankara’s capabilities and readiness to shoulder responsibility as a security producing nation”.^[6] Alongside this and in line with this thinking, the US persisted in its strong backing of EU-Turkey relations. In 2002 US Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz, one of the main supporters of the new paradigm of the ‘war on terror’, left no doubt that the US was a stakeholder in Turkey-EU relations and was so because of geopolitical considerations: “’history suggests that a European Union that welcomes Turkey will be even stronger, and safe’, he declared. ‘The alternative, exclusionary choice is surely unthinkable”^[7].

As Sabri Sayari argues however, as opposed to the pre-1999 period, Washington’s lobbying campaign in 2002 was unsuccessful, in so far as it failed to obtain a specific date for the opening of Turkey’s accession talks with the EU. It is at this time that European leaders began voicing their complaints about US insistence and meddling regarding Turkey’s accession process and the Trojan Horse syndrome, which had always been in the back-minds of Europeans, forcefully came to the fore.^[8]

The changing dynamics in the US-EU-Turkey relationship were confirmed in the months that followed. Especially in Europe, but also in Turkey, the new pro-Turkey offensive launched by the White House regarding Turkey’s integration process was rejected by Europeans as perceived as a means to induce Turkey’s participation in the new Iraq invasion that was being planned by the Bush administration; in fact its timing (early January, right before the invasion in March 2003), left no room for misunderstandings.

At a critical moment when Europe was trying to build its own new identity, presenting itself as a ‘ non military’ superpower prioritising diplomacy over other coercive means  – operation Iraqi Freedom was strongly opposed by the most important continental countries such as Germany and France as a dangerous neo-imperialistic enterprise -, – Turkey’s involvement in the Iraqi war became a matter of identity. In fact, on the 10th of February 2003, Belgium, France and Germany, then joined by Russia, vetoed a US-backed measure to authorise NATO to organise a military plan to protect Turkey in case it would be attacked by Iraq.^[9] Rather than signifying an act against Turkey as such, this decision expressed on outright opposition to the war as well as Turkey’s participation in it, which these member states, heavily afflicted by the Trojan horse syndrome, took then as almost for granted.

This is the first piece of evidence underlining the beginning of a negative indirect influence of the US on the EU regarding Turkey. When requesting to deploy troops on Turkish territory, Washington (as EU member states) had assumed that Turkey would agree to allow the US to attack Iraq from its territory. Yet in view of the highly contested US strategy to go to war with Iraq, the Bush administration’s plan to ensure European/NATO protection of Turkey depreciated in the eyes of Europeans the value of US attempts to bolster European, including Turkey’s, security. Europeans believed that if the purpose of Turkey’s accession was to help the US revisit the Middle East starting with Iraq, then they failed to see the benefits of it.

Thus, the persistent American pro-Turkey pressure on the EU started having one important negative backlash: EU actors began associating strong US insistence exclusively to US foreign policy interests in the Middle East and neighbouring regions rather than a genuine concern over the EU’s own future. Moreover, the US’s downplaying of Turkey’s domestic shortcomings and its emphasis on geopolitics and strategic significance also had another negative by-product: Washington’s rhetoric was willingly internalised by Turkey’s foreign and security policy establishment, which, backed by the US, increasingly assumed that strictly fulfilling the EU’s Copenhagen criteria was unnecessary in view of Turkey’s overarching strategic significance for the US and EU alike. This line of thought also arguably tended to strengthen nationalist and euro-sceptic groups in Turkey, who became increasingly convinced that the US-Turkey-Israel axis represented the natural and most desirable structure and reference point for Ankara’s foreign policy as well as its domestic evolution, representing a viable and far less costly (in terms of domestic transformation) alternative to the EU^[10].

Since the Second Iraqi War: an indirect negative influence

The military invasion of Iraq split European allies to the core: the Coalition of the Willing on the one hand included, among the others, Great Britain, Spain and Italy; on the other hand the No-War-Front with France and Germany in the lead. In view of this split the EU as such attempted to postpone the operation and seek means to avoid armed confrontation. In the words of then European Parliament president Pat Cox, on the 3^rd of February 2003 the Union was still calling for a “last-ditch effort to avert the war”^[11]. Hence, the opposing positions taken by the US, which was adamant to resolve the crisis through military means, and the EU, which, internally divided, bid for time.

The last corner of the triangle – Turkey – was confronted with an epochal decision. As is well-known, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) failed to pass a motion to authorize Washington to deploy its troops on Turkey’s territory in order to open a northern-front to attack Iraq. The result of this parliamentary vote was more due to fate than to strategy. The bill in fact obtained 264 votes in favour, 250 against and 19 abstentions; that is to say that given the two-thirds majority requirement for the approval of a motion, the bill was rejected just by three votes. But faced with MPs’ overwhelming feelings of opposition to the war also the government thought it was safer to adopt a different strategy. This meant a shift to a more prudent approach to the military operation and to the US strategy. From that moment on Turkish-American relations experienced the most important cool down at least since 1974 .

The Turkish government’s shift in its Iraq policy, due to popular pressure on MPs and street demonstrations, confirmed the shift in the indirect influence of the US on Turkey’s policy priorities, favouring first the need to foster domestic consensus and only then use Turkey’s domestic standing as a source of leverage to improve its external relations. A switch which is clearly addressed to the EU, and marks a step further away from the US concept that prioritises security and global interests to the detriment of internal demands. Moreover, the historically pro-American military and security establishment in Turkey was negatively affected by the cool down in US-Turkey relations, and many pro-EU Turks, hoped that this would both constrain their actions in Northern Iraq as well as bolster Turkey’s democratic transformation^[12].

In view of the US’s inability to directly influence Ankara, Washington’s started speaking to Europeans about Turkey in essentialist and ideational terms. This had an overall negative boomeranging effect on the EU. The starkest manifestation of this boomerang effect was a statement by then French President Chirac at a NATO summit on 29^th June 2004: “If President Bush really said that in the way that I read [referring to the need for EU to accept Turkey], then not only did he go too far, but he went into territory that isn’t his purpose and his goal to give any advice to the EU, and in this area it was a bit as if I were to tell Americans how they should handle their relationship with Mexico”^[13]. President Chirac’s words could not have been clearer. For Europeans it was no longer a question of dealing with foreign allies or pointing out global common interests. The issue was now at the core of Europe’s history, roots and tradition. If the EU were to adjudicate on its borders, neighbours and above all identity, the choice had to be the Union’s own, free from external intrusion or pressing advice.

Since then, US actors appeared to partially take the point. Certainly several statements were made suggesting that Washington had no intention to bully Turkey into the Union. In the aftermath of Chirac’s statement Rockwell Schnabel, US ambassador to the EU, on the 17^th November 2004 said that the US supports Turkey’s bid to the EU “strongly but discretely”, adding that “membership is an interior issue of the EU. They will make the decision. So we have to be silent. Our stance is well known. The support for Turkey given by our many presidents and administrations has never changed. It isn’t reflected much in public opinion; however, our support continues”^[14].

Furthermore, and bolstering the optimism surrounding Turkey’s reform process, at its height in 2002-2004, the Turkish No vote to the second front war on Iraq also led to some important reconsiderations on Turkey by Europeans. While accidental, the Turkish parliamentary vote was interpreted by some (particularly those opposing the US war in Iraq) as an instance of Turkish democracy and independence from heavy US pressure in practice. In other words, regardless the real sources and causes of the vote, it was read by many as a manifestation of Turkey’s progress in democratic reforms, helping to deconstruct the image of Turkey as an American Trojan horse.

The options opened by Turkey’s no vote could have facilitated a further Turkey-EU rapprochement. Yet this was not the case.

One explanation could be that both Turks and Europeans were aware that the US represents the only guarantee for all Turkish security and foreign policy problems, and that the EU does not embody a real alternative security guarantee. In support of this hypothesis is the memorandum signed by Ankara and Washington after the beginning of the war. In April 2003 the US Secretary of State Colin Powell, during an official visit to Turkey, recognised some Turkish security requests and Turkey in turn accepted the possibility of a fly zone and emergency landings for the US air force, as well as the transportation of non-war material and humanitarian aid through Turkey’s territory. During the same meeting, the two sides agreed on a $8,5 billion loan from Washington to Ankara^[15]. In other words, despite Turkey’s no vote, the perceived imperative to restore a security partnership with the US diluted in the eyes of Europeans the view of Turkey as wholly independent from Washington.

A second and related explanation regards the fact that Turkey and the US have continued to share a more similar reading to security than the EU. Talking about security and Northern Iraq in fact, it is impossible not to notice the distance separating the Turkish and European concepts of security, the former being far closer to the American one. Setting aside disagreements regarding Iraq’s constitutional future and the PKK, Ankara and Washington share a similar understanding of the foreign policy means to deploy in the area, exerting most of their efforts through military force and capacity.

Indeed, the second Iraqi war led to the increase in Turkish military operations against the PKK in Northern Iraq, much to displeasure of the EU. Turkey in fact received an official warning from the Commission on the 24 March 2003 that a military intervention in Iraq’s territory could damage its accession process. Then President of the Commission Romano Prodi, said that such an action would “contradict a whole series of undertakings by the Turkish government”; UK Prime Minister Tony Blair stated at the House of Commons that “it would be entirely unacceptable for there to be any incursion”; along the same line the German Defence Minister Peter Struck warned that Germany would withdraw its AWACS crews from NATO’s mission; and finally the Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel confirmed that “taking such an issue will be determining factor in refusing it entry to Europe”^[16].

A third explanation may be that, irrespective of Turkey’s position, the Iraq war and Turkey’s accession process brought the chaotic Middle East to the EU’s backyard.[17] This took place within a wider European context in which the debate on the EU’s borders rose back on the political agenda following the eastern enlargement. A heightened concern over borders, coupled with Turkey’s accession process and instability in the Middle East increased the perception of Turkey as a troubling neighbour rather than a safe cordon sanitaire for Europe.

Finally, US policy in the region entrenched in the minds of European public opinion, the “clash of civilizations” view of the world, a view which deepened in the aftermath of September 11^th and the following European terrorist attacks in London and Madrid and was deeply exacerbated by the Iraqi war. Bringing the Middle Eastern quagmire to Europe’s backyard, combined with the perception of a clash of civilisations, contributed to the ensuing rise in islamophobia, which has inevitably entailed that “Muslim” Turkey has fallen in the opposing “camp” of a wider global civilizational struggle. This raised further European negative instinctive reactions about the inclusion of the “Other” into the EU family^[18].

These negative reactions were also evident in the minds of European political elites, some of which eagerly linked the question of “Islam” to Turkey’s accession process.  German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared that Turkey would represent a liability to the EU because it is “culturally different”^[19]. In other words, the paradigm of the clash of civilisations propelled by the US “War on Terror” and the war in Iraq unintendedly dovetailed with and exacerbated EU scepticism regarding Turkey’s accession process.

Hence, while it is true that the Iraqi war dug an apparent and formal ditch between the US and Turkey, this did not suffice to fill the one between Brussels and Ankara. So for the above-mentioned reasons, the indirect US influence on EU-Turkey relations was far from positive.  Sailing away from Washington did not entail redirecting on a course to Brussels, but rather pushed Ankara in the open sea: The Greater Middle East (GME).

Turkey’s new foreign policy activism in the region: asset or liability?

The new Turkish foreign policy dynamism in its neighbourhood follows partly from the consequences of American attempted reordering of the Greater Middle East. Most evidently, the Iraq war moulded Turkey’s policy towards Iraq in view of the perceived Kurdish threat stemming from Northern Iraq and the possible repercussions on Turkey’s own Kurdish question. Turkey’s realpolitik response to the resumption of PKK terrorism from Northern Iraq in turn negatively affected its European integration process. Hence, not only has instability in Iraq interlocked in a vicious circle with European debates about borders and Turkey’s accession process, but also Turkey’s own foreign policy response to instability in Iraq added to the EU’s increasing doubts regarding Turkey’s membership prospects.

The Turkish establishment, viewing the prospects for Kurdish autonomy in Northern Iraq as a fundamental threat to Turkey’s own territorial integrity and national security, has responded by deploying an armed contingent of 1200-1500 soldiers in Iraqi territory. This added to the already critical state in Turkey-US relations in July of 2003 when US soldiers detained a number of Turkish special forces in Suleymaniya ^[20]. Although the crisis was rapidly resolved, it deepened the scar marring Turkey-US relations. To make matters worse, the small cross-border operations flowed into a large-scale ground operation in February 2008, when approximately 10,000 troops, backed by fighter jets, entered into the Iraqi territory officially to attack the PKK^[21].

This said, particularly over the last few years, Turkey’s policy towards the Northern Iraq question, has both softened in terms of its objectives and widened in terms of its policy instruments. Starting with Turkey’s objectives, regarding the contested issue of the city of Kirkuk, after a change in senior military staff, the Turkish government seems to have reluctantly accepted the idea that Kirkuk will be the capital of the Kurdish area (regardless of its status within Iraq). In addition, from 2004 the Turkish government proposed a more realistic policy towards the status of Northern Iraq: it is widely accepted that officials may even tolerate outright Kurdish independence, particularly if this represented the only alternative to a chaotic and radicalised Iraq, posing constant security challenges to Turkey^[22]. An alternative reading would see the moderation of Turkey’s position as the direct consequence of the failure of Turkey’s initial strategy which centred on the strengthening of the Iraqi Turkmen population, which however failed to reap fruits in view of the poor showing of the Iraqi Turkmen Front at the January 2005 Iraqi elections. Regarding the widened use of policy instruments, Turkey has been increasingly making use of “soft” trade and civil society contacts beyond its traditional reliance on military means. In November 2005 for example, the first Iraqi Airways flight landed in Istanbul after fourteen years. Two months later private charter flights from Kurdish cities were established. In December 2005 the Turkish National Security Council called for a settlement over Kirkuk acceptable for all the Iraqis. On the trade and economic aspect in the 2007, the 65% (350 million dollars) of tenders in Dohuk were awarded to Turkish companies; this besides the already 380 Turkish out of the 500 foreign companies working in Erbil, which together represent the 95% of a 2.8 billion dollars market in the whole of Northern Iraq^[23].

Beyond Iraq itself, the Iraq war and its consequences also set the context for a broader Turkish engagement in the Middle East, as epitomised by Turkey’s lead involvement in the conference of Iraq’s neighbours initially convened in 2003 to avert war in Iraq and then formalised through six monthly meetings to discuss a whole array of matters both directly related to Iraq (e.g., refugees and border security) as well as regarding wider regional issues (e.g., energy cooperation)^[24]. Turning instead to Turkey’s bilateral relations in the region, since 2002, Ankara has increasingly sought serious dialogue with the major actors in the area, such as Syria and Iran. The urgency and gravity of the situation in Iraq and the inability of Turkey to resolve the problem alone induced Ankara to collaborate with its immediate neighbours: Syria and Iran, as well as to engage in the Israeli-Arab peace process.

Starting with Syria, the Iraq war alongside the US’s increasingly aggressive and isolationist stance towards Syria accelerated the rapprochement between the two countries moving towards a veritable strategic partnership.[25] As Turkey, the Iraq war was strongly opposed by Syria, which shared with Turkey serious concerns over the possibility of a sovereign and autonomous Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq and the implications for the region and in particular for the Kurdish minority in Syria. In turn, in 2002, the Syrian and Turkish military staff signed an agreement to conduct joint military exercises; in July 2003, Turkey accepted to resume talks on the Euphrate’s water. In 2004 Bashar al-Asad paid the first ever visit of a Syrian President to Turkey, reaching economic agreements, reciprocated only few weeks later. Finally, on 17 October 2007, al-Asad supported Turkey’s position towards the PKK in Northern Iraq^[26]. The growing confidence between Ankara and Damascus opened the way to Turkey’s increased activism in the Arab-Israeli peace process whereby Syria invited Turkey to facilitate negotiations with Israel. The Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz reported the news on 4 February 2007 about seven rounds of secrets negotiations between September 2004 and July 2006, led on the Israeli side by former ambassador to Turkey Aron Liel and facilitated by Turkey, on occasions including also the participation of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan.

Turkey’s rapprochement to has included also a traditional Turkish foe: Iran. The first steps in the rapprochement were made at the beginning of the 21^st century in view of the resurgence of Azeri nationalism in Iran. Seen the strong ties linking Azerbaijan to Turkey, Teheran sought Ankara’s cooperation to ease its internal problems^[27]. This notwithstanding Turkey’s embeddedness in the Western approach towards Iran and Iranian foreign policy remained critical. Here again the 2003 Iraqi war was the occasion to mark a radical acceleration in Turkey’s timid steps towards Iran. As in the Syrian case, also Iran hosts a sizable Kurdish minority. The first preoccupation was that of protecting the Iranian and Turkish borders from large influxes of refugees. This led to joint efforts in border control including intelligence sharing and training. In July 2004 Turkey and Iran also signed a security cooperation agreement in which Iran recognised the PKK as a terrorist organization^[28]. Since the end of the war, the major shared concern between the two countries has been the future settlement of Iraq; Teheran, like Ankara, has objected to the creation of a strong and autonomous Kurdish entity in the north, that could destabilise Iran as well as represent an ally of its major foe: Israel. As in the Syrian case, shared concerns over Iraq ushered the way to deepened cooperation in other fields. In December 2006 Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan visited Iran, where he underlined the increasing amount of trade between the two countries from $2,1 bn to $7 bn and forecasted a further rise to $10 bn in the near future. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in turn confirmed his intention to strengthen ties with Turkey and to “jointly invest in other parts of the world together”^[29]. Beyond trade in February 2007, a Turkish delegation flew to Teheran to sign new energy deals: one to allow the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) to drill on Iranian soil and the second to facilitate the transportation of natural gas from Turkmenistan to Turkey^[30].

Turkey’s rapprochement to Syria and Iran conditioned also its relations with its traditional ally Israel. Unlike Syria and Iran, Turkey’s relationship with Israel has not been affected as much by the Iraqi war. This said, Turkey’s rapprochement with Iran and the Arab world heightened Turkey’s sensitivities towards Israeli conduct in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and in particular Turkey’s military incursions in the West Bank during the second Intifada as well as Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 2008-9. After Israel’s Operation Defensive Shield in the West Bank in April 2002, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit talked about a genocide^[31] and in May 2003 Turkey’s ambassador to Israel was recalled^[32]. After the Gaza attacks in March 2003, Prime Minister Erdogan defined Israel a “terrorist state” defining its actions as “a crime against humanity”^[33]. The January 2009 Davos World Economic Forum January 2009 was the occasion for another public demonstration of the troubles between the two countries. During the panel on Gaza Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan stormed out from the stage after Shimon Peres’ speech.^[34] In addition, Israel’s stance towards Northern Iraq and its unveiled support for Kurdish autonomy acted as a further wedge in Turkish-Israeli relations. This however has not entailed a break in Turkish-Israeli ties. The two countries continue to be bound by a wide a set of interests. To give one example, Turkey and Israel signed a $141 bn agreement on the eve of the December 2008 Gaza attack, to provide the Turkish air force with airborne space imagery intelligence systems for four years^[35]. However even if at governmental levels Turkish-Israeli ties seem not to have been deeply affected the increase in anti-Israeli (and on occasions also anti-Semitic) popular sentiment in Turkey is unquestioned and has been accentuated by American acquiescence to developments in the region^[36].

Summing up, the US-led war in Iraq set the context and accelerated Turkey’s increasing activism in the Middle East. Turkey’s resistance towards Kurdish autonomy has not been shared by many in the US (and Israel). Turkish-Iranian energy links upset the Bush administration’s plans to build pipeline networks to transport Caspian resources by avoiding Iranian (and Russian) territory^[37]. By contrast, Turkey’s rapprochement towards its neighbours and its increasingly reliance on soft power as a means to achieve its goals has rendered Turkey’s foreign and security policies far more congruent and likely to those of the EU.

However has this affected positively Turkey’s bid to join the EU? This is still an open question. In fact this assertiveness could have opposite outcomes, at least in two main fields: identity and foreign policy. Regarding identity, a positive influence is possible if the EU is able to share its principal values with Ankara, that is viewing Turkey as a country where individual rights and liberties are being strengthened, where bottom up solutions and transition processes are worth more than the top down imposition of rules, and where the military has a moderate power. If instead Turkey is viewed as a Muslim, Middle Eastern country and the EU as political entity with fixed borders ^[38], Turkey’s accession process will inevitably remain troubled. Regarding foreign policy, it depends on how much the EU wants to engage with the Middle East. If the Union commits to a strong engagement Turkey would enrich the Common Foreign and Security Policy thanks to its deep and deepening knowledge and engagement into the Middle East. On the contrary, if the EU does wish to or rather cannot agree internally on engaging in the region, Turkey’s actorness in the Middle East may be counterproductive, in so far as the Union would feel as being drawn, through Turkey, into the turbulent Middle East.

Conclusions

The aim of this article has been to understand how US foreign policy influenced, directly or indirectly, positively or negatively, EU-Turkey relations between the mid-1990s until today. This analysis has highlighted the importance of two main turning-points in this dynamic: the 1999 EU decision of the Helsinki summit to give to Turkey candidacy and the 2003 US war in Iraq.

Until 1999 the US influence was direct, positive and effective, aiming to obtain candidacy for Turkey. During this period, US action was characterised by the traditional American concept, shared by Turkish establishment but only partially by the EU, of the hard security rationale for Turkey’s membership. Clear examples of US efforts on this basis are the Clinton administration’s successful efforts to avoid a military crisis between Greece and Turkey over Imia/Kardak and the intense lobbying activity to overturn the negative European Council response in Luxembourg in 1997. After 1999, when Turkey became a domestic issue for the EU and not simply  a foreign policy question, US efforts and their hard security rationale no longer struck the right chords in the EU. In turn, US influence became indirect and US direct lobbying efforts regarding Turkey’s accession began to miss their targets. The preparations for the war in Iraq accentuated the shift in the US’s indirect influence from ineffective to negative, as evidenced by some European countries’ veto on NATO’s military umbrella for Turkey.

Since the TGNA No Vote on the US’s request for a northern front to attack Iraq, Ankara started changing its foreign policies, prioritising domestic reforms and opening up to the Middle East. While intuitively this could have aided Turkey’s EU integration process in practice this was not the case. This was due to three main reasons. First both Brussels and Ankara were well aware that the solution to Turkey’s foreign policy problems stemming from Iraq necessitated US support. Second Ankara and Washington continued sharing a more similar security concept than Brussels. Third, the Iraq war brought the chaotic Middle East to Europe’s backyard, worrying European citizens about the prospects of extending the EU’s borders to Turkey’s southeast.

A further consequence of the American re-shaping of the Middle East has been Turkey’s own increasing activism in the region. While taking a different form, this Turkish activism in the region is likely to rise under the Obama administration in the US, in view of the US President’s genuine preference for multilateralism and belief that “no intermediary is as well placed to guide these enemies [i.e. Middle Eastern foes] away from confrontation as Turkey”^[39]. For the EU, having an important country such as Turkey, positively and deeply involved into GME dynamics and with strong ties with the countries of the region could be an asset, although not necessarily an asset that would bolster Turkey’s accession prospects. All hinges on whether the Union makes good on its commitment to be an effective and increasingly present actor in the region.

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^[1] Z. Onis e S. Yilmaz, Turkey-EU-US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity?, p. 4. Available on  home.ku.edu.tr/~zonis/ONIS-YILMAZ-TURKEY-EU-US%20TRIANGLE-REV%20DEC%202004.pdf.

^[2] B. Kuniholm, Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: Differences in European and US Attitudes, and Challenges for Turkey, p. 3. Available on www.irex.org/programs/symp/01/kuniholm.pdf.

^[3] Decision No. 1/95 Of The EC-Turkey Association Council of 22 December 1995 on implementing the final phase of the Customs Union, p. 1. Available on http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/_files/Gumruk_Isbirligi/okk1.pdf

^[4]Available on http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kurdtur.htm

^[5] S. Sayari, The United States and Turkey’s Membership in the European Union, The Turkish Yearbook, Vol. XXXIV, 2003, p. 168.

^[6] M. Parris, Starting Over: U.S.-Turkish Relations in the Post-Iraq War Era, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003. Available on http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/878248/posts., p. 9.

^[7] S. Sayari, op. cit., p. 169.

^[8] Ibidem, p. 169.

^[9] Associated Press, 10th of February 2003, available on http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-search/we/Archives?p_product=APAB&p_theme=apab&p_action=search&p_maxdocs=200&p_text_search-0=nato%20turkey&p_field_label-0=Topics&s_dispstring=nato%20turkey%20AND%20date(2/1/2003%20to%203/1/2003)&p_field_date-0=YMD_date&p_params_date-0=date:B,E&p_text_date-0=2/1/2003%20to%203/1/2003)&xcal_numdocs=20&p_perpage=10&p_sort=_rank_:D&xcal_ranksort=4&xcal_useweights=yes

^[10] Z. Onis and S. Yilmaz, op. cit., p. 11.

^[11] Available on http://www.lymec.org/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=168.

^[12] Z. Onis and S. Yilmaz, op. cit., pp. 17-18 .

^[13] Available on http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0406/28/ldt.00.html.

^[14] Available on http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkey-eu-bid-third-way-looming/article-132381.

^[15] M. Fumagalli, La Turchia tra il Processo di Allargamento dell’Unione Europea e la Politica Estera Americana (2002-2003), in A. Colombo, L’Occidente Diviso: la Politica e le Armi, Egea, 2004, p. 219.

^[16] EurActiv, Incursion into Iraq could damage Turkey EU bid, 25 March, 2003. Available on http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/incursion-iraq-damage-turkey-eu-bid/article-115915.

[17] M. Comelli, E. Greco and N. Tocci, From boundary to borderland: transforming the meaning of borders through the European neighbourhood policy, European Foreign Affairs Review, 12, 2007, pp. 203-218.

^[18] According to a Wall Street Journal Survey, in September-October 2004 over 50% of Western Europeans viewed Europeans Muslims as a threat to their security.

^[19] S. Cagaptay, D. Yegenoglu and E. Alptekin, Turkey and Europe’s Problem with Radical Islam, Policy Watch 1043, 2 November, 2005, Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Available on http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2391.

^[20] H. J. Barkey, Turkey and Iraq. The Perils (and Prospects) of Proximity, Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, p. 10. Available on http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr141.pdf.

^[21] Hurriyet, Turkey launches first land operation in N. Iraq, 23 February, 2008. Available on http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-624755.

^[22] Iraq in transition: vortex or catalyst?, Middle East Programme Briefing Paper

04/02, Chatham House, September 2004. Available on http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/3198_bp0904.pdf.

^[23] E. Y. Habur, OYAK rides the gravy train in Northern Iraq, Today’s Zaman, 9 July, 2009. Available on http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=116081.

^[24] T. Oguzlu, Iraq, in M. Kibaroglu, op. cit., pp. 167-187.

[25] Under the Bush administration the US has exerted considerable pressure on Syria through the Syrian Accountability, policies towards Lebanon and the Iraq War. This in turn increased Syrian propensity to improve its bilateral toes with its neighbour and Western ally Turkey.

^[26] B. Suer, Syria, in M. Kibaroglu, Turkey’s Neighborhood, pp. 189-224.

^[27] R. Olson, The Kurdish Question and Turkish-Iranian Relations: From World War I to 1998,

pp. 77-87.

^[28] F. S. Larrabee, Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East, Foreign Affairs, June-July, 2003.

^[29] Hurriyet, Turkey, Iran vow to boost bilateral, regional co-operation, 4 December, 2006. Available on http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-594802.

^[30] Hurriyet, Turkey, Iran set to increase energy ties, 22 February, 2007. Available on http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-600252.

^[31] S. Alpay, The Complexities of Turkey’s Relationship with Israel, Zaman, January, 2009. Available on http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/yazarDetay.do?haberno=163204.

^[32] B. Park, Turkey’s Policy Towards Northern Iraq: Problems and Perspectives,

Adelphi Paper, N. 374, Routledge, 2004, pp. 43-44.

^[33] S. Alpay, op. cit.

^[34] Hurriyet, Turkish PM storms out of Davis’ Gaza session, slams moderator, 30 January, 2009. Available on http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=10887282&tarih=2009-01-30.

^[35] Y. Schleifer, Turkey: Israel’s Gaza Offensive Presents Ankara with Diplomatic Challenge, Eurasia Insight, January, 2009. Available on http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav010809b.shtml.

^[36] O. Bengio, Turkey and Israel in the Aftermath of the Gaza War: Relations at a Crossroad?, Tel Aviv Notes, February, 2009. Available on http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/tel-aviv-notes-turkey-and-israel-aftermath-gaza-war-relations-crossroad.

^[37] In fact just a few months after the Turkish Iranian energy agreements, US State Department spokesperson Tom Casey complained about the fact that US policy towards Iran’s nuclear question needed the cooperation of all American allies, including Turkey. See Hurriyet, US criticise Turkey for continuing energy cooperation with Iran, 22 September, 2007. Available on http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-614930.

^[38] H. Yilmaz, Turkey’s Place in the Changing Paradigms of Europe, The Cost of No EU-Turkey: Four Views, Open Society Foundation, May, 2009. Available on http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/cost-turkey/article-182508.

^[39] O. Taspinar, Time of Turkey to Reward Obama, Brookings, 16 March, 2009. Available on http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0316_obama_taspinar.aspx.