The most outstanding aspect of ‘America’s Allies and War’ is the systematic and even-handed manner in which it demolishes popular notions of alliance politics, such as the depiction of European NATO allies as free-riding pacifists, whilst making an important theoretical contribution to the burden-sharing literature and International Relations scholarship in general.
No peace is perfect. But a flawed peace is probably better than no peace at all. Contingency peace plans are not guarantees of success in such war-torn countries as Libya, but neither are they idle dreams. The international community needs such a unified plan to secure a better peace in Libya. If they fail to plan a post-war peace in Libya, the intervening powers are planning to fail.
Although all wars may represent a failure of diplomacy, war is often the last resort of diplomacy. This paradox results from two competing ideas of what the supreme objective of diplomacy should be: peace at any cost, or peace by any means. This is the paradox of Libya. The international military intervention resulted from a mixture of an arguably successful strategy of coercive diplomacy at the UN, and a failure of third-party mediations.
Although this book appeared before the November 2010 bombing of Yeonpyeong island by North Korean forces, its insights and are no less relevant to the question of reversing a dangerous trend of military provocations, brinkmanship and near-war collisions between the Koreas. As Dr. Clemens forcefully argues, a long-lasting, peaceful solution to the inter-Korean division is neither impossible, nor idealistic.
The kind of conventional military brinkmanship going on at the common NATO-Russia border is not good news. A phenomenon not seen since the frostiest Cold War periods. If the last East-West confrontation offers a cautionary tale, it is that the situation urgently needs to be de-escalated, before worst-case scenarios become self-fulfilling prophecies.
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was a costly and, ultimately, pointless war. However, exactly why the Red Army wound up in direct military conflict, embroiled in a bitter and complicated civil war—some 3,000 kilometres away from Moscow—is a point of historiographical uncertainty. Little known and appreciated for its significance, the Soviet-Afghan War was one of the turning points of the late Cold War.
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