A major contributor to conflict has been the West’s desire to spread democracy and Russia’s desire to prevent it.
Russia’s desire to limit Ukraine’s independence and to retake control of Crimea did not emerge during the Putin era. Rather they were there from the very beginning.
The conflict in Ukraine will remain difficult to solve because Russia’s goals are contradictory to Ukraine’s and the West’s norms.
Russia’s position requires that the West acquiesce to a Russian ‘sphere of influence’. In the EU, sensitivities about a ‘new Yalta’ will make that hard to accept.
Understanding the long-term continuity underlying Russian hybrid operations is important as it shows that 2014 was not an improvised response to a temporary challenge.
Scholars writing about the Russia-Ukraine conflict face a choice in perspectives that is likely to lead them to being criticised no matter what they do.
Russia’s actions in 2014 were not just a response specific events such as NATO enlargement, EU policy, democracy promotion or revolution in Ukraine.
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