The disjuncture between kinetic elements of American COIN doctrine and the nation-building mission inherent to ‘new’ conflicts lies at the root of ongoing difficulties.
The synergistic interaction between the ‘Anbar Awakening’ of 2006 and the surge of 2007 paved the way for U.S. withdrawal at the expense of a long term, stable, Iraq.
The strategies employed by the Bush administration after 9/11 to manufacture public consent for action have since been recontextualised towards Iran by Barack Obama.
The ‘Information Age’ has brought undeniable and unprecedented changes to the ways insurgencies and social movements organize themselves.
The Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq was a story of neo-conservative ideas (militarism, morality, and democracy) about the role of America in the world.
Four grave risks for regional stability lurk in the wake of a nuclear Iran: regional proliferation, an ‘imbalance of terror’, an emboldened Iran, and Israel’s response.
The success of Palestinian nationalism in the context of the peace process is complicated by the variations in Orientalism which occur between different forms of Zionism.
Globalisation not only exacerbated the structural conditions that elicited the Arab revolt, but allowed for local and global actors to shape the form of this resistance.
The failure of the US intelligence community to predict the Islamic Revolution in Iran offers lessons that remain relevant today in the aftermath of the ‘Arab Spring’.
The potentiality of statehood provided by partition filled the nation building fervor of Hindus, Muslims, Arabs, and Jews.
The different outcomes of the two wars was due to a combination of preparedness, initiative, superpower involvement, military capabilities, and intelligence failures.
‘Hard’ & ‘soft’ power are competing approaches to power in IR. Soft power is increasingly effective & hard power less so; ‘smart power’ offers a promising third strategy.