The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the culmination of a long series of events and the product of many complex, different, and yet interrelated factors.
Throughout its endeavour, NATO has faced many key challenges in its crisis management operation in Afghanistan.
In a ‘state of exception’, where it is vital to maintain national security, liberal governments do not suspend the rule of law but rather legally circumvent it.
Shaw’s risk-transfer theory and Der Derian’s conceptualization of virtuous war allow an in-depth understanding of the deployment of drones in the War on Terror.
The prevalence of torture represents a failure of the state-led, sovereignty-based international order. A move beyond torture requires a move beyond sovereignty.
In recent years, American audiences have grown sceptical on the securitisation of the US-Mexico border, and indeed, the broader discourse on immigration and security.
Failed states signal that the Westphalian model lacks empirical support and is a simple political construction that deserves greater theoretical scrutiny.
The disjuncture between kinetic elements of American COIN doctrine and the nation-building mission inherent to ‘new’ conflicts lies at the root of ongoing difficulties.
The strategies employed by the Bush administration after 9/11 to manufacture public consent for action have since been recontextualised towards Iran by Barack Obama.
The Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq was a story of neo-conservative ideas (militarism, morality, and democracy) about the role of America in the world.
While effective at ensuring the survival of organizations that use such methods, there is scant evidence to support the idea that terrorism achieves political objectives.