The intervention in East Timor illustrated how armed force can save lives, but intervention in Kosovo failed to provide a long-term solution and did more harm than good.
R2P, although a symbolic moral step for human rights, is not a sufficiently effective positive step, and is too militaristic in its approach.
Despite some significant issues, the Tallin Manual still provides a foundation to assess the legality of cyber warfare in international and non-international armed conflict.
The only humanitarian interventions that seem to be widely accepted are those authorised by the Security Council under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
The jus ad bellum principles show that the intervention in Libya was justified, and offers an example of how to respond to the idea of civilian protection.
In trying to improve the actions of both terrorist organisations and INGOs working in intra-state conflicts, policy makers need to change the incentives driving these actors.
The evidence shows that ICISS report does not signify a change in state practice or in international law, but it did achieve to reframe the discourse on intervention and sovereignty.
Politicising human rights reduces their potential to act as a standard against which regimes can be measured and affects power in the international sphere. The War on Terror is an example of this trend.
The nature of sovereignty has changed from one which vests states with the right to non-intervention, to one which grants them certain responsibilities towards its own population.
NATO’s political objective superseded humanitarian considerations. A liberal argument for the primacy of human rights cannot account for NATO’s conduct in Libya.
Whilst advancements have been made in the prevention of genocide, they fail to protect vulnerable populations due to a lack of political will.
Only in rare cases does military intervention lead to stable democracies. Successful democracy implementation is usually dependent on the internal factors and conditions of a state.