The death of Qaddafi is, naturally, a very public symbol that his reign of oppression is over and will not return, but this is not the end of the story for Libyans, the UN or NATO. The campaign to maintain peace between the various factions could prove to be more difficult than the defeat of Qaddafi’s forces.
Perhaps, looking back at the EU’s performance in the Libyan crisis in five years’ time, the best lesson to (re-) learn is that the EU is not good at hard security policy, but does a very decent job when the task is about dealing with the aftermath of conflict. Stable democracies cannot be built on the battlefield. They require a whole different set of capabilities than what NATO can offer.
Motivated both by analytical rigor and political expediency, ICISS sandwiched its discussion of international response to atrocities between what it described as a “responsibility to prevent” and a “responsibility to rebuild.” Once introduced, however, the logic of prevention as core to the global atrocity agenda was difficult to deny. Why wait to halt a massacre if early engagement might avert it entirely?
While the development of R2P as a concept has been the preserve of international relations theoreticians (albeit ones with large amounts of practical experience), its implementation rests on the practitioners of the day. And these practitioners deal in the world of realpolitik with all of its inconsistencies, relativities and competing national interests.
Some are calling the coalition intervention that began 19 March 2011, in Libya a success. I call tens of thousands of deaths and injuries a tragedy. When such casualties occur owing to a military intervention never shown to be necessary, the intervention is a failure.
Because of the deep concern on the part of many UN member states that RtoP could give rise to a regime change agenda and the equally deep global opposition to such an agenda, it is incumbent on us to explore the relationship more deeply in order to ascertain whether there are ways of maintaining a clear distinction between RtoP and regime change without sacrificing the protection of civilians.
The problem with R2P is precisely that which rendered “Never Again!” and the Genocide Convention impotent, namely that its enforcement is conditional on the support of the permanent five members of the Security Council. Only the very naive imagine that the P5 honour Article 24.1 of the Charter and act on behalf of UN member states; each state’s respective national interest determines their position.
The UN was neither designed nor expected to be a pacifist organisation. Its origins lie in the anti-Nazi wartime military alliance amongst Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. The all-powerful UN Security Council is the world’s duly, and only, sworn in sheriff for enforcing international law and order.
The draft constitution creates an enormous and unprecedented opportunity for Libyans to shape their future in ways that will mark a clean and decisive break with the past. Yet, truly democratic state-building after conflict is not without perils, and democracy is not a foregone conclusion at the end of any authoritarian regime.
One of the most depressing, and distressing, realities we have to acknowledge has been our inability to prevent or halt the recurring horror of mass atrocity crimes.
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