Beware the Utopians: John Rawls, E.H. Carr, Karl Popper, and the notion of a Realistic Utopia 

Beware the utopians, zealous men certain of the path to the ideal social order.
– Ian McEwan, Saturday[1]

Introduction

According to Ken Booth, we live in “a world that does not work for most of its inhabitants.”[2] Arguably, the number of causes behind domestic, international, and transnational harm is beyond measure. It might even be asserted that instead of the causes of international justice, it is rather the mode and means of engaging these causes that have determined and constrained contemporary debate within the field of international justice. Unfortunately, the matter is never as obvious and clear as we like it to be. Although it would be challenging to find anyone who disregards world poverty as a pressing issue, it would be an even greater challenge to come to a consensus on who carries the burden of responsibility. Additionally, even if one was to reach such a consensus, there is no global institution that would be capable of putting obligations on the actors who caused these issues.

Though not every case at hand is equally clear-cut, in most cases the majority of them can be reduced to a conflict between, to put it bluntly, idealism and realism. Whereas the former indicates the willingness and necessity of changing the world we live in, the latter reminds us of the constraints our actions have to account for when trying to do so. Even though it does not seems likely that this entrenched debate will vanish shortly, there are considerable endeavours that have tried to overcome or at least assert this juxtaposition.

One such effort can be found in John Rawls’ The Law of Peoples.[3] For many reasons, his notion of a realistic utopia can be seen as an attempt to overcome the aforementioned tension. This essay will therefore start by embedding this notion in a better understanding of The Law of Peoples. Subsequently, it will broach the work of two other political theorists, the international political theorist E. H. Carr and the political philosopher Karl R. Popper. Both authors have engaged the issue as well, and it will be my conclusion that comparing all these accounts might cast a brighter light on what the concept of a realistic utopia might mean and, more importantly, how we might avoid the dangers of utopianism while safeguarding the possibility of political change within the boundaries of what is realistically possible.

I. Rawls

The Law Of Peoples is both an underestimated and controversial work that marked the closure of John Rawls’ philosophical project in which he, by turning to the international level, brought his journey to an end. In that regard, the work was highly anticipated seeing as how three decades earlier, his A Theory of Justice had made an immense impact within political philosophy in general and international justice in particular. In short, it was an elaborate account of the principles that should order a just society. The success of this argument had fostered the expectations when Rawls exchanged the domestic for the international realm and, in other words, would argue about justice on an international scale. Unfortunately, these expectations were not met. Cosmopolitan thinkers like Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge, who had made attempts to transpose Rawls’ domestic principles to the international level on their own, felt disappointed by The Law Of Peoples as it lacked the ambition and conviction A Theory Of Justice owed its success to. One could argue that this helped to conceal the importance of Rawls’ final work and influenced future underestimation. It is my opinion, however, that this fatal judgement is based on a flawed understanding of this work. Additionally, engaging with the issue of a realistic utopia might in turn bring us to a better understanding of The Law of Peoples.

If not The Law Of Peoples, Rawls might as well have provided his book with a different title with an identical meaning: A Realistic Utopia. This assertion is based on Rawls’ proclamation in the beginning of the book, namely in that it “focuses strictly on certain questions connected with whether a realistic utopia is possible, and conditions under which it might obtain. (…) Political philosophy is realistically utopian when it extends what are ordinarily thought of the limits of political possibility.”[4]

Though Rawls is a vivid defender of liberal democratic societies and the principles that constitute them, he realised that he could not advocate this conviction as strongly when talking about relations among different societies as opposed to relations within a society. Let me clarify this by switching back to A Theory of Justice. In this work, Rawls has put forward two principles that should govern a just society. Whereas the former principle stressed “equal basic liberties”[5] among men, the latter, also known as the difference principle, held that social and economic inequality is only tolerable so far as it leads to “everyone’s advantage”[6] and “positions and offices are open to all.”[7] Most importantly, Rawls stated that there is a lexical order among these principles that holds “the first principle prior to the second.”[8] In other words, the second principle can only be maintained as long as the first principle is met. It is here that the flawed understanding of Rawls’ argument by cosmopolitan thinkers like Beitz and Pogge is to be located. They criticised Rawls for having neglected the second principle when turning to the international realm. This did not spare Rawls from justified as well as unjustified criticism from a more cosmopolitan liberal perspective. Before we broach this criticism, it is crucial we elaborate on Rawls’ reasoning a bit further.

Most importantly, Rawls argues that the international system consists of five types of domestic societies: “liberal peoples,” “decent peoples,” “outlaw states,” “burdened societies,” and “benevolent absolutisms.”[9] I will address the notion of peoples later on. This differentiation is preceded by Rawls’ general aim and explanation of the title of his book:

By the “Law of Peoples” I mean a particular political conception of right and justice that applies to the principles and norms of international law and practice. I shall use the term “Society of Peoples” to mean all those peoples who follow the ideals and principles of the Law of Peoples in their mutual relations.[10]

Although he unambiguously defends constitutional liberal democratic principles and norms, Rawls is aware of the fact that there are multiple comprehensive doctrines within different societies. In this regard, it is impossible to put forward an international difference principle, like Beitz did, for this would interfere with the first principle that guarantees equality of liberties of peoples. It would be paternalistic and even imperialistic to hold that one doctrine is superior; although Rawls himself subscribes to one he deems inherently valuable. Even though he shares some strong convictions with the cosmopolitans, he is cautious in spreading these norms and principles in an arrogant manner and remains aware of other comprehensive doctrines. This quite clearly exposes the balance Rawls is trying to maintain: on the one hand, he wants to form a Society of Peoples among societies that share convictions; but on the other hand he wants to prevent an aggressive foreign policy of exclusion that separates us from them. And this is where the notion of decent peoples comes in: “I use the term ‘decent’ to describe nonliberal societies whose basic institutions meet certain specified conditions of political right and justice (…) and lead their citizens to honour a reasonable just law for the Society of Peoples.”[11] Along with the liberal societies, decent societies form a group of well-ordered societies that excludes outlaw states (those who do not want to join the Society of Peoples) and burdened societies (those who cannot join the Society of Peoples.)

The Law of Peoples should include neither solely western, liberal societies, nor should it be an institution like the United Nations where nearly all nations are welcome. According to Catherine Audard,[12] this is why the Law of Peoples cannot be considered part of international law for the former excludes burdened societies and outlaw states whereas the latter makes no such distinction. Relating to the English School of International Relations theory, Rawls takes on a pluralistic position that emphasises people’s right to self-determination. More so, “treating peoples as equals in the Society of Peoples might initiate domestic changes in the long run and help internal transformations towards more democracy and freedom.”[13] Although this clearly marks a lead by example approach that poses a viable alternative to a more aggressive, cosmopolitan approach, Rawls is driven to this position by another, less strategic notion: reasonable pluralism – “the diversity among reasonable peoples with their different cultures and traditions of thought.”[14] As it is at the domestic level, there are different comprehensive doctrines at the international level: “If we punish societies because they are not as democratic as we are, then we will be guilty of arrogance.”[15] In other words, a balance is to be maintained between excluding everyone and including everyone. And this balance is a realistic utopia.

The Law of Peoples has provoked two notable strands of criticism.[16] On the one hand, cosmopolitans argued the work was too limited in its scope, too relaxed with regard to the toleration of non-liberal peoples, and strikingly silent about justice within other societies.[17] As mentioned before, cosmopolitans stressed the lack of ambition in Rawls’ argument and his failure to tackle issues of international injustice more thoroughly. On the other hand, political realists made a noteworthy remark that the agreement upon these democratic principles in the Law of Peoples is nothing more but a power game. The issues are concealed with notions like human rights to make self-interests more acceptable.

Both convincing critiques mutually clarify the importance of a realistic utopia. Avoiding paternalistic and imperialistic cosmopolitanism and ignorant realism of the status quo, Rawls wants to extend “what are ordinarily thought of [as] the limits of political possibility.”[18] His notion of peoples is in this regard quite revealing: Rawls does not place emphasis on the individual, as cosmopolitans tend to do, for this exceeds the confines of reality. More importantly however, he prefers the notion of Peoples as opposed to States: “We must reformulate the powers of sovereignty in the light of a reasonable Law of Peoples and deny to states the traditional rights to war and to unrestricted internal autonomy.”[19] Realism all too often risks of legitimising prevailing power relations and prevents any serious attempt to extend the limits of political reality.

It might not come as a surprise that Rawls, as a contractarian philosopher, is highly indebted to Jean-Jacques Rousseau. With regard to the idea of a realistic utopia, Rawls refers to the French philosopher when he combines realism (“men as they are”[20]) and utopia (“laws as they might be”[21]). David Boucher[22] defines this as an “alternative philosophical criterion to realism and Utopianism”[23] that seeks to “unite justice and utility[.]”[24] More so, in The Social Contract,[25] Rousseau stated that he, in David Boulder’s words, wants to “bring together what right permits with what one’s interests prescribe[.]”[26]

In The Construction of a ‘Realistic Utopia’,[27] Chris Brown reaches a similar conclusion in which he calls our attention to the work of E.H. Carr, who also wrote on the relationship between realism and utopia. We hereby see how the notion of a realistic utopia, though not a term Carr used, is a notion worth asserting within the field of International Relations as well.

II. Carr

In one of his major works, The Twenty Years’ Crisis,[28] Carr articulated a remarkable critique of utopian thought that showed “how utopian dreams of progress, prosperity and peace had helped to produce, and then become derailed by, the impending global conflagration.”[29] The inter-war crisis was, according to Carr, the greatest evidence of the failure of the utopian project of liberal internationalism. Nevertheless, this need not imply we should depict Carr as an advocate of plain realism. In fact, according to Ken Booth,[30] Carr’s stance on this issue is relatively unclear. However, along with his demolishment of utopianism, Carr argues for a combination of or compromise between the two strands. He claimed that “any sound political thought must be based on elements of both utopia and reality.”[31] Fearing the emergence of consistent realism, which Carr opposes, after the dangers of utopianism have been exposed, he wants to reclaim a defence for some form of utopian thought. “Having demolished the current utopia with the weapons of realism, we still need to build a new utopia of our own, which will one day fall to the same weapons.”[32] Carr’s solution eventually takes the form of a “constant interaction”[33] between reality and utopia. Or as George Lawson[34] describes it: “a dialectical relationship between the first-best world of speaking to truth(s) and the second-best world of political action, in other words an unending dialogue between intellectual imagination and political prudence.”[35]

Eventually, Booth defines this as utopian realism, which combines normative (utopia) and empirical (realism) elements. Indeed, a utopia should be realistic and practical. Even so, “the world does not have to look like the one we are familiar with.”[36] Although it is impossible to know where we are heading, it is nonetheless fruitful to think about the possible paths we can take. Or as Booth describes it more metaphorically:

Nobody just sails to keep afloat. Noah was probably the only sailor who set out without a harbour or anchorage, but he certainly had a destination. A desired physical goal is implicit in sailing, though all sailors know that on a given voyage they might not actually reach the destination they originally planned.[37]

Carr’s unending dialogue between utopia and reality strikes a compromise between consistent realism and unrealistic utopianism. The utopian aspect within a realistic utopia should be one that focuses on processes instead of end-points, according to Booth. We do not have final destinations or future blueprints. And even if we had those, they would not work in the long run. We rather need to focus on the process and “make a better world somewhat more probable for future generations.”[38] Circumventing a more aggressive undertone of end-point utopia’s, the peaceful change Booth is referring to will only be achievable when we take the confines of reality into account without taking them for granted. Or as Carr puts is:

In practice, we know that peaceful change can only be achieved through a compromise between the utopian conception of a common feeling of right and the realist conception of a mechanical adjustment to a changed equilibrium of forces.[39]

George Lawson goes even further and holds Carr’s solution to be a considerable alternative to, what he calls “the timeless and spaceless ambitions of utopians.”[40] He argues that Nancy Fraser and other cosmopolitans (Lawson’s utopians) maintain a flawed understanding of the past and present, which results in contestable assumptions about the future. Lawson’s field of analysis is the “shape, form and content of contemporary world politics.”[41] After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, all sorts of claims could be made because, “the current historical period represents some kind of unique opening.”[42] The similarity with Carr’s critique of utopianism is striking for he too lived in a period of intense change. According to Lawson, these periods are highly susceptible to utopias because they tend to “thrive in ‘abnormal times’”[43] This form of theorising thereby abstracts any embedding in time, space, or history. The story is told in a seemingly evident manner that is “taken-for-granted”[44] and “goes-without-saying”[45] and unambiguously “serves to iron out multi-linear historical trajectories and conceal intricacies of time and place.”[46]

As opposed to this cosmopolitan reading of history that excludes any alternative, Lawson puts forward the notion of a realistic utopia. Relating to Carr’s solution of a constant conversation between reality and utopia, Lawson wants to provide a more nuanced understanding, which he defines as middle-range theories.[47] In an exercise of historical land-mapping, Lawson argues we should not take our vision for granted, but rather understand the limits of this vision. Booth’s notion of process-utopia’s is provided with an underpinning of historical understanding when Lawson concludes that: “Progressive politics can only start from recognition of the complexity of the contemporary era and the multiple histories that lie behind its scaffolding.”[48]

When we relate this back to Rawls’ notion of a realistic utopia, what conclusions can be drawn? When writing The Law of Peoples in 1999, Rawls was aware of the similarities between his notion of a realistic utopia and the work of Carr. Rawls wrote:

Though criticising utopianism, Carr never questioned the essential role of moral judgement in forming our political opinions; he presented reasonable political assumptions as a compromise between both realism (power) and utopianism (moral judgement and values). In contradiction to Carr, my idea of a realistic utopia doesn’t settle for a compromise between power and political right and justice, but sets limits to the reasonable exercise of power. Otherwise, power itself determines what the compromise should be.[49]

It seems Rawls anticipated the critique his notion of a realistic utopia would receive from a realist perspective. As Audard pointed out, these critics argued, that “[a]ny agreement on democratic principles is a pawn in the power games that define international relations.”[50] As mentioned earlier, Rawls wants to set constraints to unlimited state sovereignty by forming a society of peoples and not states. It is about extending the boundaries of what is realistically possible. Oddly enough, consistent realism would lead us to similar forms of reasoning that Lawson exposes within utopianism. The application of a blueprint leads to the narrowing of political agency, he argued. Consistent realism, however, would entail a similar consequence, since this would impede political agency as well. If we are not able to extend the boundaries of reality and, contrary to what Booth argues, the world does have to look like the one we are familiar with. Political agency is rejected in favour of stubbornly clinging to the status quo of realism. A dialectical relationship between utopia and reality, as Carr proposed, will not hold for a moral judgement will always be overshadowed by power.

So how can we resolve this tension? How can we set these limits to state sovereignty and power without lapsing into a form of utopianism, directed towards an end point, that entails the paternalistic and imperialistic policies of cosmopolitanism? How do we foster the multiple possibilities of political agency that both consistent realism and utopianism iron out, as Lawson states? The answer can be provided by turning to the work of Popper, whose work has been widely underexposed in International Relations theory. With his devastating critique of utopianism and historicism, Karl Popper may cast a brighter light on the abovementioned questions.

III. Popper

In Ideal and Reality in Society,[51] Popper makes a distinction between political realists and political idealists. Whereas the latter aspire the development and use of an aim towards which humanity should evolve, the former adhere that they are facing reality. Popper does not favour either of these approaches but feels obliged to warn us of the dangerous consequences of utopian engineering, which is implied within political idealism.

The utopian is known for having an ultimate political aim, i.e. “the Ideal State.”[52] Only when this is determined, “only when we are in the possession of something like a blueprint of the society at which we aim, only then can we consider the best ways and means of its realization.”[53] Defined this way, all political action should be directed to, similar to what Booth defined, an end-goal—configured and structured by a rational process. Popper does not criticise the idea of a blueprint as such, but rather the fact “that we must undertake the reconstruction of society as a whole.”[54] What is most dangerous about this approach is how it is irreconcilable with other ideals or blueprints. This implies that, since the development of this ideal is a long-term process, it has to “suppress unreasonable objections”[55] for these jeopardise the whole utopian project. This is exactly what Lawson meant with the process of ironing out “multi-linear historical trajectories.”[56]

A difference of opinions can accordingly only lead in one direction: violence. In his lecture Utopia and Violence,[57] Popper argues that utopianism inevitably entails violence when differences of opinion can no longer be settled by argument. More so, the utopian will even refuse to debate his ideal and its implementation for they stand beyond discussion. He therefore will use “violent methods for the suppression of competing aims”[58] to eliminate and stamp out all “heretical and competing views.”[59] In short, utopianism can only clear the way for totalitarianism; an evil Popper has dedicated one of his major works to: The Open Society and Its Enemies.[60]

Returning to our central argument, what does this merciless critique of utopianism imply for the possibility of a realistic utopia? As stated before, the alternative to utopianism is not necessarily opportunistic realism of the status quo. So how can we extend the boundaries of reality? Or as Popper asks himself:

Wherein, then, lies the difference between those benevolent Utopian plans to which I object because they lead to violence, and those other important reforms which I am inclined to recommend?[61]

When we recall notions like Booth’s process utopias and Lawson’s middle-range theories, a critical reader may wonder how these ideas would be practically realisable. In other words, where is the realistic aspect in these realistic utopias? How do we settle the plurality of opinions without regressing to violence? Booth claims to solve this issue by turning to Rawls’ notion of the veil of ignorance. He argues that the “idea of a universal rational ethical standpoint”[62] is conceivable when “a ‘veil of ignorance’ is drawn across social reality.”[63] This, however, does not solve the issue for Booth does not escape the hostile logic of competing blueprints within utopianism. Every man has his own notions of the good life, the ideal society, the right notion of justice, etcetera. Whether the piecemeal engineer has a blueprint or not is of lesser importance. It is rather his method and approach to political action that differentiates him from the utopian engineer:

The piecemeal engineer or the piecemeal politician will (…) adopt the method of searching for, and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather than searching for, and fighting for, its greatest ultimate good.[64]

This clearly answers Poppers earlier question. Instead of working out a distant ideal of a just society that pleads for the realisation of abstract goals, one should work for the elimination of concrete evils. Moreover, people will more easily come to an agreement about the concrete evils in this world than about “some ideal form of social life.”[65]

This focus on concrete evils actually has a Rawlsian echo. The latter clarified that two ideas motivated The Law of Peoples. The first is that “the great evils in human history”[66] follow from political injustice and the second that these evils will eventually disappear when we follow just social policies and establish just, basic institutions. Popper understated this thought but rejected the application of a blueprint that aims to reconstruct society as a whole. He shares this critique with Lawson, who opposed ideal theory when arguing “that there is no tabula rasa and no year zero from which to begin again.”[67]  More so, it is unrealistic, Popper continues, “that a complete reconstruction of our social world would lead at once to a workable system.”[68] For a realistic utopia to remain realistic, changes have to be carried out on a small scale that can be measured under realistic conditions, like for instance the introduction of a new kind of life insurance, a new kind of taxation, or a new penal reform.

Eventually, Popper aims for, what I define as, a realistic utopia that, paraphrasing Booth’s words, makes our lives a little less terrible and unjust each generation. Many things could be achieved if we would only give up our quarrels over “Utopian blueprints for a new world and a new man”[69] and start working on the issues that matter like “stamping out unemployment, equalizing opportunities; and preventing international crime, such as war instigated by men like gods, by omnipotent and omniscient leaders.”[70] At the end of his argument, Popper reveals his liberal convictions, which unambiguously resemble Rawls’ two principles from A Theory of Justice, when he states, “every man should be given the right to arrange his life himself so far as this is compatible with the equal rights to others.”[71]

Before I turn to the conclusion of this essay, one question needs to be addressed. If the dangers of utopianism are so obvious and yet severe, then why does it have such an appealing affect? Why are people repeatedly drawn to these so-called universal narratives that close down possibilities of political agency that show striking resemblances with consistent realism? “The appeal of Utopianism arises from the failure to realise that we cannot make heaven on earth.”[72] Utopianism irons out contesting opinions in favour of a particular reading of the past and present, as Lawson clarified. Utopias tend to “thrive in ‘abnormal times[.]’”[73] They simplify political reality by presenting a linear and narrow narrative that excludes any contradiction.

A few years after his essay on utopianism, Popper wrote one of his major works, The Poverty of Historicism,[74] in which he criticised any form of the abovementioned way of reasoning: “Every form of historicism expresses the feeling of being swept into the future of irresistible forces.”[75] In doing so, it claims to have located laws that underlie the evolution of human history. Once these laws are discovered, the historicist can make predictions about the future. Historicism or utopianism thereby becomes analogous to consistent realism when it claims that “society will necessarily change but along a predetermined path that cannot change, through stages predetermined by inexorable necessity.”[76] Change of a divergent kind, essential to the notion of a realistic utopia, becomes futile: “holistic control, which must lead to the equalization not of human rights but of human minds, would mean the end of progress.”[77] This is what Lawson meant by the exclusion of any form of “alternative historical reading.”[78]

Against this narrowing and exclusionist utopian dogmatism, Lawson argues for a recognition of the limits of our own vision. If we want to make our utopia realistic, we have to safeguard the possibility of change that is underpinned by an alternative reading of history. As I quoted him earlier: “Progressive politics can only start from recognition of the complexity of the contemporary era and the multiple histories that lie behind its scaffolding.”[79] He concludes that we have to temper our utopias with an appropriate dose of realism.

Conclusion

Doing justice to these three independent thinkers within the framework of an essay that does not lose its scope, is both an ambitious and precarious endeavour. Although Rawls is in many regards our springboard and realistic utopia is arguably a notion that has to be attributed to him, eventually, this concept has produced a fruitful and enthralling discussion that does not reach a sole victor. In this conclusion, I will therefore break the whole discussion down by switching back to the notion of a realistic utopia itself and relate this back to each individual theorist.

I do not regard a realistic utopia as a strict Rawlsian conception. More so, I do not regard it as a completely satisfying concept either. However, I still argue that it allows us to conceive what Rawls, Carr and Popper were aiming at. Generally speaking, it would be a question of how to ideally induce change that is not utopian within the confines of the world we live in that is not constrained by the realism of the status quo. That is why I would discard realism and utopianism as useful tools for assessing this question: they both entail the two extremes in the debate and as such cannot be stopped from ending up as some sort of a compromise that poses severe limits to desirable change. This is why I tend to agree with Rawls’ critique on Carr’s compromise that is, according to Ken Booth, utopian realism. A compromise might not be entirely suitable for posing limits to power. As Rawls asserted, what possibility is there for preventing that power itself determines what the compromise should be? As realism mostly tends to argue in favour of power and maintain a balance that reflects this favour, Rawls wants to extend the boundaries of what is politically realistic as far as possible.

The crux of Rawls’ argument, however, is that he does not seem to succeed in providing us with a competent defence towards utopianism. Although he cleverly points to the tendency within cosmopolitan arguments to act paternalistic or imperialistic by neglecting the liberties of other societies, his main goal remains a blueprint of a just society. Rawls, as opposed to Carr, cannot step outside the boundaries of his ideal theory. This clearly puts limits on his defence towards utopianism when applied to Popper’s critique of political action guided by ideal blueprints. Although we all have our notions of an ideal society, they cannot by any means, form the basis of our actions without taking differing opinions into account. That is why, in order to prevent endless quarrels over our ideals or blueprints that lead us to nowhere, we should focus on preventing harm and make the world a bit better each generation. Additionally, our action should not seek promoting justice, but fighting injustice. In this regard, similarities between Popper and Rawls, as liberal thinkers, become evident.

Even so, Popper’s account seems more realistic for he does not rely on any ideal blueprint. This puts Popper’s argument more closely to Carr’s: they both recognises the severe and intrinsic dangers of unrealistic utopianism. Even though Rawls might reasonably object that power will determine any compromise between utopia and reality, embedding utopian agency in an ideal theory that seeks to transform a society shows remarkable resemblances with consistent realism for it irons out any form of differing ideals. Although Rawls repeatedly sought to dissociate himself from cosmopolitan liberals, he never quite succeeded to indemnify himself from the abovementioned criticism. It therefore indicates the struggle he continuously faced in maintaining a balance that is a realistic utopia.

Further Reading on E-International Relations

• Outside of Critical Theory, What Has Marxism Contributed to Understanding IR?
• An Ethical Dilemma: How Classical Realism Conceives Human Nature
• The Possibility of a Cosmopolitan World Order: An Optimistic View of History
• Has Critical Security Studies Run Out of Steam?
• The Metaphysical “On War”: Is Clausewitz Still Relevant in the 21st Century?
• Revisiting Wendt: An Argument for the Normativity of Wendtian Constructivism