Although the term ‘Islamism’ covers a wide range of political ideas, the bulk of popular Islamist movements exhibit strong nationalist tendencies. Islamism, insofar as it can be succinctly categorised, represents an attempt to inject Islam into politics. The problem is that, in spite of its proponents’ claims to the ideological immutability of the religion, in reality there are many different interpretations of what Islam is and how it relates to politics. Considering nationalism likewise to be a spectrum of related ideas which take the nation, I will demonstrate that Islamist movements can, by and large, be described as nationalist.

Hamas can arguably be considered the most nationalistic Islamist movement, openly embracing in deed and rhetoric both Islam and the Palestinian people as political objects. The Iranian Khomeinist regime, on the other hand, is sceptical of the nation in theory, but is now enjoying its fourth decade of temporal rule over the Iranian people. This gap between rhetoric and deed in attitudes toward the nation-state runs throughout the Islamist phenomenon, representing an ongoing struggle for legitimacy between different conceptions of what the nation is and what it should be. This in large part stems from the fact that although Islam is a powerful ideology, it presents no clear answers on the question of political agency in the modern era.

In order to better understand how so-called Islamism relates to the idea of religious nationalism, I will first explore the concepts of political Islam and nationalism. I will then consider the role that nationalism plays in the rhetoric and practice of the two movements previously mentioned: Hamas and Khomeinist Iran. I will argue that Islam’s role in political discourse is determined by the exigencies of politics, rather than the other way around. For this reason, Islam is a socially contingent and useful tool for addressing political problems. The primary means for addressing political problems in the current international system is through the nation-state. Islamism is thus an acknowledgement of this reality, and an attempt to reconcile state-centric, pragmatic politics with a powerful signifier of identity.

Islam and Politics

The idea of Islamism as it is commonly discussed in the West is highly problematic. Liberal Islamist thinkers such as Abdolkarim Soroush and Fethullah Gülen, both highly influential humanists, are by terminology carelessly lumped into the same category as Osama bin Laden and the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In popular discourse, Islam is commonly assumed to be the pre-eminent political factor in Muslim societies, and is frequently suggested to be the causative influence of any number of negative political outcomes.

But Islam, as a heterogeneous and pre-modern belief system, presents no clear answer to the questions of the modern political era, good or bad. As James Piscatori points out, it is hard to reliably claim “that any general conception of Islam exists apart from the core, the profession of the faith.”[1] The fact that “heresiographers have identified over 72 sects within it, each considering itself the ‘sacred sect’” gives testament to the fractured nature of the religion.[2] Apart from a set of vague, moralistic ideas Piscatori claims “grow out of” the shahada –such as that “government edicts and legislation must not contradict the revealed law”, that “obedience is owed to the guardians of the law” and that “the actions of the governors themselves must be judged by the standards of the revealed law”- Islam provides no definitive answers to the modern political system: “These ideas mark off the Islamic political field, but we can also see that it is a broad field in which many questions –such as who decides on the succession of the Prophet, what form of regime (monarchy or democracy, for example) is sanctioned, and exactly when political revolt is permissible- are left unanswered.”[3] Questions of political structure and economy in the twenty-first century were neither anticipated nor answered by the foundational texts of Islam, leaving a serious gap in Islamic political philosophy.

This perspective enables us to view Islam not as monolithic and abstract, but rather as an element of culture and politics closely linked to the political process. The relationship between religion and politics is discursive: the diverse collection of beliefs and customs we describe as ‘Islam’ certainly influence politics, but politics –the practice of power in response to material and socio-historical conditions- influences Islam in turn. Politics, moreover, is the dominant factor in the relationship.

By Western liberal standards, many Islamist movements certainly do espouse deeply problematic ideas and practices, and the fact of the previously identified gap in Islam’s political philosophy does not disguise the reality that tradition and custom have found their own, very convincing, answers to the problem. The rise of globalisation, widespread education and popular politics, however, are increasingly breaking down the hegemony of conservative interpretations of the religion’s relationship to the state. The authority of organisations such as the conservative al-Azhar, which has used Islam to support the Mubarak and Saudi regimes, is increasingly questioned.

Moreover, it is of course not only Islamists who hold objectionable opinions- so too do many secularist regimes. The real problem relates to the broader economic and historical context out of which such movements arise. Pro-capitalist Fethullah Gülen and the radical Ayatollah Khomeini formed their views and found their popularity in response to differing circumstances, and thus present highly divergent views of the world. Despite the claims of both the Islamists and their detractors, Islam alone is not determinant of politics.

As a result, it is difficult to say that the popularity of political Islamist rhetoric necessarily represents any popular ‘Islamist’ consensus on political issues. According to a March-April 2012 poll, for example, over 90% of Egyptians stated that Islam should inform national lawmaking. When it comes to the role of religion in government, 61% preferred conservative Saudi Arabia to liberal Turkey as a national model. But on the other hand, 61% supported free speech, and 64% a free press- both concepts that do not exist in Islamist Saudi Arabia, and which are often derided by conservative Islamists as foreign concepts.[4]

This would suggest that although many Egyptians may identify with Islamist rhetoric, the reality of individual political preference is much more complicated. For many, support for Islamist movements comes down more to the Islamists’ willingness to resist the status quo than any specific religious agenda. Much of the popularity of Osama bin Laden has been attributed to the perception among some Muslims that “he is the only one” who “stood up to defend us.”[5] Applying the idea of resistance to the status quo in a different context, some have suggested that the Muslim Brotherhood’s victory in the 2012 Egyptian presidential election came down to the fact that Morsi’s opponent, Ahmed Shafik, was linked to the old Mubarak regime.[6] The Brotherhood’s long-time involvement in the dispersal of charity and other social and religious projects outside of politics put it in a good position to challenge the political establishment. Resistance and community engagement bring much popular legitimacy to such organisations, without them having to face the difficult decisions that naturally come with institutional politics.

History suggests that –as I will argue below in the case of Iran- as a system of values, Islam is arguably better suited to opposition and resistance than sustaining governmental legitimacy. It is easy to criticise corrupt politicians on the basis of ‘Islamic’ values such as honesty and integrity. The difficult thing is defining a pragmatic political project based on the ideas of the ancient religion.

Thus, Islam can be seen as an important personal signifier able to be harnessed in pursuit of tangible political goals, but it is important to remember that it is also a pre-modern and heterogeneous belief system that in reality provides few definitive answers to modern political problems.

Nationalism

Nationalism, like Islam, is a field of intense political contestation. The nation may be defined in terms of citizenship, ethnicity, tribe, language, race, shared history or religion. Indeed, depending on who you ask, national identity is often an amorphous combination of several of the above. Acknowledging the inherently problematic nature of the concept, Max Weber suggested that “a nation is a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own.”[7]

The state is thus a central and unavoidable question for all modern political subjects. It is the vehicle through which both symbolic and pragmatic politics are played out. According to Ira M. Lapidus, “For many peoples, including Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Iranians, Malays, and Tajiks, contemporary identity is a fusion of historic lineage, linguistic, and ethnic ties with Islamic and national symbols.”[8] As a result, “contemporary nationality lies on a Muslim substrate; and/or the reverse- Muslim identity is translated into ethnic and national loyalties. Political situations will change the emphasis from one dimension to another.”[9]

The clearest challenge to the notion of Islamism-as-nationalism are the jihadist and pan-Islamist movements, such as the early incarnations of the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-Islami, as well as current-day al-Qaeda, al-Shabab and Hizb ut-Tahrir. Each actively rejects the legitimacy of the nation-state, seeking to replace it with an international caliphate. Arguably, however, such movements merely sit at the more exclusivist and thus radical end of the nationalist spectrum, recognising universalising Islam as the sole signifier of membership to a trans-state nation. And besides, as history has shown, such a narrow definition is inherently unstable, with many organisations having made the transition from pan-Islamism to more nationalist-Islamism. The Muslim Brotherhood is the most well-known example of this. There is even recent evidence of the Taliban playing down its religious beliefs in favour of more nationalist discourse in an effort to gain popularity.[10]

This transition is illustrative of a big source of tension within nationalist-Islamist movements: the fact that nationalist politics is inherently secularising. It forces the religious leader to address issues of “power in this world, not the next.”[11] This –along with nationalism’s traditional association with the West- is undoubtedly the reason Islamists tend to be sceptical of the state and the nation. It is also the most likely reason why Islamist movements have tended to become less religiously-focused as they have engaged more closely with the state. Thus, in the context of this essay, ‘nationalism’ is used in a broad sense, both as a symbolic expression of collective identity and as the pursuit of tangible political goals through the structure of the nation-state.

Out of a certain political situation –the need to resist Western imperialism, or the perceived failure of secularism, modernity, Western values or the patrimonial state to bring prosperity to the ‘nation’- rise those who believe they are able to solve the problems that ail society by redefining the nation -and thus the state- in the image of Islam. For this reason, we can see how Islamism, as the pursuit of an Islamised collective identity and popular political outcomes in the context of the contemporary state system, can be viewed as a nationalistic pursuit.

Hamas

Hamas is perhaps the most clearly nationalist of the Islamist movements. Islam, for Hamas, represents a means of appealing to the Palestinian masses, and differentiating itself from the more secular and institutionalised Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). It is used to justify the Palestinian nationalist resistance against Israeli imperialism, and is largely subservient to the primary goal of national liberation.

Hamas began as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1980s, responding to the popular call for the Islamists’ participation in the First Intifada. Following the PLO’s agreement in 1993 to recognise Israel without a reciprocal Israeli agreement to recognise the sovereignty of Palestine, Hamas led the charge in denouncing the Oslo Accords. Although the peace process was broadly popular throughout the mid-1990s, its failure to bring peace and prosperity to the Palestinians meant that the secular and corrupt PLO became less and less popular. Hamas, the organisation which had warned against the Accords all along, benefited from the PLO’s loss and came to be seen by the Palestinian people as a viable alternative.

According to Henry Munson, “Resistance, national resistance, to what Hamas sees as the occupation of Palestine by foreigners has always been the movement’s primary raison d’être.”[12] Considering the 1988 Hamas Charter, we can see how this resistance is couched in the language of Islamic rhetoric:

The Islamic Resistance Movement is a distinctively Palestinian movement. It gives its loyalty to God, it adopts Islam as its way of life, and it strives to raise the banner of God over every inch of Palestine.[13]

The Charter does not merely use Islamic discourse in an abstract way, but specifically justifies the fight to liberate the lands of Palestine using religious justifications:

Nationalism from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement is part of Islamic dogma. Nothing is loftier in nationalism or more profound than this: If the enemy invades a Muslim land, waging jihad and fighting the enemy becomes an individual duty on every Muslim. […]

Abandoning any part of Palestine is abandoning part of Islam. For the nationalism of the Islamic Resistance Movement is part of its religion. The movement thus teaches its members to raise the banner of God over their nation and wage jihad.[14]

Such language universalizes the fight against Israel, imploring all believers to band together in pursuit of jihad. This viewpoint would seem to suggest, however, that Hamas is, as many Western and Israeli detractors contend, “an extremist organisation driven by radical religious ideology.”[15] Indeed, much violence has been justified in these terms. But to reach such a conclusion ignores Hamas’ “progressive de-emphasis on religion.”[16]

An examination of the 2005 electoral platform of Hamas’ Change and Reform party is demonstrative of this move away from religion. The platform is largely concerned with issues of Israeli occupation and institutional reform. There are very few references to Islam, the majority of which “are not only very general, but are actually […] used to justify Hamas’s participation in the elections.”[17]

In its campaign rhetoric in the lead-up to the 2006 election, Hamas also “avoided overly religious rhetoric in its campaigning, did not denounce its adversaries as infidels and apostates, but largely stuck to ‘bread-and-butter’ issues.”[18] But while religion was not a primary issue, Hamas’ candidates “did benefit from the public’s perception of them as ‘god-fearing people’ who are not prone to corruption and mismanagement.”[19] And as one would expect of a party moving from opposition to government, documents published after Hamas’ electoral win are even more focused on specific, worldly issues, demonstrating a “strong pragmatic, and, indeed, state building emphasis.”[20]

As in any large political organisation, Hamas is comprised of differing camps who offer divergent ideas on how to reach the goal of national liberation. Following Hamas’ election to the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 2006, reformists within the organisation appeared to have been vindicated- until the West decided to cease its support for Hamas, favouring the Fatah-dominated PLO. The West’s decision to impose sanctions on Hamas-controlled Gaza created a disincentive for the Islamists to engage with legitimate, non-violent political processes, returning the upper-hand to hardliners within the organisation. Sanctions reinforced the perception that the Western powers have an anti-Islamic agenda and remain in control of the destiny of the Palestinians, feeding into Islamist arguments for the liberation of Palestine. Refusing to recognise Hamas dilutes its incentive to take a conciliatory approach towards Israel and the West. At the same time that more and more of the PLO-controlled West Bank is being carved up and given to Israeli settlers, Hamas is able to defy those who impose sanctions, strengthening the argument that it is only the Islamists who are willing to resist the status quo.

Thus, whereas previously Islam had been employed to justify violence in the form of ‘defensive jihad’, the 2005 platform and later discourse clearly represent a tactical calculation on Hamas’ part that a move towards institutionalised politics would be beneficial in pursuit of the goal of national liberation. This represented a willingness to negotiate on what were supposedly questions of dogma, demonstrating the primacy of the national interest over Islam.

Notably, the trust engendered in religious politicians on the basis of their perceived morality was as influential as any purportedly religious values attached to the party itself. The organisation’s willingness and ability to stand up to Israel and the West assists in its pursuit to redefine the Palestinian people in its own Islamist image, undoubtedly proving to many that the secular PLO are not merely un-Islamic, but also un-Palestinian. This suggests the importance of identification in religious politics, and ties in with the idea of nationalism: constituents want to see themselves reflected in their politicians, and shared belief is an important element in this process.

Although Hamas remains a nominally religious organisation and refuses to denounce many of the religiously-justified calls to violence found in its 1988 Charter, it is nonetheless a heterogeneous movement with a strong pragmatic and nationalist streak.

Ayatollah Khomeini and Iran

The Iranian regime, despite its theoretical rejection of the nation-state, justifies its existence through a mixture of Islamic, nationalist and anti-imperialist rhetoric. On top of this, its position as one of the few Islamist states has demonstrated how difficult it is to maintain a consistent ‘Islamic’ political ethos in all areas of policy.

Henry Munson suggests that although he “would have rejected such a label,” the Ayatollah Khomeini “was in fact an Iranian nationalist.”[21] As Munson points out, “Islamists generally condemn nationalism, yet they are often remarkably nationalistic. One is reminded of the relationship between Marxism and nationalism.”[22] As is the case with Marxism, the easy equation of resistance with moral good makes Islamism a powerful ideological tool for those suffering under the yoke of imperialism. The paranoid responses of Western conservatives to the threat of a supposed globalist Islamism –which arguably is more akin to a series of state-building projects- also suggests that Islamism in some ways plays a similar structural role in anti-imperial politics to that previously inhabited by Marxism.

Khomeini, like many Islamists, rejected the concept of nationalism on ‘religious’ grounds, seeing it “as a Western strategy designed to divide and weaken Muslims.”[23] In spite of this, he conceded that it was acceptable “to love one’s fatherland and its people and to protect its frontiers.”[24] Such comments suggest that Khomeini had a complex relationship with the idea. He saw the deviation from ‘true’ Islam as the reason for Iran’s weakness at the hands of the imperial powers, with the American-backed Pahlavi Shah being the symbolic and functional manifestation of corrupt Western dominance in the country. In this context, the ethno-nationalism promoted by supporters of the Shah, which emphasised the glory of the pre-Islamic Persian empire, had to be rhetorically rejected- and with it, the idea of non-Islamic Persian identity as a key signifier in Iranian culture.

But in response to the Iranian parliament passing a bill providing diplomatic immunity to American civilian and military personnel, supposedly in exchange for a $200 million loan from the United States, Khomeini declared:

They have sold us and our independence[…] If they had the slightest bit of feeling for the national honor, they would have called for general mourning[…] Our dignity has been trampled underfoot; the dignity of Iran has been destroyed[…] They have reduced the Iranian people to a level lower than that of America’s dogs. If someone runs over a dog belonging to an American, he will be subject to investigation and prosecution, even if he is “the shah” himself. But if an American cook runs over “the shah of Iran” or any other important person, no one can prosecute him[…] You have sold the independence of Iran and its dignity to reduce it to the level of the enslaved and most backward nations.[25]

Such a sentiment clearly makes use of nationalist concepts, appealing to the commonality between members of the nation and “the dignity of Iran”. Though Khomeini in theory rejected the idea of the nation, he was an effective politican who could nevertheless appeal to Iranians’ common identity. Moreover, the idea of a common Iranian identity faced with imperialist outsiders played very easily into Islamist rhetoric. Nationalism and the nation-state originated in Europe, certainly, but the imperialist behaviour of the Western states in turn served to spread the concepts across the world. The common experience of domination by the group of people who call themselves Iranians cemented the collective sense of self and other. Not only did the Americans (and British) speak another language, live in another place and have a different history, they were kafir- unbelievers. For Khomeini, an Iranian is a Muslim by nature. It is thus not a contradiction to define the polity in specifically nationalist terms, because the nation and the religion are one and the same. Just as Islam differentiates Hamas from both the PLO and the Israelis, it proved to be a powerful assertion of collective identity in the face of outside domination for the Khomeinists, too.

But while Shi’i tradition provided an interpretation of Islam that could more readily –but by no means unproblematically- be adapted into a modern political system, it has proven less forthcoming on other pragmatic questions. The inherent contradiction at the foundations of the Iranian state –the fact that ‘The Iranian revolution always claimed to have two sources: God’s sovereignty and the people’s will”[26]– is part of the reason for the problems faced in the implementation of an Islamist agenda in Iran. The absolute must somehow be balanced with the ever-shifting. The two are in constant tension. And, as highlighted earlier, interaction with the structures of the state actually undermines claims to religious sovereignty.

This has been nowhere more obvious than in Iran’s approach to international affairs, where it “tends to use a realpolitik compass to find its path[.]”[27] Shahram Akbarzadeh suggests that Iran’s support for Hizbullah is evidence not of its “commitment to some form of co-operation and unity along sectarian lines,” but rather of “the importance of religious bonds for irreligious aspirations, namely an entrenched competition with Saudi Arabia for the leadership position in the Muslim world.”[28]

Iran’s approach to the Nagorno-Karabakh war, in which it sided with Christian Armenia against Shi’i Azerbaijan, is perhaps the clearest evidence of the difficulty of applying Islam to practical policy. In response to fears of secession by the large Iranian Azeri minority, solidarity with Azerbaijan based on either shared religion or ethnicity was abandoned in the interests of the Iranian state.

An inspection of Iran’s governmental structure further undermines its claims to being a truly Islamic state. Khomeini’s designated successor, Ali Khamenei, was not an ayatollah or marja before assuming the status of Supreme Leader of Iran. The Iranian constitution had to be amended to permit Khamenei to take office, and his designation as a marja has ever since proven highly controversial among Iranian clerics. Olivier Roy has argued that the decades following the Iranian Revolution have seen “a slow de facto de-radicalization of the political institutions,” citing as evidence for this the proliferation of secular political bodies such as the Expediency Council, along with the direct appointment of representatives to the Council of Guardians not by the clergy but the Grand Ayatollah.[29] The Supreme Leader also directly controls the media, armed forces and judiciary. This essentially makes the Iranian system a dictatorship tenuously justified on a dual basis: the sovereignty of God and the people. Such an arrangement, in reality, leads to the supremacy of neither God nor the people, but the totalitarian state, led by one man. As Akbarzadeh suggests, “Political Islam in Iran appears to have completed a full circle, from a force for the supremacy of Islam over the temporal state to a force for the primacy of the state at the expense of the Islamic ideal.”[30]

I would thus argue that, in spite of Khomeini’s assertions to the contrary, Iranian Islamist politics has not only always contained a distinctly nationalist and worldly undertone, but has inevitably been forced to engage in power politics since taking power of the Iranian state in 1979. The result is a governmental structure which essentially subordinates the interests of Islam and the Iranian people to the interests of the state.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is clear that the very concept of Islamism is both highly problematic and closely linked to nationalism. Islam provides a strong rhetorical tool for furthering national political projects, providing as it does an empty vessel on many questions relevant to the contemporary political world. This is not to say that Islamists’ use of religious discourse is disingenuous, but rather that, having suffered under the corruption of different imperial powers and secular patrimonial regimes across the region, Islam appears to offer an obvious solution for many. The experiences of Hamas and Iran have, however, demonstrated that the tension between questions of Islam par excellence and those of the relationship between (Muslim) people and the state can be incredibly complex and not easily resolvable. It is undeniable that the logic of the nation-state has a strong effect on politics, Islamist or otherwise. Thus, while some movements openly embrace the idea of nationalism and others reject it, the fact remains that in order for any contemporary political movement to remain effective, it must acknowledge and account for the idea of the nation-state. As a result, the majority of Islamist movements could indeed be regarded as religious nationalist, though the extent to which Islamists could be said to represent the interests of the nation once in power is dependent upon the governmental structure of the state concerned. Above all, Islamism represents a useful tool of resistance against a status quo which is not representative of the interests of the nation, and in this sense can be called nationalist.

Bibliography

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