Martha Crenshaw warned of the risks of adopting an overly deterministic vision with regards to terrorism. She provides a fitting image where a framework for understanding the emergence of terrorist groups must essentially be viewed in terms of a “funnel,” with certain circumstances narrowing down available options or altering choices, while, ultimately, the decisive factor remaining up to individual decision-making.[1] This element of choice, taken within the context of a historical, ideological and affective framework, is crucial for coming to terms with the resort to terrorist activity. This echoes Silke’s well-founded claim that when entering the seemingly crazy world of violent deeds, one must not adopt the Cheshire-cat’s logic, assuming all individuals residing within this context to be equally insane, but, rather, one must view terrorism as being articulated around the fact that “normal people can do abnormal things.”[2] Following this non-deterministic approach, we will not seek to establish a restrictive definition of terrorism. We will instead observe what is commonly understood as terrorism in order to shed some light on such activities: “Si définir le terrorisme est un exercice vain, traiter de l’action de ceux que le sens commun qualifie de terroristes est possible, et utile, surtout si l’on fait l’effort de chercher à les connaître et à appréhender leurs orientations de façon informée”[3][4].

This essay strives to provide a framework that enables us to situate and understand the interrelations of the processes associated with the emergence of terrorist groups. It will take Wieviorka’s insights on the “antimouvement”[5] to be key, following the broad strokes provided by his analysis. According to his work, terrorism emerges within groups that pass from being a movement to the structure of an antimouvement. This is a crucial point in that it provides not only an appropriate framework for studying terrorism but also for studying the processes associated with the emergence of terrorism. In brief, this essay will illustrate the dynamic nature of Wieviorka’s antimouvement. It will accordingly observe the three dimensions of this structure: the principles of identity, opposition, and totality[6]. The examples this essay will refer to are the Basque separatist ETA (Euzkadi ta Askatazuna – Basque Homeland and Freedom[7]) and the West German RAF (Rotte Armee Fraktion – Red Army Faction[8]). This is because these groups and their motivations are seemingly very different, which should allow for a broader examination of how terrorist groups may emerge.

Although both social movements and antimouvements coalesce around an identity, antimouvements differ in that they are no longer rooted in the representation of a certain group of individuals. The idea of “identité sociale”[9] becomes substituted for that of “une essence, une figure abstraite ou mythique”[10][11]. In the Basque country, the quest for defining Basque identity has been a long and drawn out process, which is not only essential to understanding ETA  (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Basque Homeland and Freedom) and its agenda, but also in how ETA also forms a part of that identity. The roots of Basque nationalism are conventionally thought to lie in the drastic social changes brought about by the rapid industrialization undergone by the Basque country during the nineteenth century[12]. This industrialization, coupled with immigration from the rural to urban areas and from Spain to the Basque territory, fostered many ills, simultaneously disrupting entirely the Basque traditional way of life[13]. Here the role of Sabino de Arana y Goiri is crucial, as he founded, in 1895, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco[14] (PNV),[15] which politically defended the “mythical concept [of] a pre-industrial Basque egalitarian” society[16]. Although an integral part of ETA identity originates from the context outlined above, the ongoing process of self-definition within the group has been equally important.

Revealingly, the birth of ETA on July the 31^st 1959 was the direct result of a scission with the more moderate PNV youth group EGI[17]. Even after its official creation, ETA has followed an ongoing process of self-definition. Some have pushed for a strongly nationalist stance, promoting the Basque identity through an emphasis on Euskera (the Basque language), while focusing on the threat posed to this identity by the maketos[18][19]. Others have preferred a more socialist approach, leading their battle on the front of class struggle[20]. Yet, a third faction, the tercermundistas,[21] of whom Federico Krutwig was among the most influential, have wished to lead the conflict on both national and social fronts[22]. ETA’s yearly general assemblies have been crucial here as they dictated the ideological stance to be adopted[23]. These assemblies have also been conducive to a progressive radicalization of the group, with those voicing more moderate views being set apart[24]. It is now visible that, at least within ETA, the emergence of the group was accompanied by a simultaneous process of identity creation, one that relied heavily on ideological or pseudo-mythical attributes, as opposed to the direct representation of a social group.

In Germany, despite the fact that the RAF’s ideological orientation had been left wing, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist[25] politics, rather than nationalistic, a similar process of identity creation was also undertaken. Although created in May 1970[26], the ideological debate forming the bedrock of the RAF’s identity can be found in the West German student activism of the late 1960s[27]. In 1966, these students, led by Rudi Dutschke, formed the APO (extra-parliamentary opposition), which aimed to provide a radical-socialist counter-weight absent from the parliament in Bonn[28]. Crucial to the ideological debate that accompanied this political activism were the works of several socialist and revolutionary theorists such as Che Guevara, Ho-Chi Minh and Carlos Marighella who had encouraged the resort to political violence and urban guerrilla[29]. The RAF must be understood within this ideological context, as its acts reveal to be a specific response to these questions on political violence.

It is broadly accepted that nationalism is construed as a “‘Janus-faced’ phenomenon; meaning that, like the Roman God, it looks both at the past and the future”[30]. Specifically, what this highlights is nationalism’s focus on the present’s inadequacy, while, at the same time, striving for the return to a specific ‘Golden Age’[31]. This is a first indicator of the crucial role history plays. It seems, however, that the core functioning of nationalism also applies to the socialist beliefs upheld by the RAF. Indeed, in both cases the ideological layout is the same: an unacceptable status quo is rejected in favour of an ideal towards which one must strive.

Aside from highlighting the similar ideological mechanisms, be it nationalist or socialist, this leads us to a second way in which history becomes crucial to the emergence of terrorist groups. Although it seems almost tautological, it is essential to highlight that history provides the context under which the resort to violence is undertaken. More specifically, with both, the historical background created a need for certain political actors to break with the past, attributing their ideologies with a sense of urgency.

Within the Basque country, there was a radicalization among certain Basque youths following what appeared to be the failure of the PNV to obtain and maintain international political sympathy as, from the beginning to the mid 50s, Francoist Spain accrued its international recognition[32]. On a more interpersonal level, Mario Onaindía highlighted the need among ETA’s male members to break with the past generation, the gudaris[33], held responsible for losing the war against Franco and, within the PNV, for not seeking to use more confrontational methods[34]. Within the context of Franco’s harsh repression, the moderation of the PNV and the last generation was read as inaction. Quite revealingly, the student group Ekin, of whom many members eventually founded ETA, is Euskera for “To Do” or “To Act”[35]. If anything, this generational need to assert oneself as separate from the other, or the former, is even more poignantly visible with the RAF. Indeed, much of the student unrest originated from the impression that West Germany was not truly facing its Nazi past and was too lenient in terms of taking adequate measures[36]. For students, the reinstatement of many “professors tainted with a Nazi past”[37] and West Germany’s implicit support for the war in Vietnam was viewed as evidence of the Federal Republic of Germany’s fascist nature. This is an impression captured in Gudrun Ensslin’s declaration: “This is the Auschwitz generation – you cannot debate with them.”[38] This last claim highlights the extent to which a generational break and the assertion of a new found identity was felt to be both necessary and urgent within such socio-historical contexts.

We should by now start to realize the extent to which the emergence of terrorist groups relates directly to a process of identity creation. On a fundamental level, this process is key as it enables certain social groups to feel a sense of proximity with the antimouvement and its claims. Consequently, certain individuals thus feel that it is correct in its undertaking and, in certain cases, provide it with support. This is crucial to the very basic concern of recruitment within the group. Snow quite rightly indicated that for underground organizations, due to their secretive nature, recruitment can only take place within “extramovement social networks”[39]. Similarly, Wilkinson views a broad support base to be crucial for the emergence and longevity of the activities of terrorist groups, correlating the duration of armed struggle with the support the group enjoys[40]. Identity is central to this process of support acquisition. However, considering this essay’s focus on the terrorist group as an antimouvement, it is crucial to highlight, again, the extent to which this exercise of definition is heavily reliant on ideological and mythical material, rather than directly representing a given social group.

This process of identity creation facilitates antagonistic relations with other groups to emerge, which, for social movements, involves another movement with divergent interests within the status quo[41]. For the antimouvement, however, antagonism becomes not only heightened, but also blurred. What should be a conflicting relation is elevated to a state of war, with the opposition being designated no longer in terms of social belonging, but through broad references to the system, imperialism, order and the like[42]. Accordingly, this essay will argue that it is this dimension of the antimouvement, this blurred, conflicting conceptualization of relations, that is incorporated into a resort to violence through an appeal to a state of war, which marks the culminating point of a process of radicalization. Indeed, in both cases violent and excessive state repression show to be crucial in explaining the use of violence politically.

In the Basque country under Franco, when ETA was created, all ostensible representations of Basque nationalism were rendered illegal[43]. In effect, the repressive pressure on the Basques was double-edged in that it not only targeted any form of non-Spanish nationalism, but also the proletariat that had developed in the Basque country since its industrialization[44]. In West Germany, violent repression also formed a part of the political landscape. These repressive tendencies were effectively crystallized by the death of Benno Ohnesorg, which, for many, confirmed the fear of the West German government’s fascist tendencies and subsequently fostered the dialogue surrounding the use of violence politically[45]. These both correspond perfectly, in effect, to Tilly’s framework where he illustrates how social movements have repertories of actions, a set of practices they may engage in, that evolve during a cycle of protest[46]. Violent means are, then, provoked, justified, tested and ultimately adopted or rejected as responses to state sanctioned repression. Encounters with the state foster the radicalization of a movement[47].

This is similar to Krutwig’s idea of an action-repression-action cycle[48], a cycle that predicted a massive repressive response from the state would mobilize greater support for ETA and justify, in the eyes of the public, a more violent response from the terrorist group. In the case of ETA, this did indeed occur, with repression strengthening the Basque national consciousness[49]. The RAF in Germany, on the other hand, seemed more inclined to reason in terms of “propaganda by deed”, a concept associated with Pisacane. Pisacane argued that the masses were generally too exhausted to think for themselves and only violent actions had the impact necessary to guide them[50]. In either case, however, “state repression, coupled with activists’ declining faith in the value of peaceful protest, caused those skeptical about violence to seriously contemplate it and those persuaded of the need for violence to take the radical leap into action.”[51] Whether directly responding to a specific violent event acting as a “precipitant factor”[52] or to an ongoing policy of repressive state conduct resulting in alienation[53], harsh repression shows in both cases to have escalated to the point where some eventually saw the resort to violence as justified and viable. A second common characteristic to both cases, and to both action-repression-action[54] and “propaganda by deed”[55], is that violence plays a communicative role. As Crenshaw put it:

Terrorist violence communicates a political message; its ends go beyond damaging an enemy’s material resources. The victims or objects of terrorist attacks have little intrinsic value to the terrorist group but represent a larger audience whose reaction the terrorist seek.[56]

Though the act is fundamentally communicative, a language that diminishes the risks of it being misunderstood usually accompanies it[57].

In understanding violence as being communicative, the process of radicalization we have just sketched out reveals war or violence, as a representation of antagonism. This is nowhere more visible than in the writings and statements of terrorist groups. In the case of West Germany, we are fortunate in that Ulrike Meinhof, being konkret’s columnist[58], provides us with a wealth of writings from both before and during her underground activity, enabling us to palpably sense the discussion or incentives that ignited her participation. Meinhof’s quest for more influential political communication can be felt in her 1967 article “Napalm and Pudding”[59] in which she applauds the ability of the German kommunes[60] to use alternative protest methods to attract media attention. Thus, as she says, counters “the conspiracy of silence that oppositional activity in the Federal Republic is usually met with.”[61] The following year, her article “Setting Fire to Department Stores” not only marked the beginning of her formal interest in the activities of Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin, but also her support for specific forms of law breaking in the aim of conveying a political message. As she put it: “The law that gets broken when department stores are set on fire is not a law that protects people. It is law that protects property.”[62] Moreover, her discussion on the use of violence is then seen in her article “From Protest to Resistance”, where she claims: “The students are not rehearsing for a rebellion, they are engaging in resistance”, highlighting the fact that “violence, physical violence was deployed”, in response to the attack on Rudi Dutschke.[63] The final step of this radicalization, embracing the practices tentatively examined here, can be found in her later statements, such as the following one released while she was imprisoned in 1974: “we delight in the death of every cop who gets killed or has ever been killed, and anyone in prison who has tricked and killed the pigs is our brother, sister, comrade, friend – one of us.”[64] This language effectively removes any conceptual space between the terrorist group and the rest of society, the us and them. This use of language is not unique to the RAF. It presents conflict as a situation of war by employing a language characterized “not only by military vocabulary but by structures of conflict.”[65]

Within ETA, the theoretical input of the tercermundistas, like Federico Krutwig, had a similar effect[66]. Drawing extensively upon the experiences of liberation movements in the third-world, Krutwig introduced concepts such as guerrilla and war of national liberation within ETA’s discourse[67], emphasizing the warring stance adopted by the group. Also at play in this process is Euskera, which, within ETA, replaced “the two main pillars of Basque identity – race and religion”[68]. Language then, as the defining factor of the Basque people, acted as a dividing force. Nowhere is this put more clearly than in Clark’s work:

Language serves the purpose of stimulating conflict by sharpening the divisions between the combatants. Language serves to perpetuate struggle by transmitting the conflict from one generation to another.[69]

Language has, thus, gone hand in hand with the warring discourse adopted by ETA to explain its use of violence: “radical Basque nationalists have created an explanatory world-view with a great interpretive extension.”[70] In these ways, both ETA and the RAF have adopted discourses that seek to highlight the legitimacy of their recourse to violence[71] in a state of accrued conflict of which they liken to war.

The antimouvement’s third dimension, totality, asserts that the antimouvement no longer aims to alter a given status quo, but instead entirely topples the existing system in favour of an ideal – for example, Wieviorka speaks of “basculer dans un au-delà […] plus ou moins élaborée”[72][73]. This is accompanied by a resurgence of myths associated with this ideal[74]. Many revolutionary theorists have called for the complete alteration of the status quo. We will focus here on Franz Fanon, as he was highly influential for both terrorist groups.

Within ETA, Fanon’s works greatly inspired the tercermundistas[75], and the RAF, in light of its supposed anti-imperialist support for a variety of third world states[76], also drew extensively on his work[77]. In effect, Fanon’s revolutionary framework is entirely consistent with the principle of totality. Fanon says:

l’acteur contestataire entend non pas développer son combat à l’intérieur d’une relation avec un adversaire, mais s’en séparer, lorsque la figure de l’adversaire laisse la place à celle de l’ennemi, alors, la violence peut définir une dimension incontournable de l’action.”[78][79]

Fanon’s work, therefore, ties in well with the view of violence as being necessary and justified: the original violence is that delivered by the oppressor, giving way to that of the liberation movement[80]. This group, as we have already claimed, does not seek reform, but rather a complete break with its position as a subject[81]. As Sartre puts it in the preface of Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth:

The rebel’s weapon is the proof of his humanity. For in the first days of the revolt you must kill: to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time; the survivor, for the first time, feels a national soil under his foot.[82]

Other than capturing perfectly the drives we have mentioned so far, Fanon also provides a new interpretation of the role of violence, which Sartre touches upon, in that violence becomes a discursive process of self-liberation and affirmation. One’s identity becomes ultimately linked to the use of violence. Taken within the colonial context from which these groups viewed themselves to be part of, Fanon’s theory provides a firm base on which to build violent liberation movements pushing for a complete break with the status quo. In the case of ETA, Franco’s regime provided such an intense degree of repression, so as to ensure not only a sense of alienation but also the view of violence as being legitimate[83]. As for West Germany, the degree of police brutality[84] conjured, for many, the memories of the not-so-distant third Reich.

The final point that Wieviorka’s totality highlights is the distance from reality that inevitably accompanies the formation of the antimouvement, the increased reliance on “[s]ocial myths, traditions, and habits permit the development of terrorism as an established political custom.”[85] This essay has already pointed to the fact that an antimouvement is separate from a given social group – although it may benefit from some support from certain groups – and that it constructs its identity around “un imaginaire qui fait appel à des matériaux culturels – texts de la tradition religieuse, episodes historiques, mythes”[86][87]. Such a distance from reality is all the more poignant in the cases where violence occurs alongside the decline of a specific social movement. This echoes Wieviorka’s concept of ‘inversion’ defined as “un travail idéologique et pratique par lequel un acteur s’écarte de l’expérience vécue de ceux au nom de qui il s’engouffre dans le terrorisme et devient la figure hétéronome d’un combat qui n’est pas le sien, ou très accessoirement.”[88][89] ‘Inversion’ parallels della Porta’s claim that terrorism emerges in cases where a social movement cannot be revitalized[90]. Violence, in this case, comes and fills the gap of wavering general support.

Separation from the realities of representation and support are intensified by the degree of isolation that usually accompanies the commitment to an underground group. Indeed, a crucial point in the development of the RAF was the fact that, following the liberation of Andreas Baader on May 14^th 1970, many of the members were identified and forced permanently underground[91]. Similarly within ETA, the solidification of its structure saw the creation of the liberados[92], those essentially liberated from living in society in favour of a complete commitment to ETA[93]. These are all symptomatic of what Wieviorka calls the “éloignement du movement de reference”[94][95], in preference of a greater ideological calling necessitating a complete overthrow of the existing system. This has been referred to, quite rightly, as extreme perceptions of reality[96].

We have seen how, within the dimensions of an antimouvement, several processes are at play in what conditions the emergence of terrorism. Identity, which is defined in mythical or ideological terms and placed within a context of historical urgency, provides the antimouvement with a meaning that does not rely on representation of another group. The principle of opposition goes through a process of escalation, with state repression heightening the sense of antagonism between certain political actors and ultimately culminating in a vision of the status quo as a state of war. Here, the identities of those who stand outside the group become blurred, and the idea of a space between ‘us and them’ seems to disappear. Finally, Wieviorka’s totality shows how the ultimate aim becomes one of complete change from a given state of affairs. In this case, the myths and concepts on which the justification of violence relies on become elevated and eventually fill the void arising from the greater distance between terrorist actors and the social group to which they would wish to appeal. Here, violence is no longer simply a communicative political means. It becomes formative. This can be seen as, yet, another facet of the emergence of terrorist groups: their practices themselves eventually form part of the end that the group strives for. Violence becomes, in itself, part of the path to freedom.

On March 5^th 1937, fifty-two Basque civilians embarked onto the fishing boat, the Nabara, which tweaked to provide a makeshift battleship. These civilians fought the professionally trained forces of the Francoist blockade around the city of Bilbao[97]. Of the original crew, only fourteen survived that day[98]. Moved by the bravado of these men, the poet C. Day-Lewis wrote the poem “The Nabara” which, in effect, eloquently touches upon the very processes we have highlighted throughout this essay. It begins as follows:

Freedom is more than a word…
… She is mortal, we know, and made
In the image of simple men who have no taste for carnage
But sooner kill and are killed than see that image betrayed.[99]

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