Interview – Mutasim Ali – E-International Relations

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# Interview – Mutasim Ali

Jul 20, 2026

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by

E-International Relations
in Features, Interviews

Dr Mutasim Ali is Legal Counsel at the Raoul Wallenberg Center for Human Rights, where he co-leads its Sudan Taskforce for Accountability and Justice. He also leads the Center’s sanctions program, where he authors independent legal analyses and files submissions for targeted sanctions. He is a scholar-practitioner of constitutional law, international human rights, and post-conflict governance.and a leading advocate for genocide prevention and refugee rights. A survivor of the Darfur genocide, he became the first Darfuri asylum seeker to be granted refugee status in Israel, where he campaigned tirelessly for refugee protection.
Where do you see the most exciting research/debates happening in your field?

In the field of international law, the most exciting debate concerns states’ responsibility for breaches of international conventions intended to safeguard human life and dignity. While it is understandable that states may opt out of accepting the jurisdiction of an international arbitrator, this makes the enforcement of law and adherence to these conventions challenging. Particularly when states act in bad faith or use their political and economic influence to avoid scrutiny. For example, states failing to prevent genocide, or complicit in genocide, or even committing genocide, can evade accountability and justice solely because they lodged a reservation to the ICJ’s jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue in question—in this case, the threat facing entire communities targeted for extermination. The situation in Sudan is a case in point, where third-party states directly and openly enable genocidaires, yet cannot be brought to trial. The question, therefore, is: in times where mass atrocities are increasing, and the international order is at total risk, what are the tools available to enforce international law and hold even powerful states to account?

How has the way you understand the world changed over time, and what (or who) prompted the most significant shifts in your thinking?

For a long time, I saw the world through the lens of institutions, laws, and formal authority. I believed in the independence of international legal regimes to respond effectively to a situation like Sudan. Working with victims and survivors of atrocities and learning from the urgency of their issues made me realize that there are two worlds: the ideal world we all aspire to live in and another world that we deal with. The latter is driven by politics and economic interests. It is discouraging. Yet, working with mentors like the Honorable Irwin Cotler, who has dedicated his life to advocating for a better world, reminds us never to accept the world as it is.

Since Sudan’s independence in 1956, periods of armed conflict have outweighed periods of peace, and the current conflict has been described as a “war on civilians” because of its devastating impact on civilian populations. How should we understand the violence unfolding in Sudan today within the broader context of the country’s modern political history?

The current conflict in Sudan can only be understood as part of the country’s tragic history, where the State has consistently maintained exclusionary policies and relied on militarized solutions to respond to legitimate political claims (e.g., concerning marginalization and the equitable distribution of power). As such, subsequent Sudanese regimes established tribal and ideological militias to outsource violence. The creation of the Janjaweed Arab militias in the early 2000s is part of that process. The current war, however, can no longer be described as an internal armed conflict. Sudan has become a marketplace of industrial-scale violence, where foreign actors provide arms and money to the warring parties in exchange for gold and other minerals and natural resources.

Much international coverage of Sudan focuses on humanitarian suffering. While such reporting is undoubtedly important, does it risk obscuring the political dynamics of the conflict, and what is lost when audiences are encouraged to empathise with victims without necessarily understanding the structures that place them at risk?

It is indeed correct that the current crisis is purely political. It stems from deliberate policies of exclusion and failure to manage Sudan’s diversity. Therefore, an ultimate solution would be to address the root causes by engaging the broader Sudanese population in a participatory political process. The challenge now, however, is that in the face of continued mass atrocities and the threat of singling out communities one after the other for destruction and annihilation, we are forced to prioritize the protection of civilians over lengthier political processes. I am worried that by focusing on the underlying causes of Sudan’s political crisis now, we risk diverting our attention from the atrocities that are currently unfolding before our eyes. Accordingly, the international community should begin with an immediate cessation of hostilities and the delivery of aid to those in need, and this will eventually create conditions for political processes designed by the Sudanese that will ultimately lead to sustainable peace.

You have described Sudan as a “transnational marketplace of violence.” What does this concept help us see that conventional descriptions of the war fail to capture, and to what extent should contemporary conflicts be understood as political economies of profit rather than simply struggles for power?

The Sudan conflict is often perceived as a civil war or a war between two generals (the commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces, SAF, and the leader of the Rapid Support Forces, RSF). That framing obscures the reality that powerful external actors (e.g., states, corporate entities, and individuals) are fueling the conflict for access to Sudan’s natural resources, including the seaport. They’re not only supplying arms and funds but also recruiting mercenaries from thousands of miles away to fight in Sudan. The major problem with mercenaries is that because they do not have constituencies to care for and protect in Sudan, their main drive is material gain. That’s why they are so brutal when they commit atrocities. The El Fasher massacre is a case in point: the RSF, with the support of Colombian mercenaries, committed atrocities that the UN described as bearing the “hallmarks of genocide.” According to the UN, over 6,000 people were killed in the space of three days—the scale of violence was such that blood pools were visible from space. To date, tens of thousands remain unaccounted for. These atrocities would not have been possible without the substantial external backing of the RSF.

In 2024, the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence of genocide against the Masalit people in West Darfur. Yet international action remained limited. What does the Sudanese case reveal about the contemporary meaning of “Never Again” and the effectiveness of international institutions in preventing atrocities?

Regrettably, “Never Again” turned out to be again and again. Sudanese in Darfur have endured genocide twice within a single generation—yet there is no end in sight. States that once championed Never Again are today partnering with and even shielding those who commit or enable atrocities. Normally, states should act as a matter of legal and moral duty to prevent genocide. In other words, the failure to prevent genocide is a standalone breach of international law, let alone complicity and/or commission of genocidal acts. If prevention of genocide becomes a matter of political choice, the future is grim. Atrocities in Sudan set a dangerous precedent that will have far-reaching implications, beyond Sudan’s territory. This is another reason for the urgency to act.

You have argued that localised ceasefires should be prioritised over broad peace negotiations in Sudan. What does the Sudanese experience reveal about the relationship between civilian protection, localised ceasefires, and broader peace processes?

Sudan’s experience demonstrates that the Sudanese people, with the support of the international community, have consistently resorted to peace agreements between warring parties to resolve political issues affecting the broader Sudanese population. This approach created political pacts that preserved the interests of the parties involved while sidelining wider Sudanese society. The direct effect is that excluded groups are then incentivized to take up arms and enter into similar agreements. This explains why there are so many armed groups (mostly tribal and regional) in Sudan—some are taking sides with either the SAF or the RSF. Others have maintained a neutral position thus far. What makes the conflict’s resolution complex now is that the war has become profitable for the armed actors, so there is no political will to resolve it. As such, given the absence of political will, the unlikelihood that any party could prevail militarily, and the unwillingness of the international community to intervene, localized arrangements for cessation of hostilities become imperative to safeguard human life. This is by no means an ultimate solution; rather, it is a temporary measure meant to prepare the environment for a broader peace process. The success of localized ceasefires depends on the international community’s support for existing local mechanisms, which should be practical and not require substantial resources to enforce.

Much of your scholarship examines the relationship between peace-making and constitution-making in deeply divided societies. Drawing on Sudan’s experience, what can constitution-making realistically contribute to post-conflict peace-building?

A proper constitution-making process in Sudan is the ultimate guarantor of lasting peace. Since the creation of Sudan as a modern State, Sudanese have not had the opportunity to collectively discuss their visions and aspirations for Sudan. The State has been shaped by select political and military classes and has always been portrayed as an Arab and Islamic State. To break away from Sudan’s past, it is imperative that the Sudanese people deliberate on and construct a social contract that reflects their diversity and their views of the State. Only then can the country move to a prosperous future.

Looking ahead, what gives you hope for Sudan’s future, and what developments would need to occur for a sustainable, inclusive, and genuinely civilian-led political settlement to become possible?

The ongoing conflict is unlike any other, creating a significant divide among the Sudanese. Without being naïve about a better future for the Sudanese, I believe there remains an opportunity to resolve the root causes once and for all—for the conflict has now impacted nearly every Sudanese. That opportunity should be seized by engaging in an inclusive discussion guided by principles of human rights, dignity, and liberty. Sudanese must also invest in education for Sudan’s development. The failure this time risks dividing Sudan into a few smaller states, which will guarantee neither lasting peace nor development.

What is the most important advice you could give to early career scholars?

Young scholars must challenge the status quo and must not accept the world as it is. For example, when the ICJ continues to allow states to invoke a reservation to Article 9 of the Genocide Convention on the basis of its own precedent, that must be challenged. The world is changing, and the circumstances under which the Genocide Convention was adopted have changed, as has State practice. In other words, scholars should continuously drive the change and not be hostage to the past.