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Faith-Based Diplomacy and the Case of Somalia

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Introduction[1]

With a largely homogenous population, Somalia's people tend to speak a common language, and they share a similar cultural heritage with strong ties to the Sufi branch of Sunni Islam. Still, Somalia—having only gained its independence from Britain and Italy in 1960—had a great deal of difficulty forging a national identity. Throughout a century of colonial history, Somalia was parceled and divided constantly by different partitioning agreements between the world's colonial powers. Combined with a strong "reliance on clans as the primary social and governmental" institutions within Somali society, "the development of a 'national' identity, and consequently respect for a national government was difficult to achieve." [2]

After independence, what followed should be no surprise. In 1969, Siad Barre took control of Somalia through a military coup d'état. His regime engaged in a number of human rights violations, exploited clan rivalries, was oppressive, and corrupt. [3] In the late 1980s, support for Barre's regime declined precipitously. He successfully repelled a coup, and cracked down on enemy clans. The clans, however, joined together and formed a number of rival factions, each attempting to overthrow the government. By the late 1980s, coupled with the emergence of power thirsty warlords, this sparked a protracted and bloody civil war, and led to Barre's eventual exile. [4] Somalia descended into chaos, becoming "[o]ne of the first [failed-]states to arouse international attention" in the post-Cold War era. [5] Despite a number of attempts by the international community to intervene in Somalia the situation further devolved, and the war continues to this day. In fact, according to the *Fund for Peace* and *Foreign Policy* magazine's 2011 index of failed states, Somalia is the worst failed state in the world, topping the list four years in a row. [6]

Although the civil war in Somalia has never been an inherently religious conflict, Islamic militant organizations, such as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), and the Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin (Al-Shabaab) increasingly gain strength in Somalia. Some analysts fear that Al-Qaeda could even take advantage of Somalia's anarchy, moving operations to the East African state. Another major concern is that Somalia's persistent and pesky piracy problem could be used to finance terrorist and insurgency groups much in the way the Taliban capitalized on Afghanistan's opium trade. Ultimately, the fact is that Somalia could metastasize "into something worse than it has already become," [7] and this warrants the international community's immediate attention and eventual action.

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11), the United States of America (U.S.) has grown increasingly sensitive to the issues of failed states. In fact, some foreign policy experts believe that failed states can provide safe havens, such as the one provided by Afghanistan to Osama bin Laden prior to 9/11, to terrorists and other international criminals. Moreover, U.S. policy towards failed states has become far more complex and expensive over the last ten years. Because failed states, like Somalia, have difficulty enforcing the rule of law they become fertile recruiting and training grounds for terrorists. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that "most U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations" can call a failed state home. [8] Even now, however, Somalia still does not receive enough attention. Despite U.S. drone strikes on Islamic militants on 23 June 2011, for instance, the U.S. lacks a broad "strategic framework in Somalia," argues Joshua Foust. [9]

While heads of state, military thinkers and policymakers continue to debate a proper response [10] to recent events in the Horn of Africa, [11] what follows is an argument that traditional approaches to international relations (IR), such as

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liberalism, realism, and realpolitik, have failed in Somalia. As policymakers determine what to do with Somalia, they should consider employing faith-based diplomacy jointly with traditional military operations and Track I diplomatic efforts. Although the role of religion in the Somali conflict has only begun to develop over the last decade, perhaps the role of religion in the peace building process could be more prominent. Before one can really appreciate the kind of role religion can play in Somalia though, it is necessary to understand the role religion plays in IR.

Identity, Religion, and Violence in International Affairs

Although many scholars have found his “clash of civilizations” thesis to be a xenophobic rendering of post-Cold War geopolitics,[12] Samuel P. Huntington’s ideas remain a credible force in today’s world. Huntington argues that throughout the twenty-first century the various civilizations of the globe will find themselves at odds in one of two types of identity-based clashes: “fault line conflicts,” or “core state conflicts.”[13] Identity-based conflicts between ethnic groups, religious groups, tribes, clans, and nations, have taken place during every era of human history. [14] Moreover, he warns, protracted fault-line conflicts last longer than most others, precisely because they involve “the fundamental issues of group identity and power.”[15]

Yet, strangely enough, Huntington’s forecast was ignored by many experts who were surprised in the 1990s, by what *seemed* to be the very genesis of identity-based conflict. Some analysts, policymakers, and scholars were just too accustomed to the East-West political, and economic rivalries of the latter half of the twentieth century. Consequently, they assumed that fighting would be rooted in the same “old Cold War ideologies of the past.” Therefore, asserts Douglas Johnston, the founder and president of the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD), these experts were essentially unprepared for identity-based hostilities to play such a large role in twenty-first century conflict.[16]

Students now understand that the 1990s and 2000s were witness, not to issues of communism and capitalism, but to the *reemergence* of conflicts of communal identity based on ethnicity, race, nationality, religion, clans, tribes, and so on.[17] Unfortunately, argues Reza Aslan,

[r]eligion is *identity*. Indeed in many parts of the world, including the United States, religion is fast becoming the supreme identity, encompassing and even superseding ethnicity, culture, and nationality.[18]

In other words, religious-based conflict is a historical reality that will proliferate in the absence of the ideological pressures that once divided the world. Take religious civil wars as an example. These conflicts cause more fatalities among combatants and civilians than non-religious civil wars, they typically last around two years longer, they recur twice as often, and finally, “they make up an increasing proportion of all civil wars.”[19] In fact, notes Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah, religious civil wars only accounted for 19% of all civil wars in 1940, but by 1990, they accounted for nearly half.[20]

Religious civil war and religious terrorism are often prosecuted by members of transnational communities that are capable of invoking “the transnational nature” of their beliefs to instigate conflicts with “‘glocalized’ dimensions.”[21] Huntington is not surprised. He suggests that religion is the most important thing that distinguishes one civilization—the highest form of identity—from another. In the post-Cold War era, “economic modernization and social change” are divorcing people from their local identities, while also weakening the nation-state as a key “source of identity.”[22] Aslan suggests that individuals have multiple markers of identity. So, if nationality gives way “it is only natural that another” identity marker, like religion, would fill the void.[23]

Huntington agrees. It is religion that seeks to fill the gap left by the decline of these other forms of identity; and it is religion that unites civilizations because of the fact that it transcends arbitrary national borders.[24] The problem, however, is that defining identity in terms of religion creates an “us” versus “them” paradigm that allows animosity to flourish and fosters violent conflict.[25] There is, as Aslan maintains, “no middle ground,” in this kind of conflict, because it “partitions the world into black and white, good and evil, us and them.”[26] Said differently, it turns “them” into an enemy, and enemies must be destroyed. Since religious wars mirror cosmic conflicts between good and evil, the cosmic warrior is thus viewed as “a puppet in the hands of God.”[27]

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Basic Track I diplomacy cannot fully address these issues, unfortunately, because post-Enlightenment traditions have, for the most part, left religion and statecraft divorced from one another in the West, and especially in the U.S. Accordingly, the practice of diplomacy has been characterized more by matters of realpolitik than morality since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[28] Furthermore, the field of IR has, over the whole, primarily been concerned with “the Westphalian scheme of sovereignty” that intended to rein in religious fundamentalism, curb the influence of oppressive theocrats, and prevent religious wars and crusades.[29] As a result, issues of morality, culture, and identity go largely unnoticed by foreign policy elites around the globe. From genocide to terrorism, this has complicated a number of issues that dominate contemporary IR. In fact, it has been suggested that the failure to understand the potency of religion in IR led to both Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution and the events of 9/11.[30]

Beyond the practical implications of this reality, the West’s adherence to sovereignty and secular nationalism—the “political philosophy that places the nation-state at the center of collective identity”[31]—has left religion and the role it plays in the world an understudied aspect of IR.[32] Of course, many people instinctively understand that religion *does* play a role in global affairs. The problem is that they view the role of religion in world politics through the lenses of sovereignty, secular nationalism, and the secularization thesis.[33] This typically causes them to conjure ideas of “violent confrontation,” suggests Lee H. Hamilton, because “[h]istory is replete with illustrations of the divisive role that religion has played” in IR.[34]

Some experts, however, are trying to alter this perception by highlighting the aspects of religion that promote peace, justice, and reconciliation. Madeleine Albright, the former U.S. Secretary of State under President Bill Clinton, says it best. Religion, and interfaith understanding, she contests, can

inspire us to look for the best in ourselves and in others. [Abraham] Lincoln... coined the perfect phrase, appealing in the aftermath of war to ‘the’ better angels of our nature’—summoning our capacity to care for one another in ways that cannot fully be explained by self-interest, logic, or science.[35]

Johnston and Brian Cox believe that there is a way to apply the “moral warrants for peacemaking [that] exist in the theologies of all major world religions” to conflicts such as these.[36] Despite the fact that religious zeal has inspired many conflicts throughout history, they claim that it can also help end them. “Ways,” insist Johnston and Cox, “must be found to use religion as a positive force in resolving” the twenty-first century’s major clashes of communal identity.[37]

For this reason, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the ICRD, and transnational religious actors (TRAs), such as the Mennonite and Roman Catholic Churches, are actively promoting the role of religion in international security and peace building. Said differently, these organizations are tapping into the “potential of a new kind of diplomacy” called Faith-based diplomacy (FBD), which has the ability to bring a new level of transcendence to conflict, by speaking directly “to the heart, mind, and spirit of the combatants.”[38]

In the war for public opinion though, secular ideologues and dedicated atheist proselytizers, such as James Haught, author of *Holy Hatred: Religious Conflicts of the '90s* and *Holy Horrors: An Illustrated History of Religious Murder and Madness*, still continue to propagate a negative vision of religion’s role in the world. They further confuse the situation by insisting that religion is “unrepentantly violent, even the root of all violence.”[39] From a political standpoint, advocates of secularism in the U.S. can justify the absence of religious considerations from foreign policy making and diplomacy by standing behind the doctrine of the separation of church and state. On the other hand, Johnston argues that FBD has the ability “to bridge the gap across religious boundaries” without interfering with the West’s desire to separate church and state.[40]

This is critical. Greater intercultural understanding is paramount for the security of the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. military understands this. After the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were well underway, the U.S. Army began deploying human terrain teams (HTTs), in an effort to map the social and cultural terrain of each combat theater.[41] FBD has the potential to further this understanding at the international and micro-societal levels. Yet, in the upper echelons of government, policymakers use the wall of separation between church and state to feign naivety of religious issues. Arguably, this has compounded the general misunderstandings the West has with, for example, the Islamic World.

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Within the Islamic worldview, there is no separation of church and state. However, now that the events of 9/11 have demonstrated the virility of religion's role in IR, policymakers are obligated, more than ever, to consider religion in the creation of foreign policy.

Faith-Based Diplomacy (FBD)

In the post-9/11 era, two inextricably linked questions remain. First, how must the policymakers and diplomats of the world attempt to heal the rifts between the Islamic and Western worlds? Surely, the fences damaged by two long and devastating wars require more than an exit strategy to be mended. Second, how can the U.S. and its allies move forward in their overseas counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism operations without further destabilizing relations with the Islamic world?

Traditional Track I diplomacy rooted in the secular status quo is incapable of answering these questions fully. The concept of the separation of church and state is alien and intolerable to most in the Islamic world. In fact, "Islam speaks the language of integration," not separation. For example, when Westerners use the term "secular," Muslim's hear "godlessness."^[42] American policymakers must realize that "Islam embraces faith and politics," because religious convictions are deeply wedded to political life throughout the Ummah (Muslim community).^[43] With this in mind, official Track I diplomacy must be supplemented by Track II, or unofficial, diplomacy. Specifically, FBD can help bridge the divide between the Islamic and Western worlds, by opening a dialogue, building relationships, promoting reconciliation, and facilitating a greater understanding of Western and Islamic cultural differences. This will also make it easier for the U.S. to move forward in its counterterrorism and COIN operations without further straining relations with nation-states in the world of Islam.

For example, Johnston argues a compelling case for the expansion of the Foreign Service to make room for the appointment of religion attachés. First of all, religion attachés appointed to key countries could help infuse policymaking discussions with knowledgeable information about the role religion plays in culture, conflict, and more. Former Secretary of State Albright says that she had no problem developing trade deals, because she could rely on "an entire bureau of economic experts," and she had a "cadre of experts on nonproliferation and arms control." In all of the State Department, only one Ambassador could give her reliable advice regarding the integration of religious principles into her diplomatic efforts.^[44] Religion attachés would help resolve this problem. Second, the deployment of such specialists by the U.S. Department of State could significantly increase the capacity of the Army's HTTs by communicating information regarding religion to teams in the field. Essentially, this would improve the aspects of COIN that focus on winning hearts and minds.^[45] Third, the State Department, through the religion attaché, could work with NGOs and TRAs engaged in FBD. This would provide a tremendous amount of legitimacy to these organizations, while promoting and building a successful multi-track diplomacy. Finally, Johnston says that the religion attaché could take over a great deal of the responsibilities associated with the International Religions Freedom Act, thus relieving overburdened embassy staffs and improving America's image abroad.^[46]

FBD also encourages engagement. Take, for instance, President Barack Obama's efforts to engage the Muslim World in an open and honest dialogue. The Obama Administration has taken a number of tangible steps to "repair the damage caused by the hostile characterization of Muslims" over the last decade.^[47] First, President Obama appointed George Mitchell as special envoy to the Middle East, and then he gave a number of critical speeches in an attempt to reach out to Iranian, Turkish, and Arab Muslims all throughout the greater Middle East. In doing so, he has established a clear set of goals, such as promoting greater educational opportunities for young people in Palestine. These goals were based on common ideals that transcend the differences between Westerners and the Ummah; and by invoking the Qur'an, President Obama has given his goals additional legitimacy "in the eyes of an attentive Muslim population."^[48]

So far, FBD sounds promising; although, some may consider this a "timid or toothless"^[49] approach to foreign policy. Addressing such a criticism requires that practitioners and students of FBD look beyond intercultural understanding and rhetorical efforts at building partnerships. They must identify some of the substantive aspects of FBD. They must answer these questions: 1) what exactly is FBD; 2) when has it been employed in the past; and 3) how has it succeeded?

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One of the earliest known instances of what might be called FBD occurred during the Sixth Crusade (1227-1228), commonly referred to as the Crusade of Frederick II. Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II (r. 1215-1250) had a cosmopolitan upbringing on the island of Sicily. An orphan, Frederick was educated by his guardian, Pope Innocent III (r. 1198-1216). Eventually, he took the crown of Sicily, where he ruled over a Muslim majority population. When Frederick led a crusade to the Holy Land, he used his knowledge of Islam, Arabic, and the culture of the Levant in a diplomatic effort to retake the city of Jerusalem in a bloodless crusade. His efforts eventually paid off, as the Muslims agreed to a ten-year truce, and the cession of Jerusalem, Nazareth, and Bethlehem. In return, Frederick agreed to allow Muslims to remain in the city and to retain their property. Additionally, he agreed that the Muslim population could have a distinct justice system, administered by Muslim officials. In addition to this autonomy, the Muslims were able to retain control over the Dome of the Rock, and the el-Aqsa Mosque.[50]

The crusades were a clash of civilizations made manifest in a centuries-long holy war. As a type of faith-based diplomat, however, Frederick was able to overcome these circumstances. Even if his successes were short-lived, by recognizing the differences between the European Christians he led, and his Middle Eastern Muslim opponents, he was able to transcend cultural barriers in an effort to obtain an agreeable settlement. Two chronicles demonstrating some of Frederick's qualities have been handed down by some of his Arab contemporaries. First of all, Muslims respected Frederick II because he was the ruler of Sicily. Second, they respected his attempts at building relationships with the sultan. For example, the emperor sent messages to Sultan al-Malik al-Kamil "on difficult philosophical, geometric and mathematical points, to test the men of learning at his court." By building a friendship—something that may not have happened if Frederick were not a prototypical faith-based diplomat, respectful of Muslim culture—each ruler came to trust and feel secure with the other.[51] Other Muslims came to respect Frederick's actions, too. During one episode, the emperor was visiting Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem. He commented on the beauty of the Dome of the Rock, praised the beautiful calls to prayer, and read Arabic inscriptions about the previous crusades aloud, even noting humorously that the Christians were referred to as polytheists. Finally, he chased a proselytizing priest from the sites, demonstrating to the Muslims his sincerity and understanding.[52]

Indeed, FBD is, as the title of one article suggests, "an ancient idea." In fact, one of the most basic principles of FBD is reconciliation, which has its roots in ancient Hebrew, Greek, Roman, Arab, and Indian traditions. Other principles of the faith-based diplomat include an unwavering commitment to prayer, fasting, and love for one's enemy.[53] To this list might also be added a commitment to nonviolent civil resistance, where appropriate, of course.

These qualities have been illustrated time and again by some of history's more recent cases of FBD in action. Take, for example, one of the world's most famous and most capable faith-based diplomats, Pope John Paul II (r. 1978-2005).[54] He used his spiritual role as the head of the Catholic Church and his temporal role as the head of the Vatican to intervene in a number of issues throughout his reign. Under his leadership, the Vatican mediated the Beagle Channel Conflict (1978). His visit to Cuba and meeting with Fidel Castro (1998) had prodigious implications. His visit to St. Louis, Missouri (1999) resulted in the commutation of a death row inmate convicted of murder. Finally, the pope played a pivotal role in the defeat of communism and the end of the Cold War.

Shortly after being elected pope, John Paul II directed the Vatican to intervene in the Beagle Channel Conflict, a confrontation between Chile and Argentina over a disputed waterway. The pope, concerned about a war between two Catholic countries, used the Vatican's institutional authority to prevent such an occurrence. Over the next six years, the Vatican's successful mediation resulted in a new accord: the Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Following a national referendum in Argentina, the treaty was signed in Rome, and the conflict was finally put to rest.[55]

In 1998 and 1999, the pope again demonstrated an aptitude for FBD. First, he traveled to Cuba. John Paul II conducted public masses, and met privately with Fidel Castro. Afterwards, Cuba freed over a hundred political prisoners, with Castro promising "to evaluate the cases of hundreds of others." The visit also sparked a review of U.S. policy towards Cuba, leading to the "resumption of humanitarian flights to the island," and an easing of restrictions that allowed exiles to send money to family members in Cuba, and that allowed more sales of medical supplies to the island.[56] Second, in 1999, Pope John Paul II traveled to St. Louis, Missouri on a visit that would have similar results for one prisoner.

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On the occasion of the pope's visit, Missouri Governor Mel Carnahan and some of his staff were summoned to an audience with the Vatican's top diplomat, Secretary of State Cardinal Angelo Sodano. The governor and his staff were bracing for a lecture on the death penalty or abortion. However, Governor Carnahan and his handlers were surprised when they heard the real reason they were summoned. Cardinal Sodano said

Governor... we've invited you here today in a spirit of friendship and goodwill, not confrontation. We're not asking you to change your personal views on capital punishment. We're not asking you to change the laws of your state... We're asking one thing, and one thing only. On behalf of the pope... we're asking that you exercise your mercy and authority in regard to Mr. Darrell Mease.[57]

Darrell Mease was a Missourian from the Ozarks, who murdered three people in 1988. He was convicted of First Degree Murder on 15 April 1990, and sentenced to death in June. Mease set on death row for years, but his execution was coincidentally scheduled during the papal visit, and subsequently delayed. After an interfaith prayer service, John Paul II approached Governor Carnahan, and personally reiterated Cardinal Sodano's request that the delay of Mease's execution be made permanent: "Governor, will you please have mercy on Mr. Mease?"[58] On 28 January 1999, the governor's office made it official. Darrell Mease's sentence was commuted, making the convict the first man in the history of the U.S. "to have his sentence commuted through the direct intervention of a religious leader from outside the country." [59]

During the Cold War, the pope's historic visit to Poland in 1979 played a critical role in the development of Solidarity, and the eventual downfall of communism in Eastern Europe. First, the pope began a campaign for religious freedom in the Eastern bloc. Eventually, he visited six cities in Poland over a nine day period. While the pope's visit helped foster among Poles, an "us" versus "them" mentality, it gave them the will to stand up to their communist oppressors.[60] Massive crowds turned out to see the pope, too. This fostered a sense of community—of solidarity—among the Poles as they realized they were not alone in their desire for change.

On August 14, 1980, a group of laborers at the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk launched a strike, wherein they demanded free trade unions, and more. John Paul II began publicly praying for Poland, and eventually led the Polish Church to support the Gdansk strikers. On August 31, the Polish government capitulated, signing an agreement that would establish Solidarity as the "first independent trade union behind the iron curtain." [61] Together, the Church and Solidarity undermined the legitimacy of the government. Ten years after John Paul II's historic visit, Poland hosted free elections.[62]

Many practitioners of FBD look to the events in Poland that helped usher in the end of the Cold War for inspiration. This may come as a surprise, given that the actions of the resistance were not meant to promote reconciliation, but instead were meant to defeat the enemy. However, the alliance between labor unions, intellectuals, and the Polish Catholic Church was successful because of its commitment to nonviolent civil resistance, an aspect, as noted above, of FBD. The case of the pope in Poland shows how effective FBD and nonviolent civil resistance can be in the promotion of democracy, and in the struggle against authoritarianism. It also demonstrates the efficacy of the partnership between civil society and religious institutions in promoting nonviolent political change.[63] Although the alliance in Poland dissolved after the Cold War,[64] it serves as a useful example for faith-based diplomats for other reasons, too. R. Scott Appleby contends that while many people in Poland viewed "their communist countrymen as ideological outsiders and traitors," the peaceful transition of power was marked by an astonishing "degree of civic tolerance for the vanquished opponents." [65]

FBD as a mode of conflict resolution, on the other hand, is a driving force in post-conflict reconciliation. As such, it seeks unity through diversity, the inclusion of every party to a conflict in the development of a solution, conflict resolution consistent with just war theory, forgiveness, and social justice. That's why FBD calls upon practitioners with a conscious dependence on spiritual principles, moral authority, dedication to pluralism, and an understanding that sacred texts can fill in the blanks of human understanding.[66] While most faiths take different and distinctive approaches to the issues of war and peace,[67] religious communities all over the world have parables and scriptural traditions that can "inspire and promote peace" if properly "identified and pressed into action." [68]

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Understanding the common threads of humanity that unify divergent religious communities is critical. That's why understanding such verses is so important.[69] It can help foster a sense of goodwill, cooperation, and commonality. Take the Rig Veda, a Hindu holy text, for instance. It says: "Let your aims be common, and your hearts be of one accord, and all of you be of one mind, so you may live well together." [70] The Qur'an articulates a similar message: "We made you into nations and tribes that you may know and cooperate with one another." [71] Judeo-Christian tradition also echoes the need for amity, good relations, and neighborly respect: "you shall not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge against the sons of your people, but you shall love your neighbor as yourself." [72]

The ICRD [73] understands and utilizes this. Operating for some time in the Sudan in an effort to help heal the wounds caused by civil war, the ICRD facilitated a meeting between Christian and Muslim communities in Khartoum in November of 2000 that was successful because of its adherence to the principles of FBD. The ICRD built moral authority by enlisting the Sudan Council of Churches as its co-sponsor. Then, over four days, each meeting began with prayer, and readings from both the Bible and Qur'an. Religious leaders involved in the meetings also participated in informal prayer breakfasts. Plus, the ICRD's facilitating team led members of the Muslim and Christian communities in prayer and fasting throughout the deliberations, which provided the "transcendent dimension that helped inspire the participants to rise above their personal and religious differences." [74] From the conference in Khartoum came a seventeen point consensus that recommended cooperation on employment issues, human rights issues, education, and issues of humanitarian assistance. Moreover, the ICRD persuaded the Sudanese government to implement these recommendations in serious diplomatic discussions that also invoked the Qur'an, the Prophet Mohammed, and Jesus. [75]

Johnston contends that Muslims respond to faith-based interventions to a high degree, because of the fact that this type of engagement is encouraged by Islamic law. Logic, he insists, therefore dictates that FBD would be a very effective way to open dialogue with Muslims all over the world. [76] That is why, in addition to the Sudan, the ICRD is actively involved in faith-based peacemaking efforts in Kashmir, Iran, Syria, and Afghanistan. [77] The most famous case of FBD in action so far, though, was not fostered by the caring activists at the ICRD. In fact, it "was orchestrated by President Jimmy Carter at Camp David in 1978." [78]

President Carter invited Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat to the U.S. for a series of peace talks at the secluded Camp David. The talks progressed slowly, with Sadat and Begin often engaging in long shouting matches. Briefly, they even stalled over the issue of Israeli settlements in the Sinai. President Carter, all but ready to give up, shared an emotional moment with Prime Minister Begin on the penultimate day of the summit. This led to a breakthrough, as Prime Minister Begin acquiesced to one more attempt at a settlement. Since "Begin had taken an oath, before God, not to dismantle any existing Israeli settlement," the three men finally agreed to allow the Israeli Knesset to deal with the issue of settlers in the Sinai. However, the Israelis and Egyptians built the framework for a peace treaty, which provided for mutual recognition, prohibited aggression between the two states, called for the exchange of ambassadors, and gave Israel the right of shipping through the Suez Canal. [79] Former Secretary of State Albright insists that the Camp David Accords would not have "come about if not for [President] Carter's ability to understand and appeal to the deep religious convictions of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin." [80]

The Camp David Accords attempted to address the issue of Palestine. Palestinian leaders did not attend the conference though. As a result, the provisions of the treaty that dealt with the Israeli withdraw from the West Bank have never been enforced. [81] The issue of Israel and Palestine remains ever present. Though, not the root cause of terrorism, the lack of resolution in the Palestinian peace process has made it easier for terrorists to criticize the West and the U.S. In fact, Jim Wallis stresses that the issue of Palestine represents the "most grievous source of anger among Arabs and Muslims." [82] Extremists use the plight of the Palestinians as a recruitment mechanism and call to arms. Israel is also being used as a justification for terrorist attacks. Take the first attack on the World Trade Center, for example. An organization called the Liberation Army claimed responsibility for the attack, demanding that the U.S. cut all diplomatic ties, and stop all aid to Israel. [83] Addressing this issue will not end Islamic terrorism, but it certainly will undermine it.

Wallis believes that religious communities can play a vital role in the Middle East peace process, and in responding

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to the global threat of terrorism, because *the* religious community “is itself an international community and not just an American one.”[84] The international religious community has not given up hope on the peace process, either. In fact, interfaith teams from the U.S., and Europe, comprising Jews, Christians, and Muslims have been deployed to Israel and the occupied territories to agitate for peace. Christian Palestinians actively promote nonviolent resistance, as do members of the international community. When a group of Palestinian Muslims was on its way to pray at the local mosque, a group of armed Israeli soldiers stood between them and the Mosque. In one heroic act, two members of the Christian Peacemaker Team—an American and Canadian—jumped in front of the soldiers. The two CPT activists cried out to the soldiers that the Muslims were unarmed people, which likely prevented the shooting of countless individuals. Other organizations, such as Jews United for Peace, or “Junity,” have held countless meetings trying to foster public momentum for peace. Even more are orchestrating large-scale, high-profile protests.[85]

As has been demonstrated in a review of various cases, FBD can be applied in a number of ways. With the right resources, FBD can be successfully applied to five different types of conflict:

1. Conflicts wherein religion represents “a significant factor in the identity of” the combatants, such as the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir;
2. Conflicts wherein religious leaders can be mobilized as activists in the peace process, such as the conflict in the Sudan;
3. Conflicts wherein different religious communities have been estranged for a significant period of time, requiring the development of a “civilizational dialogue,” such as the supranational issues that divide Islam and the Christian West;
4. Conflicts requiring third party mediation, wherein no significant religious dimension necessarily exists; and
5. Instances wherein the secular forces of realpolitik have led to an extended impasse, such as the situation in Cuba prior to Pope John Paul II’s visit.[86]

Somalia fits into three of these categories. The Somali civil war represents a conflict wherein religious leaders could possibly play a role in the peace process. Second, it is a conflict that has never been inherently religious, but could still use third party mediation. Finally, the forces of realpolitik and more broadly, of realism and liberalism, have failed there. In these three ways, FBD may be applicable to the worst failed-state in the world.

The Somali Conflict: The Making of the Most Dangerous Place on Earth

When the war of succession began in Somalia, the government failed, and anarchy, chaos, and lawlessness became the norm. The warring factions triggered a famine, as militias prevented farmers from planting their crops, and killed much of the nation’s livestock. In 1980, the U.S. military’s humanitarian mission, Operation Bright Star, came to Somalia when troops were airlifted out of Egypt to deliver food. By 1984, however, it was apparent that food supplies were being left “to rot on the loading docks,” because Somalia had no highways or infrastructure to speak of.[87] Despite offers from the U.S. to help distribute food, which Somalia rejected, people continued to die. According to Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, around “300,000 Somalis died of starvation; another two million were in immediate danger.”[88]

For some time, the international community looked away. Only when the media pressured involvement, did the United Nations (UN) take action.[89] In April 1992, the UN Security Council authorized the first UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). UNOSOM I deployed a small contingent of armed observers to monitor a UN brokered ceasefire. Working jointly with the observers was a group of several hundred Pakistani soldiers tasked with the protection and distribution of medicine and food. In 1992, the failure of UNOSOM I, led President George H. W. Bush to propose a U.S. led mission to the fragmented state. The UN’s humanitarian mission to Somalia was unraveling, as peacekeepers found it too difficult to protect Somali ports and food aid to the civil war torn country. By December the Security Council agreed to President Bush’s proposal to deploy a task force led by 28,000 U.S. troops to Somalia. Within days, Operation Restore Hope, led by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), had begun; 20,000 U.S. troops were being deployed.[90]

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UNITAF was under the full operational command of the U.S. Under U.S. leadership, Operation Restore Hope successfully forced open the airport and seaport facilities of Mogadishu, Somalia's capital city. With almost no casualties, the mission also began disarming bandits, and securing lines of communications. Mogadishu was easily the most volatile area occupied by UNITAF forces. However, the city began to improve as combat engineers cleared the streets of debris, and as forces engaged in active patrolling. UNITAF also succeeded in improving infrastructure, making it easier and safer to traverse the country side and to distribute food and other goods. As UNITAF completed its objectives, the groundwork was laid for a new phase in the peacekeeping mission to Somalia. The UN was prepared to launch UNOSOM II, and in May 1993, UNITAF officially merged with the new UN operation.[91]

UNOSOM II drastically altered the previous peacekeeping mission in Somalia. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali urged the international community to begin establishing a government. As a result, the UN made preparations to rebuild Somalia's stagnant economic and political institutions. Boutros-Ghali also called for the full disarmament of the competing militias. With this in mind, the Security Council authorized UNOSOM II, under the terms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to use any means and force required to disarm Somalia's warlords, especially if they were blocking access to suffering civilians.[92]

However, UNOSOM II quickly fell into trouble. First, the UN decided to disregard Somali cultural order, displacing clan leaders from the formation of any new government. A number of Somalia's warlords, clan leaders, and gang leaders were put out, in spite of their desire for an equal stake in determining the country's future.[93] Then, General Mohammed Farah Aidid, Somalia's principal warlord, began resisting the UN's expanded mission, as it called for his own removal and disarmament. Aidid, who controlled Mogadishu, may have felt isolated by the UN's policy. He may have even felt that the international community was directly supporting his enemies. After all, members of the Habr Gidr clan believed that their long time enemy, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, had orchestrated the intervention in Somalia, principally to restore the old Barre regime's Darod clan.[94]

Whatever the case, these factors combined and led to an increase in fighting. On 5 June 1993, when Pakistani peacekeepers attempted to search one of Aidid's munitions depots, members of the Habr Gidr clan retaliated, launching two ambushes. The second incident occurred when a Pakistani convoy came under attack after being delayed by barricades in the road. A total of twenty-four[95] Pakistani soldiers were killed in the ensuing violence. In response, the UN—now apparently in “the awkward business of retaliation”—escalated, and issued an order for Aidid's arrest and punishment.[96]

Aidid met the threat, in what would become the climax of UNOSOM II. During the Battle of Mogadishu, Aidid's forces attacked a group of U.S. troops, and they shot down a U.S. helicopter. Chronicled in Mark Bowden's book, *Black Hawk Down*, and a movie by the same name, the events of the battle would eventually lead to the disbanding of UNOSOM II. On 3 October 1993, based on real-time, actionable intelligence, U.S. Task Force Ranger (TF Ranger) launched a lightning raid to capture some of Aidid's top leaders. Deep in the heart of Aidid's territory, TF Ranger faced a number of tragic events, culminating in the strike of a black hawk helicopter by a Somali rocket propelled grenade, or RPG. After attempting a rescue, TF Ranger was stranded in Mogadishu throughout the night. The next day, a slain soldier was drug back and forth through the streets in front of a cheering Somali crowd and television cameras. In all, nearly 160 soldiers were deployed on the mission. In a battle they could not win, eighteen were killed after being overrun.[97]

After the Battle of Mogadishu, President Clinton, anticipating public opinion fallout, decided to withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia. Thus, the U.S. came to play no further role in the development of the Somali government. Public opinion did turn against the war, and the UN, which itself, eventually lost interest in the failed-state. The Security Council, consequently, approved a resolution that would disband UNOSOM II; thus in March 1995, the UN ended its operations in the Horn of Africa.[98]

Now, sixteen years after the humiliating withdraw of the UN, Somalia's civil war continues, poor Somali fishers have turned to violent piracy in the wake of environmental degradation off the coast of Puntland, and Somalia now faces “a raging Islamist insurgency, a government that controls a few city blocks, and African Union peacekeepers with no peace to keep.”[99] If that were not enough, East Africa is facing one of its severest droughts in the last sixty years,

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resulting in another severe famine that could cost Somalia, according to UN projections, 750,000 lives.[100] Thus, Somalia, the worst failed-state in the world, has also become the most dangerous place on Earth.[101]

The Role of Religion in the Somali Conflict

At the height of the civil war, self-association with Islam grew in strength. Average Somalis were reading the Qur'an more, in an effort to find the spiritual strength and guidance necessary for survival. Of course, "[i]dentification with Islam also became a means to achieve physical security,"[102] as militia youth groups avoided attacking religious people out of fear of the retribution of God. In spite of this, the proliferation of factions during the civil war never really seemed to produce any religiously based organizations.

Between 1991 and 1996, only three organizations of note materialized. The first was al Itihaad al Islaami (AIAI), which was the only religious faction arming itself and trying to take over territory violently. The AIAI was eventually defeated and driven from Puntland. The second such group was an international Islamic NGO, al-Islaah. Al-Islaah proved quite successful in the education sector, as it gained a great deal of influence in Mogadishu, enabling it to work across different groups. Finally, the third institution to develop was the Islamic Courts. The courts attempted to force Sharia law on Somalia, using armed militias to do so. While initially successful, the political clout of the Islamic Courts led other groups to challenge them, leading to their destruction. The next four years saw the merger of Islamic groups with various clans and other communities. In fact, in 2000, a number of leaders from the Islamic Courts divided over the issue of whether or not to partner with the Transitional National Government (TNG).[103]

After 9/11, Somalia once again gained the attention of U.S. policymakers and the international community. This time, there were no altruistic attempts to alleviate the suffering of Somalis. Instead, President George W. Bush, among others, asserted that failed-states like Somalia could become safe-havens, recruiting grounds, and command centers for terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda. This was a logical conclusion, of course, given that "terrorism and instability go hand in hand." [104] Moreover, the absence of authority in Somalia, and the high levels of anarchy that go along with it, created within the failed-state the perfect environment to foster the development of terrorism and extremism. This is made evident by the fact that terrorist and insurgent groups in Somalia are progressively adopting "a fundamental Islamic predisposition." [105]

The first major Islamic-based insurgency group to come to power in the post-9/11 era was the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU was comprised of the old Islamic courts, members of al-Islaah, jihadis, Takfiris, and others with close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. The ICU came to prominence when a popular uprising drove the warlords from Mogadishu, as it filled a void that could not otherwise be filled by businessmen or clan leaders. In 2006, the ICU renamed itself the Supreme Islamic Courts Council (SICC). Later, the SICC launched a series of attacks on the warlords in Mogadishu, dividing and conquering the warring factions. By June 2006, the SICC took control of Mogadishu, and continued to consolidate its power outside of the capital. For about six months, the courts maintained control over the capital and surrounding regions. Under the SICC, banning of folk music, un-Islamic material, and the harsh enforcement of female modesty became common place. In 2007, Ethiopia used the Islamic courts movement as a pretext for intervening in Somalia. Within a few weeks, the SICC was ousted from Mogadishu. Unfortunately, the fighting currently taking place in Somalia is likely a direct result of this move.[106]

Much of the world had not heard of Al-Shabaab, until the militia carried out twin attacks on Ugandan World Cup fans watching the final match at a couple of restaurants in Kampala on 11 July 2010. The aim of Al-Shabaab's first international terrorist attack was to convince Uganda to remove its peacekeepers from Somalia. The murder of seventy-four people, however, hardened Uganda's resolve. Through the auspices of the African Union's (AU) peacekeeping mission to Somalia, Uganda pledged more troops to the failed-state. For its part, the AU agreed to send 2,000 more troops to Somalia, too.[107]

According to Dan Cox and Christopher Heatherly, authors of the forthcoming *Somalia Trap*, Al-Shabab, seeks to impose a Taliban-styled Islamic emirate in Somalia; however, "this harsh brand of Islam [is] alien to Somalis." [108] Furthermore, Al-Shabaab has become less popular and less effective, because the imposition of strict Salafi/Wahhabi-based Sharia law is alienating Somali locals. Al-Shabaab, like its predecessor, the SICC, has

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instituted a number of harsh rules and harsh punishments. According to Human Rights Watch, Al-Shabaab has started dictating prayer observances, and it has banned certain clothing styles and cell phone ringtones. Punishments range from head shavings, to flogging, amputation, stoning, and beheading.[109]

Al-Shabaab is also challenging traditional Somali ancestral worship practices, defiling the shrines of clan founders. Moreover, the militants are lashing out against Somali Sufis by desecrating the graves and shrines of Muslim saints, revered in the Sufi tradition. Sufism dominates in Somalia because of the blend of Islam with local culture. But the emphasis Sufism places on the mystical elements of Islam is considered idolatry by the Wahhabist sect. This has ignited a sectarian conflict between Al-Shabaab, and a Sufi organization called Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa (ASWJ). Al-Shabaab is also responsible for attacking Somalia's small minority Christian population, beheading those that refuse to convert to Islam.[110]

As extremists from the Middle East find themselves facing too much pressure, they are increasingly looking to the instability of Somalia for cover. According to Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, foreign fighters are already "spreading their warped interpretation of religion" to the people of Somalia.[111] Museveni insists that the international community cannot ignore the situation in Somalia the way it allowed Afghanistan to fend for itself in the 1990s. Right now, Somalia is at the heart of the global fight against extremism. As a result, argues Museveni, "the search for peace and stability in the Horn of Africa is not just a Somali or even an African issue," it is one that requires the international community's immediate attention.

Policy Prescriptions and the Prospects of Peace

How can the world intervene in Somalia without reliving the disastrous events of UNOSOM II? The scars of the UN's operational intervention in Somalia were deep. The failure of multinational cooperation there left the international community unwilling to intervene in the Rwandan genocide. "Somalia syndrome," as it would come to be known, also had an impact on the psychology of American forces. Preparations for the intervention in Haiti, for instance, may have been influenced by the mission's Somalia veterans. Members of the 10th Mountain Division operated as a secluded force, taking up a defensive posture in an industrial complex. The 10th Mountain Division also patrolled the Haitian capital only during the daylight, heavily armed and armored. Meanwhile U.S. Army Special Forces freely mingled with the Haitian population, giving off the appearance of "schizophrenia" among U.S. forces.[112] Cox and Heatherly are concerned that extraterritorial terrorism has contributed to building momentum for a large-scale, boots-on-the-ground, nation-building mission to Somalia. However, sending a new international peacekeeping mission, they believe, would probably be a very bad idea. [113] So, how should the international community respond to the enigma of Somalia without launching a mission on the magnitude of a UNOSOM III?

The forces of traditional realism (i.e., military intervention), the forces of traditional liberalism (i.e., UN peacekeeping missions), and the forces of realpolitik have failed in Somalia. The continued stagnation caused by these failures has made the situation in Somalia even worse. Now, a drastically new approach must be attempted in an effort to break the cycle of violence in Somalia. FBD, for example, could be the basis of a revived peace process that includes every party to the conflict. Moreover, FBD should be employed because it can transcend Somalia's clan-based conflicts. Lastly, by calling on Somali religious leaders, faith-based diplomats might be able to stop sectarian violence before it leaves an indelible scar on Somali society.

FBD would not be unprecedented in Somalia. Consider the National Prayer Breakfast, and the spiritually motivated people who make up this network. In 1981, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David Jones (of the U.S. Air Force) played a vital role in the cessation of a border dispute between Somalia and Kenya. Two Americans involved with the National Prayer Breakfast passed through Mogadishu on their way to visit Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi. They met with Siad Barre, while in Somalia, where they discussed the importance of Jesus Christ's message to love one's enemies. Barre described his country's long border dispute with Kenya, and asked the two Americans to pass along a message to President Moi. When in Kenya, they conveyed to Moi that Barre would consider meeting in "the spirit of Christ" to discuss their dispute. The story was later relayed to General Jones, who invited Barre to a fellowship meeting at the Pentagon a few months later.[114]

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At the fellowship meeting, Jones told Barre that he should follow through on his earlier offer to meet with President Moi in the spirit of Christ. Barre expressed that such a meeting would be impossible. However, Jones reiterated that Barre and Moi must talk before their two countries went to war. Together with Robert Murray, Under Secretary for the U.S. Navy, Jones orchestrated a secret meeting between Barre and Moi that took place on an American aircraft carrier a month later. After the secret talks, the two presidents released a joint statement that eventually led to a resumption of trade, and an anti-insurgent partnership.[115]

Members of the Mennonite Church have also been active in Somalia. In the early 1990s, the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) and Eastern Mennonite Missions (EMM) decided to encourage peace and reconciliation as aggressively as they were providing humanitarian relief to the broken state. The MCC and EMM established a network of Somalis from North America to build recommendations for peacemaking efforts back home. The diaspora suggested a number of proposals, and insisted that elders, religious leaders, intellectuals, and women play a role in building a sustainable peace. Promoting the role of the Somali elders was especially important, because they had played the historical role of mediator in local and regional disputes. The MCC eventually financed a number of peace conferences throughout Somalia, including a grand conference for Somali elders. Now the MCC is trying to figure out how to peacefully disarm militias and youth groups without the need for further military peacekeeping missions.[116]

According to Hook and Spanier, lasting solutions to the civil war are “possible only through internal reconciliation undertaken by the Somalis themselves.”[117] One of the Mennonite Church’s primary partners in the peacemaking efforts in Somalia, the Life and Peace Institute (LPI), feels similarly. The LPI believes that the complexity of the Somali conflict requires an institution capable of facilitating a comprehensive approach to reconciliation. In February 1993, an LPI team embedded in Somalia proposed the creation of a special structure to handle Somali reconciliation. The proposal hoped that an official “Somali Reconciliation Structure” would be capable of consulting UNOSOM I on the difficult issues they were dealing with, while also facilitating as a liaison between UN officials and Somali nationals. The structure would have established three units: a general Advisory Working Group, a Peace Coordinator, and local reconciliation commissions that would have been deployed to various regions throughout Somalia. Unfortunately, UNOSOM I largely ignored the proposal; and the LPI even left it on the back burner.[118]

The LPI was not the first TRA ignored by the international community. Pope John Paul II was arguing as early as 1991, before the final collapse of the Barre regime, “that Somalia’s crisis necessitated a thrust in the direction of national reconciliation as the only real antidote to armed confrontation.”[119] Indeed, the Vatican had already become well aware of Somalia’s descent into chaos. In 1989, 22 people in Catholic missions were killed, including Bishop Pietro S. Colombo, the Vicar Apostolic of Mogadishu, who was assassinated on 9 July 1989. So, well before the world media pressured involvement in Somalia, John Paul II was stressing the need for intervention. In fact, the pontiff asserted a role for FBD vis-à-vis religious groups, stressing their instrumentality in the redevelopment of Somali civil society. Hence, in 1992, the Catholic Church launched its own humanitarian mission to Somalia, with the objective of reestablishing Somalia’s educational, medical, ecclesial, and social infrastructures. Meanwhile, he addressed the diplomatic corps accredited to the Holy See, encouraging “virtually every variety of attempt which could help Somalia transition out of hostilities.”[120]

However, the efforts of the church in Somalia “had met with serious obstacles,” and two years after the mission had begun, “the Church had been dispersed,” its buildings and houses of worship destroyed.[121] With all of this in mind, the pope continued to address the international community on Somalia between 1992 and 1995. Through World Day of Peace messages, and addresses to the diplomatic corps, he outlined a series of guidelines, proposals, and principles meant to motivate and constrain international intervention in Somalia. This constructive advice, had it been utilized, argues Bernard J. O’Connor, could have (and still could) make peacemaking and nation building efforts in Somalia successful. “Unfortunately,” he opines, “for the most part, ‘expert’ opinion ignored or bypassed” the pope’s counsel, just as the international community ignored proposals from groups like the LPI.[122]

Nevertheless, faith-based diplomats can find a way to embed themselves in the continuing Somali conflict. Given the history of the successful application of FBD in Somalia, NGOs and TRAs must identify the proper actors and institutions to help facilitate a revitalized peace process. Pope John Paul II’s exemplary demonstrations of FBD demonstrate how the moral authority of a religious actor can reinforce other types of diplomatic efforts. With this in

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mind, organizations, such as the LPI, MEC, and ICRD,[123] should work with religious leaders in Somalia. Training Somali religious leaders in conflict resolution techniques could help facilitate an eventual end to sectarian violence while also validating the peace process, and enhancing the moral authority of these external actors.[124]

More importantly, these groups should also engage domestic Islamic peace initiatives agitating for peace within Somalia. External NGOs and TRAs must work with groups, like Mogadishu's Idaacadda Qur'an ka Kariimka (IQK)—or Holy Qur'an Radio, in English—the Centre for Research and Dialogue (CRD), the Somalia Peace Line (SPL), and the Kisima Peace and Development Organization (KPDO). Toft, Philpott, and Shah argue that groups like them “promote cooperation between Muslims and people of other faiths, mediation and conflict resolution, peace initiatives, and the dissemination of religious teachings on peace and reconciliation.”[125] Their voices can be critical sources of moderation and peace as groups like Al-Shabaab try to distort the teachings of Islam. This is the case of the IQK, especially, because it broadcasts “daily peace messages based on Islamic values for peace, justice and tolerance.”[126] Of critical importance is the fact that groups like IQK refuse to broadcast threats or the menacing messages of terrorists and insurgent groups despite intimidation.

In the U.S., President Obama could order the development of a corps of religion attachés within the State Department who could work with these NGOs and TRAs in an effort to provide Track I support for their actions. Additionally, the U.S. could funnel financial resources to these organizations, and to groups of moderate Muslims in Somalia through the White House Office of Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships.[127] Such an action could help roll back the tide of extremism propagated by organizations like Al-Shabaab.

Another reason it may be beneficial to employ FBD in Somalia is that it encourages the involvement of every party to a conflict. UN efforts to build a government previously failed because they ignored clan leaders. If the UN and AU, through active NGOs and TRAs, were to involve moderate insurgents and other important leaders in Somali society, they could help reinforce future incarnations of the Transitional Federal Government. The UN must also revisit the LPI's proposal to establish a reconciliation council. Working with organizations like the LPI, the UN can provide resources, expertise, and credibility that would help the reconciliation councils become strong, legitimate, and versatile bodies.

With Al-Shabaab losing legitimacy in Somalia, another reason FBD is important to the peace process has become apparent. Faith-based diplomats teamed with moderate Muslims can help protect minority Christians and Sufi Muslims by reminding the radical elements of Somali society about the Quranic injunctions against harming the People of the Book, or dhimmi:

“And do not dispute with the followers of the Book except by what is best, except those of them who act unjustly, and say: We believe in that which has been revealed to us and revealed to you, and our Allah and your Allah is One, and to Him do we submit.”[128]

After all, Christians, Jews, and Muslims are all part of the Abrahamic tradition, and as such, are considered People of the Book. Therefore, groups like the minority Christian community in Somalia ought to constitute protected communities within Muslim society.[129]

FBD can also help promote a type of moderate religious nationalism in Somalia that could help unify disparate groups (remember how difficult it was for the Somalis to build a national identity after independence). In Islam, religion is to be placed at the center of collective identity. Since religious nationalism “is by no means a uniquely Islamic phenomenon,” it's possible that with time, religious nationalism could evolve into responsible governance, such as has happened in Turkey, and among Europe's Christian nationalists.[130] Precedent exists within Islamic history to support such an action, too. Pre-Islamic Arabian society was dominated by tribal solidarity. Among the first Muslims, however, a common faith became the basis for community, rather than tribal affiliation.[131] Fostering religious nationalism in Somalia's unique Sufi society could transcend clan conflict and become the basis for a sustainable nation-state.

Of course, NGOs and TRAs employing FBD cannot build a sustainable Somali state by themselves. Reinforcing the

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AU peacekeeping mission is a strategic imperative. The U.S. can also participate in surgical drone strikes, such as the one on two Al-Shabab leaders on 23 June 2011,[132] which can help dismantle insurgent groups. Moreover, the UN should consider making Somaliland's independence a priority. The AU opposes such a course of action, because it fears the Balkanization of the African continent. Nevertheless, establishing an independent Somaliland, and possibly even an independent Puntland, could help the international community funnel needed resources to the people of the north. Moreover, these two independent nation-states could become strong partners in the peacekeeping and nation-building efforts that must inevitably take place in Somalia-proper. Lastly, recognizing the sovereignty of these two Somali provinces would effectively isolate a host of international issues. In effect, the problem of piracy could largely be confined to Puntland, while the insurgency would be contained in Somalia. This would have a number of benefits, but chief among them, would be that it would break up the monolithic difficulty that is Somalia, making it easier for the international community—both secular and religious—to grapple with these problems.

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[11] For example, consider the Al-Shabaab terrorist attack on a Ugandan World Cup watch party in July 2010.

[12] Cox, Falconer, and Stackhouse, *Terrorism, Instability, and Democracy*, 26.

[13] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2003), 208.

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[15] *Ibid.*, 253.

[16] Douglas Johnston, "Introduction: Realpolitik Expanded," in *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik*, ed. Douglas Johnston (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2003), 3.

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[18] Reza Aslan, *How to Win a Cosmic War: God, Globalization, and the End of the War on Terror* (New York, New York: Random House, 2009), 10.

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[20] Ibid.

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[22] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72.3 (Summer, 1993): 24-26; and Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, 42.

[23] Aslan, 19.

[24] Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," 26.

[25] Ibid., 29.

[26] Aslan, 5.

[27] Ibid.

[28] "Preface," in *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik*, ed. Douglas Johnston (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2003), xii.

[29] John D. Carlson and Erik C. Owens, "Introduction: Reconsidering Westphalia's Legacy for Religion and International Politics," in *The Sacred and the Sovereign: Religion and International Politics*, ed. John D. Carlson and Erik C. Owens (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003), 1 and 9.

[30] Toft, Philpott, and Shah, *God's Century*, 3.

[31] Aslan, *How to Win a Cosmic War*, 19.

[32] The recent proliferation of topical material in this area can, in many cases, be attributed to academia's response to the Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks of 9/11.

[33] The secularization thesis was popular in the 1960s. The idea was that as society became more modern, industrialized, and even globalized, religion would become displaced by a global culture of secularism. For a thorough discussion of the secularization thesis, refer to Toft, Philpott, and Shah, *God's Century*, 1-2, 10-11, 98-99; and Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Foreword," in *The Sacred and the Sovereign: Religion and International Politics* ed. John D. Carlson and Erik C. Owens (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003), ix-xi.

[34] Lee H. Hamilton, "Foreword," in *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik*, ed. Douglas Johnston (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2003), ix.

[35] Madeleine Albright, *The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God, and World Affairs* (New York, New York: Harper Perennial, 2006), 291.

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[36] Douglas Johnston and Brian Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement," in *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik*, ed. Douglas Johnston (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2003), 15.

[37] *Ibid.*, 14-15.

[38] Hamilton, "Foreword," ix.

[39] Atheist Alliance International, "The Case Against the Case Against 'Religious Violence,'" (29 September 2010); available from <http://www.atheistalliance.org/secular-nation/vignettes-from-the-editor/255-the-case-against-the-case-against-religious-violence->; internet; accessed 4 December 2010.

[40] "Preface," xii.

[41] "U.S. Military, Oblivious of Iraqi Culture, Enlists Anthropologists for Occupation," *Middle East Online* (19 January 2008); available from <http://www.alternet.org/world/74326/?page=1>; internet; accessed 4 December 2010.

[42] "Preface," xii.

[43] John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1984), 1. In fact, this is the case with some Christian nationalists (and other groups), too. Western leaders would do well to understand this, because it could also be useful when dealing with, for instance, the Vatican.

[44] Douglas Johnston, "The Case for a Religion Attaché," in *Foreign Service Journal* (February 2002); available from <http://www.afsa.org/fsj/feb02/johnston.cfm>; internet; accessed 15 October 2010; and Albright, *Mighty and the Almighty*, 75.

[45] This might also be done by Defense Department military chaplains. Increasingly, notes Johnston, chaplains are becoming more important to the process of conflict prevention. For instance, they have been assigned to the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Furthermore, the Marine Corp, the Coast Guard, and the Navy have trained their chaplains in statecraft, "an initiative designed to enhance the conflict-prevention capability of the sea-service commands." Johnston, "Realpolitik Expanded," 3. For more information, also see Johnston and Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy," 24-26; and Kenneth E. Lawson, *Faith and Hope in a War-Torn Land: The US Army Chaplaincy in the Balkans, 1995-2005* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006).

[46] Johnston, "Religion Attaché."

[47] Douglas Johnston, "Obama Administration Policy Toward the Muslim World: A Faith-Based Perspective" (paper presented at American Muslims for Constructive Engagement, Herndon,

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Virginia, July 25, 2009): 2; available from

http://www.icrd.org/storage/icrd/documents/obama_administration_policy.pdf; internet; accessed 4 December 2010.

[48] Ibid., 3-5. Alas, polling data shows that attitudes in the Muslim world toward the U.S. are not improving. This may lead some to believe that President Obama's outreach has not been successful, but it may actually have more to do with U.S. foreign policy toward Palestine, and other issues. For actual data on the matter consult the Pew Global Attitudes Project.

[49] Ibid., 2.

[50] Thomas F. Madden, *A Concise History of the Crusades* (New York, New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, INC., 1999), 161-162.

[51] Ibn Wasil, "The Arrival At Acre of the Emperor Frederick, King of the Franks," in *Arab Historians of the Crusades* ed. Francesco Gabrieli (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1984), 268-269; and Ibn Wasil, "Jerusalem is Handed Over to the Franks," in *Arab Historians of the Crusades* ed. Francesco Gabrieli (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1984), 269-270.

[52] Wasil, "Jerusalem is Handed Over," 271-272; and Sibte Ibn Al-Jauzi, "Muslim Grief in Damascus. Frederick in Jerusalem," in *Arab Historians of the Crusades* ed. Francesco Gabrieli (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1984), 273-275.

[53] Brian Cox and Daniel Philpott, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent," in *The Brandywine Review of Faith and International Affairs* (Fall 2003): 33-34. Other examples of "religious peacemaking" come to us from the Middle Ages. In the year 1219, St. Francis of Assisi journeyed to Egypt where he spoke with "Sultan Melek al-Kamil about peace and conversion during a battle of the Crusades." Moses Maimonides, a Jewish scholar from Spain, devised medieval repentance rituals for Jewish communities. Finally, "Islamic reconciliation rituals" also "date back centuries." Toft, Philpott, and Shah, *God's Century*, 178.

[54] "Preface," xii.

[55] Johnston and Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy," 16-17; and Mark Laudy, "The Vatican Mediation of the Beagle Channel Dispute: Crisis Intervention and Forum Building," in *Words Over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict* ed. Melanie C. Greenburg, John H. Barton, and Margaret E. McGuinness (Oxford, United Kingdom: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, INC., 2000), 312-315.

[56] Johnston and Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy," 22-23.

[57] Quoted in Michael W. Cuneo, *Almost Midnight: An American Story of Murder and*

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Redemption (New York, New York: Broadway Books, 2004), 286-287.

[58] Quoted in *Ibid.*, 292.

[59] *Ibid.*, 302.

[60] While the “us versus them” mentality might ordinarily instigate religious violence, John Paul II’s outreach and the leadership of the Polish Catholic Church instead fostered the rise of nonviolent civil resistance in Poland.

[61] John O’Sullivan, *The President, the Pope, and the Prime Minister: Three Who Changed the World* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, INC., 2006), 96 and 102-103.

[62] R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation* (New York, New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, INC., 2000), 234.

[63] Cox and Philpott, “Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea,” 31, 36, 40. For a detailed discussion of the alliance between the church, civil society, and labor, as well as the church’s role in fostering nonviolent civil resistance, see Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred*, 231-235.

[64] The dissolution of the alliance and the subsequent reversion of the church to its more conservative role in society explain why the programs instituted to strengthen Polish civil society vanished after the transition to democracy. This also explains, in part, why the Polish Catholic Church did not strongly lobby for any kind of transitional justice, such as a truth commission or the Main Commission for the Examination of Crimes Against the Polish Nation. However, this is better explained by what Toft, Duffy, and Philpott describe as the absence of a political theology of reconciliation. The Polish Catholic Church was more concerned with human rights, democracy, and religious autonomy than with reconciliation, which is why it was so capable of opposing communism. However, this left the church with a dearth of thinking on justice in the aftermath of the Cold War. Perhaps it was also the absence of a political theology of reconciliation that makes the case of Poland unique in the study of FBD; a theology of liberation, human rights, and democracy promotion does explain, however, the church’s commitment to nonviolent civil resistance, and thus the interest of faith-based diplomats in the case of Poland. Toft, Duffy, and Philpott, *God’s Century*, 204-205.

[65] Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred*, 231.

[66] Johnston and Cox, “Faith-Based Diplomacy,” 16-17. Additionally, the idea that FBD must remain consistent with the precepts of just war theory is greatly expanded upon by Maureen H. O’Connell, who explains that FBD functions as a middle ground in Christian thought on war and peace by breaking the dichotomy of just war and pacifism. She insists that FBD overlaps with aspects of both pacifism and just war, and expands “their sometimes narrow approaches to responding to conflict.” Maureen H. O’Connell, “Jus *Ante Bellum*: Faith-Based Diplomacy and Catholic Traditions on War and Peace,” in *Journal of Peace and Justice Studies* 21.1 (2011): 3,

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13-14.

[67] Brandon Toporov and Luke Buckles, *The Complete Idiot's Guide to World Religions* (New York, New York: Alpha Books, 2004), 332.

[68] William Vendley and David Little, "Implications for Religious Communities: Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism, and Christianity," in *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft* ed. Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1995), 309.

[69] Admittedly, the same holy texts can contain verses used to justify or insight violence. Obviously, this has been seen with organizations like Al-Qaeda and the Ku Klux Klan. However, Reza Aslan argues that "no religion is inherently violent or peaceful." Sure, he goes on, it is easy "to comb through scripture for bits of savagery," and it's all too tempting to "assume a simple causality between text and deed" when an act of violence has been carried out in the name of religion. However, it is people that tend towards violence; it is people that tend towards peace. Moreover, argues John A. Rees, sacred scriptures "are really existing sources for the building of real political outcomes." Yes, there is diversity in religious text, and yes that diversity can be exploited by malevolent actors for political reasons, but "religious scripture can contribute positively to international affairs." After all, these texts explain how it is people are to live with their neighbors, govern themselves, treat the poor, and more. Consequently, scripture plays a fundamental role in developing identity, so it cannot be underestimated, even though it is currently under-utilized as a tool in diplomatic affairs. Furthermore, taking as examples Christianity and Islam, Christian faith-based diplomats "take seriously," in the words of Johnston and Cox, "Jesus' teaching in the Sermon on the Mount, 'blessed are the peacemakers...' [and] Muslim peacemakers are reminded in the Holy Qur'an that the heart or essence of the Abrahamic tradition is not holy war, but peace, social justice, and reconciliation." Again, O'Connell takes this further. She notes that religious traditions are built out of "centuries of storytelling." Through ritual, song, scripture, and dance, religious groups communicate their narratives. She insists that storytelling is an essential aspect of FBD, because it triggers the imaginative process that "knits people together" and "bridges distances among persons." Scripture is the basis of storytelling; storytelling is the basis of triggering the "moral imagination," which is ultimately capable of improving the efficacy of FBD. Even where scripture can elicit violence, asserts O'Connell, storytelling and imagination, especially within the Abrahamic traditions, can help heal historical wounds "by offering new perspectives on the past, present, and future," and encouraging "collective participation in a vibrant common good." Aslan, *How to Win a Cosmic War*, 4; John A. Rees, "'Really Existing' Scriptures: On the Use of Sacred Text in International Affairs," in the *Brandywine Review of Faith and Foreign Affairs* 2.1 (2004): 18-19, 25; Johnston and Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy," 17; and O'Connell, "Jus Ante Bellum," 18-20, 24.

[70] *Rig Veda* X, 191.

[71] *The Holy Qur'an* 49:13.

[72] *Leviticus* 19:18.

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[73] Based on the examples, thus far, it might be easy to interpret FBD as a Western construct that probably would not be applicable to the *modus operandi* of non-Western NGOs and TRAs. Secretary Albright, for instance, is the first major foreign policy elite to discuss religion as an element of IR. The Czech born diplomat, of course, is an American. As are Douglas Johnston, a man described as the father of FBD, and his organization, the ICRD. John Paul II was a product of the West, and Frederick II, though more cosmopolitan, was still from Sicily. They may not be as well documented, but non-Western examples of FBD still abound. In fact, Toft, Duffy, and Philpott show that Muslim and Buddhist religious actors played a role in conflict mediation in at least seven cases. This includes incidents where the Muslim leaders of Somalia and Chad both attempted efforts at mediation, and what some scholars refer to as Engaged Buddhism. Johnston also notes the example of a group of young Kashmiri Muslims that are “totally committed to promoting faith-based reconciliation” in their community. In fact, this group actively attempts to reconcile with the Hindu Pandits. Finally, Secretary Albright is not the only world leader discussing religion. The Kingdom of Jordan has been lauded for its efforts at promoting intra-faith dialogue, interreligious dialogue, intercultural understanding, and inter-civilizational dialogue. In 1994, the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies was established under the patronage of Prince El Hassan bin Talal, to provide a venue for the rational discussion of religion in the Arab world. It has since been expanded to study issues of civilizational, religious and cultural diversity. In addition, the monarchy of Jordan also promotes these efforts through a think tank called the Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought. This latter organization has become a voice for moderate Islam, and seeks to build consensus with the global Islamic community in an effort to challenge Jihadists. For example, the organization discussed apostasy, and concluded that both Sunni and Shia are in fact Muslims. A letter reiterating the consensus was signed by hundreds of scholars from Kuwait to Mecca, and it represents a vital step in the effort to foster peace in the Middle East. The Institute for Islamic Thought has also launched an initiative, “A Common Word Between Us and You,” which seeks to foster amity between Islam and Christianity. Thanks to the initiative, the institute sent a letter to Pope Benedict XVI and 26 other Christian leaders that highlighted the fact that both Islam and Christianity value love of God and love of neighbor. The Vatican responded by inviting some of the signatories to Rome for a forum. These efforts show that, despite its origins, FBD can act as a universal concept in conflict prevention and resolution. Toft, Philpott, and Shah, *God’s Century*, 180,181, 190-191; Johnston, “Realpolitik Expanded,” 9; Drew Kumpf, “The Kingdom of Jordan: Intra-Faith Dialogue, Inter-Faith Diplomacy,” *The Review of Faith and International Affairs* (20 March 2009), available from <http://www.rfiaonline.org/extras/articles/411-jordan-dialogue-and-diplomacy>; internet; accessed 18 July 2011; and Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies, “About the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies,” available from <http://www.riifs.org/purpose/purpose.htm>; internet; accessed 18 July 2011.

[74] Johnston, “Realpolitik Expanded,” 8.

[75] Ibid., 8-9.

[76] Ibid., 9.

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[77] International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, "Projects," available from http://www.icrd.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=76&Itemid=66; internet; accessed 4 December 2010.

[78] Albright, *Might and the Almighty*, 77.

[79] Jimmy Carter, *We Can Have Peace in the Holy Land: A Plan that will Work* (New York, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009), 37-39.

[80] Of course, this is not to say that Carter's religious savvy was the panacea at Camp David, but it certainly was a necessary factor contributing to the success of the talks. Albright, *Might and the Almighty*, 77.

[81] Carter, *We Can Have Peace*, 39.

[82] Jim Wallis, *God's Politics: Why the Right Gets it Wrong and the Left Doesn't Get it* (San Francisco, California: HarperSanFrancisco, 2005), 104.

[83] Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York, New York: Random House, 2002), 13 and 192.

[84] Wallis, *God's Politics*, 97.

[85] Ibid., 177-179.

[86] Johnston and Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy," 19-22.

[87] Hook and Spanier, *Foreign Policy*, 261; and Cox, Falconer, and Stackhouse, *Terrorism, Instability, and Democracy*, 176.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Hook Spanier, *Foreign Policy*, 261.

[90] Bauman, Yates, and Washington, *My Clan Against the World*, 19, 23; Hendrickson, *The Clinton Wars*, 23; Lawrence Ziring, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics* (United States of America: Thomson Wadsworth, 2005), 243; and Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (United States of America: Westview Press, 2004), 66-67.

[91] Bauman, Yates, and Washington, *My Clan Against the World*, 28, 67, 78; Ziring, Riggs, and Plano, *The United Nations*, 243-244; Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, *The United Nations*, 67; and Hendrickson, *The Clinton Wars*, 24.

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[92] Ziring, Riggs, and Plano, *The United Nations*, 243-244; Hook and Spanier, *Foreign Policy*, 262; and Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, *The United Nations*, 67-68.

[93] Bauman, Yates, and Washington, *My Clan Against the World*, 106; and Ziring, Riggs, and Plano, *The United Nations*, 244.

[94] Bauman, Yates, and Washington, *My Clan Against the World*, 106; Hook and Spanier, *Foreign Policy*, 262; and Mark Bowden, *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War* (New York, New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999), 71-72.

[95] Experts seem to disagree on this. Some sources say twenty-three Pakistani soldiers were killed. This can probably be attributed to the fact that one soldier died after Aidid's forces had taken him prisoner.

[96] Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, *The United Nations*, 68; Bowden, *Black Hawk Down*, 71; Ziring, Riggs, and Plano, *The United Nations*, 244; and Hook and Spanier, *Foreign Policy*, 262.

[97] Bauman, Yates, and Washington, *My Clan Against the World*, 142-143; Hook and Spanier, *Foreign Policy*, 262; Ziring, Riggs, and Plano, *The United Nations*, 244; and Bowden, *Black Hawk Down*, 67.

[98] Ziring, Riggs, and Plano, *The United Nations*, 244.

[99] James Traub, "In the Beginning, There was Somalia," *Foreign Policy* (July/August 2010), available from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/in_the_beginning_there_was_somalia; internet; accessed 4 December 2010; and Luke Herrington, "Terrorism, instability, and piracy in Somalia," *Examiner.com* (forthcoming).

[100] "Somalia Famine: UN warns of 750,000 deaths," *BBC* (5 September 2011), available from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14785304>; internet; accessed 13 October 2011.

[101] Jeffrey Gettleman, "The Most Dangerous Place in the World," *Foreign Policy* (16 February 2009), available from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/02/16/the_most_dangerous_place_in_the_world; internet; accessed 15 October 2010; Luke Herrington, "Mogadishu: The most dangerous place on Earth," *Examiner.com* (20 July 2010), available from <http://www.examiner.com/progressive-in-kansas-city/mogadishu-the-most-dangerous-place-on-earth>; internet; accessed 11 November 2010; and Fareed Zakaria, host., *Fareed Zakaria: GPS*, "GPS Podcast," *CNN* (18 July 2010), available from <http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/podcasts/fareedzakaria/site/2010/07/18/gps.podcast.0718.cnn>; internet; accessed 11 November 2010.

[102] Charlotte Booth, ed., "Somalia: A Nation without a State": 13-14; available from http://www.life-peace.org/sajt/filer/pdf/other_publications/Somalia%20a%20nation%20without%20a%20stat

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e.pdf; internet; accessed 15 October 2010.

[103] Ibid.

[104] Roland Marchal, "Islamic Political Dynamics In the Somali Civil War: Before and After September 11," in *Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa* ed. Alex De Waal (Indianapolis, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004), 114; and Cox, Falconer, and Stackhouse, *Terrorism, Instability, and Democracy*, 202.

[105] Cox, Falconer, and Stackhouse, *Terrorism, Instability, and Democracy*, 176.

[106] Issaka K. Souaré, "Conclusions: Towards a Revived Somali State," in *Somalia at the Crossroads: Challenges and Perspectives in Reconstituting a Failed State* ed. Abdulahi A. Osman and Issaka K. Souaré (London, United Kingdom: Adonis and Abbey Publishers, LTD., 2007), 209; Cox, Stackhouse, and Falconer, *Terrorism, Instability, and Democracy*, 176-177; and Booth, "Somalia: A Nation without a State," 14-16.

[107] Max Delany and Jason Straziuso, "Uganda Bomb Attacks Kill World Cup Fans: Al Shabab Suspected in Kampala Explosions," in *The Huffington Post* (12 July 2010), available from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/11/uganda-bomb-world-cup_n_642336.html; internet; accessed 4 December 2010; and "Africa readies troops for Somalia; U.S. funds effort," in *USA Today* (27 July 2010), available from http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-07-27-africa-troops-somalia_N.htm; internet; accessed 4 December 2010.

[108] Herrington, "Mogadishu"; and Luke Herrington, "Amid Somali turmoil, pockets of hope remain," *Examiner.com* (28 July 2010), available from <http://www.examiner.com/progressive-in-kansas-city/amid-somali-turmoil-pockets-of-hope-remain>; internet; accessed 15 October 2010.

[109] Human Rights Watch, "Harsh War, Harsh Peace," (19 April 2010), available from http://www.hrw.org/en/node/89644/section/7#_ftn61; internet; accessed 8 December 2010; and U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "Somalia," in *International Religious Freedom Report 2009* (26 October 2009), available from <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127255.htm>; internet; accessed 9 December 2010.

[110] Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "Somalia"; and "Religious groups wrap up conference in Nairobi; Somali Sufi forces organize to fight Shabaab," in *Al Arabiya* (5 November 2009), available from <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/11/05/90325.html>; internet; accessed 9 December 2010.

[111] Yoweri Museveni, "Somalia's Hour of Need," in *Foreign Policy* (25 August 2010), available from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/25/somalias_hour_of_need; internet; accessed 9 December 2010.

[112] Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Bauman, and John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, and*

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"Intervasion": A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), 189-193; and Hook and Spanier, *Foreign Policy*, 262.

[113] Dan G. Cox, e-mail to the author, 20 July 2010.

[114] Most Christians do not realize that Jesus is a well revered figure within Islam. Douglas Johnston, "Looking Ahead: Toward a New Paradigm," in *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft* ed. Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1995), 319-322; and Johnston, "Realpolitik Expanded," 9.

[115] Ibid.

[116] Marc Gopin, *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking* (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2000), 60; John Paul Lederach, "Mennonite Central Committee Efforts in Somalia and Somaliland," in *From the Ground Up: Mennonite Contributions to International Peacebuilding* ed. Cynthia Sampson, and John Paul Lederach (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2000), 141-148.

[117] Hook and Spanier, *Foreign Policy*, 262.

[118] Wolfgang Heinrich, *Building the Peace: Experiences of Collaborative Peacebuilding in Somalia, 1993-1996* (Uppsala, Sweden: Life and Peace Institute, 1997), 171-172. Religion has been quite successful in promoting what is called transitional justice. Transitional reconciliation councils have been prominent in places like South Africa and Guatemala. These institutions are instrumental in breaking cycles of violence, fostering forgiveness, promoting justice, and building sustainable peace in places torn by civil war. For more, see Toft, Philpott, and Shah, *God's Century*, 196-206; and Applebee, *Ambivalence of the Sacred*, 197-204.

[119] Bernard J. O'Connor, "Beyond Black Hawk Down: Papal Diplomacy and the Lessons of Somalia," in *The Brandywine Review of Faith and International Affairs* 2.1 (Spring 2004): 29.

[120] Ibid., 30-31, 34.

[121] Ibid., 32.

[122] Ibid., 28, 34.

[123] To this list, could be added the Community of Sant'Egidio, a Catholic lay association dedicated to promoting peace all over the world. The Community of Sant'Egidio, which includes over 50,000 members in more than seventy countries, became famous for its role in mediating the peace accords that ended Mozambique's 16-year long civil war. During the 1970s, the community grew and extended its network "into countries like Albania, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Vietnam." Given its past experience in Somalia, and its record of success in mediating conflicts,

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the Community of Sant'Egidio might prove an incredible partner for the LPI, the MEC, and the ICRD. Toft, Philpott, and Shah, *God's Century*, 174-175.

[124] Albright, *Mighty and the Almighty*, 78.

[125] Toft, Philpott, and Shah, 181-182.

[126] Tsjeard Bouta, S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana, and Mohammed Abu-Nimer, *Faith-Based Peace-Building: Mapping and Analysis of Christian, Muslim, and Multi-Faith Actors* (Washington, D.C.: Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingdael" in cooperation with Salam Institute for Peace and Justice, 2005), 119.

[127] There is a debate—for example, see J. Brent Walker, "Establishment Clause applies to U.S. foreign policy," *The Washington Post* (24 February 2010); available from http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/panelists/j_brent_walker/2010/02/establishment_clause_applies_to_us_foreign_policy.html; internet; accessed 13 October 2011—that the federal government cannot easily infuse religion into the foreign policy making process, because of the Constitution's *Establishment Clause*. In a 5-4 decision, however, the Supreme Court ruled in *Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation* (2007) that the executive branch of the federal government had the authority to distribute financial resources to faith-based organizations competing for certain federal contracts. Granted this applied to President Bush's domestic policy programs carried out by the Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships, but there is little reason to assert that the precedent set in *Hein* could not be carried over to a president's foreign policy agenda.

[128] *The Holy Qur'an* 29:46.

[129] John L. Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path* (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1998), 39.

[130] Aslan, *Cosmic War*, 23-24.

[131] Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 2.

[132] Estes, "American Boots Hit the Ground in Somalia."

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