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China and the United States: An Analysis of the Diplomacy Implemented by Richard Nixon and George W. Bush

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This essay evaluates and compares the diplomatic relations of the United States and China during the Administrations of Presidents Richard Nixon and George W. Bush. Using interest-based negotiation as the theoretical framework, the essay discusses the divergent diplomatic strategies enacted by the two presidents. The essay fundamentally argues that different conceptions and contingencies of risk, accountability and national interest drove two distinct approaches to diplomacy that have shaped, for better or worse, Sino-American relations. The focal point of the essay is to assess what motivated two presidents to think and act differently and what the consequences were. An inter-disciplinary approach will be used; encompassing concepts from the fields of diplomacy, international relations and psychology. The essay draws extensively on primary source material from the American national archives, the autobiographies of key diplomatic players, governmental policy papers, and from scholarly articles and books. The essay concludes that personal interests and domestic accountability had a varying but significant impact on the diplomatic strategies of Nixon and Bush, influencing the extent to which the perceived national interest could be pursued.

I. Introduction

As impressionable electorates looked on, putative Presidential candidates Richard M. Nixon and George W. Bush both sought to articulate a clear China policy in the run-up to the 1968 and 2000 elections. Nixon contended that 'taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors' (Nixon 1967, p.121). Conversely, Bush referred to China's government as 'alarming abroad, and appalling at home,' stating that 'China is a competitor, not a strategic partner' (Bush 1999). By analysing the diplomacy implemented by Nixon and Bush, this essay will seek to answer two questions, 'why?' and 'how was it possible?' In doing so, the essay will specifically focus on National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger's visits to China in 1971, Nixon's visit to China in February 1972, Bush's handling of the EP-3 incident over Hainan in April 2001, and U.S.-China collaboration in the Six Party talks on North Korean disarmament. As Alexander Nikolaev notes, 'negotiations occur in an incredibly complex web of political, social, and psychological situations and structures' (Nikolaev 2007, p.xiv). Thus, the essay will seek to untangle the Gordian knot within which the explanations of the Nixon and Bush diplomacies lie.

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At heart, diplomacy should strive not for 'incidental or opportunist arrangements, but at creating solid and durable relations' (Nicolson 1954, p.51). Indeed, successful diplomacy should create a positive-sum arrangement that leaves all sides equally content. However, in comparative terms, the value assigned to relations with China was markedly different. The long-term goals of Nixon's and Bush's diplomacy were undoubtedly influenced by specific contextual circumstances. In the midst of the Cold War, Nixon's diplomacy was driven by strategic opportunism. The chance to push the Soviet Union towards arms limitation agreements and détente and the end of the Vietnam War were key considerations of the Nixon Administration's rapprochement attempts. Conversely, Bush conceived of China as a hostile adversary, a rising power in the zero-sum game of international relations. Jeswald Salacuse contends that:

Political leaders pursue their own interests as well as their nations' interests. To the extent that leaders of strong states in negotiations become convinced that a negotiated settlement of a dispute is important for their country, for their political future, or for their place in history, such increased commitment serves to enhance the power of the weaker side (Salacuse 2000, pp.255-256).

In this regard, to delineate the interacting influences on the formulation of U.S.-China diplomatic relations the essay is split into three chapters. The first chapter concentrates on personal and psychological needs, as well as the effects of conceptions of risk. Importantly, motivational orientation and interpersonal orientation has a profound effect on diplomatic negotiation, making laboratory experiments and economic interpretations of negotiation ineffective (Zartman and Rubin 2000, p.273). Thus, 'personal predispositions and motives are highly prevalent driving forces in the bargaining process' (Spector 1978, p.57). The essay will try to ascertain how important personal predispositions were to the diplomatic choices of Nixon and Bush. Chapter two focuses on the impact of domestic accountability and also touches on international accountability. Here, it is expected that negotiators beholden to the desires of constituents and concerned by image loss will ordinarily be less conciliatory, delaying the negotiating process (Pruitt 1981, p.42). Notably, the political futures of Nixon and Bush, as democratically elected leaders, rest on re-election. Negotiation might therefore be shaped by the electorate's ability to punish their leaders at the polls. In this sense, international diplomacy can be conceived of as a two-level game, where 'national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments' (Putnam 1988, p.434). Finally, the third chapter assesses the diplomacy of Nixon and Bush through an examination of perceptions of national interest and perceptions of power. It will be argued that Nixon's and Bush's foreign policy mostly closely aligns with realist power maximisation. Realism expects that national interest defines the foreign policy and diplomacy of states. In an anarchic international system, with no system of law enforceable among them, 'the aim of maintaining the power position of the nation is paramount to all other considerations' (Waltz 1959, p.160). Thus, the chapter will evaluate whether national interest overcame the personal predispositions and accountability concerns of Nixon and Bush with regard to their diplomacy towards China.

The essay will argue that an examination of the diplomacy of both Nixon and Bush towards China is an exemplar of the complex, tangled and interactive nature of the pressures, constraints and opportunities that characterise diplomatic practice. It will be concluded that the pursuit of conceptions of national interest was obfuscated, shaped

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and influenced by competing forces. In the case of Richard Nixon, the essay contends that Nixon's China policy was a conflation of national interest and personal and psychological needs, in which domestic accountability was considered but circumvented, and international accountability was all but ignored. For George W. Bush, American national interest was initially influenced most closely by personal predispositions and domestic accountability constraints. However, competing factions within the Bush Administration led to unclear conceptions of American national interest, resulting in a confused and incoherent diplomacy that was further constricted by continued strong domestic accountability. The essay benefits from the recent declassification of much of the Nixon archives. Since the Bush presidency is still ongoing, official documents on relations with China are sparse. Nonetheless, it is hoped an accurate picture of Bush's diplomacy is still presented in the form of speeches, Congressional testimony and first-hand accounts.

II. Personal Predispositions and Diplomatic Risk

Decision-making under risk is conditioned by 'a choice between prospects and gambles' (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, p.263), or the extent to which a diplomat is prepared to risk. Risk-taking and risk-aversion are thus integral parts of diplomatic practice. Moreover, personal dispositions to risk are conditioned by what is known as an 'intrinsic risk attitude' or IRA (Schoemaker 1993, p.49). In this regard, propensity to risk-take can be seen as an innate personal trait, bound up in issues such as the need for achievement, status and impulsiveness. This interacts with situational factors to influence decision-making (Kogan and Wallach 1967, p.111). According to decision analysts, the implications for a particular IRA on decision-making are labyrinthine because negotiators lack the capacity to always act rationally (Raiffa 1968, pp.3-12). Moreover, negotiators with identical IRAs may still take divergent approaches to decision-making, owing for example to different beliefs on the perceived risk-factor of a particular venture, or contrasting values attached to a particular policy (Schoemaker 1993, p.54). Thus, risk must be seen as an important, if complex, determinant of negotiation and decision-making. This chapter will look at Nixon's and Bush's psychological predispositions, their propensity to risk-take and the importance of reputation and historical legacy. In this sense, did concerns over reputation influence Nixon's and Bush's China diplomacy by either encouraging risk-taking or risk-aversion? It will be argued that perceptions of personal risk were crucial to the diplomatic strategies of Nixon and Bush. In doing so, the chapter will show that approaches to diplomacy and negotiation are not solely conditioned and shaped by a narrow focus on national interest and power.

Bertram Spector opines that 'personal predispositions and motives are highly prevalent driving forces in the bargaining process' (Spector 1978, p.57), a theory that builds from Kurt Lewin's behavioural equation $B = f(P,E)$ (Lewin 1936).[1] In this sense, diplomatic behaviour is affected by personality traits and psychological needs. Thus, a psychological 'need' to negotiate, due to time or reputational pressures, for example, can weaken the stronger state's negotiating base. On the other hand, a leader concerned with maintaining a particular image could persuade a state not to negotiate if the leader perceives that the risk of a failed negotiation could be too personally detrimental.

Nixon, China, and the quest for legacy

Great ideas can change history, but only if great leadership comes along that can give those ideas force...What lifts great leaders above the second-raters is that they are more forceful, more resourceful, and have a shrewdness of judgment that...enables them to identify the fleeting opportunity (Nixon 1982, p.105).

For Richard Nixon, an obsession with history, and his place in it, undoubtedly influenced his approach to China. Psychologist David Abrahamsen detected in Nixon a frustrated 'childhood need to be recognized by his parents, his elders' (Abrahamsen 1977, p.168). This emotional and psychological need transplanted itself into a 'fantasy...to become President of the United States. He suffered from obsessive-compulsive longings to become President'

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(Abrahamsen 1977, p.173). For Nixon, however, the presidency was insufficient. Beyond the presidency, Nixon also maintained 'fantasies of being counted among the giants of history' (Brodie 1981, p.247). Indeed, Nixon's heroic need was reflected in his hyperbolic regard for others. Of Eisenhower, Nixon saw 'that rarest of men, an authentic hero...one of the giants of our time' (Nixon 1969, pp.264-265).

Yet Nixon suffered from a constant theme of rejection, which in turn brought anger and a deep longing to be loved. Nixon's childhood was difficult. He believed that his elder brother Harold had been the favourite of the family (Mazlish 1973, p.23). This feeling was magnified when Harold fell ill with tuberculosis and Nixon's mother took him to a specialist tubercular community in Arizona (Brodie 1981, p.56). According to biographer Fawn Brodie, Nixon spent his childhood drowning in self-pity, considering himself an 'unwanted puppy' (Brodie 1981, p.40) while cherishing fantasies of being universally loved. Nixon detailed his longings for acceptance in *Six Crises*. When recalling his school days, Nixon claimed that 'my biggest thrill in those years was to see the light in [my father's] eyes when I brought home a good report card' (Nixon 1962, p.318).

This attitude can also be detected in Nixon's political career. His admiration for Eisenhower went unrequited. President Eisenhower doubted Nixon's presidential credentials. Refusing initially to lend his support to Nixon's presidential bid, Eisenhower mused that 'I've been watching Dick for a long time, and he just hasn't grown. So I just haven't honestly been able to believe that he is Presidential timber' (Woodstone 1972, p.33). Nixon also struggled to gain love and acceptance from the media. Following his defeat in the California gubernatorial elections in 1962, Nixon reserved much of his wrath for the press. Nixon perceived that media coverage of the election had been unbalanced, and sarcastically announced 'just think how much you're going to be missing. You won't have Nixon to kick around anymore...' (Brodie 1981, p.463). In 1971 he repeated this notion, complaining that 'of all the Presidents this century...I have less, as somebody has said, supporters in the press than any President' (Evans and Novak 1972, p.409).

These feelings of abandonment must now be linked to Nixon's presidency and in particular, his conduct of foreign affairs. Psychologist Arnold Hutschnecker, who treated Nixon, explains that a drive for power may result from 'a painful or enormous sense of insignificance...an excessive drive for power is born out of weakness...it moves on wings of aggression to overcome inferiority' (Hutschnecker 1974, pp.83-84, 296). Fixated on his role in history, Nixon began to see himself as an international peace-maker, in a similar role to Woodrow Wilson (MacMillan 2008). Thus, Nixon imagined himself as a 'master of geopolitics' (Graubard 2006, p.487) able to conceive of policies that more ordinary politicians would not even consider. In his first inaugural address, Nixon describes a 'summons to greatness' and envisions 'an open world – open to ideas...exchange of goods and people – a world in which no people great or small, will live in angry isolation' (Nixon 1969b, www.yale.edu). To this extent, Nixon was not fuelled by the need to preserve his reputation, but by the need to exponentially expand it. As Nixon himself contends, 'truly "big" men are at their best in handling big affairs' (Nixon 1962, p.xiv).

It would appear that Nixon's dreams of a historical legacy promoted risk-taking rather than risk-aversion. Notably, Nixon had developed a history of gambling. Whilst serving in the Navy in the 1940s, Nixon became a serious poker player. As described by colleagues, he 'was not afraid of taking chances...Sometimes the stakes were pretty big, but Nick had daring and a flair for knowing what to do' (Brodie 1981, p.167). It seems as though gambling logic rubbed off on Nixon—to win big, you have to play big. Undoubtedly, China was Nixon's foreign policy gamble. Kissinger, shocked by the President's rapprochement plans, remarked 'our Leader has taken leave of reality...He has just ordered me to make this flight of fantasy come true' (Haig 1992, p.257).

Nixon's dreams needed and demanded grandiosity, and propelled a search for a new China policy. Nixon thus

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departed 'like some jet-borne Columbus going out beyond the great barrier' (Tyler 1999, p.127) in 1972. It is certainly true that national interest was also in the forefront of Nixon's mind. Establishing a long-term relationship with China, it was thought, would be especially beneficial in helping to end the Vietnam War, and in drawing the Soviet Union towards détente. Visiting China was undoubtedly an enormous personal risk. Nixon was risking his reputation and a backlash from allies abroad and from within the conservative base of the Republican Party. That Nixon chose such a bold diplomatic path was certainly a reflection of strategic needs and American national interests. However, the influence of Nixon's personality needs, such as his lust for power, his need to be loved and his obsession with historical legacy cannot be underestimated. Nixon's behaviour is consistent with Kogan and Wallach's earlier diagnosis, which stated that personal predispositions interact with situational factors to influence the diplomatic process. Nixon's intoxication with diplomacy is characteristic of his personal psychology, and in his commitment to 'success on the international front as an expression of personal glory and achievement' (Abrahamsen 1977, p.212).

Nixon's negotiations in China convey an appreciation of national interest and personal needs. Importantly, it can be argued that personal risk-aversion did cloud the President's thinking. For Nixon to gain his place in history, negotiation with China in 1972 didn't just need to take place, it also needed to succeed. To this extent, Nixon and Kissinger placed great emphasis on pleasing the Chinese. Nixon spent hours perfecting his handling of chopsticks prior to the trip (MacMillan 2006, p.225), and his preparatory notes on Mao display a hint of deference:

Treat him (as Emperor)

1. Don't quarrell [sic].
2. Don't praise him (too much)
3. Praise the people—art, ancient.
4. Praise poems.
5. Love of country (Nixon 1972).

Nixon had planned to discuss Vietnam and Taiwan as a *quid pro quo*. In reality, the end-of-trip Shanghai Communiqué conceded much on Taiwan. Nixon endorsed the 'one China' model and gave assurances on the withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan (which he was unable to keep) for little return on Vietnam (MacMillan 2006, p.328). In this sense, it is possible 'to ask whether the United States was too eager and whether it gave away too much' (MacMillan 2006, p.327). An analysis of this supposed failure is complex. Both Nixon and Kissinger had long considered Taiwan and Vietnam to be parasites, irrelevant to the great power politics that encapsulated American national interest. Nevertheless, personal needs were certainly influential. A failed negotiation would have irredeemably blocked Nixon's historical quest.

It can therefore be argued that Nixon and Kissinger were a little too forthcoming in their promises. However, as

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Kissinger has contended, 'I doubt whether the rapprochement could have occurred with the same decisiveness in any other Presidency. Nixon had an extraordinary instinct for the jugular' (Kissinger 1979, p.163). Crucial to Nixon's decisiveness was the value he attached to his own reputation and historical legacy.

In his father's shadow: Bush and the presidency

You never know what your history is going to be until long after you're gone. So presidents shouldn't worry about history. You just can't (Bush in Walsh 2007).

In contrast to Nixon's 'encyclopedic' (Evans and Novak 1972, p.9) knowledge of foreign affairs, Bush's election strategy focused almost exclusively on domestic issues. Indeed, Bush's ambivalence towards foreign policy only served to invite media and public ridicule. Bill Clinton remarked on Bush's apparent intellectual incuriosity in the aftermath of the 2000 elections, noting that 'He doesn't know anything...He doesn't want to know anything. But he's not dumb' (Weisberg 2007, p.67). So why did Bush, seemingly uninterested in foreign policy, run for President? In contrast to Nixon's presidential longings, Bush struggled to formulate a life plan. He admits, 'I didn't wake up when I was 15 years old saying, "I really want to be president." I didn't feel that way at 21, 31, 41' (Renshon 2005, p.55). In fact, his change of heart owes much to his private wish for the exorcism of his father's doubts about him. Thus, biographer Jacob Weisberg contends that Bush 'pursued a political career because of the expectations and pressures that came from being an heir apparent in the House of Bush' (Weisberg 2007, pp.xx-xxi). In much the same way as he joined the National Guard in 1968 to follow in his father's footsteps (Bush 1999b, pp.50-51), so the presidency soon loomed large in Bush's thinking.

However, Bush had been hurt by his family's view of younger brother Jeb as the natural 'family ascendant' (Draper 2007, p.38). Thus, Bush planned to prove the family wrong and to move out from his father's shadow by being the President that his father had not been. Perceiving George H.W. Bush to have been weak and 'wishy-washy' (Weisberg 2007, p.212), Bush sought to fashion himself as the self-styled 'decider' (Draper 2007, p.7), a leadership style which appears to be inflexible and consequently potentially risky. In this sense, Bush's personality and leadership style was forged in contrast to his father's, and by challenging 'a thoughtful, moderate, and pragmatic father, he trained himself to be hasty, extreme, and unbending' (Weisberg 2007, p.240).

The implications of Bush's family history on his China diplomacy will now be explored. In a conversation with George H.W. Bush in 2004, Bush Jr. contemptuously brushed off his father's criticism of a particular China policy, responding 'well, I know *you* won't agree with this, because it's kind of rough on your friends in Beijing, but...' (Draper 2007, p.262). The patronising dismissal of George H.W. Bush as a Sinophile referred back to George H.W. Bush's time as Ambassador to China in the 1970s, and the engagement policies of the H.W. Bush Administration. George H.W. Bush was a genuine China expert. H.W. Bush's Secretary of State James Baker recalls that the elder Bush was

so knowledgeable about China, and so hands-on in managing most aspects of our policy, that even some of our leading Sinologists began referring to him as the government's desk officer for China (Baker 1996, p.100).

Thus, despite the human rights issues that the Tiananmen Square massacre brought up, H.W. Bush was able to frame strong bilateral Sino-American relations in terms of their strategic and economic value (Garrison 2005, p.114).

In contrast to his father's pragmatism, George W. Bush entered office 'psychologically predisposed to see the world in terms of threats and to see China as fundamentally hostile to U.S. goals' (Garrison 2005, p.174). Where his father

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had maintained a policy of “strategic ambiguity” on the question of the American response to a Chinese attack on Taiwan, George W. Bush was emphatic. He argued in February 2000 on the presidential campaign trail that ‘it’s important for the Chinese to understand that if there’s a military action, we will help Taiwan defend itself’ (Gordon 2001, www.nytimes.com). Clearly, Bush placed smaller value on relations with China than his predecessors. Could the Bush family’s father-son relationship have been the cause of this?

Four months into his presidency, Bush was afforded the perfect opportunity to highlight his tough ‘decider’ persona. The collision between a Chinese fighter plane and an American EP-3 spy plane on 1 April 2001 over Hainan Island was Bush’s first diplomatic test as president. Bush lacked foreign policy expertise and he lacked experience in diplomacy. Yet his initial response to the crisis was to go on the offensive. On the evening of 2 April, Bush gave a belligerent speech at the White House. He warned that the Chinese refusal to immediately hand over the American crew was ‘inconsistent with standard diplomatic practice, and with the expressed desire of both our countries for better relations’ (Bush 2001, www.whitehouse.gov). By escalating the incident with such a public show of strength, it would appear Bush did not fear hardball negotiation, nor did he doubt his ability to handle the fallout. Indeed, this approach is consistent with Bush’s perception of a strong leadership style—‘where George H.W. Bush weighed options, W. sizes you up and decides’ (Weisberg 2007, p.212). According to the Bush presidential style, ‘if you’re weak internally[,] this job will run you all over town’ (Draper 2007, p.x). Rather than being frightened to risk his reputation, it appears Bush saw the EP-3 incident as an opportunity to highlight his forceful persona.

However, as the EP-3 saga moved on, Bush’s psychological needs appeared to recede. Weisberg claims that ‘Bush sees reconsidering decisions or openly changing course as evidence of weak leadership’ (Weisberg 2007, p.212). Yet on 4 April, Secretary of State Colin Powell remarked that ‘we regret the loss of the life of that Chinese pilot. But now we need to move on, and we need to bring this to a resolution’ (Powell 2001, www.state.gov). The following day, a letter written by Powell was published in Chinese newspapers, again expressing his regret for the loss of the Chinese pilot. By April 11, a U.S. statement was released conveying that the Americans were ‘very sorry’ for the loss of the pilot, and for entering Chinese air space unauthorised (U.S. Government Info 2001, usgovinfo.about.com). Shortly afterwards, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage outlined the U.S. interests in ending the diplomatic incident. Armitage spoke on the basis of a productive future U.S.-China relationship, arguing that ‘I think we will want to see if there is a way we can talk about the recent problems we have had in a non-polemical setting, to try to make sure we don’t conflict in the future’ (Kan et al 2001, p.7). The competing policy directives within the Bush administration will be discussed in detail later in this essay. While Bush’s personal predispositions initially delayed the course of negotiations, it is clear that a reconfigured national interest and strategic considerations were the key diplomatic determinants.

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Certainly, the beginning of the EP-3 negotiations appear to support the importance of personal and psychological needs. Bush's initial bellicosity, in stark contrast to that of his father, hindered and delayed the negotiations and alienated and inflamed the Chinese negotiators. However, the American climb-down, led by the Department of State and agreed to by Bush requires an alternate explanation. In contrast to Nixon's handling of China, Bush's backtracking displayed a distinct lack of awareness of personal reputation. Moreover, the American conciliation and change of course is explicitly contradictory to George W. Bush's penchant for firm and inflexible leadership. Thus, it appears that the final American response to the EP-3 incident was driven by other more important diplomatic influences, most notably the Department of State's concern for future Sino-American relations.

In sum, personal predispositions and perceptions of risk can be seen as a contributory factor affecting the course of Nixon's and Bush's diplomacy. Nixon took a bold risk in going to China to cement his reputation—he lacked firm assurances that a meeting with Mao would even take place. But if risk-taking brought Nixon to China, risk-aversion was also at play. Failed negotiations, especially those which embarrassed the United States would have been catastrophic personally and strategically, and the relatively mild negotiating strategy of Nixon and Kissinger validates this risk-aversion. Thus, Nixon's diplomatic approach to China conveys a balancing act between personal risk and sustaining American power. This demonstrates the importance of personal risk in Nixon's negotiating process. With regard to Bush, however, it can be said that the diplomatic ending to the EP-3 incident demonstrated little concern for personal risk. In the space of two days, from Bush's public statement on the evening of 2 April, to Powell's statement on 4 April, the American position had dramatically altered, from hostility to hospitality. This contravenes diplomatic risk theory, which would expect a far longer delay before concession.

III. Diplomatic Accountability

Negotiators are accountable in the sense that 'their constituents can reward or punish them on the basis of their performance' (Carnevale, Pruitt, Seilheimer 1981, p.111), placing an increased emphasis on the reaping of maximum gains on behalf of the constituency. As a result, negotiation theorists opine that negotiators beholden to constituent wants are more likely to seek greater demands, less likely to cede concessions, and more likely to hold out for particular terms than negotiators who are not accountable to significant constituents (Carnevale, Pruitt, Britton 1979, pp.118-121). Dean Pruitt suggests that accountable negotiators, fearing image loss and the impression of a lack of firmness, will often pursue less conciliatory, more antagonistic and riskier negotiation tactics (Pruitt 1981, pp.22-23, 43). Therefore, accountability pressures can provoke negotiators to pursue strategies that decrease joint negotiation benefits and prolong negotiations. This chapter will discuss the extent to which accountability pressures influenced the diplomacy implemented by Nixon and Bush towards China. It will discuss domestic sources of

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accountability, including public opinion, the media, and Congress, and the impact of international accountability through states directly affected by the negotiation process.

Nixon: the anti-Communist?

Rapprochement with China was not a new idea among American policy-making elites. Pro-Taiwanese domestic opinion had effectively handicapped the earlier Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. President John F. Kennedy recognised the strength and importance of domestic accountability as a policy constraint, admitting that 'political dynamite' was 'locked up in this issue' (Memcon 1961), inhibiting any form of strategic negotiation. Yet by the end of the 1960s, Nixon had redefined America's China policy. How was this possible? Further, to what extent did international accountability, particularly from Japan and Taiwan, limit Nixon's China policy? This section will look first at Nixon's strong anti-Communist reputation, before moving on to evaluate Nixon's negotiations with China. It will argue that domestic accountability constrained the scope but not the opening of the Nixon Administration's rapprochement, and also acted as a bargaining tool for negotiation. Further, international accountability will be dismissed as a contributory factor to Nixon's diplomacy.

After election to the House of Representatives, Nixon joined the House on Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) in 1947, an anti-Communist body that 'looked on Communism in apocalyptic terms as a conspiracy of absolute evil' (Brodie 1981, p.192). While at HUAC, Nixon developed strong anti-Communist credentials and described Communists as 'an insidious evil' (Nixon 1962, p.3), and 'a bunch of rats' (Mazo and Hess 1968, p.137). Thus, Nixon's China diplomacy illustrated his flexible and opportunistic approach to Communism. More importantly, Nixon's rabidly anti-Communist reputation gave him the domestic breathing space to approach China. As such, it can be argued that only Nixon 'could have opened a dialogue with the Chinese Communists, pilloried in the U.S. press as bloodthirsty heathens for twenty-two years, as risklessly...' (Evans and Novak 1972, p.404) as he was able to.

However, though Nixon's anti-Communist record was strong, public opinion polls in the mid-1960s showed that 70 percent of Americans saw China as the greatest threat to world peace (Tucker 2001, p.238). Hence, extreme consideration was given to the reaction of Congress and the public. The Sino-American negotiating process began towards the end of 1969. In Kissinger's words, 'thus began an intricate minuet between us and the Chinese so delicately arranged that both sides could always maintain that they were not in contact' (Kissinger 1979, p.187). In this regard, sensitivity to the opinions of Congress, the public, and the Department of State was so strong that absolute secrecy was imperative to the continuation of the diplomatic process. Winston Lord, member of the National Security Council's planning staff from 1969-73 recalls that 'there would have been a firestorm among the conservatives and many of the Republicans domestically in the U.S. about the president's even considering making

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this dramatic move toward China, causing an uproar and hamstringing him in advance' (Tucker 2001, p.244).

However, the Department of State, who Nixon had deliberately shut out of negotiations, were themselves leaning towards rapprochement. In 1969 an Asian Communist Affairs desk paper suggested 'achiev[ing] some *modus vivendi* with the Government which now speaks for a quarter of the world's population and is one of the dominant power factors in East Asia' (Kreisberg 1969, p.3). Apart from blocking out the Department of State, Nixon also sought Congressional opinion in order to cover his flanks. Nixon dispatched Kissinger to speak with Senator Karl Mundt of South Dakota and Congressman Walter Judd of Minnesota, both known members of the China lobby. Nixon's sizing up of a Republican reaction to a 'move in that [China's] direction' (Memorandum 1969) illustrates Nixon's acknowledgement of the potential strength of Congressional accountability. However, the China lobby had lost support by the end of the 1960s, and business and trade links were increasingly influencing Congressional opinion. Indeed, Democratic Senators including Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts even explored the possibility of visiting China in early 1971, much to Nixon's displeasure (Schaller 2001, p.372).

Nixon's perceptions of the strength of his accountability towards the public and Congress were made clear in the handling of his visit to China in February 1972. Nixon's concern with media coverage, integral to public perceptions of the success or otherwise of the visit is illuminating. The President loved the drama and the visual extravaganza that his visit brought. Kissinger noted prior to the trip that 'TV in front of the President is like alcohol in front of an alcoholic' (Tyler 1999, p.112). Nixon's media savvy was bound up in his personal ego and pursuit of history. Moreover though, his concern reflected the reality of his upcoming battle for re-election at the end of 1972.

Negotiations over the wording of the visit-ending Shanghai Communiqué were tough, though perhaps less than would be expected according to negotiation theory on accountability. As Lord notes, the major American concern was 'justifying this visit to our domestic U.S. audience' (Tucker 2001, p.256). This links to Pruitt's emphasis on the ability of constituents to punish negotiators. In election year, the fear of punishment through a failure to re-elect was even more keenly felt. As such, redrafting of the communiqué continued through to the last minute focused on three main issue areas: persuading the Chinese to tone down fiery rhetoric, incorporating the sense of a strong American negotiation, and significant language on Taiwan.

The handling of negotiations over Taiwan indicated a careful balance between strategic interests and public accountability. While China claimed a historic right to the island, American public opinion had long-favoured supporting Taiwan's right to self-determination. On the penultimate night of Nixon's visit, the Department of State frantically addressed several wording issues. The draft communiqué had stated that all Chinese on both sides of the

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Taiwan Strait maintained that Taiwan was a part of China, ignoring the sizeable number of Taiwanese who were pro-independence. Further, a list of America's defence commitments in Asia made no reference of the Taiwan defence treaty (MacMillan 2006, p.300). Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, has since complained that in Kissinger's memoirs, 'he treats my intervention as being lots of silly little minor nit-picks' (Tucker 2001, p.276). Part of the explanation for this can be Kissinger's ego and his focus on great power relations. The fact that Kissinger agreed to the changes, however, is an acknowledgement that even Kissinger understood the importance of assuaging the domestic American audience.

The negotiations therefore demonstrate that domestic accountability, particularly public opinion, did play some role in the negotiations. At one stage, Kissinger promised Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai that 'it's possible for us to take more measures after next year than during next year' (MacMillan 2006, p.209). This display of caution was a classic bargaining strategy, but also a tacit acknowledgement of the potential power of the electorate. Yet Nixon was still able to concede quite heavily on Taiwan and Vietnam without a public backlash. The fact that this was achieved points to the importance of Nixon's anti-Communist credentials, which created a certain degree of trust between the electorate and President which decreased the strength of domestic accountability. Nixon's return to Washington, described as 'like the arrival of the king' (MacMillan 2006, p.312), highlights Nixon's domestic success despite the significant diplomatic concessions.

This section will now move on to discuss the importance of international accountability. Most importantly, America's new China policy risked alienating two regional allies, Taiwan and Japan. Following Kissinger's secret visit to China in July 1971, Nixon acknowledged these fears, arguing that renewed Sino-American relations would 'not come at the expense of our old friends' (Tyler 1999, p.108). Indeed, Nixon reinforced this message by sending Ronald Reagan to meet Taiwanese leader Chiang Kai-Shek in October 1971, where he pronounced that 'we will weaken no cherished associations; we will break no promises. Our defense commitment remains in full force...' (Tyler 1999, p.109).

However, Nixon failed to stand firm in protection of U.S. allies. Nixon's China policy paid little notice to its effects on Japan. Nixon had become agitated by Japan's handling of US-Japanese textile trade disputes and consequently raged about 'the Jap betrayal' (Destler, Fukui, Sato 1979, pp.251-274). By failing to warn the Japanese of Kissinger's July 1971 visit, Nixon claimed revenge by 'sticking it to Japan' (Hoff 1994, p.140). As it became known, the *shokku* was a humiliation for Japan. Thus, though Nixon used China's fear of Japan as negotiating leverage, he did not as he later claimed 'put it to the Chinese like someone out of Hell's Kitchen' (Hersh 1983, pp.380-81). Nixon's contemptuous approach towards Japan demonstrates a lack of concern for international accountability.

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As early as 1969, Nixon instructed Kissinger to use the Pakistani back-channel to send word to China that the U.S. was removing its destroyers from the Taiwan Straits in 'an effort to remove [a bilateral] irritant' (Memcon 1969). During the first negotiations on Kissinger's secret trip to China in July 1971, Kissinger told Zhou that Nixon wanted to formally recognise China at some point during his second term. On his second visit to China in October 1971, Kissinger assured Zhou that the US-Taiwanese Mutual Defense Treaty 'is not a permanent feature of our foreign policy' (DoS 1971-74). Moreover, Kissinger's visit totally undermined any U.S. opposition to the UN vote on the expulsion of the Republic of China (Taiwan) from the General Assembly. As Patrick Tyler notes, Ambassador Bush was left with the 'task of selling tickets on the *Titanic*' (Tyler 1999, p.117).

Kissinger's private diplomacy, on instruction from Nixon, showed a complete disregard for American regional allies. At the conclusion of his October visit, Kissinger laboured over the final communiqué, attempting to create 'a tone of firmness without belligerence' (MacMillan 2006, p.209) on the Taiwan question. But the horse had already bolted. Kissinger had already told Zhou that 'it's possible for us to do more than we can say' (Memcon 1971b, p.25). Taiwan's reaction to the developments was one of 'essential helplessness' (Doran and Lee 2002, p.696). Taiwan, unlike the American public, had no means of punishing, or holding the U.S. accountable. Instead, American diplomats had treated it as an 'annoying fragment' (MacMillan 2006, p.291) merely complicating Sino-American relations.

Nixon's visit to China a few months later did little to assuage Taiwanese fears. The Chinese attempted to push Nixon and Kissinger into recognising Taiwan as an integral part of China. Kissinger rejected the Chinese overtures but this had little to do with international accountability. Rather, the potential domestic dissent drove America's Taiwan policy. Kissinger pushed for the visit-ending communiqué to contain vague language in order that 'it enables us to return without looking as though we have surrendered on this point' (Memcon 1972b, pp.7-9). Taiwan's reaction to the Shanghai Communiqué made clear their displeasure. Chiang held that the communiqué 'is tantamount to inviting wolves into one's home' (Chiang 1972).

Taiwan and Japan were considered expendable in the great power calculations of Kissinger and Nixon. In a conversation with Nixon, Kissinger commented, 'It is a tragedy...But we have to be cold about it,' to which Nixon replied 'Yeah, we have to do what's best for us' (Memcon 1971). Thus, it can be seen that accountability in an international setting had virtually no ability to shape Nixon's China diplomacy.

Bush: towards a mandate?

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By failing to win the popular vote in 2000, Bush 'could not credibly claim a mandate from the people' (Edwards 2004, p.17). Thus, Bush was more accountable to his domestic constituents because his hold on power was initially relatively weak. This section will first analyse the impact of accountability on Bush's handling of the EP-3 incident. It will then discuss the shift in U.S. policy that resulted in Bush's collaboration with Chinese Premier Jiang Zemin during the Six Party talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons programme. It will be shown that domestic accountability was a significant determining factor in Bush's China diplomacy.

In December 2000, Richard Neustadt addressed Bush's apparent lack of mandate. He argued that 'if he can get by two or three events that permit him to look very presidential, then by summer he'll be the president, and it won't matter how he got there' (Campbell 2004, p.3). Neustadt's statement reinforces the relevance of Bush's weak domestic standing following a tight election to his initial China policy – there was pressure to look presidential. If the election afforded a heightened sense of domestic accountability, negotiation theory suggests that this would lead bargainers to feel that 'they should look strong, which leads to distributive [competitive] behaviour' (Carnevale, Pruitt, Britton 1979, p.121).

The April 2001 EP-3 incident was Bush's first foreign policy test. In particular, Bush's public statements and overall handling of the crisis appear to show the influence of accountability concerns. Prior to the mid-air collision over Hainan, polls demonstrated that close to 60% of the American public had an unfavourable attitude towards China, higher than at any time since the polling data began in 1967 (Holsti 2004, p.87). This explains Bush's possible fear of 'losing control of the issue in domestic politics' (Yee 2004, p.57). Bush's tough approach—publicly chastising the Chinese for failing to immediately release the American crew—can be seen as a deliberate attempt to play to his domestic audience. Competitive negotiation tactics such as those employed by Bush are 'ordinarily costly in time, effort, danger of antagonizing the other...' (Pruitt 1981, p.22). Electoral accountability must be seen as a contributory factor to this approach.

Having seized the opportunity for bellicosity, Bush's final objective was the safe return of the crew, again, with domestic politics in mind. As mentioned in the first chapter, the American climb-down could not be explained in terms of personal reputation or risk, but can be understood with reference to accountability. The reaction of White House counsellor Karen Hughes to the return of the crew and the end of the crisis is particularly illuminating—'Hey, when we run for reelection, we can say we passed the foreign-policy test!' (Draper 2007, p.130).

Further, due attention must be paid to the influence of media coverage of events, since 'citizens rely heavily on the media's interpretation of political leadership during crises' (Rankin 2004, p.57). It is interesting to note the speed with

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which key American officials talked to the media in order to quickly present the image of a firm leader to the public. Such was their eagerness to do so that on 1 April, 2001, the first day of the incident, Admiral Dennis C. Blair of the U.S. Pacific Command spoke to the media before even speaking to the crew. He contended that 'it's pretty obvious who bumped into who...I'm going on common sense now because I haven't talked to our crew' (CNN 2001, www.cnn.com). Following Bush's stern words on the evening of 2 April, news media headlines read 'Bush demands prompt release of detained crew' (Washington Times 2001, www.washingtontimes.com) and 'Bush demands access to crew, spy plane' (AP 2001, www.associatedpress.com). Clearly, the goal of the Bush Administration, to project an image of strength, was endorsed by the media, who then relayed this interpretation to the American public.

However, domestic accountability cannot be said to be the only explanation for Bush's handling of the EP-3 incident. An ongoing tussle between the Department of State and the Department of Defense can be observed. The conflict revolved around the future handling of U.S.-China relations. In this regard, the softening of the US position can also be seen as 'a victory for Secretary Powell and a more realistic, less ideological approach towards dealing with China' (Yee 2004, p.59). Thus, Bush's actions can be seen as a delicate balancing act. The incident was an early opportunity to put his controversial election victory behind him, allowing him to appear tough and Presidential, fighting for the fast release of the American crew. However, Bush's concern for domestic approval was actually counter-productive; he delayed the negotiations and alienated the Chinese. The Department of State's intervention into the negotiations signalled that certain American policy-makers were aware of the need to safeguard the bilateral relationship for strategic reasons.

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks significantly altered the power balance between President Bush and the American public, with Bush's approval ratings soon rising to over 90%. His visit to China in October 2001 largely focused on Sino-American terrorism cooperation, 'brushing aside any residual fallout from the incident at Hainan Island' (Herrmann 2004, p.205). The 2002 State of the Union address and the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) appeared to demonstrate that the President now had a mandate from the American people. Further, Bush attempted to link the War on Terrorism to a wider struggle against rogue nations. North Korea was described as being a member of an 'axis of evil' (Bush 2002, www.whitehouse.gov). Bush claimed that 'we must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States' (Bush 2002b, p.14). This seems to suggest that domestic accountability would diminish in importance, as security concerns became all-consuming. This chapter will therefore move on to discuss the evolution of the U.S.-China relationship post-9/11. The Six Party talks on North Korea's nuclear programme, which brought the U.S. and China together, will now be analysed with reference to the negotiations from 2003 to 2004.

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The tragedy of 9/11 provided Bush with an opportunity. Bush acknowledged, 'I've got political capital, and I intend to spend it' (Draper 2007, p.294). The 2002 NSS moved away from the earlier conception of China as a strategic competitor owing to changing threat perceptions. Now, the U.S. sought a 'constructive relationship' with China, noting that 'we already cooperate well...in promoting stability on the Korean peninsula' (NSS 2002, p.27). The North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002 following the emergence of U.S. intelligence reports that pointed to the existence of a highly enriched uranium weapons programme in North Korea. Having initially called for complete nuclear disarmament as a precondition for negotiation with Pyongyang, the Chinese eventually persuaded the Americans to the negotiating table by convening the first of a series of Six Party talks in August 2003 (Park 2005, p.76). The Bush Administration was willing to work with the Chinese due to concerns over nuclear proliferation and the perceived economic and political leverage that the Chinese had over the North Korean regime (Park 2005, p.88). In this sense, warming U.S. relations with China were purely short-term and instrumental, focused on what China could do for the United States, rather than on the long-term benefits of positive Sino-American relations.

Initial American diplomacy on the North Korea issue was demonstrative of the fact that little had changed with regards to how the U.S. viewed China. Throughout 2003 and 2004, Bush faced serious domestic criticism relating to America's economic relationship with China. In July 2003, Senator Lindsey Graham of North Carolina labelled China as economic 'cheats' due to unfair exchange rates and cheap labour (Barboza 2003, www.nytimes.com). This was followed in September by bipartisan legislation on tariffs on Chinese imports. In announcing the legislation, Senator Jim Bunning claimed that 'there is no question that China's unfair trade practices have played a major role in the loss of millions of U.S. manufacturing jobs' (Schumer 2003, www.senate.gov). This domestic pressure coincided with the first Six Party talks in August 2003 in which American obstinacy prevented progress. A complete lack of co-ordination with the Chinese, who favoured a softer line on North Korea, led to a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release that concluded that 'the American policy towards [the] DPRK...is the main problem we are facing [in the negotiations]' (Park 2005, p.88).

The American negotiating style certainly appears to reflect Pruitt's expectation that accountability to constituents leads to high initial demands and antagonistic negotiation. Assistant Secretary James Kelly and State Department negotiators were 'kept on a tight leash' (Garrison 2005, p.173). American negotiator Charles Pritchard, who subsequently resigned in protest, recalled that 'we were prohibited from having negotiations...I asked myself, "What am I doing in government?"' (Kaplan 2004, www.washingtonmonthly.com) Bush had insisted that American negotiators hold firm on an offer of a written security guarantee in return for complete nuclear disarmament, despite the North Koreans showing little inclination to accept the deal and the Chinese pushing for greater incentives. Indeed, media reports in May 2004 had accused U.S. special envoy Joseph Detran of going "soft", providing inducements,

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and “giving in” to the North Koreans (Garrison 2005, p.173) despite the maintenance of a hard-line stance. It is therefore clear that domestic accountability, particularly in the form of Congressional oversight, severely constrained the U.S. negotiating style and impeded any attempts to cooperate further with the Chinese.

The eventual softening of the U.S. position in June 2004 needs to be accounted for. The major explanation appears to lie in electoral accountability. Having made the decision to work with China to negotiate with the North Koreans, and with precious little to show for it, the stalemate could have become a domestic liability for the Democrats to prey on. Therefore in June, Bush allowed the U.S. position to change. Subject to North Korea's full disclosure and subsequent elimination of its plutonium production and uranium enrichment capabilities and its nuclear materials and weapons, non-U.S. parties would provide North Korea with heavy fuel oil and multilateral security assurances (Cirincione, Wolfsthal, Rajkumar 2005, www.carnegieendowment.org). Even so, on July 15, 2004 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee met to discuss the North Korean talks. In attendance, Assistant Secretary James Kelly was consistently attacked by the Democrats for the failure of the negotiation process. Florida Senator Bill Nelson denounced Kelly for letting the negotiations drag on. Nelson suggested that ‘sometimes the sinner can be encouraged more to reform if there are the incentives...Economic assistance is one of those. Energy supplies are another’ (Lugar 2004, p.23). The potential for continued Democratic points-scoring, as shown in the SFRC meeting and the concomitant risk of electoral punishment, was a significant factor in the U.S. negotiation softening.

In conclusion, domestic accountability can be seen as an important factor affecting the course of Nixon's and Bush's diplomacy. In particular, Nixon's negotiations in February 1972 and Bush's North Korean negotiations in June 2004 were influenced by upcoming elections. Poor diplomatic performance would have led to negative public reaction and would have been used by political opponents looking to score political points. This is supported by Alexander Nikolaev, who argues that relationships between ‘state, media, social, political, business, etc...may create or affect actors' interests and, consequently, affect their negotiational strategies’ (Nikolaev 2007, p.xvi). International accountability can be seen as a negligible factor in the negotiation process, as neo-realists would expect. Nixon paid little attention to the effect his China diplomacy had on Taiwan and Japan. For Bush, the EP-3 incident had little international relevance while international accountability also played little part in the North Korean negotiations.

IV. National Interest: Above all Else?

The neo-realist Hans Morgenthau argues that decision-making should be governed solely by the national interest and the maintenance and maximisation of power. Morgenthau contends that ‘the statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers’ (Morgenthau 1952, p.223). The anarchic international system is thus characterised by an eternal struggle for power, which, ‘by its very nature...is never ended, for the lust for power, and the fear of it, is never still’ (Morgenthau 1952, p.92). If so, strategic and geopolitical concerns should be the primary concern of negotiators, overriding any other potential variables such as personal risk or accountability. Zartman and Rubin point out, however, that the strongest nations in terms of force or resources do not always

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triumph at negotiation: 'the issue behind power as a possession is that it fails to take into account control of the resources through will and skill' (Zartman and Rubin 2000, p.10). This chapter will therefore evaluate the extent to which national interest can explain the China diplomacies of Nixon and Bush. Further, it will assess the influence of power and perceptions of power on the negotiating process. It will argue that perceptions of the national interest as well as perceptions of power were crucial determinants of the policies of Nixon and Bush, but they cannot fully explain the diplomatic paths of the two presidents.

Nixon, Kissinger and Realpolitik

As Nixon entered office in 1969, his major challenge was to sustain American power. In his inaugural address on 20 January 1969, Nixon outlined what became known as the Nixon Doctrine and what Nixon referred to as a structure of peace. He declared

Where peace is unknown, make it welcome...After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation. Let all nations know that during this administration our lines of communication will be open (Nixon 1969, www.yale.edu).

The new doctrine was couched in Nixon's perception of American power, in which the American nuclear monopoly of the 1940s had turned into a rough strategic balance with the USSR by the late 1960s. This created new diplomatic calculations which the doctrine sought to address. Importantly, the U.S. could no longer work alone, and needed to shift 'from a paternal mission *for* others to a cooperative mission *with* others' (Nixon 1971, p.6). The two most pressing issues were clearly the ending of the Vietnam War and the need to pressurise the USSR into a superpower détente involving arms control agreements and summits. But as Kissinger admits, 'the New Administration had the general intention of making a fresh start. But in all candor it had no precise idea how to do this...Nixon was indeed somewhat schizophrenic in the early days' (Kissinger 1979, pp.167-168). Nonetheless, Kissinger has claimed that Nixon's 'powerful analytical skills and extraordinary geopolitical intuition were always crisply focused on the American interest' (Kissinger 1994, p.705). This section will assess to what extent Nixon's diplomacy was really driven by American national interest.

Nixon and Kissinger were both realists and well-schooled in balance of power thinking. Both believed that the best chance to 'shape a global equilibrium' (Kissinger 1979, p.192) involved a rapprochement with China. Kissinger has noted that, 'policy emerges when concept encounters opportunity' (Kissinger 1979, p.171). The watershed moment occurred in March 1969 when Soviet and Chinese troops clashed on the Ussuri River. Importantly, the ensuing Sino-Soviet split and the border clashes meant that the Chinese 'were pretty terrified by the chances of attack' (Tucker 2001, p.230). This gave China new impetus and greater motivation to accept American diplomatic overtures. In doing so, possible future negotiation became what Zartman calls a 'positive-sum exercise' (Zartman 1978, p.70) in which both sides stood to gain from the negotiation. Without the Sino-Soviet split, what would China have wanted from the United States? As White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman commented, 'it is pretty clear that the Chinese want it

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just as badly as we do and that makes it easier to negotiate' (Haldeman 1994, p.319).

Prior to the American shift, Kissinger had described the Soviet response to American requests for an arms limitation summit as 'grudging and petty' (Kissinger 1979, p.766). Kissinger's visits to China in 1971 brought immediate rewards. Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin soon secured a date for a Nixon-Brezhnev summit, and Western access to Berlin was quickly negotiated (Tyler 1999, p.110). Kissinger wrote in a memorandum in October 1971 that

we want our China policy to show Moscow...that it is to their advantage to make agreements with us, that they must take account of possible US-PRC co-operation...The beneficial impact on the USSR is perhaps the single biggest plus that we get from the China initiative (Kissinger 1979, p.765).

Nixon confirms this national interest-focused approach in a memorandum from 23 February 1972, stating that 'we are not being philanthropic...it is in the interest of the US that China be a strong independent country and that China's neighbors not engage in carving it up' (Memcon 1972, p.20). The Vietnam War, which Nixon argued had long 'distorted our picture of Asia' (Nixon 1967, p.20), was the other important variable in the negotiating process. Nixon hoped that he would be able to persuade China to exert some pressure on the North Vietnamese to enter into peace talks. In fact, Nixon had long seen Vietnam as an 'irritant' (Nixon 1972, p.27), a minor issue which should have no bearing on great power realism. The Nixon archives show that Nixon sought 'any moves, any influence to get negotiations' (Memcon 1972c, pp.20-27). This appears to show that negotiations were conditioned by what was most important in terms of national interest.

Undoubtedly, Nixon's trip to China in 1972 was shaped by the pursuit of American national interests. Lord states that 'we knew that Mao was no Boy Scout...we were there on a very hard-headed mission. We tried to serve American national interests. At the time we were concerned about the Soviets, the Vietnam War' (Tucker 2001, p.272). Aboard the renamed Spirit of '76 on the flight over to China, Nixon furiously scribbled notes outlining the geopolitical goals and implications of a possible Sino-American rapprochement:

What we want:

1. Indochina (?)
2. Communists—to restrain Chicom expansion in Asia.
3. In Future—Reduce threat of a confrontation by Chinese Super Power.

What we both want:

1. Reduce danger of confrontation and conflict.
2. A more stable Asia.
3. A restraint on USSR (Nixon 1972b).

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Negotiations once Nixon arrived in China focused on the importance of national interest, and the balance-of-power. Nixon asked Mao to question 'why the Soviets have more forces on the border facing you than on the border facing Western Europe' (Tyler 1999, p.132). This statement was in fact an exaggeration, only a quarter of the Soviet forces were trained on China. Nevertheless, it demonstrates the importance, in terms of national interest, that Nixon placed on winning the Chinese over. In a defensive sense, achieving a balance of power is 'driven by the fundamental interest that states have to maintain their positions and not to be dominated by an unchecked hegemonic state' (Ikenberry 2001, pp.28-29). Moreover, the selling-out of Taiwan and Japan in the Shanghai Communiqué is more evidence that national interest, shaped by great power realism, was predominant in Nixon's mind. As Nixon left China, the State Department's Charles Freeman concluded that 'we had accomplished our purpose, which was a strategic one' (MacMillan 2006, p.309). However, the American concessions on the communiqué may have been motivated by issues other than purely national interest, such as personal risk and accountability. As Chinese negotiator Qiao Guanhua noted, 'the United States comes to China and it needs the communiqué' (MacMillan 2006, p.302). To come to China and fail to secure the communiqué would certainly have been catastrophic personally for Nixon.

Finally, the Sino-American relationship after Nixon's visit continued to reflect American national interests, which Nixon perceived were best served by drawing China closer to the United States and further away from USSR. In this regard, Nixon and Kissinger attempted to draw China into a 'virtual alliance' (Foot 2005, p.93), even divulging top secret satellite images of Soviet military installations to the Chinese. In February 1973, a new communiqué contained modified language that upgraded the Shanghai Communiqué. Now, China and the United States agreed to 'resist' (upgraded from 'opposed' in the Shanghai Communiqué) 'jointly' (upgraded from 'separately') any country's attempt at 'world' (upgraded from 'Asian') domination (Kissinger 1994, p.729). As Watergate unfolded and China became less worried of Soviet aggression, Sino-American relations petered out. Yet, Nixon's diplomacy had certainly boosted America's international standing.

However, though national interest was a key influencing factor in the negotiations, other variables were at play. During Nixon's visit, Mao's wife Jiang Qing perceptively asked Nixon 'why did you not come to China before now?' (Tyler 1999, p.137). Evelyn Goh also points out that if national interest were the only consideration, why did the rapprochement not happen earlier when circumstances were equally as propitious (Goh 2005, p.3)? Thus, it must be concluded that though states seek to serve the national interest, specific contexts, situational factors and other constraints inhibit the extent to which national interest can always shape diplomatic negotiations.

George W. Bush – Towards Unilateralism?

George W. Bush's predecessor Bill Clinton was anxious to please China, determined to make the most of China's economic rise. This culminated in the safe passage of the permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) legislation through Congress in October 2000 (Sutter 2002). Conversely, Bush ascended to power with a realist belief that the United States' China policy should be based on the need for military deterrence and containment, eliminating any room for Chinese diplomatic leverage. Bush labelled China as a 'strategic competitor' (Ward 2003, p.44) while reinforcing the United States' position on Taiwan, claiming that America would 'do whatever it took' (Wu 2006, www.ciis.org.cn) to help defend Taiwan. The initial Bush Doctrine, defined by Peter Beinart as 'maximalist, bone-crushing' (Beinart 2006, p.1) Jacksonianism, maintained that 'international order [was] a direct by-product of U.S. primacy. System stability increase[d] in step with U.S. power' (Ikenberry and Kupchan 2004, p.39).

Bush's early realist pessimist position, one that feared Chinese expansion and favoured undisputed hegemony, is broadly in line with John Mearsheimer's suggestion that the United States should 'cut China off at the knees' (Mearsheimer 2002, globetrotter.berkeley.edu). Bush's apparent indifference to China is reflected in his failure to extend a courtesy call to President Jiang Zemin following his election victory. This attitude would seem to place a low value on positive relations with China, because Bush perceived that American national interest would best be served through the exercise of unilateral power. As such, Bush stated that 'America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge...thereby, making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace' (Bush 2002, www.whitehouse.gov).

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For Bush, the principal worry revolved around what China would do with its nascent power. As a presidential nominee Bush had argued that China was in transition, and *it is difficult to know [its] intentions when they do not know their own future* (Bush 1999, usinfo.state.gov). Bush's concerns were supported by the Department of Defense's Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China in 2000, which continually made reference to Chinese attempts to 'offset' US military and economic power. The Report noted that Chinese policies had 'increasingly contained themes that indirectly or directly challenge US security policies' (Office of Secretary of Defense 2000, www.defenselink.mil). This hawkish approach was endorsed by several of Bush's key advisers, including Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz.

In 1997 Wolfowitz had compared rising China to pre-World War I Imperial Germany. In this sense, China's history of national humiliation by great powers and a wish for its "place in the sun" meant that China was 'determined to achieve its rightful place by nationalistic assertiveness' (Wolfowitz 1997, p.7). Yet the Administration's China policy was not quite so unified. Secretary of State Colin Powell had a more positive view. He stated that 'strategic partner China is not, but neither is China our inevitable and implacable foe...China is not an enemy, and our challenge is to keep it that way' (Powell 2001, www.cnn.com). Chinese theorists such as Zheng Bijian, a former Chinese government official, supported Powell's theory, maintaining that China's strategic route is merely a 'development path to a peaceful rise' (Zheng 2005, p.20).

The hawkish elements of the Bush Administration seem to be reflected in Bush's instinctive initial response to the EP-3 crisis. Believing that the incident would blow over, and that the Chinese would return the American crew as a matter of course within the next 24 hours (Wu 2007/08, p.68), Bush opted not to take any action on the day of the incident, 1 April 2001. However, flabbergasted by the Chinese refusal to immediately release the crew, Bush went on the offensive in statements made on 2 April and 3 April, ignoring Chinese concerns, and restating American demands. In this regard, Bush miscalculated the strength of the American bargaining position. His negotiating style follows Pruitt's theory that, 'bargainers will delay concessions if they label themselves as *more powerful* than the adversary' (Pruitt 1981, p.88). As Jeswald Salacuse warns, and in support of Zartman and Rubin's contention on power and negotiation, states 'should ask what its sources of power are in this particular negotiation of dispute, rather than merely calculate its total resources' (Salacuse 2000, pp.266-267). Bush failed to do this.

Bush's harsh language in his public statements on 2 and 3 April only inflamed the Chinese negotiators, and ingrained in them the need for a 'resolute struggle against the erroneous behavior' (Zhang 2006, p.396) of the Americans. U.S. actions contravened Salacuse's negotiation advice, which warns that strong states 'should avoid the temptation of trying to overpower the weaker side through domineering words or actions...displays of power...may stall or slow the negotiations considerably' (Salacuse 2000, p.268). Indeed, it was only when the Department of State took over negotiations from the more hawkish Department of Defense that Bush's tone became more low-key and conciliatory, allowing resolution to finally occur. Bush's initial reaction to the EP-3 collision can be seen as rash and naïve. Bush came into office 'psychologically predisposed to see the world in terms of threats and to see China as fundamentally hostile to U.S. goals' (Garrison 2005, p.174). Thus, Bush directed American negotiation to be overtly hostile until the folly of the approach was exposed, demonstrably affecting the negotiation process, and Sino-American relations. In this sense, the national interest was finally defined in terms of positive Sino-American relations.

Following the September 11 attacks and Bush's visit to China in October 2001, a change in tack can be witnessed. Cooperation on terrorism reinforced the strategic rationale for closer Sino-American ties, as did burgeoning economic interdependence. It was thought that 'acts of unprecedented barbarism must surely give rise to new and equally unprecedented levels of cooperation among the civilized nations of the world' (Friedberg 2002, p.33). Sure enough, at the close of the October 2001 Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Summit, Bush optimistically revelled in what he termed a 'new spirit of partnership and amity with Beijing' (Vatikiotis, Dolven, Murphy 2001, taiwansecurity.org).

However, the negotiations on North Korea, beginning in August 2003 did not reflect a growing relationship due to a complete absence of U.S.-China policy coordination. Again, factions within the Bush Administration were split amongst the doves who urged greater Sino-American collaboration, and the hawks who were distrustful of North

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Korean intentions and remained overtly hostile to China. Clearly, the Bush Administration has suffered from a confused conception of the national interest. This has led Bush's diplomacy towards China to be ad hoc and action-based, lurching from one incident to another without any clear strategy of how to build a long-term constructive relationship, or even whether a constructive relationship would be beneficial at all.

In a September 2005 speech to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, then Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick called on China to become a 'responsible stakeholder' (Zoellick 2005, www.ncuscr.org) in the international system, and for example 'China should take more than oil from Sudan' (Zoellick 2005, www.ncuscr.org). Zoellick's speech echoed Nixon's 1971 address to Congress. Nixon had claimed that 'only if China's weight was reflected in the international system would it have the incentive, and sense of shared responsibility, to maintain the peace' (Nixon 1971, p.7). Bush continued this theme in November 2005 during his visit to China, where he urged China to embrace social, political and religious freedoms, and announced plans to further increase trade with China (BBC 2005, news.bbc.co.uk). It seems that Bush had decided that national interest and cooperation with China could go together. However, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review remained cautious, warning that 'China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counter strategies' (DoD 2006, p.29). Nevertheless, by 2007, the 'responsible stakeholder' model had moved to the 'shared stakeholder' model. China and the United States could cooperate on Korea, Iran, Sudan, and energy security. Hence, 'this is not to say we see each challenge with the eyes of the other. Our policies may differ. But the commonalities of interest far outweigh the differences' (Zoellick 2007, www.ncuscr.org). Unfortunately, Bush's policy shift has occurred too late to engender any real improvement in Sino-American relations.

The Bush Administration's China diplomacy clearly adhered to conceptions of the national interest. However, different government factions had varying opinions about what the national interest actually was in relation to China. This meant that Bush's China diplomacy was often ad hoc, inconsistent and lacked cohesion.

In sum, Nixon's visit to China in February 1972 was above all strategically beneficial. Though Zhou had made it clear that China would not and could not pressure Hanoi to alter its negotiation position, the talks did indirectly help to solve the Vietnam imbroglio, and the Chinese gradually encouraged North Vietnamese to reach settlement in the coming year (Goh 2005, p.210). Moreover, by May 1972 the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty was signed in Moscow. As MacMillan acknowledges, improved Sino-American relations meant that the 'Soviet Union became more aware of the need to work with the United States and even more sensitive to perceived slights' (MacMillan 2006, p.283). For Bush, in the aftermath of September 11, terrorism cooperation and the threat of North Korea should have brought China and the United States into a more cooperative, harmonious relationship.

This did not happen, however. Bush's approach lacked a core concept and unlike the Shanghai Communiqué, it did not 'envisag[e] a strategic framework to guide relations' (Zoellick 2007, www.ncuscr.org). Additionally, warring factions within his administration and domestic pressures constrained Bush's pursuit of a clear national interest.

V. Conclusion

This essay has analysed the influences and constraints that have shaped the diplomatic course of Sino-American relations under Presidents Nixon and Bush, and argued that the interaction of personal risk, accountability and the pursuit of national interest shaped the diplomatic process. In this sense, Zartman's characterisation of diplomatic negotiation as a 'process of varying values' (Zartman 1978, p.73) is particularly apt. The purpose of this essay was to establish the extent to which each variable helped to structure the course of U.S.-China diplomatic relations.

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Undoubtedly, the divergent geopolitical climates of the Nixon and Bush presidencies had a profound effect on their approaches to China. The inaugural addresses of both Nixon and Bush espoused a Wilsonian idealism, tinged, of course, with self interest. While Nixon declared that 'where peace is unknown, make it welcome; where peace is fragile, make it strong; where peace is temporary, make it permanent' (Nixon 1969, www.yale.edu), Bush also reiterated that 'America remains engaged in the world by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom' (Bush 2001b, www.whitehouse.gov). Both Presidents were committed not just to engaging the international system, but in actively guiding and shaping it.

As luck would have it, China was a key component in the doctrines of both Nixon and Bush. However, the approaches of the two Presidents were remarkably different. In this sense, this essay has sought to explain the divergence. For Nixon, China was an integral part of his new grand strategy. Indeed, his inaugural address was subtly but specifically aimed at China, as he envisioned 'a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation' (Nixon 1969, www.yale.edu). Bush, on the other hand, had spoken of redefining the U.S.-China relationship as one of competitors, not strategic partners (Bush 2000b, www.ontheissues.org). Thus, Nixon and Bush contrasted in their threat perceptions of China. Nixon believed that China could be used as a geopolitical chip, aiding in persuading the Soviet Union to commit to détente and facilitating the American exit from Vietnam, while the Chinese had just endured the failed Cultural Revolution and feared Soviet border encroachments. Bush appeared to be fearful of the effect of China's rising power on American interests. Chinese thinkers claimed that China would not tread the same path as previous great powers, for 'external expansion, aggressive war, and the pursuit of hegemony...[as] such a path leads nowhere but to failure' (Zheng 2005, p.28). Yet Bush was not convinced, perhaps aware that history was 'replete with confrontations between incumbent dominant powers and rising aspirant powers' (Zhiqun 2006, p.175). In this regard, two moments in history produced contrasting perceptions of Chinese and American power and how best to serve the American national interest. This doubtless affected the attitudes of Nixon and Bush towards negotiations with the Chinese.

However, national interest was not the sole lodestar of American diplomacy under Nixon and Bush. Anatoly Dobrynin has noted 'how profoundly human nature and indeed human relations affect the outcome of events; diplomacy, after all, is not just a public and professional skill but also a very private and individual one' (Dobrynin 1995, p.5). Nixon and Bush both grappled, in strikingly different circumstances, with the hangovers of their childhoods. This had a profound effect on their characters and their careers as statesman. Nixon's China diplomacy, though of course couched in national interest, contained significant elements of personal and psychological influence. An obsession with power and his historical reputation encouraged Nixon to take substantial risks and turned the 'dialogue of the deaf' (Goldstein 2001, p.200) into meaningful friendship. That history has proved his judgement correct bears

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testament to Nixon's diplomatic skill and creativity. In contrast, Bush's childhood created a need for differentiation from his father, George H.W. Bush, and this led to a predisposition to see China in overtly hostile terms, while Bush's personality favoured rapid decision-making over nuance. The impact of personality and individual conceptions of risk provided divergent interpretations of the rightful American diplomatic path towards China, and this significantly impacted upon the diplomacy of Nixon in particular.

Though the election of Nixon was relatively close, Nixon entered the White House with a clear mandate. The American public wanted an end to the imbroglio in Vietnam and a decrease in Cold War tensions. However, the domestic audience remained cynical and hostile to China's intentions. In 1967, 71 percent of Americans considered China to be the biggest threat to world peace (Goh 2005, p.23). Fortunately, Nixon's reputation as a fierce anti-Communist allowed him the breathing room to initiate relations with China and certainly decreased the constraint of domestic accountability. Moreover, the public's fear of war led to increased receptivity to negotiations (Kusnitz 1984, pp.114-115), and what Nixon saw as a naïve obsession with peace at any price (Yafeng 2006, p.190) allowed Nixon a degree of manoeuvrability. Nixon's disregard for the opinions of Taiwan and Japan, in particular, also minimised any semblance of international accountability. Contrary to this, Bush's infamously narrow electoral success severely inhibited and limited his options. As such, Bush was forced to pay far greater attention to the wants of his constituents than Nixon, meaning that domestic accountability was more influential in the shaping of Bush's China diplomacy. Moreover, the conservative base of Bush's Republicans was forthright in its hostility to China. As was demonstrated with Bush's handling of the EP-3 and North Korean negotiations, antipathy towards China obfuscated American national interest, and complicated diplomatic negotiations. Therefore, it can be said that accountability significantly constrained Bush's diplomatic choices, while Nixon, though acknowledging the importance of his constituents, had a greater freedom to operate.

In sum, this essay attempted to explain two questions: 'why' Nixon and Bush chose the diplomatic strategies they did, and 'how' it was possible. Richard Nixon entered the White House at an opportune moment in Sino-American history. China's changing security environment and developing worldview, together with the Vietnam morass and shifting American public perceptions towards China, created an advantageous combination of circumstances. Nixon, the realist obsessed with legacy, 'saw and seized the opportunity at hand' (Yafeng 2006, pp.222-223). George W. Bush, meanwhile, represented a contrast to George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, both of whom were Sinophiles. Despite China's protestations of peaceful intent, the American public and Bush saw China as an inherent threat to American power. Moreover, the 11 September attacks and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq shifted Bush's focus. As such, the diplomacy of Nixon and Bush can be seen as a result of the complex and contextual interaction of several competing variables. While Nixon's diplomacy made possible the normalisation and institutionalisation of

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Sino-American relations, the Bush legacy is one of a missed opportunity.

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[1] In this equation, B = behaviour, P = person (needs and tensions) and E = environment (forces and valences).

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