The Significance of the US War on Terror Policy for the Japan-US Relationship
Written by Yuki Horiuchi

It is recognisable that Japan's participation in the War on Terror has had some short-term influence on the Japan-U.S. relationship, however, there is not much research about its long-term influence. This thesis discusses the long-term influence of the War on Terror on the Japan-U.S. relationship by examining new security bills that the Diet passed in 2015. In addition, this study tries to shed light on what kind of significance the War on Terror has had for the Japan-U.S. relationship.

The first section describes historical facts concerning the Japan-U.S. relationship and Japan's security policy in pre-War on Terror periods (from the end of WWII): the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1951, the revision of the Security Treaty in 1960, the implementation of the 1978 Guidelines, the Gulf War in 1991, and the implementation of the 1997 Defence Guidelines. Examining these historical milestones related to the Japan-U.S. relationship enables us to obtain the background knowledge and the analytic framework necessary for studying Japan's participation in the War on Terror and its influence on the Japan-U.S. relationship.

The second section analyses the post-War on Terror period to study the sequence between the War on Terror and the new security bills. The second section particularly examines how Japan, led by the Koizumi administration, reacted to the U.S.-led War on Terror policy. After the September 11 attacks, the Koizumi administration expressed its intention to support the U.S. due to the fact that some Japanese policy makers wished to avoid repeating the same “failure” made in 1991, when the Gulf War took place. Through supporting the U.S., Japan was involved in an unprecedented activity — deploying the JSDF to an active war zone for the first time in the post-WWII era.

The next section deals with changes in the Japan-U.S. relationship under the Koizumi administration. It is fair to say that the Japan-U.S. relationship became quite close compared to the pre-War on Terror period. After the September 11 attacks, Japan exhibited active commitment to the U.S. which was represented by the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance (LCSMHRA). These commitments played an important role in making the Japan-U.S. relationship a “global alliance” as Secretary Condoleezza Rice stated in the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in 2005. Even though the Japan-U.S. relationship evolved into a global-level alliance, whether or not it is actually a global peace-oriented alliance is in question. SCC after the September 11 attacks (2002 and 2005) seemed to perceive international terrorism as a priority for the Japan-U.S. relationship, however, from 2006 it shifted to security issues in East Asia. It could be speculated that the Japan-U.S. relationship is still a regional security-oriented alliance.

In order to study the current state of the Japan-U.S. relationship, the fourth section takes a close look at the new security bills passed by the Abe administration. Not only describing facts of the new security bills, this section also analyses the logic used by the administration for justifying the bills. According to some politicians and scholars, the Abe administration made some vital logical errors which suggest that the administration has an immature understanding of the ability to implement the bills.

However, it is true that the new bills enable the JSDF to function without any geographical constrains, which indicates the further tightening of the Japan-U.S. relationship. The question here is what kind of sequence occurred
between the War on Terror and the new security bills. It is difficult to discover clear coherence between these due to the fact that the administration seems to put a primary emphasis on threats represented by China and North Korea in terms of designing the new security bills.

The conclusion of this essay is tentative; the War on Terror might have contributed to the global-level Japan-U.S. relationship accomplished by the new security bills. The primary reason the Abe administration was able to bring such a radical change in the Japan-U.S. relationship may have been because of Japan’s participation in the War on Terror under the Koizumi administration. Of course, it is impossible to know whether or not the Abe administration would have submitted the new security bills without Japan’s participation in the War on Terror.

The Historical Background of Japan’s Security Policies: Before the War on Terror

In order to examine the significance of the War on Terror to Japan’s security policies and the Japan-U.S. alliance, it is necessary for us to consider several milestones in the security relationship. The milestones include the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1951, the revision of the Security Treaty in 1960, the implementation of the 1978 Guidelines, the Gulf War in 1991, and the implementation of the 1997 Defence Guidelines. Studying these events and clarifying the fundamental posture of the Japan-U.S. relationship enables us to compare them with the movements in the relationship in the War on Terror era. By doing so, we can better understand the significance of the War on Terror in the Japan-U.S. alliance. Thus, looking closely at the security relationship between the two countries in the pre-War on Terror period is vital.

Before discussing the Japan-U.S. security relationship, the Occupation of Japan needs to be mentioned in order to understand the fundamental context of the Japan-U.S. relationship. After Japan’s defeat in WWII, the United States assigned General MacArthur to rebuild Japan through the Occupation. As discussed among the Allied nations during WWII, the objectives of the Occupation were to: disarm Japan, rehabilitate Japan’s economy, and prevent Japan’s remilitarisation.[1] In the course of the Occupation, the Government Section of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) produced the draft of the Japanese constitution to satisfy MacArthur’s vision for the future of Japan.[2] By the constitution drafted under U.S. supervision, and Article 9 in particular, Japan renounced “war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes”.[3] The Occupation finally ended in 1952 following the Treaty of San Francisco in 1951.

The first milestone in the security relationship between Japan and the U.S. was the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1951, which was agreed upon with the Treaty of San Francisco. Having a security relationship with the U.S. allowed Japan to rearm itself, which the United States wanted to avoid when WWII finished. However, because of the Korean War, the U.S. changed its security strategy with regard to Japan. General MacArthur led the creation of the National Police Reserve (NPR) in order to protect Japan from the Japanese communists since U.S. forces were deployed on the Korean peninsula in 1950.[4] Two years later, NPR became the National Security Force which possessed an undoubted character as a military; the Mutual Security Assistance program required Japan to “achieve the minimum troop levels.”[5] In order to make it compatible with renouncing any military means in Article 9, General MacArthur created the following interpretation: Article 9 does not prohibit military force in accordance with the right of individual self-defence granted by the UN Charter.[6] Thus, the initiation of the Japan-U.S. security relationship was brought, in part, by the external force of the U.S. in the face of the potential threat of communists inside Japan.

In 1960, the administration led by Nobusuke Kishi agreed on the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan was established. The main difference between the previous security treaty and this treaty, arguably though, is an equal relationship as sovereign states. This characteristic can be observed in the following articles of the security treaty in 1960:

Article IV:

The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.[7]
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Article IV indicates the mutual characteristic of this security treaty: it is possible to observe each nation's commitment to "a substantive military structure for defence cooperation" and the security of East Asia.[8]

Article VI:

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.[9]

This article was probably written in the hope of exhibiting the obligations of burden sharing of the two states for mutual cooperation. Since the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was established under the status of post-Occupation Japan, Japan agreed on this treaty as a sovereign state. In addition to that, as mentioned above, this treaty possesses the characteristic of the mutual security relationship. Thus, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is a milestone in the security relationship between Japan and the U.S.

The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defence Cooperation (1978) is the third milestone in the the Japan-U.S. security relationship. This agreement was made in order to cope with the Soviet Union. According to the guidelines, the JSDF provides maritime shipping with security within 1000 miles of the Japanese archipelago.[10] In addition, the JSDF was obliged to increase its maritime responsibility: they strengthened their "minesweeping, anti-submarines, patrol and surveillance capability" for countering against the Soviet Union.[11] Due to these security arrangements, the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defence Cooperation were effective during the late Cold War.[12]

Many Japanese conservative bureaucrats consider Japan’s inactive role in the Gulf War as a traumatic event in Japanese security policies. In 1990, the Hussein administration of Iraq invaded Kuwait, and it caused the Persian Gulf Crisis. The next year, an alliance led by the United States attacked Iraqi forces, and the Gulf War took place. In order to prevent Iraq from invading other states in the region, George H.W. Bush organised a multinational military alliance referred to as Operation Desert Storm.[13] The U.S demanded Japan’s participation in the military operations due to the fact that Japan was dependent on oil from the Middle East (70% of Japan’s oil came from the region at that time).[14] The requirement of deployment of the SDF for logistical support for the military alliance, however, could not be achieved because the Japanese government adhered to the restrictions imposed by Article 9.[15] Consequently, Japan’s support was limited to a $13 billion monetary provision which was referred to as “checkbook diplomacy” by the US.[16] Thus, Japan’s lack of military commitment to the Gulf War was criticised by the United States and other allies, [17] and above all it created some suspicion of Japan on the US government.[18] Criticism of Japan’s failure to provide military support in the Gulf War convinced some Japanese politicians that a monetary provision is not sufficient to help the settlement of international contingencies.[19] To contribute to international society (or to avoid making the same mistakes in the Gulf War), in 1992 the Diet established the PKO law by which civilians and the JSDF can be engaged in PKO activities in noncombat areas.[20] Another significant move generated by Japan’s failure in the Gulf War was the fact that the Koizumi administration perceived the September 11 attacks as a political opportunity to exhibit active support for the US.[21] It can be speculated that Japanese policy makers tried to avoid repeating what happened in the Gulf War at any rate.

The last significant event with regard to the Japanese security issues before the War on Terror is the revision of the Guidelines in 1997. Primary motives of the revision of the Guidelines are categorised into internal and external factors. The internal factor basically originated with Okinawa: three US marine officers sexually violated a 12-year-old girl in Okinawa in 1995 which raised the question whether the US bases in Okinawa were necessary as the threat of the Soviet Union had disappeared.[22] Not only people in Okinawa but also people throughout Japan shared the same question. Thus, it can be assumed that the government of Japan needed to justify the presence of the U.S. bases in Okinawa in order to continue a favourable security relationship with the United States. The external factor refers to the unstable situation of East Asia. In 1993, North Korea conducted a nuclear experiment. Even though the circumstances did not evolve into an emergency, it was sufficient for policy makers to conclude that there was no
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The legal framework to deploy the JSDF in the case of an emergency around Japan.[23] In addition, from 1995-1996, the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis occurred by which the necessity of reconsidering the security framework between the U.S. and Japan became clear to Japanese and U.S. policy makers. For these reasons, the U.S. and Japan decided to revise the guidelines and redefine the post-Cold War security relationship. One of the main changes made in the Guidelines in 1997 was that it clearly suggested Japan's commitment to “situations in areas surrounding Japan”. [24] Furthermore, the 1997 Guidelines stressed the point that the U.S. military role would decrease; instead the JSDF had a larger role of leading defensive operations.[25] All things considered, the 1997 Guidelines rendered the U.S-Japan joint military activities possible in areas surrounding Japan, and it is fair to say that the the Japan-U.S. security relationship made progress towards a seamless security relationship.

In sum, the the Japan-U.S. security relationship evolved in the context of the Cold War: the U.S incorporated Japan into the U.S. alliance to contain its opponent, the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the Japan-U.S. security relationship developed relatively smoothly, which was illustrated in 1960 and 1978. However, after the Cold War, Japan and the U.S. realised that the Cold War-oriented security relationship was not likely to adapt to post-Cold War conditions. Japan’s failure to participate militarily in the Gulf War led Japanese conservative policy makers to move toward a more active commitment including military support. In addition, changing circumstances in East Asia incited the U.S. and Japan to decide to redefine the post-Cold War security relationship. In the next section, this essay analyses Japan’s participation in the War on Terror in the attempt to clarify what changes have and have not been made and what has not changed in Japanese security policies.

Japan’s Reaction to the U.S.-led War on Terror

Japan’s security policies and the Japan-U.S. relationship have been changing in an incremental fashion since WWII. As discussed above, the ever-changing circumstances of international politics have heavily influenced the range of security cooperation between Japan and the United States. For example, certain acts by China and North Korea after the Cold War motivated Japan and the U.S. to strengthen their security relationship, and the 1997 Guidelines emphasised Japan’s leading role in defending its land from external attacks. However, the United States obviously seemed to be demanding Japan’s more active role in the security relationship. In 2000, the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defence University issued a report entitled “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership”, generally known as the Armitage Report. In the report, Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye stated that “Japan’s prohibition against collective self-defence is a constraint on alliance cooperation” and approving the right to collective self-defence would pave the way for a mature relationship, which is like the relationship between Britain and the U.S.[26] Thus, the Japan-U.S. relationship would not be complete unless Japan authorised the right to collective self-defence.

The question is whether Japan’s participation in the War on Terror policy has escalated its security reform, which referred to the attempt to authorise the right of collective self-defence among other reforms. In the following paragraphs, Japan’s response to the U.S.-led War on Terror campaign and some noteworthy changes with regard to the Japan-U.S. alliance are discussed.

As a response to the U.S. request of authorising the use of the right to collective self-defence, the three laws concerning contingency were passed in June, 2003.[27] These three laws were the Law Concerning to Ensure National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack, the Law Reform Bill of the Self-Defence Forces Law, and the Law Reform Bill of the the Establishment of National Security Council Law. By these laws, Japan attempted to establish the “fundamental principles and posture corresponding to security in a situation of armed attack” and facilitate the smooth actions of the JSDF.[28] In the face of pressure from the Armitage Report and for the U.S.-led War on Terror, the Japan-U.S. relationship entered a new stage.

Japan’s response to the September 11 attacks was noticeably contributory and quick compared to the Gulf War in 1991. A few days after the terrorist attacks, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage released a statement saying Japan’s flag must be visible in the Afghan war.[29] The statement refers to “showing the flag”, thus interpreted as urging Japan to commit militarily to the impending Afghan war. Soon after the Armitage statement, Prime Minister Koizumi declared that Japan would actively support and cooperate with the United States.[30] In
addition, Koizumi also displayed his intention to deploy the JSDF for the purpose of medical and logistical support.[31] On October 28, the Koizumi administration speedily passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML). By the law's establishment, from December in 2001, the Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) was capable of providing logistical support with those allies participating in Operation Enduring Freedom in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea.[32] Even though Armitage's blunt advice seemed to play some role in Japan's proactive reaction to the September 11 attacks, as Penn points out, "internalized gaiatsu" played a significant role.[33] Some Japanese policy makers strongly wished to avoid facing the same accusation (absence of military support provoked suspicion from the U.S. and other allies towards Japan) made in the Gulf War by which the Japanese government reacted promptly.[34]

Furthermore, in July, 2003, the Japanese government passed a Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance (LCSMHRA) by which Japan enabled the JSDF to deploy to southern Iraq.[35] The harsh external pressure (gaiatsu) by Richard Armitage primarily prompted the law's formation.[36] In the face of the end of the war against Iraq by the "Coalition of the Willing", Richard Armitage put Koizumi under pressure to commit to post-war reconstruction activities in Iraq, saying Japan must put "boots on the ground".[37]

These newly established laws, ATSML and LCSMHRA are significant to Japanese security and the Japan-U.S. alliance in two ways. First of all, it is simply due to the fact that Japan broke its "Cold War taboo against employing the SDF in overseas collective security ventures".[38] The other one is the fact that the establishment of ATSML and LCSMHRA created "de facto precedents of cooperation with the U.S. and other states in the case of the global 'war on terror'".[39] It follows that the U.S. and other allies can oblige Japan to commit to bilateral security cooperation as these countries do; this would correspond to Japan's use of the right to collective self-defence.[40]

However, some scholars argue that the significance of ATSML and LCSMHRA should not be overemphasised. For example, Miller concedes that Japan deployed the MSDF to the Indian Ocean for the purpose of supporting Operation Enduring Freedom by which Japan made an important step for authorising the right to collective self-defence.[41] However, he also writes the MSDF's deployment to the Indian Ocean "should not be exaggerated" since Japan has not legitimatised the right to collective self-defence and its discussion has been immature.[42] That said, Japan's shift in its security posture plays a significant role in the medium and long terms.[43] The establishment of ATSML and LCSMHRA would motivate "a further incremental jump in the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance", Hughes comments.[44]

In addition to the responses to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (ATSML and LCSMHRA), Japan and the U.S. made an important step in terms of Japan's security. In the face of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the spread of Ballistic Missiles (BM), and "new threats" including international terrorists, Japan and the U.S. agreed to cooperate on equipping Japan with the Ballistic Missile Defence System.[45] The nuclear threat from North Korea had already been known, and it was understandable for Japan to establish the defence system against it. However, Japan also intended to protect itself from "aratana kyoui (new threats)" that refers to international terrorist groups. It can be speculated that Japan and the U.S. took the War on Terror as an opportunity to strengthen the security cooperation between them.

According to Yáng, the establishment of the three laws concerning contingency responding to the Armitage Report, ATSML and LCSMHRA, and the agreement on cooperating on the ballistic missile defense system contributed to the global-level cooperation of the Japan-U.S. relationship and Japan's remilitarisation.[46]

Thus, overall, it is fair to conclude that Japan's participation in the War on Terror had some significance and influence on the Japan-U.S. relationship.

Japan-U.S. Relationship under the Koizumi Administration

As mentioned above, Japan's active responses to the U.S. with regard to the Japan-U.S. relationship and the War on Terror policy between 2001 and 2003 can be regarded as signs of the global-level Japan-U.S. alliance. In addition, there is some evidence that Japan and the U.S. clearly indicated that the current Japan-U.S. relationship is on a
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global level. In February 2005, in the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC), Japan and the U.S. issued a joint statement concerning the security cooperation between Japan and the U.S.[47] In the statement, Japan and the U.S. shared the common strategic objectives in an attempt to fight against “new and emerging threats, such as international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery”. [48] They also had a discussion about “global common strategic objectives” which included a pledge that Japan and the U.S. would seek a closer partnership by achieving “peace cooperation activities and development assistance to promote peace, stability, and prosperity” on a global scale. [49] It follows that Japan and the U.S. stressed the global characteristic of the Japan-U.S. alliance. [50] Furthermore, during the SCC in October 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice clearly stated that the relationship between Japan and the U.S. used to be on a regional level; however, now it truly became a “global alliance”. [51] By 2006, when Koizumi left the government, Japan and the U.S. had successfully built their tightest security relationship in the post-WWII era. [52] The Defence Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) is also worth noting. DPRI was advocated during the SCC on December 16, 2002 in order for the United States to adapt to the new security environment. [53] DPRI included the transformation of the U.S. army and the U.S. comprehensive military strategy. [54] The aforementioned SCC in 2005 also dealt with DPRI for further cooperation between Japan and the U.S. In short, what should be emphasised here is the fact that Japan and the U.S. immediately attempted to reform the Japan-U.S. relationship for the purpose of dealing with international terrorism. In a nutshell, that implies some significance of the War on Terror on the Japan-U.S. alliance.

However, there are some scholars who object to the completion of the global-level Japan-U.S. alliance. The evolved Japan-U.S. relationship created an expectation that Japan would be “the Great Britain of the Far East” and play an important role in contributing to the stability of Northeast Asia and possibly the Middle East. [55] Britain is generally known as the most important U.S. ally. “Great Britain of the Far East” thus refers to the “linchpin, a key security outpost” in Northeast Asia. [56] Hughes, however, argues that Japan is not exactly the Great Britain of the Far East. [57] There is one important difference between Japan and the U.S. with regard to their security agendas. Although the U.S. hopes that Japan will play an active role not only in Northeast Asia but also in the Middle East and worldwide, the main concern of Japan is not to cooperate with the U.S. worldwide but to deal with possible threats from China and North Korea. [58] The gap between the concerns of Japan and the U.S. tells us that Japan had to pay the “price” (participating in the War on Terror and establishing laws and security posture for the policy) for the purpose of facing possible long-term threats from China and North Korea. [59] It is worth considering the real state of the Japan-U.S. relationship due to the fact that Japan’s security policies, the Japan-U.S. alliance in particular, have a great bearing on the future of Japan. Taking a close look at a series of Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committees that have been held from 2002 to 2012 might provide us with some clues about the state of the Japan-U.S. relationship. Though SCC was first convened in 2000, it is reasonable to analyse SCC in 2002 since that was the first one since the September 11 attacks took place. Joint statements issued by SCC in 2002 and 2005 seemed to put a primary emphasis on the new threat, international terrorism (intentionally or accidentally under the Koizumi administration). [60] According to SCC in 2006, Japan and the U.S. still mentioned the importance of facing the new threats, though they seemed to be more interested in “peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the linchpin of American security policy in the region”. [61] The next year, both states shared their views on security and the defence cooperation of the Japan-U.S. alliance. When observing the “Common Strategic Objectives” that resulted from the 2007 SCC, we can speculate what the alliance’s most important interests are. In the early parts of the objectives emphasis is placed on checking China and the stability of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. [62] Even though the last three objectives dealt with fighting terrorism and Japan’s intention to keep contributing to the War on Terror, their importance obviously seemed to be smaller than the earlier parts. [63] The priority of stability in Northeast Asia remained, too, in 2011 and 2012 (the latter rather heavily focused on the issue of the military bases in Okinawa though). [64] The shift of priority suggests that the Japan-U.S. alliance now rather concentrates on regional security in Northeast and East Asia rather than global threats like international terrorism.

The New Security Bills of the Abe Administration and their Flaws
In order to discuss the Japan-U.S. relationship, we cannot ignore the recent events that have occurred under the Abe administration. For the purpose of guaranteeing the effectiveness of this study, it is worth examining decisions regarding Japan’s security made under the Abe administration during the period from mid-2014 until the end of 2015.

On July 1st, 2014 Abe announced cabinet approval of the right of collective self-defence.[65] According to the decision, Japan would change the conventional interpretation of the use of the right of collective self-defence because it claimed that the conventional interpretation and the current circumstances around Japan were not compatible anymore. PM Abe used an example of the occurrence of conflict abroad under which a U.S. vessel “rescuing and transporting” Japanese citizens came under attacks, and the conventional interpretation of the right to collective self-defence would not allow the JSDF to protect the United States, thus, neither would it be allowed to protect its citizens. Japan, therefore, needed to authorise the right to collective self-defence to protect its alliance and citizens, Abe said.

He also stated that the fundamental rules of deployment of the JSDF abroad would remain the same, which means “the SDF will never participate in such warfare as the Gulf War or the Iraq War in the past”[66] Abe’s statement at the press conference mentioning the Iraq War seemed to be an admonishment of ex-prime minister Junichiro Koizumi for his unconditional support for the U.S. explained in the previous sections. However, whether or not Abe could have advocated the change of interpretation for the right of collective self-defence in such an expressive way without Koizumi’s support for the U.S. after the September 11 attacks is open to discussion.

One year later, on September 19, 2015, the Abe administration further advanced the reconstruction of the Japanese security posture by authorising the legislative package. The package included two bills: the International Peace Support Bill and Peace and Security Legislation Development Bill. The International Peace Support Bill allows the JSDF to be deployed abroad and engage in logistical support for a foreign military; however, Japan cannot conduct any logistical support in battle fields.[67] The Peace and Security Legislation Development Bill, on the other hand, revises 10 existing laws concerning the role of the JSDF, logistical support of the JSDF, and such.[68] These two laws are designed primarily for authorising the use of the right of collective self-defence. Now Japan can logistically support and also use military force against an external enemy attacking the U.S. military and other allies with no geographical constraint.[69] Above all, the new laws will strengthen the Japan-U.S. relationship, increasing Japan’s security responsibilities as well.[70]

When the Abe administration advocated the necessity of the right of collective self-defence, it introduced two specific examples: a situation in which a U.S. vessel rescuing and transporting Japanese citizens is under attack (see above), and Iran laying mines in the Strait of Hormuz. However, each example has some flaw by which validity of the new security bills is in question.

It is almost impossible to argue that the first example reflects realistic possibilities. According to the memorandum that Kiyomi Tsujimoto cited at the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on June 11, 2014, the U.S. would not be able to use its resources in order to transport foreigners in contingency.[71] The memorandum clearly states:

The Department refrains from entering into formal agreements with other governments on the evacuation of their nationals. We have two long-standing agreements with the Canadians and British to consult with each other with respect to evacuation planning. All foreign governments (including Canadians and British) are urged to plan for their own nationals’ evacuation and not to depend on USG resources.[72]

This is a strong argument that denies the validity of the example. The U.S. obviously has no obligation to be involved in the evacuation of foreigners. Thus, Japan would never encounter the necessity of supporting a U.S. vessel that transports Japanese citizens in contingency.

In order to convince Japanese citizens, the Abe administration created the other example. The example refers to a situation in which Iran lays mines in the Strait of Hormuz, resulting in a severe energy crisis for Japan.[73] The circumstance would allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defence due to the fact that the case would be subject to one of the “Three New Conditions” for exercising the right of collective self-defence.[74] The first condition
of the Three New Conditions states:

When an armed attack against Japan occurs or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.[75]

It seems that the example is compatible with the condition; however, some people point out that the JSDF cannot be deployed in this case. According to Asaho Mizushima, a legal scholar at Waseda University, the Strait of Hormuz is composed of territorial waters of both Iran and Oman, thus there are no international waters.[76] On May 20, 2015, Abe clearly said that “there is no possibility that the JSDF will use its force for combat purposes in territories and territorial waters of other nations”. Since minesweeping is considered to be a military activity, the JSDF cannot conduct minesweeping in the Strait of Hormuz. In addition to that, Iran is traditionally a “pro-Japanese” nation, which means it is difficult to assume that minesweeping (using force) against Iran is realistic.[78]

These examples for justifying the use of collective self-defence exhibited logical flaws; which raises doubts about the government’s ability to exercise the right of collective self-defence. Not only that, PM Abe completely changed his statement about minesweeping in the Strait of Hormuz at the peace and security legislation special committee of the House of Councillors on September 14, 2015.[79] He said that considering today’s international situation, it is unrealistic to assume that minesweeping in the Strait of Hormuz will actually take place.[80] It could be concluded that the current administration does not possess adequate understanding about the new security bills and the right of collective self-defence.

Sequence Between the War on Terror and the New Security Bills

Analysing the government’s motivation for the new security bills can provide us with some clue about a sequence between the War on Terror and the new security bills. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Kan expressed primary concerns about the current situation in East Asia on the newly established web page called “Why now the peace and security legislation?” (direct English translation).[81] According to Kan, Japan is in a problematic situation in East Asia: North Korea’s nuclear threats and China’s aggressive practices in the East and South China Sea and ever-growing military power.[82] He also mentions threats in the international community represented by international terrorist groups such as ISIL; however, one of the most important purposes of the legislation, increasing deterrence, seems aimed mainly toward North Korea and China.[83] Thus, it is fair to say that the Abe administration put more emphasis on threats in East Asia than on international terrorism in terms of the new legislation.

In addition, some studies conducted by the Pew Research Centre show that a majority of Japanese people perceive China as the biggest threat to Japan (68% answered that China is a threat to Japan).[84] and only 9% of people have a favourable feeling about China.[85] The findings indicate people’s perceptions of the international circumstances surrounding Japan today.

It is plausible that the motivation of the new security legislation is primarily driven by today’s situation in East Asia, thus it is difficult to find a clear sequence between Japan’s participation in the War on Terror and the new security bills. However, it would be worth considering if the current administration could have established the new security bills without the fait accompli of the expanded role the JSDF accomplished by its deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan under the Koizumi administration. At this point, it is quite difficult to examine it, though there is one tendency which is in common between the background of both the participation in the War on Terror and the new security bills. The Koizumi administration decided to unconditionally support the U.S. to fight against international terrorists due to two main reasons: some Japanese policy makers were afraid of failing to show a supportive posture toward the international community and the U.S. like happened in the Gulf War, and the Armitage Report urged Japan to authorise further military commitments. As for the new security bills, the Japanese Communist Party revealed that in December, 2014, Chief of Staff of the JSDF Katsutoshi Kawano reported to some U.S. military executives that the new security bills would be established by the summer of 2015.[86] It could be speculated that the administration wished to exhibit to the U.S. that Japan was prepared to pass the bills as soon as it could. Thus, some external pressure from the U.S. was involved in both decisions.
Conclusion

Since WWII ended, the Japan-U.S. relationship has been significant for the security of both nations and changing in an incremental fashion. Describing the historical background of the Japan-U.S. relationship sheds light on some tendency of its security relationship; international contingency has always played a contributing role in reinforcing the alliance. For example, the Korean War created a situation in which the U.S. made the decision to rebuild the JSDF, and the September 11 attacks and the War on Terror campaign generated Japan’s motivation to deploy the JSDF to an active war zone for the first time in the postwar era. Japan’s participation in the War on Terror policy, however, should not be overrated according to some scholars. Even though it brought the deployment of the JSDF to an active war zone, it was just a part of the incremental change of the Japan-U.S. relationship. Some people might argue that Japan’s participation in the War on Terror policy has contributed to the establishment of a global-level Japan-U.S. alliance; however, Japan is far from being the Great Britain of the Far East since Japan’s current priority seems to be its own security in East Asia.

In SCC between 2002 and 2006, Japan and the U.S. seemed to perceive international terrorists in the Middle East as the most serious threat and also the main reason why the Japan-U.S. relationship needed to be reinforced. From SCC in 2006, however, their focus shifted from dealing with the terrorists to circumstances in East and Northeast Asia involving China and North Korea. The threat of international terrorism as a motivating force between Japan and the U.S. was quite temporal. Thus, it could be concluded that Japan utilised the War on Terror campaign as a temporal motivation to strengthen the Japan-U.S. relationship for its own sake.

The security-related changes under the Koizumi administration were, needless to say, significant in terms of the Japan-U.S. relationship. However, in order to appreciate the current situation from a critical view, it is necessary for us to learn the security policies and changes of the Abe administration. As discussed above, the Abe administration has accomplished some radical changes in Japan’s security and the Japan-U.S. relationship. The fact that Japan will be able to deploy the JSDF abroad and even conduct military activities if the conditions are fulfilled provides us with the logical conclusion that the Japan-U.S. relationship is now in the most cooperative level and nearly seamless.

The research question of this study is what impact the War on Terror policy had for the Japan-U.S. relationship. If a direct or clear sequence is proved between Japan’s participation in the War on Terror and the new-level Japan-U.S. relationship, it could be concluded that the War on Terror has directly (or indirectly) contributed to the current state of the Japan-U.S. alliance. As this study shows, however, it is quite difficult to discover a direct connection between these. There is the possibility that the administration could have designed the new security bills due to the temporarily expanded role of the JSDF in the War on Terror in the early 2000s, though it lacks verifiability. It seems that the current circumstances in East Asia which create concerns for Japanese and U.S. policy makers have much to do with the design of the new security bills.

If some research finds a connection between the War on Terror and the new security bills, however, the participation in the War on Terror helped to reduce friction in making the Japan-U.S. relationship a global alliance. It does not refer to the fact that Secretary of State Rice said that the Japan-U.S. alliance became a “global alliance” at SCC in 2005. Even though the new security bills had logical flaws, the administration failed to exhibit its adequate understanding of and ability to implement them, and were developed mainly considering the current circumstances in East Asia, the bills eliminated geographical constraint. If both the Japanese and U.S. governments had intended that the Japan-U.S. alliance would remain purely a regional-oriented alliance, geographical constraint would have remained. Thus, the Japan-U.S. relationship now can be called a global alliance and is closer to the “Great Britain of East Asia” at least in a geographical fashion. Until an applicable contingency takes place, however, we cannot know whether the current Japan-U.S. alliance works properly. However, it is worth noting that Japan’s participation in the War on Terror might have played an important role in making the Japan-U.S. relationship a global alliance.

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Written by: Yuki Horiuchi
Written at: Miyazaki International College
Written for: Dr. Benjamin A. Peters and Dr. Jeong-Pyo Hong
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