The ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 marked the emergence of the European Union EU as a burgeoning security actor, under its Common Security and Defence Policy (Whitman 2010, p.28). This ensured that when the opening salvos of the Libyan Civil War were fired two years later, the EU was expected to respond in a security crisis just 125 miles from the Cretan coast. Seasoned scholars of CSDP noted how: “Libya checked all the boxes for the ideal CSDP mission” (Howorth 2014, p.137). Moreover, it was argued that the EU had an international obligation to intervene under the embryonic doctrine of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) (Bajoria 2011). However, European disunity would ensure that the EU would fail to deploy any CSDP mission during the initial conflict. The primary research question then is to ask why, despite the reforms under Lisbon, did CSDP prove so ineffectual in Libya? By utilising these two case studies, this dissertation will critically analyse the evolution of CSDP. A substantial amount of literature exists in regards to the Treaty of Lisbon’s CSDP provisions (Anglelet et al. 2008). Likewise, the role of the CSDP has also been extensively analysed in regards to Libya (Koenig 2014). However, by comparing and contrasting Lisbon and Libya, this dissertation hopes to create a “small n” comparison, thereby allowing for a detailed level of analysis that covers a critical period in the development of the policy (Burnham et al. 2008, p.88). Furthermore, European disunity in major security crises has surfaced before in the former Yugoslavia and Iraq. Yet, despite the reforms of Lisbon, Libya would once again expose these fissures in defence policy. This dissertation hopes to articulate why this divergence occurs. Moreover, a theoretical approach will be employed throughout. The theory of intergovernmentalism utilises the concept of the rational actor model to note how European states only decide to cooperate with one another when the gains from such cooperation consistently outweighs the losses (Howorth 2014, p.197). The divergence of interests in the “high politics” of security and defence therefore ensures that a common European policy is unlikely (Hoffman 1966, p.882). The state then, and particularly its domestic dynamics, often determines European cooperation and therefore CSDP: “Any attempt to grasp the subtler dimensions of CSDP has to come to terms with what Hoffman called “national public spaces”, in short has to factor domestic politics in the equation” (Howorth 2014, p.197).

In order to effectively analyse these different aspects of CSDP, this dissertation will consist of two substantive chapters. The first chapter shall analyse CSDP and its common institutions as a whole. Following from this general analysis of CSDP, the second chapter will move to the particular positions of the three most powerful EU member states (Britain, France and Germany) from Lisbon to Libya. The theoretical approach of intergovernmentalism will be employed throughout.

This dissertation will now provide a brief overview of the subject. CSDP is a key component of the broader Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Before the Lisbon Treaty, CSDP was labelled as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). However, for the sake of simplicity, it shall be referred to as CSDP throughout. CSDP was created by the St Malo Declaration in December 1998. This was an Anglo-French agreement which sought to create an autonomous, EU wide defence policy which could be deployed in response to crisis management scenarios (Atlantic Community Initiative 1998). St Malo led to the eventual creation of various CSDP institutions, such as the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which serves as its primary decision making body (Council of The European
Finally, a brief description of the Libyan crisis will be outlined. On February 16th 2011, peaceful protests began in the city of Benghazi, criticising the regime of Muammar Gadhafi, who had ruled the country for over forty years (Black 2011). The protests were part of the wider Arab Spring, which saw popular demonstrations against authoritarian rulers across the region. The Libyan regime brutally repressed the protests. In response, the EU quickly imposed sanctions, whilst calls for international intervention rose. (Phillips 2011). On the 17th March, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed resolution 1973, which authorised the use of force in Libya to enforce a no-fly zone, arms embargo and to protect civilians (Adams et al. 2011). Britain and France jointly proposed and voted for the resolution, whilst Germany, (a non-permanent UNSC member at the time) abstained. On the 19th March, under US strategic command, an international coalition initiated the mandate of UNSC 1973, under the name “Operation Odyssey Dawn” (Taylor 2011, p.5). By the 31st March, NATO assumed full control of all military operations, under the new name of “Operation Unified Protector” (Taylor 2011, p.11). The EU member states which participated in these operations are as follows: Britain, France, Italy, Denmark, Spain, Sweden, The Netherlands, Greece, Belgium, Bulgaria and Romania (Taylor 2011, p.16). Following the death of Gadhafi in October, the Libyan opposition, the National Transitional Council (NTC), formally declared victory, with the NATO mission formally ending on 31st October (Norton-Taylor 2011).

Chapter One: The European Level Response. CSDP from Lisbon to Libya

As the introduction to this dissertation outlined, the Lisbon Treaty contains an array of reforms that sought to craft a powerful CSDP. Indeed, it even appends a “Mutual assistance clause”, which appears to mimic the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) Article V (Menon 2011, p.82). Unwittingly, the Treaty has contributed to the emergence of a “capability-expectations gap” in regards to CSDP (Hill 1993, p.306). This term was defined by Christopher Hill, who noted how the expectations of the EU as a global actor outweigh its actual capabilities (Hill 1993, p.316). This ensured that when the Libyan conflict erupted, the EU would not be able to fulfill the expectations upon it. To substantiate this, the first section shall detail the Lisbon Treaty and its main provisions concerning CSDP. The second section shall detail the crucial relations between CSDP and NATO. Finally, the third section shall examine the two CSDP missions in Libya.
As one of the most identifiable reforms under Lisbon, the HR-VP raised unrealistic expectations of the office when compared to the institutional and political reality (Helwig 2013, p.235). Firstly, rather than appointing a distinguished official, the EU’s foreign policy chief would be a former chair of the health authority in the home county of Hertfordshire (Howorth 2014, p.58). HR-VP Catherine Ashton then was not selected on the basis of who could most assiduously project Europe’s interests abroad. Like many senior EU posts, the selection was the product of member state politicking (Charlemagne 2009). Beyond a brief stint as a Trade Commissioner, this low profile HR-VP would enter to foray into Libya with a questionably low level of experience. Most importantly, the appointment process also illustrates the power of leading member states. Realist intergovernmentalists such as Stanley Hoffman denote how the divergence of nation state interests in the realm of foreign affairs, or “high politics”, ensures that there is no significant common policy in this sensitive area (Hoffman 1966, p.882). Consequently, to prevent a powerful HR-VP that would encroach into high politics, it is likely that the “member states chose a low profile candidate to keep her on a short leash” (Ruger 2012, p.156). Ashton then would have little agency and her authority would be determined by the member states: “The capability of the HR to act is mainly a function of structural factors such as the political will of Member States to leave scope of manoeuvre for the HR” (Helwig 2013, p.236). Critics of this view would retort that Javier Solana was selected as HR, but the new position of HR-VP is significantly more powerful. Indeed, the HR-VP’s foothold in the Commission could even be perceived as an attempt to inject supranationalism into CSDP. Another critique regards the very coherency of this new office. By wearing two hats in both the Council of Ministers and the Commission, the HR-VP is expected to be in two places at once. Moreover, this already encumbered portfolio is also expected to oversee CSDP, as the introduction outlined. Thirdly, Ashton was too mired in institutional turf wars with institutions such as the Commission to focus on CSDP effectively (Menon, 2011, pp.78-79). Even as the Libyan crisis unfolded, the divisive task of actually creating the new EEAS remained a primary objective of the HR-VP, and was only completed in December 2010 (Mahony 2010). Consequently, the office often appears insular as it is marred by infighting within the European quarter.

These constraints explain why Ashton largely shunned any role in the military aspect of the Libyan conflict, thereby contributing to the failure of CSDP (EU Business 2011). For instance, when questioned by the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, she noted that we must accept: “the reality of 27 member states who are sovereign, who believe passionately in their own right to determine what they do, particularly in the area of defence, who will take different views” (Agence France-Presse 2011). Crucially, the HR-VP did at one point attempt to enter the realm of defence when she made clear her objections to a no fly zone, for fear of civilian casualties (Watt 2011a). This brief foray however was quickly rebuffed by Cameron and Sarkozy, who: “covertly instructed her not to interfere in the military decision making” (Balossi-Restelli 2013, p.99). The HR-VP would only tenuously proceed after the concerns of all member states had been heard almost equally, from London to Ljubljana (Castle 2011). The dominating role played by member states thus ensured Ashton displayed a highly degree of timidity in such a sensitive sphere of policy. This was only compounded by the distinctly civilian prism within which she viewed the EU’s global role. Indeed, in a speech just as the Libyan conflict began, Ashton declared that the EU: “is not a traditional military power…it cannot deploy gunboats or bombers” (Ashton 2011). Ashton’s views thus stymied the efforts of the Lisbon Treaty to create a comprehensive approach to CSDP that combined both its civilian and military instruments in crisis management (Koenig 2014, p.257). Libya vividly demonstrated the gap between the expectations of the HR-VP, and the actually capabilities of the office. Despite expectations of a new leader of CSDP, the response to the Libyan crisis would be a series of distinctly national ones.

Other than the HR-VP, the Treaty of Lisbon also contains two key passages that were explicitly designed to enhance CSDP. However, these instruments have yet to be activated and remained inactive throughout the Libyan crisis, which again contributes to the capabilities-expectations gap (Hill 1993, p.306). The first provision, PSCo, was the most ambitious, yet it has remained latent: “Unfortunately, PSCo features high among the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty that some EU Member States seem to have forgotten that they subscribed to” (European Union Institute for Security Studies 2010a, p.1). The primary reason for this is that there is little consensus on what constitutes the criteria for PSCo. For instance, if a hypothetical PSCo group were to mirror NATO’s commitment to spending 2% of GDP on defence, it would be a highly exclusive club indeed (Biscop 2008, p.4). PSCo then soon became known more for its ambiguity than for its ambitiousness and made a CSDP military role in Libya less viable. A second
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provision appears under Article 44, which, in regards to a CSDP operation, allows for a group of states to rapidly deploy within the framework of a CSDP mission, but outside of its planning and command structures (European Union Institute for Security Studies 2014, p.3). If it received unanimous consent from The Council of Ministers, a group of member states could rapidly forge their own coalition of the willing within CSDP. Despite European disunity, it would have been conceivable to execute a CSDP mission under Article 44 to allow for the rapid evacuation of EU citizens from Libya (Brattberg 2011, p.2). However, despite Lisbon’s attempt to reboot CSDP, both PSCo and Article 44 would remain relegated to the status of rather obscure Treaty passages. Again this contributed to the emergence of a capability-expectations gap that the EU would never fill in Libya (Hill 1993, p.306).

CSDP-NATO Relations during the Libyan Crisis

Relations between NATO and CSDP are predicated on a perceived division of labour between the two institutions in crisis management. Indeed, the military alliance unsurprisingly enjoys primacy through the established principle of “first right of refusal”, whereby a CSDP mission cannot proceed unless NATO has decided not to act first (Marsh 2006, p.94). In addition, the Treaty of Lisbon explicitly accepts the primacy of NATO in defence matters among EU states that are a member of it (Menon 2011, p.82). Traditionally, while NATO intervenes militarily, CSDP focuses on the humanitarian efforts and post conflict reconstruction. This appears to have almost been codified during an International Conference in Paris on 1st September 2011, during which the EU agreed to assist in Tripoli’s post conflict reconstruction (Koenig 2014, p.259). Realist intergovernmentalists argue that while member states utilise strictly intergovernmental organisations such as NATO for defence, the EU is an arena for secondary security concerns: “Over the last decade, the EU has increasingly come to serve as the institutional repository for the second order concerns of member states” (Hyde Price 2011, p.22). This explains the increasingly civilian character of CSDP. Despite the expectations created by the Treaty of Lisbon, any military mission in Libya would always fall to NATO by default (Howorth 2014, p.139).

However, perhaps most crucially, a CSDP military mission failed to materialise because EU member states were highly dependent on US and NATO support. Firstly, Operation Odyssey Dawn, the initial military campaign in Libya, was orchestrated under US strategic command (Taylor 2011, p.10). Given the disunity over the Libyan conflict and the laborious decision making process within CSDP, it would be Washington that stepped forward in this rapid deployment scenario. However, it is intriguing to note that when Odyssey Dawn morphed into NATO’s Operation Unified Protector, many European states were actually reluctant. Indeed, Sarkozy had initially wished to conduct a CSDP mission (Watt, 2011b). Even atlanticists such as Poland were sceptical of a NATO led mission (Howorth 2014, p.138). However, begrudgingly, they accepted that only through NATO command could the complex operation be effectively executed. Moreover, EU member states suffered from a debilitating lack of military capabilities. Indeed, in 2010, during the interlude between the Lisbon Treaty and the Libyan conflict, Europe was the only region in the world where defence spending declined (Youngs 2014, p.34). Even Britain would find that the impact of its cuts were on vivid display during the conflict. For example, the head of the Navy, First Sea Lord Sir Mark Stanhope, questioned the feasibility of a prolonged Libyan mission because of the scrapping of Britain’s Harrier jump jets and its sole aircraft carrier, HMS Ark Royal (Hopkins 2011). It was also reported that previous reductions to the number of RAF Typhoon pilots created difficulties for Britain to maintain its sortie levels when a rotation in personnel was due (Harding 2011). However, assessing military capabilities is not just a quantitative exercise in counting the number of available jets. A CSDP military mission would also have been hindered by the quality of European armed forces and their ability to meet the demands of the modern, expeditionary warfare that characterised the Libyan campaign. For instance, only 30% of all armed forces within the EU are actually capable of being deployed on operations abroad (Menon 2011, p.79). Moreover, high levels of unnecessary duplication existed between the then 27 member states. For example, whilst the EU collectively possesses 89 different weapons programmes, the US has 27 (Blitz et al. 2010). The consequence of this lack of military capabilities is that EU states that participated in the conflict were highly dependent on US logistical and technological support. For instance, throughout both operations, US assets accounted for 85% of all mid-air refuelling, and almost 75% of aerial surveillance (Taylor 2011, p.9). Such support was paramount for the continued policing of the no fly zone and arms embargo. Britain and France played a leading role within NATO, accounting for 44% of all “strike sorties”, that is sorties which attempted to engage an enemy target (Benitez 2011). However, the idea that the United States was “leading from behind” appears inaccurate given how critically dependant European states were upon Washington (Rogin 2011). Any autonomous CSDP military
The ineffectiveness of CSDP in Libya is also manifest in the modesty of its two missions in the country. Its first, European Union Force Libya (EUFOR Libya) was authorised on 1st April 2011 (Council of the European Union 2011). It was headquartered in Rome, under the command of Italian Rear Admiral Gaudiosi, with the mandate to provide an armed escort for humanitarian agencies and to protect refugees (The Council of the European Union 2011). However, the Eternal City was to live up to its name, for the Rear Admiral would never be called into action. EURFOR Libya was never deployed (Howorth 2014, p.182). This was because the mission had an unorthodox condition attached, requiring a request from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to proceed (Hatzigeorgopoulos et al. 2010, p.3). Firstly, it is noteworthy that EUFOR Libya only serves to confirm the lack of a permanent military-strategic level of command or Operational Headquarters (ESDP military operations is the lack of a permanent military-strategic level of command or Operational Headquarters) (European Union Institute for Security Studies 2010b, p.8). Unfortunately for CSDP, hard power needs a headquarters. Once again, the reason for this failure is the diversity of national situations amongst member states. Britain has always been ardent against an OHQ. Indeed, during the Libyan crisis on 18th July 2011, The British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, angrily vetoed any notion of an OHQ in the Foreign Affairs Council (Pop 2011). Why build a new EU OHQ in Brussels when there is a perfectly suitable SHAPE headquarters 40 kilometres away in Mons? It is ironic then that as Operation United Protector diligently patrolled the skies over Libya, the EU was busy squabbling over the principle of an OHQ. This absence of any centralised military facility was a key reason in CSDP’s failure over Libya: “It was, once again, the lack of such a facility which, in part, made it impossible for CSDP to assume ownership of the Libyan mission” (Howorth 2014, p. 97).

CSDP Missing in Action: EUFOR Libya and EUBAM Libya

The ineffectiveness of CSDP in Libya is also manifest in the modesty of its two missions in the country. Its first, European Union Force Libya (EUFOR Libya) was authorised on 1st April 2011 (Council of the European Union 2011). It was headquartered in Rome, under the command of Italian Rear Admiral Gaudiosi, with the mandate to provide an armed escort for humanitarian agencies and to protect refugees (The Council of the European Union 2011). However, the Eternal City was to live up to its name, for the Rear Admiral would never be called into action. EURFOR Libya was never deployed (Howorth 2014, p.182). This was because the mission had an unorthodox condition attached, requiring a request from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to proceed (Hatzigeorgopoulos et al. 2010, p.3). Firstly, it is noteworthy that EUFOR Libya only serves to confirm the division of labour between CSDP and NATO detailed in the previous section. Indeed, CSDP’s focus on aid efforts was welcomed by the then NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen (Pilkington et al. 2011). This humanitarian focus thus supports the realist intergovernmental view, in which the EU is utilised as a vehicle for “second order concerns” (Hyde-Price 2011, p.22). Additionally, why this conditionality was made with OCHA appears questionable. Indeed, the head of OCHA, Valerie Amos, penned a letter to HR-VP Ashton, stressing how she did not want her organisation to be associated with any military action, for fear this would jeopardise its neutrality amongst combatants (Koenig 2014, p.260). From the outset then, EUFOR Libya was strategically ill conceived,
being as much a political agreement as a military operation (Koenig 2014, p.259). It represented a tenuous compromise between member states with striking divergences regarding the legitimacy of any CSDP military mission in Libya (this divergence will be detailed in chapter 2). Sceptics of CSDP would go even further: “One depressing interpretation is that the whole idea was a cynical ploy: by making an offer that the UN simply had to refuse, the EU looked good but took no risks” (Gowan 2011). The central reason then CSDP failed to mount any credible military role in Libya is that European disunity was pervasive: “One must bear in mind that the EU underwent an internal crisis which analysts have compared to the one caused by the war in Iraq in 2003. This has extended to the setting up of EUFOR Libya” (Hatzigeorgopoulos et al. 2010, p.12).

Whilst EURFOR Libya reflected a political compromise in Brussels, it did not reflect the strategic reality on the ground in cities such as Benghazi or Mistrata. The Treaty of Lisbon raised expectations of the EU as a military actor capable of responding rapidly in crisis management scenarios. As Javier Solana noted: “Our capacity to deploy rapid reaction forces also needs strengthening. In the second decade of ESDP, the Lisbon treaty will put all this within the EU’s grasp” (Solana 2009). However, the failure of EURFOR Libya vividly illustrates how it would be unable to fulfil such expectations.

The second CSDP mission concerns Libya’s ongoing post conflict reconstruction. In May 2013, the Council of Minister’s authorised European Union Border Assistance Mission Libya (EUBAM Libya), a civilian mission to help manage Libya’s borders. (European External Action Service 2015d, p.1). EUBAM Libya was certainly long overdue, having been deployed over two years after the civil war began. This criticism appears widely shared, with The European Parliament’s Standing Rapporteur on Libya, Ana Gomes MEP, criticising it as “far too little, too late” (Gomes 2013, p.3). The mission was a modest force of only 100 personnel for the task of managing a sprawling and lawless 4,348 km land border and 1,770km of coastline (Howorth 2014, p.182). This was only compounded by the poor infrastructure across the country, as well as operational challenges, such as Libya’s militarised border guards (Mzioudet 2013).

EUBAM Libya would also be largely limited to Tripoli, with no deployments in southern Libya (Hatzigeorgopoulos et al. 2010, p.11). Consequently, the mission did little to alleviate the deteriorating security situation across Libya’s porous southern border. Awash with arms this border would contribute to unrest in states such as Mali, which itself descended into war from 2012-2014 (Annan 2013). Furthermore, even EUBAM Libya’s focus on the countries coastline has done little to alleviate the challenges inherent in a border which gained notoriety as a perilous smuggling and migration route. Unfortunately, EUBAM Libya appears to be quite literally a drop in the ocean. Its annual budget of €26 million is low when compared to the likes of assistance provided by member states such as Libya’s former coloniser, Italy (Rettman 2013). Indeed, what Tripoli primarily sought was assistance in the field termed Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-Integration (DDR) (Gomes 2013, p.2).

Recent developments have also hindered the effectiveness of the mission. In October 2013, militiamen abducted the Libyan Prime Minister, Ali Zeidan, at the plush Corinthian Hotel in Tripoli (Stephen 2013). Ironically, this hotel happened to be where the operational headquarters for EUBAM Libya was located and its operations room was stormed by the militia during their search for the Premier (Stephen 2013). This raid was portent to the future of the mission as Libya descended into conflict between warring militias jostling for influence in the power vacuum created by Gadhafi’s demise. Indeed, by July 2014, EUBAM Libya was forced to decamp into neighbouring Tunisia (Rettman, 2015). Just four months later, the mission was downsized to a rump force of just 17 staff (European External Action Service 2015d, p.2). Nonetheless, despite the unedifying position the mission finds itself in, it cannot be wholly blamed. The post-revolutionary political system is highly decentralised, making it troublesome for the EU to work effectively with officials such as the Libyan Prime Minister, who has few executive powers in the realm of defence (Gaub 2014, p.45). It is noteworthy then that the fluid political environment in Libya ensures that any CSDP mission would be highly challenging, no matter how well resourced.

Chapter Conclusion
The Treaty of Lisbon attempted to reinvigorate CSDP. It even attempted to move away from a strictly intergovernmental configuration, with the creation of the HR-VP and QMV in regards to PSCo (Anglelet et al. 2008, p.22). However, there is a clear danger that this focus on CSDP serves to unfairly raise expectations on the EU to intervene militarily in Libya: “Ambitious rhetoric on the potential of the treaty to enhance the effectiveness of the CSDP serves merely to raise expectations excessively, paving the way for complaints that the Union has failed” (Menon 2011, p.87). Crucially, despite Lisbon, CSDP has failed to generate European defence capabilities. Instead, it often appears as an insular policy more concerned with institution building: “Key innovations in EU defence policy tend to be about setting up new institutions in Brussels, rather than defence ministries buying new equipment” (Freedman 2004, p. 21). The expectations upon CSDP to intervene militarily in Libya should thus be lowered as it does not possess the powers associated with a unitary state (Hill 1993, p.316). NATO was always going to take leadership in a combat mission such as Libya. However, it should have played a greater role in less combat intensive areas, such as the evacuation of EU citizens, maritime duties and post conflict reconstruction. Nonetheless, CSDP should be viewed as a mirror of the collective positions of EU member states. It is their divergence that caused the failure of CSDP: “Debating institutions is all well and good. Yet this should not serve as an alibi for member states” (Menon 2011, p.87). To fully explain the evolution of CSDP from Lisbon to Libya, a domestic approach must be taken.

Chapter Two: The Domestic Level Response: Explaining the Divergence of Britain, France and Germany

Now that the CSDP as a whole has been examined, this dissertation will now analyse the particular positions of the EU’s leading states, from the Treaty of Lisbon to the Libyan conflict. This focus will utilise the intergovernmental view that divergence between such member states ensured that CSDP remained ineffectual during the conflict. In particular, this chapter shall examine what Stanley Hoffman describes as the “national situations” of each member state that causes divergence (Hoffman 1966, p.868). The first three sections then shall individually detail the positions of Britain, France and Germany during the Treaty of Lisbon and in the interluding period before the Libyan conflict. The fourth section shall analyse Anglo-French defence cooperation, which has supplanted CSDP in many respects. The remainder of the section will also detail the reactions of Britain and France to the Libyan crisis itself. The final section shall detail the position of Germany during the Libyan crisis.

Britain and CSDP

Britain’s negotiation over The Treaty of Lisbon would fall under the premiership of Gordon Brown. Brown was an advocate of what he described as “pro-European realism”, which called for more intergovernmental decision making over increasingly outdated calls for more supranational integration (O’Donnell et al. 2007, p.262). This preference was evident during the negotiations over the Treaty, with Britain consistently diluting key aspects of the policy. For instance, the very name of the HR-VP was a demotion from the original title of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs: “Here, Britain’s engagement has been in another great tradition of the country’s involvement with the European project- it is designed to restrain the true potential of the policy” (Charter 2012, p.126). An institutionally constrained HR-VP would show little leadership during the Libyan crisis. In a similar vein, the scope of the EDA was kept to a minimum, with a modest budget and a small number of personnel made available to it (Biscop 2012, p.1303). This had implications for CSDP in Libya, for an EDA with few powers of oversight made any potential introduction of the ill-fated PSCo more difficult. Moreover, Brown’s resistance to a less strictly intergovernmental CSDP was only compounded by domestic concerns, such as the global financial crisis and his own political unpopularity, ensuring he had little time for grandiose commitments to CSDP (Irondelle et al. 2010, p.35).

The Coalition that entered Government in 2010 would even further distance themselves from CSDP post Lisbon Treaty. Firstly, the practical concerns regarding CSDP centred on the Battlegroups concept (O’Donnell 2011, p.423). Battlegroups, which were created in January 2007, consist of battalion-sized forces of approximately 1,500 personnel (Howorth 2014, p.83). Their aim was to create rapidly deployable forces that could be utilised in aid of the EU’s crisis management tasks (European Union External Action Service 2009a, p.2). However many within the Ministry of Defence (MOD) saw them as an untested concept that was not up to the task of combat missions (O’Donnell 2011, p.423). This lack of confidence in the concept was illustrated when a British led battlegroup selected for standby contained troops who had only just returned from a tour in Afghanistan (Biscop 2012, p.1304).
Moreover, Britain continued to view many of its European partners as unwilling to commit to reverse the decline in defence expenditures, with the UK alone accounting for almost a quarter of all EU defence spending (Biscop 2012, p.1297). Worryingly, many within the Conservative party were also ideologically opposed to CSDP, viewing the Lisbon Treaty as an underhand attempt to mould it into a more integrationist policy (Fox 2008). In opposition the future Defence Secretary, Liam Fox, railed against the Treaty, describing the double hatted HR-VP as threat to British sovereignty by allowing the Commission, a supranational institution, to gain a foothold in CSDP (Fox 2008). Fox was also vocally critical of PSCo and its introduction of QMV into CSDP decision making, whilst he also pledged to withdraw Britain from the EDA (Parker 2010). In Government, Mr Fox would become one of the most eurosceptic Secretaries of State to run the MOD and quickly stalled any creation of the fledging PSCo, ensuring that by the summer of 2010, the debate surrounding the provision entered a stalemate (Biscop 2012, p.1306). Less than a year after the Treaty entered into force, one of the central pillars post-Lisbon CSDP would remain dormant. Moreover, although he did not withdraw from the EDA, he nevertheless vetoed any increases in its already modest budget (Hennessy 2010). Likewise, Britain’s long held opposition to an OHQ would stymie the creation of any CSDP military operation in Libya (Pop 2011).

Now that Britain’s position has been outlined, it is important to detail the wider theoretical position of this chapter. Britain’s opposition to CSDP illustrates the “logic of diversity” in defence polices (Hoffman 1966, p.882). The term, coined by Stanley Hoffman, posits that the EU’s member states unique worldviews, or “national situations”, lead to a diverse array of independent policies in the “high politics” of foreign policy (Hoffman 1966, p.868). Britain’s past, coupled with its current status as the most powerful European military power has led to the view that it simply does not need to integrate its defence policy: “Britain’s defence budget...had in effect immunized the country’s leaders from any sense of the need for extensive common efforts with European partners” (O’Donnell 2011, p.424). To illustrate this view, Hoffman uses an analogy whereby political integration is akin to European states putting all their collective resources, or ingredients, into a blender (Hoffman 1966, p.882). Outside the realm of “high politics”, it may be beneficial for states to put their ingredients into the blender, with the single market a key example of this (Hoffman 1966, p.882). However: “in areas of key importance to the national interest, nations prefer the certainty, or self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the contested blender” (Hoffman 1966, p.882). Utilising the rational actor model, Britain has calculated that the benefits of European wide co-operation in defence policy do not out outweigh the risks to its own autonomy. Consequently, when this national situation juxtaposes with a policy that rests on unanimity, the result is what Andrew Moravcsik (the founder of the Liberal Intergovernmental school) calls “lowest common denominator outcomes” (Moravcsik 1998, p.382). Indeed, Moravcsik notes how the very creation of CFSP was the result of lowest common denominator bargaining and largely followed Britain’s “minimalist” stance (Moravcsik 1998, p.382). Britain would apply this to CSDP, ensuring it remained minimalist through an institutionally constrained HR-VP, a diminished EDA and a lack of any OHQ. This ensured CSDP would play no military role in Libya.

France and CSDP

Another illustration of this diversity of European defence policies is the position of France, which contrasts with Britain’s considerably. France has always been the most vocal supporter of CSDP and supported the provisions within the Treaty of Lisbon (Mahony 2008). Indeed, historically, France advocated “Europe de la défense”, or “defence of Europe” (de France 2015). This is the view that Europe should not only play a greater role in crisis management, but also territorial defence, which traditionally falls under NATO (de France 2015). For instance, President Charles de Gaulle withdraw France from NATO military command in 1966 (Gordon 1993, p.77). However the legacy of de Gaulle also contributes to what Hoffman describes as a high French “national consciousness”, which ensures that any significant cooperation in the realm of high politics is often perceived as a threat to its cherished ability to act autonomously (Hoffman 1966, p.891). This ensures: “There is a difficulty French leaders have in reconciling the national requirements of their Gaullist legacy with their growing desire to co-operate in Europe” (Gordon 1993, p.197). Frances Imperial past bears down on its views towards the present CSDP. Like Britain, France prefers the certainly of self-reliance to the untested blender of defence integration (Hoffman 1966, p.882). CSDP thus remains a weak policy, ensuring it would be unlikely to play a combat intensive role in Libya. Secondly, France has often utilised CSDP as a means to project its own foreign policy interests, especially in Francophone Africa. For instance, the EU’s peacekeeping mission in Chad and the Central African Republic in January 2008
(EUFOR Tchad/RCA) primarily consisted of French troops and illustrates how even after Lisbon, other nations remained reluctant to commit troops to CSDP military missions (European External Action Service 2009b, p.2). This has been deemed “power laundering” by Moravcsik (Ojanen 2006, p.61). A member state then will use the collective instruments of the EU’s foreign policy when it stands to gain, rather than acting independently (Ojanen 2006, p.61). When these interests do not coincide, CSDP will not be used, as Libya illustrates.

Another key development that hindered any role for CSDP in Libya was Sarkozy’s announcement in March 2009 of France’s return to the military command structures of NATO (Irondelle et al. 2010, p.29). Sarkozy had hoped this historic reversal of French policy would pay a dividend for CSDP. By re-joining NATO, Sarkozy could allay fears by atlanticist EU states that France is seeking to utilise CSDP to supplant NATO (Ghez et al. 2009, p.81). However, the French Presidency of the EU in 2008 did little to reinvigorate the policy (de France 2015). CSDP’s increasingly civilian outlook thus appears settled for now. This reintegration is also coupled with France’s increasing apathy towards CSDP as its attempt to reinvigorate the policy failed even after the historic move towards NATO (Ghez at a. 2009, p.81). With British obstructionism and German averseness, France increasingly accepted that it should scale back in its championing of the policy. Indeed, a Report by the former Foreign Minister, Hubert Védrine, summarises this growing view: “It is highly likely that our efforts will be met with the same polite scepticism and the same inaction as our previous efforts... we should be more clear-sighted, less declamatory and more rigorous. We should focus on practical objectives” (France Diplomatie 2012, pp.22-23). This more pragmatic approach to European defence would see France reposition itself away from CSDP and instead forge bilateral ties with Britain.

**Germany and CSDP**

For Germany, support for CSDP is a central tenet of its defence policy, perhaps more so than any other member state: “There is no German foreign and defence policy separated from its European context” (Linnenkamp 2015). The countries strong focus on multilateralism and restrained view of the use of military force make it well suited to a European wide defence policy which often harbours a civilian focus. Berlin thus largely welcomed the CSDP provisions within Lisbon and actually pushed for further cooperation, such as the creation of a OHQ (Linnenkamp 2015). However, along with other member states, its enthusiasm for PSCo has waned. Since the enation of the Treaty, Germany has shown that it continues to prefer bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation outside its structures, as evidenced by the German-Swedish “Ghent Framework”, which seeks to generate greater military capacity (Howorth 2014, p.97). However, the most significant factor in Germany’s relationship with CSDP is its “culture of restraint” in regards to the use of military force (Brockmeier 2013, p.64). This culture was borne from the ashes of the Second World War and so has a deep rooted hold across German society. This national situation would ensure Germany remained wary of any military involvement in CSDP missions even after Lisbon was signed. For example, in January 2008, Germany refused to commit troops to EUFOR Tchad/RCA, with many commentators in the country questioning France’s intentions in its former colonies (Ward 2008). Additionally, Germany’s foreign policy often takes an almost mercantilist focus on trade, with Berlin keen to promote its strong export market. This clearly diverges with France and its emphasis on military independence: “France may have the Inflexible, the Hades and a garrison in Djibouti, but Germany has Siemens, the Bundesbank and Daimler-Benz” (Gordon 1993, p.193). Again, despite the attempts by Lisbon to cultivate a robust CSDP, the diversity of worldviews in defence policy would thwart the creation of any unified policy.

**The Entente Cordiale, not CSDP, as the Engine of European Defence in Libya**

In November 2010, Britain and France signed the Treaty on Defence and Security Cooperation, in what became known as the Lancaster House Treaties (Wintour 2010). This historic defence cooperation even included plans for a 10,000 strong joint expeditionary force and an integrated strike carrier group (Wintour 2010). However, the real significance of the bilateral agreement is that it falls outside CSDP, a fact that did not go unnoticed in Brussels. For Britain, this suited its preference for strictly intergovernmental, bilateral defence cooperation. Indeed, the Coalition’s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) made clear this intention (Cabinet Office 2010, p.59). Less than one year after The Treaty of Lisbon had come into effect, the Lancaster House Treaties illustrates how Europe’s leading military powers had become disillusioned with CSDP’s failure in generating material advancements in military capabilities. This is especially true of the dormant PSCo (European Union Institute for Security Studies 2011, p.36).
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Rather than through CSDP, a “clusters” approach between small groups of likeminded member states was proving more effective (Howorth 2014, p.138). When this failed, Paris pushed for a CSDP maritime mission, which was similarly rebuffed (Koenig 2014, p.262). However, this support for CSDP was largely due to political considerations, rather than the strategic utility of the policy. Firstly, Sarkozy clearly sought to further advance French leadership in the southern Mediterranean, as evidenced by his creation of the EU’s “Union for the Mediterranean” (Vucheva 2008). France’s enthusiasm for an EU response was thus an “attempt to Europeanise the French desire for leadership in the Southern neighbourhood” (Koenig 2014, p.261). This supports Moravcsik’s “power laundering” approach as Sarkozy was more than willing to wrap France’s foreign policy interests in the Flag of Europe (Ojanen 2006, p.61). Moreover, the domestic situation in Paris must be detailed. The President had a battle for his political survival looming in April of the following year and so had to be seen to responding robustly to the chaos in Europe’s soft underbelly: “Demonstrating European puissance through a hyperactive CSDP may respond to the national interests and goals, particularly at election time” (Balossi-Restelli 2011, p.92). Indeed, the Government had already been roundly criticised for its lacklustre response to the Arab Spring, with the then French Foreign Minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, resigning in February 2011 over her alleged links with the former authoritarian regime in Tunisia (Willsher 2011). This analyse thus supports Hoffman’s focus on “national situations” in explaining divergence in defence policy (Hoffman 1966, p.868). In addition, it is important then not to interpret French calls for a CSDP mission as a vote of confidence in the policy. When it was more advantageous, Paris was quick to jettison any European unity. For instance, Sarkozy unilaterally recognised the TNC the day before the European Council meeting on 11th March (Balossi-Restelli 2011, p.93). Furthermore, France would begin Operation Odyssey Dawn unilaterally and with little co-ordination with allies, with French Rafale Jets attacking Gadhafi forces advancing on Benghazi on the 19th March (Clarke 2011, p.4). Yet alone CSDP, even Anglo-French military cooperation was shown to be in its infancy, with sometimes poor coordination between the two powers. Most crucially, Sarkozy soon accepted that the only conceivable command for the campaign would be through NATO, marking the first military mission since France’s reintegration into NATO (Watt 2011b). Any CSDP military role was highly unlikely when even the principle architect of Europe de la défense was putting itself under NATO command in a mission on Europe’s border.
Germany’s dramatic abstention over UNSC Resolution 1973 would lead many to question the very survival of CSDP (Menon 2011, p.75). From the outset, the Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle, was a vocal critic of military force, raising the issue of potential civilian casualties and the risk of pulling Germany into a protracted war (Miskimmon 2012, p.401). Even before the abstention on the 18th March, Chancellor Merkel personally vetoed any support for a no fly zone to be included in a European Council joint statement on the 11th March (Watt et al. 2011c). Germany also blocked any CSDP maritime mission (Koenig 2014, p.262). Once again, it is the domestic approach which largely explains the German position, and therefore the failure of any significant CSDP response to the crisis. Firstly, Germany’s position over Libya exposed the visceral divergence between the two pillars of the European project, France and Germany. Indeed, Le Monde reported that Westervelle and his French counterpart undiplomatically traded barbs over the crisis during a meeting in Brussels on the 21st March, with French Foreign Minister Juppé claiming: “The common security and defence policy of Europe? It is dead” (Garton-Ash 2011). Moreover, Merkel was irked at Sarkozy’s hyperactive response that often failed to co-ordinate with European allies (Miskimmon 2012, p.67). On a matter as crucial as war and peace on Europe’s border, there was an almost insurmountable void between the positions of France and Germany. Libya was also a prime opportunity to test CSDP’s vaunted battlegroup concept. During the Libyan crisis, one of the Battlegroups on standby was a German led force which was ready to deploy under EUFOR Libya (Charlemagne 2011b). As has been noted in the previous chapter, EURFOR Libya’s questionable linkage with the OCHA ensured Germany would never have to deploy troops (Gowan 2011). Germany’s reluctance would contribute to the failure of the mission, whilst also ensuring the vaunted Battlegroup concept would remain in perpetual stasis (European Union Institute for Security Studies 2013, p.4). However, in regards to NATO, Germany did increase its Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) missions in Afghanistan, which freed up NATO air assets to be deployed over Libya (Clarke 2011, p.7). This illustrates how serious Germany views its commitments to NATO, even when it takes an opposing view. Again, this demonstrates the primacy of the military alliance over CSDP.

As in France, domestic elections would play a role in determining the position towards Libya. Westervelle was keen to show leadership in order reverse the decline in the popularity of his Free Democratic Party (FDP), which faced electoral ruin in state elections in Baden-Württemberg on the 27th March (Brockmeier 2013, p.74). The court of public opinion also agreed with the Foreign Minister, with a poll by the publication Stern indicating that 88% of Germans opposed the involvement of Bundeswehr forces in Libya (Brockmeier 2013, p.73). This would be in stark contrast with France, where 63% of citizens supported military action (Ipsos Mori 2011). There simply was no political gain to be had in any German intervention under NATO or CSDP. The use of force in Germany would have also required a vote in the Bundestag (Hoffman 2002, p.194). Merkel was understandably wary of calling a vote that she may have lost and the inevitable questions of confidence in her coalition Government that would follow. Moreover, the German political class was preoccupied with the controversial passage of the European Financial Stability Facility and the recent Fukushima nuclear disaster, both of which dominated news headlines during the Libyan crisis (Balossi-Restelli 2011, p.98). This analysis thus supports the intergovernmental view that the failure of CSDP in Libya can be explained by the divergent interests of the leading member states (Hoffman 1966, p.863-864). It also illustrates the inability of CSDP to foster a common strategic culture: “The failure of the EU’s big three to agree on a common position indicates that German strategic culture has been more resistant to adaptation as a result of the socialisation effects of CSDP” (Miskimmon 2012, p.404). In the first major test for post-Lisbon CSDP, Berlin would not join ranks with its European allies, but critically abstain with Beijing and Moscow.

This analysis on Europe’s leading powers illustrates how it is often domestic level concerns that govern CSDP and many other areas of EU policy. This approach: “is frequently overlooked in analyses of EC policy making that focus on the specifically European institutions. In doing this, the nation state policy-making sub structures are omitted, which creates the danger of superficiality” (Bulmer 1983, p.357). Indeed, the dominating role played by member states rather than common institutions during the Libyan crisis was confirmed during the extraordinary European Council meeting on the 11th March (Watt et al. 2011c). This signalled how the EU’s response had in effect elevated from the Foreign Affairs Council and the PSC, to the elected heads of Government and State (European Council 2011). This move is also one element in the broader trend towards “deliberative intergovernmentalism”, whereby heads of Government and State have increasingly determined EU policy through regular summity (Puetter 2012).
is thus important to view the EU and CSDP not as sovereign entities, but as “a vehicle” for the collective interests of its member states (Hyde-Price 2011, p.19). Only this will reduce the capabilities-expectations gap unfairly placed upon CSDP. As the Libyan crisis illustrates, divergences between member states would ensure no common response through CSDP prevailed. Europe remained a kaleidoscope of strategic cultures that were simply unable to converge. In regards to the theoretical approach, the failure of CSDP appears to directly critique neo-functionalist spillover theory, which “remains today an inductively derived ideal type, rather than a general theory...a pre theory of regional integration” (Moravcsik 1993, p.476). As an inductive theory, neo-functionalist thought is centred upon the unproven assumption that a more integrated Union will appear. Although spillover often sees its way into many areas of policy, in the sensitive realm of “high politics” it may have found its limit (Hoffman 1966, p.882). Indeed in 2003, Moravcsik predicted that such divergence would ensure a united CSDP capable of deploying in a prolonged, high intensity conflict would never occur (Moravcsik 2003, p.83). In Libya, his prediction holds.

Conclusion: Finding the Nearest Sand Dune?

The signing ceremony of the Treaty of Lisbon was a grandiose occasion, set inside the ornate sixteenth century Jerónimos Monastery in the Portuguese capital (Charter 2011, p.1). Amongst the pomp and pageantry, some speculated that the Treaty of Lisbon would mark the beginning of the EU as bona fide global security actor. However, less than two years after its ratification, it would fail in the southern Mediterranean. This dissertation has attempted to articulate why the EU provided such an ineffectual response. Firstly, following from Lisbon, CSDP has proven too preoccupied with institution building as an end in itself, rather than generating hard military capabilities (Freedman 2004, p. 21). This has only served to reinforce the asymmetric relationship between CSDP and NATO. Whilst NATO “prepares the dinner’, the EU “washes the dishes” (Kagan 2003, p.23). The impotence of the EU during the crisis illustrates how we must lower our expectations of CSDP in the military realm. As Christopher Hill notes colourfully: “Only this will put an end to the apparently widespread view of the EC as panacea, a cross between Father Christmas and the Seventh Cavalry” (Hill 1993, p.322). However, while participation in the no fly zone was always going to be highly unlikely, a CSDP military mission was entirely possible. A rapidly deployable mission to evacuate refugees should have been authorised. Furthermore, as EU NAVFOR-ATALANTA Somalia demonstrates, the EU was capable of participating in a naval mission to enforce the UN mandated arms embargo (European External Action Service 2015c). Unfortunately, even when the EU attempted to intervene under EUFOR Libya, it only served to expose the deep fissures amongst member states. Indeed, the mission was harshly characterised as an April fool’s joke (Gomes 2011). The EU (and the West more generally) increasingly appears to be composed of “societies filled with Nietzsche’s last men and women” (Mead 2014, p.79). After decades under comforting embrace of the US security umbrella, many EU member states have grown adverse to the use of military force (Hyde-Price 2011, pp.26-27). However, ultimately, it would be the diverging interests of the EU’s leading member states that led to the failure of CSDP in Libya. As intergovernmental theory outlines, states still jealously guard the realm of “high politics” for themselves (Hoffman 1966, p.882). Britain is a key example of this. Even after St Malo, it has consistently taken a minimalist stance towards CSDP, resulting in “lowest common denominator” outcomes that have diluted the potential of the policy (Moravcsik 1998, p.382). However, a key weakness exists in this dissertation in that only three large states have been examined. A more comprehensive analysis would have included others such as Italy. However, this caveat aside, the focus on the member states should rightly take precedence in explaining CSDP (Menon 2011, p.87). CSDP then does not possess the traditional powers of statecraft incumbent on a unitary state (Hill 1993, p.316). As Hoffman noted: “The nation state is still here, and the new Jerusalem has been postponed” (Hoffman 1966, p.863). Nation states still determine defence policy and CSDP and until there is a fundamental convergence, any significant CSDP military role is unlikely: “Security policy requires a public consensus, but 50 years after the Schuman Plan, there still is only a juxtaposition of national public spaces” (Hoffman 2002, p.198). In the wake of the Libyan crisis, an EU diplomat solemnly declared that “CSDP died in Libya, we just have to pick a sand dune under which we can bury it” (Menon 2011, p.76). While it may be premature to mourn the death of CSDP, its evolution from Lisbon to Libya demonstrates how it requires a serious reappraisal of its very purpose.

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Written by Andrew Huckle


Written by: Andrew H. Huckle
Written at: University of Leicester
Written for: Dr. Ben Clements
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