In an age of geopolitical complexity, asymmetrical warfare has increased in lethality. In more than a decade since September 11, the international community continues to witness the unparalleled expansion of terrorism (Abadie 2006; Bergesen and Lizardo 2004; Hoffman 2006; Plummer 2012). Inevitably, domestic terror groups have evolved into progressively ambitious regional networks, in which organisations such as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and Boko Haram stand as the most potent opposition force to many in the international community (Delman 2015; Plummer 2012; Zimmerman 2015). The growing influence of domestic terrorist organisations, and the increased sophistication of contemporary warfare, have had implications not only for states, but for academia and international security alike (Coggins 2014; Plummer 2012; Wither 2016). Following President George W. Bush’s declaration of a ‘War on Terrorism’ in 2001, several scholars sought to explore ‘root’ determinants of domestic terrorism, focusing on proximate causes and motivations at the individual or group level (e.g., Abrahms 2013; Chenoweth 2010; Coggins 2014; Pape 2003). Despite this, remarkably little investigation exists explaining the growth of the phenomenon further. Even with eight out of the nine regions of the world witnessing an increase in domestic terrorism since 2002 (GTI 2017)[1], few scholars develop explanatory models for the growth of domestic terrorism. Omission thereof represents a stark gap in existing literature.

Aims and Research Questions

In this study, I move beyond the ‘root’ causes of terrorism toward developing an explanatory model for the growth of domestic terrorism. My particular contribution builds upon an emergent and underdeveloped account of governmental stability and territorial control as determinants of the growth of domestic terrorism (e.g., Korteweg 2008; Piazza 2008; Plummer 2012; Walsh et al. 2016). As will be discussed, the literature on the nature and control of domestic territory, in relation to terrorism, is inherently underdeveloped (Crenshaw 2000; Ghatak 2016; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009; Pape 2003; Piazza 2008). In addition, the empirical relationship between stability in governance and domestic terrorism is incredibly restricted in its prediction of ‘state failure’ as an antecedent of governmental weakness (e.g., Coggins 2014; Newman 2007). Hence, I pose the following research questions: What factors determine the growth of domestic terrorism? Within this, do governmental weakness and territorial control provide for the growth of domestic terrorism? Overall, I aim to provide a better quantitative understanding of the nature and determinants of domestic terrorism which, in turn, will provide implications for both policy and research.

Defining Domestic Terrorism

In order to fully comprehend the nature of domestic terrorism, it is crucial to come to a concrete definition of the term itself. There remains a peculiar failure in the academic literature to reach an agreement on a definition of terrorism (Huff and Kertzter 2017; Sikle 2004). The only characteristic agreed upon is that terrorism involves violence, or the threat of violence (Lacquar 1996: 6). This definitional failure in the literature matters for two reasons.[2] First, classifying actions as terrorism has direct implications for the prosecution of the perpetrators (Huff and Kertzter 2017: 2). Certainly, organisations deemed to be ‘terrorists’ are subject to financial sanctions and close surveillance. Sanctions, under certain circumstances, are extended to states in association with such organisations (Becker 2006; Cassese 2001; Crawford 2002). Second, terrorism is understood as a qualitatively different form of political violence
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(Agamben 2005; Crenshaw 2000; Huff and Kertzer 2017; Kydd and Walter 2006; Pape 2003). Thus, defining terrorism is crucial to combating it (Huff and Kertzer 2017: 2).

**FIGURE 1.** Comparison of Domestic and Transnational Terrorism, 1970-200

For the purposes of my dissertation, I follow a conclusive definition of terrorism. In order to ensure fluidity in my results, I follow the definition provided by the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), in which terrorism is the “threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation” (GTI 2017). I limit my examination to the study of domestic terrorism, as the incidents and casualties are comparatively larger for domestic terrorism than transnational terrorism, as shown in Figure 1, despite the latter generating wider media and scholarly attention (Ghatak 2016: 58). Certainly, terrorism is considered domestic “when an incident involves perpetrators, victims, and an audience of the country in which the incident occurs” (Enders and Sandler 2006: 6).

My dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 investigates the determinants of domestic terrorism and academic inertia. Chapter 2 presents my theory for the growth of domestic terrorism and justifications for my hypotheses. Chapter 3 outlines the data and methodology for my research. Chapter 4 presents my results. The final section of my dissertation concludes on my model for the growth of domestic terrorism and expands upon the implications thereof for both policy and political science.

**Literature Review**

The literature advances several explanatory factors in determining the growth of domestic terrorism (Abadie 2004; Burgoon 2006; Crenshaw 1981; Eyerman 1998; Ghatak 2016; Kegley 1990; Krueger and Laitin 2008). The importance of one specific factor, however, is often overshadowed by another in a discipline of continual development and infinite importance. This chapter provides an overview of the literature on the growth of domestic terrorism. First, I examine ‘root cause’ theories of terrorism because of their ability to guide discussion on the growth of domestic terrorism. Next, I examine the theory of instability. Finally, I outline the overall limitations of existing manifestations for the growth of terrorism.

1.1 Foreign Policy

As a cause of the growth of terrorism, foreign policy is examined frequently in the academic literature (Kegley and Hermann 1997; Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 2002; Pape 2005; Praja 2006; Shanks, Jacobson and Kaplan 1996), and convincingly prioritised when assessed against western states (Kegley 1990; O’Brien 1996; Scott 2009). Kegley (1990), O’Brien (1996), and Savun and Phillips (2009) provide separate accounts illustrating that states, in adopting more active foreign policies, are more likely to foment resentment among foreign groups. In turn, existing research provides for the role of ‘superpower’ foreign policy in the international system, which postulates that
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hyperactivity must be considered as a potentially powerful external influence on the development of terrorism (Kegley 1990; O’Bien 1996).

This argument follows two main strands within the literature. First, states of a ‘superpower’ status are more likely to create resentment vis-à-vis foreign policy behaviour; thus, they are vulnerable to the terrorism of foreign aggrieved groups (Savun and Phillips 2009: 890). For example, the 2008 attack on the U.S. consulate in Turkey is given as exemplification of the continued resentment toward the U.S. for the intervention in Iraq, in 2003. Second, Pape (2003, 2005) argues foreign policy is more relevant in examining suicide terrorism, in acting as a channel of resentment. Specifically, foreign policy resentment motivates calculated coercion toward modern democracies to make significant concessions to national self-determination (Pape 2003: 348). For example, attacks by Hamas toward Israel, in 1995, were perpetrated to compel Israel to withdraw from towns in the West Bank. Overall, the literature offers a convincing examination into the way in which foreign policy may act as a foundation, or facilitator, for the growth of terrorism.

Despite impressions of ubiquity, the popularity and effectiveness of the proposed ability of foreign policy to provide an account of the growth of terrorism is subject to wide condemnation (Crenshaw 2007: 160). In fact, the literature maintains a strong denunciation of foreign policy explanations (Crenshaw 2007; Gaibulloev Piazza and Sandler 2017; Von Hippel 2002). Specifically, Gaibulloev, Piazza, and Sandler (2017) argue foreign policy motivations do not provide a robust influence on the development of terrorism. Von Hippel (2002: 28) affirms, foreign policy explanations are based upon insufficient empirical data and do not provide for a robust explanation of the growth of domestic terrorism. Consequently, foreign policy theses fail to provide a well-rounded account of the growth of domestic terrorism.

1.2 Regime Type

The relationship between regime type and the growth of terrorism remains contentious. Eubank and Weinberg (1998), Eyerman (1998), and Schmid (1992) discuss the ‘strategic influence’ thesis, in claiming that democracy is a facilitating condition for the rise of terrorism. This explanation maintains that democracies aid the growth of terrorism by reducing the marginal costs to the perpetrators through safeguarding fundamental freedoms alongside access to potential targets and rights to due process (Eyerman 1998; Schmid 1992). In turn, Eubank and Weinberg (1994, 1998, 2001) provide empirical support to suggest a correlation between increased protection of civil liberties and the growth of terrorism within democracies. Thus, a core cause of the growth of terrorism may not be democracy itself, but its ability to provide attractive freedoms that facilitate a fertile environment for growth. In applying this foundation, proponents of this argument distinguish between established democracies and newly formed democracies, in arguing established democracies are less likely to experience terrorism as opposed to newly formed democracies (Eyerman 1998: 151). Indeed, this argument follows the logic that a newly formed democratic government is unable to properly streamline fundamental freedoms, in which the government is unable to restrict individuals supporting radical terrorist organisations. Therefore, the strategic influence strand of regime type literature holds democracy as a pivotal characteristic within the determinants of the growth of terrorism.

In more contemporary literature, regime type has taken a different form, with the question tending to be one of how the lack of democratic liberties influence the growth of terrorism (Campos and Gassebner 2002; Li and Schaub 2004; Ross 1993). Crenshaw (1981: 383) argues the lack of opportunities for political participation in nondemocratic societies induce political grievances and dissatisfaction among dissenters, providing a motivation for the growth of domestic terrorism. In consolidation of this argument, Campos and Gassebner (2002: 29) argue, the intuition is that societies lacking democratic liberties constrain political protest into clandestine and often violent forms, among them terrorism. The causal relationship between regime type and political participation underpins the political access thesis in the academic literature. This argument is used to invalidate strategic influence theory by arguing that democracy allows for participation in the political system, where the settling of grievances through governmental processes is possible, as opposed to political violence (Li and Schaub 2004; Ross 1993). By way of exemplification, Li (2002: 294) examines the effects of democracy on terrorism from 1975 to 1997 in 119 states and demonstrates that democratic participation reduces terror incidents domestically. Hence, the political access realm of regime type theory, and its statistical relevance, is grounded in the contemporary research of traditional theory.[3]
Undoubtedly, there remains incongruity within the literature surrounding the influence of regime type toward the growth of domestic terrorism. Gaibulloev, Piazza and Sandler (2017: 491) argue the inconsistency within the academic literature between regime type and its relationship with terrorism challenges the legitimacy of theory itself. Certainly, many dispute the use of regime type, particularly democracy, as binary in the international system (Bollen 1990; Cheibub et al. 2010). In turn, Piazza (2008: 45) argues more recent developments in the literature surrounding domestic terrorism are far more significant than conventional regime type assertions.[4] With this in mind, and the lack of a clear explanation, or model, for the growth of terrorism vis-à-vis regime type, it is imperative to review additional determinants.

1.3 Minority Discrimination

Minority discrimination is an increasingly examined motivation for the growth of domestic terrorism (Blomberg and Hess 2008; Crenshaw 1981; Ghatak 2016; Piazza 2011, 2012). Crenshaw (1981) and Ghatak (2016) illustrate an interactive relationship between discrimination and economic and political openness. In more detail, terrorism is a ‘rational choice’ when minorities’ exclusion from political power and relative deprivation from public goods increases, and the unsettling forces in the initial phases of economic development provide aggrieved people with opportunities for mobilisation (Ghatak and Gold 2017: 618). The logic of this argument derives from discussions on the foundations of political violence, such as Alesina and Spolaore (2003)’s suggestion that the exclusion from political power, and/or deprivation of public goods, encourage individuals to challenge a state. Overall, there remains a well-established consensus placing economic and political discrimination at the epicentre of the development of domestic terrorism.

The examination of minority discrimination aims to contour traditional understandings on the determinants of political violence. Crenshaw (1981), Ghatak (2016), and Gurr (1970, 1993) illustrate that relative depression may serve to explain the occurrence of terrorism. Specifically, discrimination against, or deprivation of, a minority group develops grievances; grievances are consequently directed against the state, economic status quo, mainstream society, and the majority population (Ghatak 2016: 60), which establishes a channel for the creation and development of domestic terrorism (Piazza 2011). In turn, large-n studies on economic discrimination often highlight the way in which aggregate measures of inequality are positively associated with domestic terror incidents (Ghatak 2016; Piazza 2011). Certainly, Rana (2012) demonstrates—in his study on the Indian Mujahideen (IM)—the way in which young jihadists are radicalised as migrants in impoverished Muslim neighbourhoods, in India. Further perspective is given on this relationship by Ghatak (2016: 62), in demonstrating the approval of Islamic terror is not associated with religiosity, lack of education, or income dissatisfaction, but urban poverty. Thus, there remain convincing accounts for the way in which minority discrimination increases the development of domestic terrorism.

In addition, the literature focuses on political discrimination as a determinant of domestic terrorism (Crenshaw 1981; Ghatak 2016; Hoffman 2006; Lai 2007). Hoffman (2006) describes the way in which terrorism acts as a response to political discrimination, and its growth domestically highlights the desire to further promote grievances and achieve longstanding political objectives. Ghatak (2016: 64) affirms, terrorism is more likely to be adopted as an opposition strategy in political settings where ‘resource mobilisation is possible but where peaceful protests generally render no fruitful results.’ Feldmann and Perala (2004)’s case study on the development of terrorism in post-Cold War Latin America, and Gupta (2011)’s case study on the IM, both provide exemplification of domestic terrorism as a channel for grievances vis-à-vis political discrimination. Overall, the examination of both political and economic discrimination as determinants of domestic terrorism highlight convincing theoretical and practical arguments toward an explanation for growth.

Despite seemingly convincing assertions and arguments grounded in traditional logic, postulations of economic and political discrimination run the risk of existing as micro-examinations of a large phenomenon. In addition, many argue determinants grounded in discrimination do not offer an explanatory model for the growth of domestic terrorism (Hoffman 2006; Li 2005). Thus, it is imperative to examine additional determinants of the growth of domestic terrorism.

1.4 Demography
A number of scholars have identified a relationship between the growth of domestic terrorism and demography (Drakos and Gofas 2006; Krueger and Laitin 2008; Nichiporuk 2000; Samaranayake 1999; Tavares 2004; Zahid and Khan 2016). In this view, more populous countries are likely producers of terrorism.[5] In drawing upon specific factors, the literature focuses on issues relating to large-scale deaths of civilians and the reinforcement of grievances (Campos and Gassebner 2009; Drakos and Gofas 2006), urbanisation and consequent large-scale recruitment (Campos and Gassebner 2009; Krueger and Laitin 2008; Tavares 2004), and ethnic and religious composition (Nichiporuk 2000; Zahid and Khan 2016) in determining the relationship between demographic strain and the growth of terrorism. By way of exemplification, Zahid and Khan (2016: 13) note the way in which terrorist organisations in Pakistan appear to be in a position to capitalise on demographic transition. In addition, Nichiporuk (2000: 8) argues demography is of significance in determining the growth of terrorism in Afghanistan. Certainly, a specific realm of the academic literature places demographic strain as an influential determinant of the growth of domestic terrorism.

Despite the development of scholarship in this area, the findings are somewhat underdeveloped. In an innovative study analysing terrorism and political instability, Campos and Gassebner (2009: 14) argue the results published by proponents of the demography thesis do not provide a positive statistical link between population and the growth of terrorism. Certainly, the demography proposition fails to present a persuasive account of the growth of domestic terrorism and is subject to wide condemnation (Campos and Gassebner 2009; Krieger and Meierrieks 2011; Schneider et al. 2009). In turn, I move forward in examining additional determinants of the growth of domestic terrorism.

1.5 Social Welfare

Social welfare postulations remain a recent addition to the literature on the growth of domestic terrorism. The logic behind this argument relies upon the ability of social welfare policies to manipulate preferences and capabilities of social actors in a way that influences levels of terrorism within the state (Burgoon 2006; Enders and Sandler 2006; Frey 2004). It is proposed that enhanced social welfare policies used to reduce poverty, inequality, and socioeconomic insecurity, diminish incentives to commit or tolerate terrorism, creating a negative effect on the growth of domestic terrorism itself (Burgoon, 2006: 177). In consolidating this view, Frey (2017: 31) describes the way in which domestic policy-makers face a ‘trade-off’ between using repressive counterterrorism methods, and relying on increased social spending to reduce the support and recruitment of terrorists. Thus, within this logic, larger spending on social welfare and the production of socioeconomic policy has a negative effect on the growth of terrorism, subsequently lowering levels within the state.

In addition to domestic policy, scholarship focuses on international social policy incentives, including foreign aid donation, and the way in which it serves to reduce domestic terrorism (Azam and Thelen 2008; Burgoon 2006; Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. 2006). In the wake of George W. Bush’s speech, in 2002, in which he proclaimed, “We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror” (cited in Krueger and Maleckova 2003: 119), various quarters of the academic literature sought to distinguish a relationship between the increase of international aid policy and the decrease of domestic terrorism (Azam and Thele, 2008: 376). Scholars examined the way in which foreign aid, focusing on welfare developments, serves to reduce levels of terrorism within states (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Svensson 1999). Nonetheless, this proposition is widely criticised in practice. Indeed, a number of principal scholars within the literature have argued against the foreign aid thesis by giving examples of terrorist organisations (e.g., Hezbollah, Hamas, and Al-Qaeda) descending from wealthy and educated origins (Hassan 2001; Krueger and Laitin 2003; Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Sageman 2004). Thus, the literature remains firm in noting that although social welfare policy may be empirically influential, it does not serve to determine the development of domestic terrorism (Blomberg and Hess 2008; Drakos and Gofas 2006). Overall, advocates of the social welfare policy fail to provide a convincing and accepted argument within the literature vis-à-vis the growth of domestic terrorism.

1.6 Instability

The theory of instability as a cause of the rise of terrorism has been examined widely in the literature (Abadie 2006; Campos and Nugent 2002; Lai 2007; Piazza 2008; Rice and Patrick 2008), and is convincingly prioritised when assessed against economics and the political system (Abadie 2004; Bradley 2006; Li 2005; Plummer 2012). Abadie
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(2006), Campos and Gassebner (2009), and Ghatak (2016) illustrate the link between domestic instability and the growth of terrorism. In their view, domestic instability fuels terrorism, because terrorism requires ‘skills’ that can be honed in countries that are unstable, or have experienced economic or political instability (Campos and Gassebner 2009: 10). In contouring regime type arguments (e.g., Eyerman 1998; Schmid 1992), the theory of instability marks a significant turning point in the academic literature; in moving from traditional ‘root causes’ to developing a malleable theory of political violence.

1.6.1 Economic Instability

The literature surrounding economic instability suggests economic corruption in government, and weakness of a regulatory institution, prepare the ground for terror uprisings (Blaydes 2011; Blumi 2011; Campos and Gassebner 2009; Dolatabadi et al. 2016). In this view, corruption and lack of authority positively influence domestic terrorism (Blaydes 2011; Blumi 2011; Al-Harithi 2010). For example, a relationship between the lack of control and the growth of domestic terrorism is observed in Afghanistan before 2011, and in Iraq post-2003 (Al-Harithi 2010: 80). In addition, the literature holds GDP, as an economic variable, as a ‘proxy for state administrative, military and police capabilities,’ with low levels of GDP providing a link toward the growth of terrorism (Campos and Gassebner 2009; Fearon and Laitin 2003). The logic of this argument derives from the way in which the instability of economics allow for exploitation of conditions within the domestic arena, heightening the recruitment of terrorists and the expansion of terrorism itself (Zimmerman 2015: 21). For example, GDP in Yemen, between 2010 and 2011, had fallen from $95.5 billion to $81.3 billion (World Bank 2016), demonstrating the way in which instability may augment the probability of terrorism, with terrorism in Yemen described as ‘an exacerbating crisis’ (Zimmerman 2015: 1). Overall, the literature provides a convincing model for the growth of domestic terrorism vis-à-vis economic instability.

1.6.2 Political Instability

In measuring the instability of the political system, scholars trace similar assertions. The literature maintains ‘weak states’ are more susceptible to terror uprisings (Coggins 2014; Plummer 2012; Rice and Patrick 2008). In this view, the failure of a state is intrinsically linked to the status of the political system; thus, where instability occurs in the political arena, the development of terrorism is expected. For example, Tisdall (2015) describes the political system in Yemen as ‘somewhat unstable.’ Consequently, Zimmerman (2015: 18) details the way in which AQAP sought to manipulate the status of the political system to expand international interest domestically, signalling the growth of its organisation. Indeed, the political realm of the theory of instability acts as an addition to its economic counterpart, in demonstrating a model for the growth of terrorism. Overall, the theory of instability allows for a concentrated yet malleable model for the growth of domestic terrorism.

1.7 A Gap in the Literature

The study of terrorism is multifaceted. Scholars have made significant progress in recent years in the study of domestic terrorism, despite limited availability of data (Eubank and Weinberg 1998; Eyerman 1998; Ghatak 2016; Gurr 1970; Li and Schaub 2004). However, a large portion of the literature focuses on the ‘root’ causes of terrorism (Cinar 2009; Kruglanski and Fishman 2009; Newman 2006; Schmid 2005). In turn, a partial analysis is provided. Specifically, Taspinar (2009: 76) argues ‘root’ causes aim to determine a unique panacea, or a one-size-fits-all measure, toward the occurrence of terrorism. Certainly, the literature identifies specific influential characteristics for the growth of terrorism, yet fails to provide an appropriate model for growth. With this failure, the theory of instability seeks to provide an applicable model for the growth of terrorist behaviour (Abadie 2006; Rice and Patrick 2008). This theory, however, does not exist without criticism (e.g., Coggins 2014; Plummer 2012). Overall, Crenshaw (1981) notes the importance, yet struggle, of the literature to determine a universally applicable demonstration of the growth of terrorism. In focusing on the ‘root causes’ of terrorism, the literature fails to present a comprehensive model toward the growth of such phenomenon. Consequently, Chapter 2 examines the theory of instability, in its ability to act as an explanation of growth, with the aim of developing my own model for the growth of domestic terrorism

Theory
The literature advances several ‘root’ determinants of terrorism (e.g., Eyerman 1998; Newman 2006; Schmid 2006). In turn, I argue scholars fail to prioritise the importance of several explanatory motivations for domestic terrorism. Having identified the omnipresent problem, and the failure within the academic literature in Chapter 1, this chapter provides a discussion on theory toward developing a new model for the growth of domestic terrorism. First, I examine the theory of instability toward developing a theoretical framework. Next, I detail my own theory for the growth of domestic terrorism. The development of my theoretical considerations guide the selection of three hypotheses.

2.1 Understanding the Theory of Instability

The theory of instability is examined frequently in the literature surrounding domestic terrorism (Abadie 2006; Campos and Gassebner 2009; Campos and Nugent 2002; Lai 2007; Piazza 2008; Rice and Patrick 2008). Under this theory, less durable regimes and states infused with unstable or corrupt systems of economics are likely producers of domestic terrorism (Abadie 2004; Bradley 2006; Campos and Gassebner 2013; Lai 2007; Li 2005; Piazza 2008; Plummer 2012). Proponents of these arguments maintain that there exists a link to domestic terrorism in consequence of instability as terrorism requires skills derived, and enriched, from states that have experienced a form of instability (Campos and Gassebner 2009: 10). However, the literature on instability too often disregards the political context, in favouring arguments on economic corruption (Coggins 2014; Plummer 2012).

Recent scholarship suggests that economic corruption in government, and weakness of a regulatory institution, prepare the ground for terror uprisings (Blaydes 2011; Blumi 2011; Campos and Gassebner 2009; Dolatabadi et al. 2016). The literature depicts GDP as a ‘proxy for state administrative, military and police capabilities,’ where low levels of GDP are capable of providing a link to the growth of domestic terrorism (Campos and Gassebner 2009; Fearon and Laitin 2003). With the availability of testable variables, the importance of economic instability toward the growth of domestic terrorism is not a new assertion in the academic literature (Krieger and Meierrieks 2011: 9). In focusing on the importance of economics in determining the growth of domestic terrorism (Campos and Gassebner 2013: 455), the quantitative literature too often disregards the importance of the political context. Whilst terrorist organisations are not states themselves, terrorism is a form of asymmetrical warfare. The importance of the economic context in determining the growth of terrorism should not undermine the analysis of political motivations (Plummer 2012: 419).

Consequently, I limit my extension of the theory of instability to the political context.

The political realm of the theory of instability is intermittently cited within the academic literature, in comparison to its economic counterpart. The literature examines the view that less durable regimes tend to motivate the growth of domestic terrorism (Krueger and Laitin 2003). Coggins (2014), Plummer (2012), and Rice and Patrick (2008) examine the ‘failed state hypothesis,’ in maintaining ‘weak states’ are more susceptible to terror uprisings. Hehir (2007) argues this conceptualisation of the failed state hypothesis is intrinsically linked to the ‘status’ of the political system in the state itself, with regard to the level of democratic principles and political freedom. This theory of political instability is welcomed within the literature (Campos and Gassebner 2013: 30). It is, however, inherently limited as a stand-alone theory for the growth of terrorism. Firstly, the failed state hypothesis lacks testability in terms of the quantitative measurability of instability itself.[6] In addition, the theory provides a foundation for the growth of domestic terrorism, as opposed to an explanation for the growth of the phenomenon itself. In turn, the literature on instability fails to distinguish between sufficient conditions and necessary conditions for the growth of domestic terrorism.[7] Certainly, the literature has advanced several conditions necessary (e.g., political or religious motivation) and sufficient (e.g., relative deprivation and erosion of civil liberties) for the growth of domestic terrorism (Black 2004; Kruglanski and Fishman 2006; Levy and Goertz 2007; Vanderheiden 2005). Thus, I argue the theory of instability fails short in distinguishing between the level of influence among ‘unstable’ factors toward the growth of terrorism.

Overall, the theory of instability is somewhat limited in its consolidation of the growth of terrorism. The value of examining the political context of the state in determining the growth of terrorism, however, is not disregarded (Coggins 2014; Plummer 2012). The question therefore remains, what other determinants better explain the growth of domestic terrorism? Certainly, one of the most puzzling aspects of examining the growth of terrorism is the ability to draw upon political, rather than economic, variables in demonstrating a motivation for growth (Coggins 2014; Plummer 2012).[8] Drawing upon this observation, I offer alternative explanations for the growth of terrorism:
governmental weakness and territorial control.

2.2 Governmental Weakness

Governmental weakness influences the growth of domestic terrorism. My proposition follows a logic deriving from the claim that less durable regimes tend to motivate terrorism (Krueger and Laitin 2008; Lai 2007; Li 2005). The weakness, itself, is categorised by the functionality of the state.[9] In turn, where there is a challenge to governmental authority, or a lack of confidence, or ability, to control behaviour within the state, I expect higher levels of terrorism.

H1: States with higher levels of governmental weakness have higher levels of domestic terrorism.

The conceptualisation of weakness as a determinant of the growth of terrorism is not an entirely new idea in relation to previous scholarship. Mair (2008) and Plummer (2012) argue both ‘weak states,’ and ‘failed states’ are optimal for terrorist activity.[10] Without preliminarily categorising weakness, I argue the failure to assert control provides a level of functionality best suited to the growth of terrorism. My argument follows support from Plummer (2012: 420) who argues, the failure to assert control within the domestic province provides the best ground for the rise of terrorism. Despite such support, my theory of governmental weakness faces confrontation. Li and Schaub (2004) and Mair (2008) find, ‘midrange state failure’ is most optimal for terrorist activity, and that ‘completely failed states’ are not hospitable to terrorism. However, terrorist activity does not attach itself to one particular ‘type’ of state (Ghatak 2016; Li 2005; Piazza 2008). In turn, I argue my theory for the growth of terrorism is measurable across all levels of governmental weakness. Overall, I predict, domestic terrorism will be demonstrable among both...
high and low levels of state failure.

Figure 2 aims to demonstrate my creation of a theoretical framework *vis-à-vis* the growth of domestic terrorism. The unstable nature of the Yemeni political system provides exemplification for the relationship between governmental weakness and terrorism (Tisdall 2015: The Guardian). In the fall of the Yemeni regime itself—with poor political freedom, periodic conflicts with Shia tribes in the North, and the rise of AQAP in advancing control in the South (Zimmerman 2015: 21)—it is not difficult to comprehend the way in which the instability of the political system may be deduced as a motivation for the growth of terrorism. Consequentially, Figure 2 demonstrates the way in which states of low functionality, and high governmental weakness, such as Yemen, are applicable to my theory of governmental weakness.

In addition to states of low functionality, Figure 2 demonstrates the way in which my theory of governmental weakness is applicable to states with higher functionality. For example, Awad (2017: The Atlantic) describes the way in which the Egyptian political system is considerably strong *vis-à-vis* the absence of war and periodic conflict, in comparison to the level of conflict in Yemen. Nevertheless, terrorism within Egypt itself is still prominent, with Mostafa (2017: Al-Monitor) describing terrorism within the state as a ‘ferocious qualitative operation.’ In addition, Greer (2016: Foreign Policy) highlights the way in which the Pakistani administration has higher levels of functionality in comparison to other states in the Middle East. Nonetheless, Pakistan is by no means exempt from terror uprisings (Killalea, 2017: News Com). Certainly, both cases give rise to the question, does higher functionality determine lower levels of terrorism? This question directly relates to the findings of H1 and shall be assessed throughout this dissertation. Overall, my theory of governmental weakness underpins the consistent understanding of terror actions in the international community (Coggins 2014; Lai 2007; Li 2005; Rice and Patrick 2008; Plummer 2014), and is a developed counterpart of existing theory.

**FIGURE 3.** The Logic of Territorial Control
2.3 Territorial Control

The importance of the control of territory by terrorist organisations toward the growth of terrorism is underdeveloped in the academic literature (e.g., Korteweg 2008; Piazza 2008; Plummer 2012; Rock 2006). Whereas my theory of governmental weakness provides a foundation for the growth of terrorist activity, the examination of territorial control denotes an explicit model for the growth of terrorism within a state. Thus, I expect the examination of both theoretical developments to provide a well-rounded account for the growth of domestic terrorism.

My theory of territorial control follows three related logics (see Figure 3), derived from the claim a state, subject to failure, is unable to successfully monitor, or govern, its territory (Korteweg 2008: 61). First, ungoverned areas within the state provide sanctuary to terrorist organisations, where the state lacks the capacity or will to remove them (Korteweg 2008: 61). Second, the adoption of such ungoverned areas, in consequence of the fragmentation of state control, allows for controlled growth within the state, and, consequently, the successful advancement of terrorist organisations throughout. Finally, the control of territory influences a willingness to victimise civilians and engage in terrorism (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Kalyvas 2006; Mampilly 2011). In turn, where there is a large control of territory by terrorist organisations, I expect higher levels of terrorism within the state.

H2: States in which terrorist organisations have higher levels of control of domestic territory have higher levels of terrorism.

Territorial control, as a model of growth, is underdeveloped within the academic literature surrounding domestic terrorism. Nonetheless, the importance of territorial control toward strengthening terror activity is not unnoticed in the absence of theory. Korteweg (2008: 61) argues, ‘the environments created in particular states with weak governance capabilities are conducive to the activities of various terrorist groups.’ Certainly, the confluence of territorial control and state failure are intrinsically linked to terrorism (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Kalyvas 2006; Mampilly 2011; Stewart 2016). Figure 2 demonstrates the way in which my theory of territorial control toward the growth of domestic terrorism interacts with my theory of governmental weakness. As previously noted, the Yemeni government lacks the ability to control its domestic province, and is depicted as fragile, and unstable, both throughout media sources and within the academic literature (Tisdall 2015; Zimmerman 2015). In consequence of domestic instability, AQAP sought to manipulate the location of conflict to enhance their geographical standing in Yemen, through the capitalisation of ungoverned areas, or ‘black holes’ (Zimmerman 2015: 28). Hence, my theory of territorial control may be coupled with my theory of governmental weakness in determining the growth of domestic terrorism. Such discussion provides a foundation for the following hypothesis:

H3: States with higher levels of governmental weakness, and in which terrorist organisations have higher levels of control of domestic territory, demonstrate even higher levels of terrorism.

Notwithstanding the view that the lack of central government control over domestic territory is a sine qua non for the growth of terrorism (as described by Korteweg 2008: 65), my theory of territorial control may exist as a separate entity in prescribing the growth of terrorism. For example, in Egypt, governmental weakness is considerably low; nonetheless, Mostafa (2017: Al-Monitor) describes the way in which terrorist organisations are able to gain control of territory within the state. Figure 2 highlights this relationship, in noting the low level of governmental weakness, and higher level of territorial control. In turn, the theory of territorial control is applicable across multiple states, and various functionalities of governance. Thus, territorial control may be tested as both a stand-alone theory for the growth of domestic terrorism, and as a model in conjunction with my theory of governmental weakness.

2.4 On Black Holes and Incubators of Terror

Overall, there remains a gap in the academic literature with regard to a comprehensive model for the growth of domestic terrorism. The most influential studies on terrorism analyse traditional ‘root cause’ theories of terrorist behaviour (Eubank and Weinberg 1998; Eyerman 1998; Newman, 2006; Schmid 2005; Von Hippel 2002). However, few systematically examine the way in which terrorism is able to flourish domestically. In addition to highlighting
normative justifications for analysing such phenomenon, this chapter has outlined the way in which there remain several theoretical justifications. Certainly, governmental weakness has the ability to act as a necessary condition, or foundation, for the growth of domestic terrorism; territorial control, has the ability to provide a sufficient, or explanatory condition. With this in mind, it is important to provide a systematic analysis of theory. As such, Chapter 3 will outline the data and methodology used within this study to test my prescribed hypotheses.

**Data and Methodology**

Having discussed theoretical justifications in Chapter 2, I outline the data and methodology used to conduct my research in this chapter. First, I offer a justification for both my quantitative methodology and data collection. Next, I outline my dependent, independent and control variables. Finally, I detail the model used to conduct my analysis before discussing data limitations.

3.1 **Quantitative Methodology**

To examine the growth of domestic terrorism, I employ a quantitative methodology. A quantitative study has been chosen to align with previous research into the nature of domestic terrorism (e.g., Campos and Gassebner 2009; Piazza 2011; Plummer 2012), and to enhance the empirical examination of my chosen hypotheses. In determining the growth of domestic terrorism, this method has several advantages. First, some of the most salient issues facing political scientists—especially the use of quantitative methods—are severely neglected in most research on terrorism (Young and Findley 2011: 412). Silke (2001, 2004) highlights the paucity of quantitative research on terrorism, and recommends the imbalance in research methodologies be addressed. In turn, I advance the quantitative understanding of domestic terrorist behaviour in this study. Second, my dependent variable is difficult to measure. Caprioli (2004) and Tarrow (1995) detail the way in which statistical analysis allows for the systematic reduction and restructuring of complex issues in political science. Thus, a quantitative analysis proves more favourable in capturing the multifaceted nature of terrorism across a large period of time (Freilich and LaFree 2016; LaFree and Gruenewald 2018).

3.2 **Data Collection**

This dissertation undertakes an ambitious task: to present data on the growth of domestic terrorism, and its relationship with governmental weakness and territorial control. It requires the coherent understanding of terrorist behaviour domestically and the careful observation of violence, both in its amplification and attenuation. It requires the consistent oversight of not only state behaviour but the relationship between state behaviour and the strength of governance. It, finally, requires an understanding of the manipulation of territory throughout complex environments and the coding of change in territory both accurately and effectively. In consequence of the intricate nature of this project, the data required for this task is limited and difficult to collect.

There are several previous efforts to create reliable datasets on domestic terrorism (Enders et al. 2011; Jenkins 2006; Mickolus et al. 2006). However, many studies produce inconsistent results (Robson 2004; Sheehan 2012) and fail to provide relevant variables of interest with regard to my hypotheses. Studies, largely, collect data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), or ITERATE (Drakos 2009; Ghatak 2016; Piazza 2011; Plummer 2012; Rosendorff and Sandler 2005). In its focus only on international terrorism, I exclude ITERATE as a plausible source for data collection. In addition, the GTD is an events-based dataset. It fails to offer a level of terrorism and, instead, offers a breakdown of domestic terror events (Sheehan 2012: 14). As my thesis is concerned with the level, and not the breakdown, of terrorism domestically, I collect data from the GTI.

**FIGURE 4. GTI Methodology**
The GTI is a relatively new construct and has only been used recently in the academic literature (Bader and Schuster 2015; Berkebile 2017; Hyslop and Morgan 2014; Procasky and Ujah 2016). Nonetheless, it is welcomed as a comprehensive measure of terrorist activity (Liu and Pratt 2017: 407). It is the first terrorism index to systematically rank countries on the impact of terrorism, in assessing not only the direct physical impact of terrorism, but the psychological and indirect effects (Liu and Pratt 2017: 407). In addition to domestic terrorism, I collect state-level data from Banks’ Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. I collect my rebel behaviour variable from the Non-State Actor Dataset, which I offer as a proxy for terrorist behaviour. I combine the data collected into an original dataset with a sample of state-level data for 161 states between 2002-2011.[11]

3.3 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the level of terrorism within a domestic state, illustrative of a state’s GTI score. The use of the level of terrorism as opposed to the number of terror attacks is a relatively new proposal for quantitative literature. Scholarship on domestic terrorism often selects event-focused dependent variables, such as the calculated rate of terrorist attacks within a state (Campos and Gassebner 2013; Piazza 2008) or the total number of fatalities (Newman 2006; Plummer 2012). However, selecting the level of terrorism is best suited to my assessment of domestic terrorism (Schmid 2011; Sheehan 2012). Additionally, the GTI offers a more advanced scaling of domestic terrorism. The GTI score for a state is based on a unique scoring system, accounting for the relative impact of incidents in the given year. States are scored on the basis of four aggregated physical effect indicators: the total number of incidents, total number of fatalities, total number of injuries, and the sum of property damage. To account for the lingering effect of terrorism, the GTI takes into account scores from previous years, and weights as follows: current year (52%), previous year (26%), two years ago (13%), three years ago (6%), and four years ago (3%). The weighted scores are banded logarithmically into a ten-point score.[12] This enables each score to reflect a relative linear indicator of the impact of terrorism in a state, in respecting earlier levels of violence and intensity (Procasky and Ujah 2016: 257).[13]

### TABLE 1. Governmental Weakness Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable Banks’ (2008) Definition</th>
<th>Assassinations Any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high government official or politician. General Strikes Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority. Guerrilla Warfare Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime. Governmental Crisis Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the present regime – excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow. Purges Any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition within the ranks of the regime or the opposition. Riots Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force. Revolutions Any illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government. Anti-Government Demonstrations Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3.4 Independent Variables

The independent variables for governmental weakness are taken from Banks’ Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. I select eight variables (defined in Table 1) which provide a proxy for governmental weakness. My chosen variables are well-accepted as indicators of domestic instability and political violence within the literature. The variables offer a more well-rounded and advanced proxy in replace of a single indicator of ‘weakness,’ which remains both underdeveloped and unfavourable (Abrahms and Potter 2015; Campos and Gassebner 2013; Crenshaw and Robinson 2010; Gassebner et al. 2008).

With regard to territorial control, I require an independent variable that assesses the amount of control of territory by terrorist organisations. Nonetheless, data on the control of territory is inherently limited (Kibris 2011; LaFree and
Dugan 2007; LaFree and Freilich 2012). Certainly, data on the amount of control is only available for a number of states in Africa and Asia, with data on an international scale pending for release past the timeline of my dissertation (see Walsh et al. 2016). In turn, I use the rebel control variable in the Non-State Actor Dataset. This variable is binary and specifies: control of territory by rebel groups in a conflict (1) and, no control of territory by rebel groups in a conflict (0). The use of a binary variable may seem unfavourable in the assessment of the growth of domestic terrorism. However, it is not uncommon in previous studies (e.g., Walsh et al. 2016). Overall, with the inaccessibility of data on territorial control, I am confident that the binary variable will produce laudable results.

<p>| Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent, Independent and Control Variables |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GTI Score</td>
<td>2381</td>
<td>2.105</td>
<td>2.352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Control</td>
<td>10578</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassinations (log)</td>
<td>8834</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla Warfare (log)</td>
<td>8834</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutions (log)</td>
<td>8833</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riots (log)</td>
<td>8833</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purges (log)</td>
<td>8834</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental Crisis (log)</td>
<td>8834</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-government Demonstrations (log)</td>
<td>8833</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Strikes (log)</td>
<td>8834</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity2</td>
<td>8823</td>
<td>0.535</td>
<td>7.465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (log)</td>
<td>9173</td>
<td>10.052</td>
<td>4.797</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for all variables. In order to respond to the skewness of large data, I log several independent variables for data testing. Indeed, the log of variables is not uncommon in quantitative literature, in responding to the skewness of large values (see, e.g., Robbins 2012; Lütkepohl and Xu 2012).

### 3.5 Control Variables

I use several control variables to allow for a more comprehensive analysis. First, I control for regime type. As discussed in Chapter 1, there remains a certain disparity in the academic literature vis-à-vis the importance of regime type toward the growth of domestic terrorism (Campos and Gassebner 2002; Crenshaw 1981; Eyerman 1998; Schmid 1992). Despite this, regime type remains a variable of interest in most studies on domestic terrorism (Lai and Morey 2006; Plumper et al. 2010; Robertson and Teitelbaum 2011). Following previous literature, I use the Polity2 scores in the Polity IV Project as a source for this variable. In addition, I control for GDP. As previously discussed, the relationship between low economic development and the rise of domestic terrorism is frequently cited in the academic literature (Campos and Gassebner 2009; Fearon and Laitin 2003), in which, it is held, low levels of GDP are linked to the development of domestic terrorism. If data permitted, I would use several other controls.[14]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. Correlations</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
<th>(9)</th>
<th>(10)</th>
<th>(11)</th>
<th>(12)</th>
<th>(13)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GTI Score</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Control</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassinations (log)</td>
<td>0.436</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla Warfare (log)</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Revolutions (log)</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riots (log)</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purges (log)</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental Crisis (log)</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-government Demonstrations (log)</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Strikes</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (log)</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.105</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.072</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.6 Correlations

Having outlined my variables, it is important to consider the correlations between them. A correlation is a number used in statistics to describe the degree of relationship between two variables. In the quantitative study of domestic terrorism, scholars have previously encountered problems with levels of correlation between dependent and independent variables (Abadie 2006; Drakos and Gofas 2006). Table 3 highlights the correlations between my variables. There remain no issues of correlation between the variables used that would improperly influence the outcome of my research. Certainly, there remain higher correlations between guerrilla warfare and revolutions toward the growth of terrorism. However, this is to be expected (Baylouny 2004; Ganor 2002; Ratner 2004). In addition, none of my independent variables are directly used in the calculation of my dependent variable. Thus, the correlations presented do not produce any major issues for data testing.
3.7 Limitations

My dissertation represents a new systematic effort to create measures of terrorist activity with respect to the domestic control of territory and governmental weakness. Nonetheless, two limitations should be noted. First, the binary variable may be empirically unfavourable. The variable in the Non-State Actor Dataset explicitly refers to ‘rebel’ control of territory as opposed to ‘terrorist’ control. Nonetheless, the Non-State Actor Dataset incorporates terrorist organisations as an actor within its calculation of rebel control. In addition, the binary variable remains the only cross-national measurement of territorial control and presents a respected account of the control of domestic territory.[15] Thus, I view the use of this variable as a confident representation of the control of territory by terrorist organisations. Second, the use of eight independent variables as indicators of governmental weakness, as opposed to a single variable may be seen as a limitation. Indeed, several scholars use the Failed State Index as a single indicator of domestic instability (Campos and Gassebner 2013; Coggins 2014; Plummer 2012). The Failed State Index, however, does not provide a comprehensive indication of governmental weakness in its methodology, nor does the conceptualisation of a ‘failed state’ draw upon all necessary levels of ‘weakness’ (Ghatak 2016; Li 2005; Newman 2007; Piazza 2008). Hence, my use of eight variables as opposed to a single variable offers a well-rounded assortment of governmental weakness, and will enhance the analysis of the relationship between governmental weakness and domestic terrorism.[16] Overall, governmental weakness and territorial control can be measured reliably.

3.8 OLS Regression

My dependent variable unveils an issue of over-dispersion; that is, the variance is larger than the mean. Over-dispersion makes the use of standard models, such as a Poisson regression, problematic (Campos and Gassebner 2013: 32). The use of Poisson regression models in the literature on domestic terrorism is uncommon (Campos and Gassebner 2013; Coggins 2014; Ghatak 2012; Plummer 2012). As such, I select an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model to test my hypotheses. The OLS model is a statistical tool that identifies the causal effect of one variable upon another (Weinstein 2007: 307). It allows for the estimation of unknown parameters in a linear regression, and will allow for the determination of the growth of terrorism in linear form. The OLS regression accompanies the nature of my dependent variable (being continuous in form). Indeed, I will use the OLS model in Chapter 4 to assess the statistical significance of my estimation; that is, the degree of confidence that the relationship I observe in the data is close to the true relationship (Weinstein 2007: 307).

Results and Analysis

**TABLE 4. Growth of Domestic Terrorism: OLS Model Results**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>GTI Score</th>
<th>Territorial Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governmental Weakness</td>
<td>(0.50**)</td>
<td>(1.92**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassinations (log)</td>
<td>(0.50**)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla Warfare (log)</td>
<td>(1.84**)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutions (log)</td>
<td>(1.83**)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riots (log)</td>
<td>(0.50**)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purges (log)</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental Crisis (log)</td>
<td>(0.65**)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Government Demonstrations (log)</td>
<td>(0.32**)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Incubators of Terror: Anatomising the Determinants of Domestic Terrorism
Written by Blair Welsh

(0.11) General Strikes (log) 0.32

(0.23) Controls Polity2 -0.02**

(0.01) GDP (log) 0.32**

(0.03) Constant -2.22**

(0.25) Observations 1512 R-squared 0.454 Growth of domestic terrorism, 2002-2011. Note: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is GTI Score. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors; **p <0.01, *p <0.05. GDP is gross domestic product.

Introduction

To evaluate each of my arguments, I conduct an OLS regression. Table 4 displays the results, with the model centred around a state’s GTI score. I present and discuss the results in this final chapter. First, I outline and interpret the results for my territorial control and governmental weakness arguments. Second, I consider the results for my control variables. Finally, I discuss the nature of the results in light of a model for the growth of domestic terrorism in examining predicted margins.

4.1 Territorial Control

The coefficient for territorial control is positive and statistically relevant at the 0.01 level, lending support for my argument that where terrorist organisations are in control of territory, higher levels of domestic terrorism are expected (H2). The results follow the finding that the control of territory has a strong relationship with the willingness of organisations to engage in acts of terrorism (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003; Kalyvas 2006; Kortweg 2008; Mampilly 2011). In turn, the results support the developing interest in the academic literature toward the influence of territorial control on the perpetration of violence (e.g., Walsh et al. 2016). Overall, there is strong support for H2.

FIGURE 5. Spectrum of Weakness: Scaling ‘Weakness’ by Coefficient Size
4.2 Governmental Weakness

The results for my governmental weakness argument ($H1$) are varied. First, the assassination of government officials is positively associated with the growth of domestic terrorism, and is statistically relevant at the 0.01 level. This is supported, empirically, by several scholars who argue the assassination of government officials is often accompanied by the growth of domestic terrorism (Goodwin 2006; Perliger 2016; Saiya 2017). For example, the assassination of government officials in Islamabad, in 2011, is often linked to the growth of domestic terrorism in Pakistan (see, e.g., Khan et al. 2015; Walsh 2011). In addition, guerrilla warfare and revolutions are both positive, and statistically relevant at the 0.01 level. Both relationships mirror existing literature on motivators for the growth of domestic terrorism (e.g., Krueger and Laitin 2008; Lai 2007; Li 2005). Moreover, the results indicate strong support for the active role of guerrilla warfare and armed revolutions in the relationship between governmental weakness and the growth of domestic terrorism. Additionally, riots are positively associated with the overall growth of domestic terrorism, and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. General strikes are positively associated with the overall growth of domestic terrorism, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. Anti-government demonstrations and governmental crisis are both positive and statistically relevant at the 0.01 level, indicating additional support for $H1$. Nonetheless, purges are negatively associated with the growth of domestic terrorism. Overall, the results provided vary the support for my governmental weakness argument ($H1$).

It is clear, however, that relatively milder forms of dissent or violence (e.g., strikes and demonstrations) do not convincingly explain the occurrence of domestic terrorism under the realm of governmental weakness, in comparison to more severe determinants (e.g., guerrilla warfare and revolutions). This provides evidence for the argument that only certain forms of governmental weakness influence the growth of domestic terrorism (Ghatak 2016; Mair 2008; Plummer 2008). Thus, the results suggest a spectrum, or level, of influence vis-à-vis governmental weakness and the growth of domestic terrorism. For example, revolutions and guerrilla warfare provide for higher governmental opposition as opposed to general strikes, or anti-government demonstrations, which display a relatively mild dissent. I demonstrate this ‘spectrum of weakness’ in Figure 5, in order of coefficient size. Overall, states plagued by higher levels of weakness can be seen to exhibit higher levels of domestic terrorism. I will discuss this relationship later in this chapter.

4.3 Additional Factors and Controls

A number of things are immediately apparent from the results for my control variables. First, the coefficient for regime type is negative, and statistically relevant at the 0.01 level. In turn, states with lower Polity2 scores are more likely to be higher producers of domestic terrorism. This is interesting in light of the highly contentious relationship between regime type and

FIGURE 6. Predictive Margins I: The Relationship Between Territorial Control and Guerrilla Warfare, Revolutions, and Governmental Crisis
domestic terrorism in the academic literature. On one hand, scholars argue democracy is a facilitating condition for the rise of terrorism (Eubank and Weinberg 1998; Eyerman 1998; Schmid 1992). On the other hand, scholars argue nondemocratic societies provide a motivation for the growth of domestic terrorism (Campos and Gassebner 2002; Crenshaw 1981; Li and Schaub 2004; Ross 1993). My results provide sustenance to the political access realm of regime type theory, which argues nondemocracies are more susceptible to the growth of domestic terrorism. This is significant as the inconsistency within the literature, it is argued, challenged the legitimacy of arguments on the influence of regime type as a determinant of domestic terrorism (Gaibulloev, Piazza and Sandler 2017: 491). Second, GDP is positive and statistically relevant at the 0.01 level. This stands against the economic realm of the theory of instability in which, it is argued, lower levels of GDP are associated with the growth of domestic terrorism (Blaydes 2011; Blumi 2011; Campos and Gassebner 2009).

4.4 A Model of Incubation

FIGURE 7. Predictive Margins II: The Relationship Between Territorial Control and Assassinations, Riots, and Anti-Government Demonstrations
Having considered the results for $H_1$ and $H_2$, it is necessary to interpret the results in light of $H_3$. Indeed, the degree of support for $H_3$ is contingent upon the selection of the indicators for governmental weakness. Figure 6 displays the predictive margins for territorial control relative to guerrilla warfare, revolutions and governmental crisis. Guerrilla warfare has a positive relationship with territorial control and the growth of terrorism. Indeed, as guerrilla warfare increases, the growth of terrorism is predicted to increase at a higher rate if the terrorist organisation has control of domestic territory. However, the overlap of confidence intervals marginally constrains the relationship between territory and guerrilla warfare. It demonstrates that as guerrilla warfare increases, territorial control is not statistically significant vis-à-vis domestic terrorism. Overall, the separation between $T.C. \text{ at } 0$ and $T.C. \text{ at } 1$ demonstrates territorial control as a sufficient condition for the growth of terrorism. However, its influence as an explanatory condition becomes less significant as guerrilla warfare (as an indicator of governmental weakness) increases.

Revolutions have a strong and positive relationship with territorial control and the growth of domestic terrorism. Figure 6 details that as revolutions increase, the growth of domestic terrorism is expected. This increase is predicted on a greater scale where terrorist organisations have control of territory. The relationship between revolutions and terrorism remains underdeveloped in the academic literature (as noted by Dawoody 2016). My results, alongside domestic events throughout the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, and the Colour Revolutions from 2003, demonstrate the relationship between terrorism and revolutions as both empirically and statistically relevant. This maintains important research implications for the academic literature, and in the role of revolutions as an indicator of governmental weakness. Additionally, Figure 6 emphasises that terrorism is predicted to grow at a higher rate in the presence of a governmental crisis where organisations have control of territory. Therefore, with regard to aforementioned variables as indicators of governmental weakness, there remains strong support for $H_3$.

Figure 7 displays the predictive margins for territorial control and the growth of domestic terrorism vis-à-vis assassinations, riots, and anti-government demonstrations. It highlights that terrorism is predicted to grow at a higher rate in the presence of assassinations where organisations have control of territory. This result is somewhat constrained where assassinations increase. Certainly, the overlapping confidence intervals demonstrate that the need for territorial control in the rise of domestic terrorism is not statistically significant where assassinations increase. This mirrors the relationship between guerrilla warfare, terrorism and territory. It questions the nature of territorial control as a sufficient condition. Indeed, the control of territory, as a sufficient condition, may not be essential where ‘higher’ forms of weakness (e.g., assassinations and guerrilla warfare) are present. The relationship between the growth of domestic terrorism, control of territory, and riots is somewhat similar. The role of territory becomes more of a foundation as opposed to an explanation where riots increase vis-à-vis the growth of domestic terrorism. In relation to anti-government demonstrations, the growth of terrorism is expected to increase at a higher rate where terrorist organisations have control of domestic territory, in comparison to where they do not. The relationship between terrorism, control of territory, and anti-government demonstrations remains distinct. This provides both further support for $H_3$ and to the demonstration of a model of the growth of domestic terrorism.
Figure 8 displays the predictive margins for territorial control relative to general strikes and purges. General strikes have a small linear relationship with the growth of domestic terrorism and control of territory. In turn, the presence of a general strike has a small impact on the growth of domestic terrorism. The relationship between general strikes and terrorism is not statistically significant. The slight intersection of margins where general strikes increase, again, questions the significance of territorial control as a sufficient condition. Overall, my results demonstrate that the role of territory is significant, toward the growth of terrorism, as forms of governmental weakness initially begin to increase. However, its influence becomes less significant where certain indicators of governmental weakness begin to escalate on a larger scale.[17]

In addition, purges have an interesting relationship with territorial control and the growth of terrorism. This relationship is negative, and thus where purges increase, terrorism decreases. In my model of governmental weakness, purges have a negative effect on the growth of domestic terrorism, irrespective of control of domestic territory. This result mirrors existing studies on purges and terrorism in the academic literature (e.g., Nitsch and Schumacher 2004). The results prove interesting with regard to indicators of governmental weakness and instability. Indeed, the nature of a purge may, at first glance, infer a sense of governmental weakness or instability (Rummel 1984: 450). However, a purge highlights institutional security; the presence of structural military and political institutions within a regime (Biddle & Zirkle 1996; Bratton and Van de Walle 1994; Quinlivan 1999; Roessler 2011). In turn, the negative effect of purges on domestic terrorism, in the presence of a functional regime, is expected.

Figure 8 demonstrates the negative relationship between regime type and the growth of domestic terrorism, modelled in terms of the control of domestic territory. Indeed, where a state’s Polity2 score increases, terrorism decreases. This positive linear prediction is consistent vis-à-vis control of territory and no control of territory. In addition, Figure 8 highlights the positive linear relationship between GDP, territory and terrorism. Interestingly, where a state’s GDP is higher, the growth of domestic terrorism is expected. Furthermore, the growth of domestic terrorism is predicted to be higher if the terrorist organisation has control of domestic territory. This result is in direct competition with the economic realm of the theory of instability, which receives the greatest amount of attention among scholars of terrorism (Campos and Nugent, 2002; Abadie, 2006; Lai, 2007; Piazza, 2008). The theory argues low economic development allows for the exploitation of conditions within the domestic arena, heightening the influence of terrorist organisations (Piazza, 2008; Zimmerman, 2015). It must be noted, GDP is not the only indicator of low economic development or instability,[18] and the argument for economic instability cannot be fully disregarded in light of my results. Certainly, the theory of instability, with regard to economics, is centred around low economic development as a proxy for state administrative, military and police capabilities, and thus to measure such capacity solely on GDP would be to overstate its influence. My results contribute to the quantitative literature on instability, which too often disregards the importance of the political context. Indubitably, the results of my dissertation demonstrate the requirement of an essential understanding of the political context toward determining the growth of domestic terrorism.

As a whole, the results provide support for $H1$, $H2$ and $H3$. The results demonstrate that my
model for the growth of domestic terrorism, and its interactive relationship with territory and governmental weakness is strong. States with higher governmental weakness (e.g., presence of guerrilla warfare and revolutions), and where terrorist organisations have control of territory, demonstrate higher levels of domestic terrorism. Moreover, states with intermediate governmental weakness (e.g., presence of anti-government demonstrations and general strikes), and where terrorist organisations have control of territory, demonstrate intermediately higher levels of domestic terrorism, but not as high as states with higher levels of governmental weakness. In addition, the \( R^2 \) coefficient for the regression is 0.454. The \( R^2 \) coefficient is a statistical measure of how close the data is to the fitted regression line (Darlington and Hayes 2017: 30). Thus, the relatively high \( R^2 \) coefficient indicates that the chosen regression model is an appropriate choice for the observations. Overall, the interplay of control of territory with appropriate indicators of governmental weakness has proven to demonstrate a significant increase in the growth of domestic terrorism.

**FIGURE 8.** Predictive Margins III: The Relationship Between Territorial Control and General Strikes, Purges, Regime Type, and GDP

**Conclusion**
In search for factors determining the growth of domestic terrorism, my dissertation concentrated on the significance of governmental weakness and territorial control. I argued that governmental weakness and the control of territory act as an explanatory model for the growth of domestic terrorism, in explaining both the variation and presence of terrorism within a state. Certainly, the results detail that higher forms of weakness (e.g., guerrilla warfare and armed revolutions) provide a strong explanation for the growth of domestic terrorism than lower forms of weakness (e.g., anti-government demonstrations and general strikes). Several common suppositions of weakness, however, are not supported. The growth of terrorism does not have a positive linear relationship with purges. Additionally, general strikes did not prove statistically relevant. This does not undermine my model for the growth of domestic terrorism. It does, however, highlight that a spectrum of influence applies when assessing the relationship between governmental weakness and domestic terrorism. Furthermore, the results provide for the importance of territorial control. The growth of domestic terrorism is considerably heightened where the terrorist organisation has control of domestic territory. The relationship between territory and governmental weakness is demonstrated in some instances. Certainly, the influence of territorial control becomes less significant where certain indicators of weakness (e.g., assassinations, guerrilla warfare, and riots) increase. Overall, territorial control is a sufficient condition and governmental weakness is a necessary condition for the growth of domestic terrorism.

5.1 Research Implications

My argument challenges scholars and analysts of terrorism to re-evaluate the categories and approaches they have employed to study political violence. First, it demonstrates that control of territory is significantly influential toward the overall growth of domestic terrorism. My results provide that displacement of control may best serve to be understood in tandem with governmental weakness. Indeed, the logic that an organisation’s control of territory indicates a willingness to engage in political violence (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Kalyvas, 2006) is supported. Thus, the role of territorial control should not be undermined in the academic literature. Second, my results dismiss the overall influence of GDP, as a proxy for state administrative stability (Campos and Gassebner 2009; Fearon and Laitin 2003) and thus, a determinant of political violence. Third, my results contribute to the literature on necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for the growth of domestic terrorism (e.g. Black 2004; Kruglanski and Fishman 2006). The ‘spectrum of weakness’ may prove helpful in future research in determining the importance of explanatory motivators for the growth of domestic terrorism. Despite such implications, my model for the growth of domestic terrorism is not, in itself, complex. It could be amended in future to remove the binary variable for territorial control to reflect upcoming data. In addition, the role of economics could be developed to demonstrate alternative economic determinants as opposed to prioritising the role of GDP.

5.2 Policy Implications

FIGURE 9. Counterterrorism Formula
Understanding why domestic terrorism flourishes in one environment and not another is important for policy-makers focused on the prevention of terrorism (Campos and Gassebner 2013: 44). In particular, my analysis of statistical evidence of terrorism from 161 states suggests the following transparent and actionable conclusion for policy-makers: targeting organisations with a large amount of territorial control in politically unstable environments would decrease the level of domestic terrorism. This is significant for two reasons, both for policy and practice. In practice, states should be concerned with a number of terrorist organisations in the international community. My model for the growth of terrorism can be applied to a number of states. For example, in Egypt, Gama’at al-Islamiyya continue to manipulate territory to advance domestically, despite strong governance (Wright 2014: The New Yorker). In addition, the siege of territory in Yemen is rooted in the organisational strategy of AQAP (Tisdall 2015; Zimmerman 2015). For example, in February of 2018, domestic fighters allied with the pro-secession Southern Transitional Council, in Aden, to place severe pressure on Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi (current president) to flee the presidential palace (Dehghan 2018: The Guardian). In consequence, both academics and media outlets report that AQAP have sought ‘strategic growth,’ in obtaining large swaths of land (e.g., Byers and Stewart 2018; Dehghan 2018). In turn, institutional instability and the strategic advancement of AQAP in Yemen demonstrates my model in practice. Thus, policy-makers should be extremely concerned with the growth of domestic terrorism. I must note, I do not intend to argue my model depicts every case of domestic terrorism. However, it provides an appropriate step in the academic literature toward developing an applicable model toward understanding the development of domestic terrorism.

For policy itself, states should continue to pursue strong counterterrorism strategies. In light of aforementioned cases, states must prioritise appropriate counterterrorism mechanisms with the aim of stabilising political institutions, destabilising domestic rebellion, and countering territorial control. Figure 9 highlights my suggestion for a counterterrorism formula. In order to achieve a successful counter of domestic terrorism—following my results—I propose it is necessary to combat control and instability. Indeed, policy should focus not only on formal acts of terror, but domestic acts which may infer instability (e.g., revolutions, guerrilla warfare and the assassination of public officials). This is particularly relevant for states such as South Sudan (Rolandsen 2015), and Somalia (Jones et al. 2016). In addition, this provides an important implication for the current U.S. National Defence Strategy. Secretary Mattis stated in 2018, that “inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern [for] US national security” (Browne 2018: CNN). With domestic terrorism in proliferation, asymmetrical warfare increasing in lethality, and the nature of current events as demonstrated above, I recommend states, including the U.S., prioritise appropriate counterterrorism mechanisms over unduly dystopian defence strategies.

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Appendices

*Appendix A- States in Sample*

Afghanistan Equatorial Guinea Malawi Albania Eritrea Malaysia Algeria Estonia Mali Angola Ethiopia Mauritania Argentina Finland Mauritius Armenia France Mexico Austria Gabon Moldova Australia Gambia Mongolia Azerbaijan Georgia Montenegro Bahrain Germany Morocco Bangladesh Ghana Mozambique Belarus Greece Myanmar Belgium Guatemala Namibia Benin Guinea Nepal Bhutan Guinea-Bissau Netherlands Bolivia Guyana New Zealand Bosnia and Herzegovina Haiti Nicaragua Botswana Honduras Nigeria Brazil Hungary Nigeria Bulgaria
Appendix B- Global Terrorism Index Methodology[19]

The GTI score for a country in a given year is a based on a unique scoring system to account for the relative impact of incidents in the year. The four factors counted in a country’s score are: the total number of terrorist incidents in a given year; the total number of fatalities caused by terrorists in a given year; the total number of injuries caused by terrorists in a given year, and a measure of the total property damage from terrorist incidents in a given year.

Each factor is weighted between zero and three and a five-year weighted average is applied to reflect the latent psychological effect of terrorist attacks over time. The weightings are determined by the Global Peace Index Expert Panel and are as follows: total number of incidents (1); total number of fatalities (3); total number of injuries (0.5); sum of property damages measure (0.5).

The property damage measure is further disaggregated into four bands depending on the measured scope of the property damage inflicted by one incident. Incidents causing less than US$1 million are accorded a weighting of 1, between $1 million and $1 billion a 2, and more than $1 billion a 3. It should be noted a great majority of incidents are coded in the GTD as ‘unknown’, thus scoring nil, with ‘catastrophic’ events being extremely rare.

Five-Year Weighted Average

To account for the after effects of trauma that terrorist attacks have on a society, the GTI takes into consideration the events of previous years as having a bearing on a country’s score in the current year. For instance, the scale of the 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway will continue to have a psychological impact on the population for many years to come. To account for the lingering
effects of terrorism, the prior four years are also included in the scoring with a decreasing weight each year. This is as follows: current year (52%), previous year (26%), two years ago (13%), three years ago (6%), and four years ago (3%). The weighted scores are banded logarithmically into a ten-point score.

Logarithmic Banding Scores

The impact of terrorism is not evenly distributed throughout the world; there are a handful of countries with very high levels of terrorism compared to many countries which experience only very small amounts, if not zero terrorism. Hence, the GTI uses a base 10 logarithmic banding system between 0 and 10 at 0.5 intervals. Mapping the scores in this way yields the total number of 21 bands (see Table 5). This maps all values to a band of size 0.5 within the scale of 0-10. In order to band the scores, the following method is used:

1. Define the Minimum GTI Score across all countries as having a banded score of 0.
2. Define the Maximum GTI Score across all countries as having a banded score 10.
3. Subtract the Minimum from the Maximum GTI scores and calculate r by:
   1. root = 2 x (Highest GTI Banded Score – Lowest GTI Banded Score) = 20 x (10-0)
      = 20
   2. Range = 2 x (Highest Recorded GTI Raw Score – Lowest Recorded GTI Raw Score)
3. The mapped band cut-off value for bin n is calculated by $r^n$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5. Bands Used in the GTI Band Number</th>
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<th>Band Cut-off Values</th>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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Notes

[1] North America was the only region to experience a reduced impact.

[2] I follow the two definitional failures presented by Huff and Kertzer (2017). There are, of course, other wider implications for the definitional failure. However, the implications presented by Huff and Kertzer (2017) mirror the interpretations of many other scholars (e.g., Agamben 2004; Lacquer 1996; Sikle 2004).

[3] “Traditional theory” is used to refer to ‘strategic influence’ arguments (e.g., Eubank and Weinberg 1998; Eyerman 1998; Schmid 1992).

[4] Recent developments include arguments relating to economic and political instability, and
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minority discrimination (Blomberg and Hess 2008; Ghatak 2016; Rice and Patrick 2008).

[5] The literature also accounts for the way in which more populous countries remain targets for terrorists (e.g., Eminue and Ugomba 2011; Pillar 2001). However, my focus only on domestic terrorism (as opposed to transnational terrorism), I limit my discussion to the given arguments on producers of terrorism.


[7] A necessary condition is a condition that must be present for an event to occur. A sufficient condition is a condition, or set of conditions, that will produce the event. A necessary condition must be there, but it alone does not provide sufficient cause for the occurrence of the event. Only the sufficient grounds can do this.

[8] Many scholars (Blumi 2011; Campos and Gassebner 2009; Dolatabadi et al. 2016) note the availability, and applicability, of economic variables as opposed to politically-motivated variables.

[9] States of a ‘high functionality’ are categorised as demonstrating low governmental weakness and states of a ‘low functionality’ are categorised as demonstrating high governmental weakness.

[10] A ‘weak state’ refers to ‘a situation where central government has a poor capacity to control public order within its territory, is unable to consistently control its borders, cannot reliably maintain viable public institutions or services, and is vulnerable to extra-constitutional domestic challenges,’ and a ‘failed state,’ suggests that the government—if in existence—is ‘completely unable to maintain public services, institutions, or authority, and that central control over territory does not exist’ (Newman 2007: 465).


[12] The logarithmic scale is between 0 and 10, with 10 being the highest possible score for a state.

[13] The exact calculation of the GTI score is provided in the Appendix B.

[14] If data permitted, I would control for median age, religious diversity and population. Controlling for the median age of a state is valuable, in respecting the claim that crime is heavily represented in the 15-35 age group (e.g., Ehrlich and Liu 2002; Plummer 2012). Controlling for religious diversity would follow the finding that more homogenous states experience more domestic terrorism than heterogeneous (Boylan 2010; Piazza 2006). Many control for population because as the size of the population increases, the probability of criminal activity also increases (Plummer 2012). The inclusion of these controls would have severely limited the timeline of my dissertation (with data only available, for all three controls, up to 2007). If data permits, however,
the control variables could be used in a future study on domestic terrorism.

[15] Professor James Igoe Walsh of the University of North Carolina, leading researcher for the Resources and Conflict Project, confirmed that the binary variable offered by the Non-State Actor Dataset is the only large-n variable currently available in the research of territorial control in conflict.

[16] It must be noted I do not intend to argue the eight variables are the only indicators of a form of governmental weakness. I use the eight variables as exemplary measures of governmental weakness.

[17] See, for example, the intersection of confidence intervals for riots at 3.5 on the x-axis; assassinations at 3 on the x-axis; guerrilla warfare at 2 on the x-axis.

[18] Other scholars (e.g., Cinar 2017; Khan 2013; Sandler and Enders 2008) use a range of alternative indicators for low economic development (e.g., World Bank indicators, Gross National Product, World Development Indicators, and economic variables obtained from International Financial Statistics).

[19] Note: Appendix B is taken from Appendix C within the Global Terrorism Index.

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