The Human Terrain System: Clashing Moralities or Rhetorical Dead Horses?
By Marc W.D. Tyrrell on February 5, 2012
In Understanding the Human Terrain in Warfare: A Clash of Moralities[1], Dan Cox produces a vintage 2007 “argument” for supporting the Human Terrain System (HTS).[2] His argument, however, is long on rhetoric and short on both logic and facts concentrating, as it does, on an argument of moral rectitude rather than actually bothering to examine the HTS and its institutional environment.
At the start of his article, he notes that the HTS is a proof-of-concept program; a “cutting edge experiment”. Really? Various military forces have been using socio-cultural knowledge for over 2,000 years in the Western world (and longer in China),[3] and there is a long history of U.S. military engagement with such knowledge going back over 200 years to the Lewis and Clark expedition. The use of socio-cultural knowledge by the U.S. military during and after World War II is quite well documented. Indeed, one of the foundational articles dealing with the HTS draws an explicit parallel with the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) system from Vietnam.[4]
Cox makes a very interesting assertion when he says that “the need to understand the human terrain is just as pressing for the just and efficient prosecution of warfare”. Indeed, his general argument in this area is compelling both from a utilitarian standpoint and from the standpoint of current and historical military practice. What is not compelling is his specific argument that such knowledge of the “human terrain” implicitly comes solely from the Human Terrain System.
Indeed, there are much “better” systems operating inside the U.S. military establishment if we define “better” using a purely utilitarian scale: the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity’s Geospatial Intelligence Directorate, the U.S. Army’s Foreign Area Officer program and the U.S. Special Operations Commands’ alpha teams to name only three of over fifty programs that integrate socio-cultural knowledge into military operations.
The real issue at stake for the U.S. military – the “cutting edge experiment” – is not the use of socio-cultural knowledge and advisers but, rather, a) who they will be, b) where and how they will be used and c) where and how they will be most effective in supporting military operations. In order to even begin to answer these questions, we have to move beyond rhetoric and start to examine the actual effectiveness of the Human Terrain System.
What do we actually know about the operations and effectiveness of the Human Terrain System that would allow for an evaluation of it? In December, 2008, I called for a program evaluation of the HTS along three main lines[5]:
- First, there should be an evaluation of the truth-claims made by the program within the military context. Is it actually reducing kinetic operations? Is it increasing the effectiveness of COIN[6] operations? Is it materially hampering the operations of the “enemy”? Is it measurably changing the attitudes of military commanders and troops in terms of the TTP’s[7] they employ?
- Second, there should be an evaluation of the efficiency of the program in bureaucratic terms. In comparison with other programs of a similar size and age, is it managed “efficiently”? Are its HR policies and practices in keeping with “industry standards” [of other bureaucratic programs]? Are its technical assets (e.g. the reachback centre, the MapHT program, etc.) on developmental par with other, similar programs? Are its accounting procedures on par with similar programs? Etc., etc., etc.[8]
- The third set of evaluations should be “ethical”. Some people inside the Anthropology crowd do not appear to realize that the US Department of Defense has some of the most stringent ethics guidelines for research conducted on human subjects. Consider, by way of example, Title 32, CFR, Part 219 – Protection of Human Subjects from the Office of the Secretary of defence.[9] This established a minimum baseline for research actions taken by DoD employees, and it should be compared and contrasted with the AAA Code of Ethics[10] to establish points of overlap, agreement, disagreement and differing extensions (i.e. areas where there is no overlap). The actions of HTTs should then be compared against this composite ethical “baseline”.[11]
Over the past three years, we have only limited answers to these questions. Often, the “answers” we have, at least concerning the actual effectiveness of the HTS, have appeared in short articles. For example, on April 12, 2010, Matthew Arnold published Improving the Coalition’s Understanding of ‘The People’ in Afghanistan: Human Terrain Mapping in Kapisa Province in the Small Wars Journal.[12] According to Arnold:
This article provides a summary of the work being currently undertaken by the Human Terrain Team (HTT) of TF [Task Force] La Fayette (TFL), the French Brigade, to better systematically understand local populations in Kapisa Province. Specifically, TFL’s efforts mean undertaking Human Terrain Mapping (HTM), which in the context of Coalition efforts in Afghanistan can be understood as the collection, collation, and presentation of the socio-political information necessary for a field unit to decisively influence a local population. Concurrently, this paper also articulates the role that HTM could play in the day-to-day campaigning of other Coalition units trying to better understand local populations.
A comment posted by Joshua Foust, and ex-HTS social scientist who also worked in Kapsia Province, contains an interesting, and unanswered, question:
I remain confused by one point, though. He’s not the first HTT social scientist to note the complete lack of systematic collection methods, nor the first to try to implement a solution. If he’s as successful as this essay suggests, I’d be interested in learning how he was able to get broad adoption of his HTM methods, since we spent years trying to convinced deployed HTTs on the need for standardized interview forms stored in a central place, and everyone obsessed on knowing the precise details of the people in their AOs [Areas of Operations]. The thing is, most of those efforts fizzled out, partly because the HTTs didn’t have good equipment or mandates to really implement these ideas, and partly because some HTTs have such enormous leeway in carrying out their missions few saw the need to cater their methods to a CONUS-based research center… and a number of them were so busy they didn’t have much time or opportunity to specifically tailor their collection methods to any AO-wide standard.
Foust was not the only person “confused” by Arnold’s truth-claim. The last comment on the article (October 10th, 2011), by CPT Erhan Bedestani, is quite illuminating:
I was deployed to Tagab as the SF [Special Forces] Detachment Commander during the time period that Dr. Arnold was there. I will tell you first and foremost his assessment of the coalition and its understanding of the local populace is INCORRECT. This is the second article I have seen him write and I am making it a point to clarify that his assessments are wrong. The methods he proposes we use, to better engage are indeed being used and were being used long before Dr. Arnold arrived in country.
As I noted earlier, most of the evidence of actual effectiveness is de facto anecdotal, such as the Arnold article. The single, open-source piece of evidence that I am aware of is contained in a set of interviews conducted as part of the Congressionally Directed Assessment of the Human Terrain System by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA)[13] where commanders experiences of the HTS are synopsized (Table B-2, page 153):
| Category | Number of Interview | Number of unique HTT | Percentage of unique HTT |
| Very useful | 5 | 3 | 21 |
| Varied in usefulness | 8 | 8 | 57 |
| Not useful | 3 | 3 | 21 |
| Total | 16 | 14 | 100 |
These results are not an actual indictment of the programs’ effectiveness. Then again, they are certainly not evidence of the cultural “Silver Bullet” implied in many of the early, pro-HTS articles. When looking at the results, it is important to note that the commanders interviewed had their dealings with HTT’s in 2008 and 2009, and the interviews were conducted in May and June of 2010.[14] The reason why this is crucial to keep in mind during current debates is that this is before COL (Ret’d) Steve Fodacaro was replaced by COL Sharon Hamilton as program manager (June, 2010).[15]
The CNA analysis of the HTS program was, in many ways, an indictment of the management of the program (specifically of management structure), rather than of the programs’ intent or effectiveness. Indeed, the body of the report contains many conclusions that go towards answering my second set of evaluation criteria, i.e. a comparison with similar bureaucratic programs. The report concludes with the following (page 145):
Although there may be others, we identified six specific problems or challenges that have faced the HTS program as a result of one, or some combination of the factors listed above:
- The recruiting of unqualified team members
- High rates of attrition of HTS team members deployed during conversion to DAC
- Contract ceiling was reached and HTS operations were halted
- Timecard problems
- Determining permanent duty station/no TDY pay for DACS for time spent at Ft Leavenworth
- HTS program management
With the notable exception of point 6, HTS program management, these are all human resources issues (recruitment, retention, standardized HR processes, etc.). The CNA report notes that while some of these problems may have come from a lack of TRADOC oversight,
It is also important to note that some of the problems with the program identified in this chapter are beyond the scope of TRADOC’s ability to resolve by itself. Such as:
- Problems resulting from federal government regulations such as requiring timecards for HTS employees while deployed
- The consequences of establishing a permanent duty station at Fort Leavenworth for deploying employees
- The consequences of slow federal hiring practices or understaffing and
- The lengthy DoD authorizations and funding process may constrain some programs requested by the U.S. military fighting in two theaters.
So, let us think about this. We have problems, many serious, with a program that, at the time of the CNA analysis (2010), was four years old, that was stood up in the middle of two ongoing wars to provide battlefield support to commanders but was staffed by contractors rather than by government employees.[16] Anyone who has studied large organizations or been involved in them should be aware that there will be inevitable problems with them. Consider, by way of an academic example that is dealing with a much simpler problem, just how long it takes to get a brand new Ph.D. Program up and running.
There is another factor that needs to be considered as well, which is the entire issue of how and where problems with the HTS were being publicly reported. While John Stanton[17], one of the prime HTS critics, cannot be described as “anti-military” or “anti-war”, the same cannot be said for other HTS critics.[18] Indeed, the reaction against this perceived anti-military bias with the military use of social science in general and Anthropology in particular is very clear in Cox’s piece when he states:
The baggage these and other anthropologists carry from their “Vietnam experience” and their general loathing and distrust of both the U. S. Army and the U. S. government is coloring perceptions of the positive impact anthropologists and other social scientists can have in lessening the violent impact of war.
When I was a child, my grandmother used to say “it’s easier to catch flies with honey than vinegar”, and the validity of that piece of folk wisdom is quite obvious here. Indeed, the effects of the polarization of the “debate” surrounding the HTS probably made it more difficult for structural problems inside the program to be fixed while it was on the road from a proof-of-concept program to a program-of-record.
The final part of the evaluation I called for, on the ethics of the program, has not been conducted. “But”, I hear people cry, “what about the AAA report on the HTS?”.[19] The CEAUSSIC report does, indeed, contain an excellent section on ethics (pages 47 – 49) that lays out the core of how such an evaluation should be conducted and what would need to be considered. The problem, however, is that much of the debate centres on two problems: a) does HTS research require an Institutional Review Board (IRB) and b) where is the HTS Code of Ethics? These two questions have not, over two years later, been publicly answered and, without them, the over-arching evaluation cannot be conducted.
I sub-titled this piece “Clashing Moralities or Rhetorical Dead Horses” for a reason. The moral arguments in Cox’s piece do not and cannot substitute for an actual examination of the operation of the Human Terrain System, especially when he uses a utilitarian argument. When Cox states “In the end, the anthropologists do not have the high ground and at best there is a clash of moralities between the anthropological community and the moral warrior,” he merely shows his inability to produce an actual argument in favour of the HTS.
Do the military need and will they continue to use socio-cultural knowledge in order to complete their missions? Yes. Is this only provided by the HTS? No. It is more than time for us to stop flogging a dead rhetorical horse and start looking at the reality of the various and multiple engagements between the military and socio-cultural knowledge.
—
Marc W.D. Tyrrell is a Senior Research Fellow at the Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies at the Norman Patterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada and a member of the Editorial Board of the Small Wars Journal. He is a symbolic Anthropologist whose research focuses on how people make sense of perceived reality (symbol systems) and how this is communicated. He blogs at the Small Wars Journal (occasionally) and his own blog In Harmonium.
[1] Posted January 18th, 2012 available at:
http://www.e-ir.info/2012/01/18/understanding-the-human-terrain-in-warfare-a-clash-of-moralities/
[2] This style of “argument” shows up continuously in the popular press, especially in 2007. For examples on the pro-HTS side, see Kambiz Fattahi US army enlists anthropologists, BBC News, October 16, 2007 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7042090.stm and ‘Academic Embeds’: Scholars Advise Troops Abroad, NPR interview with Montgomery McFate and Roberto Gonzales, October 7, 2007 available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=15124054 For an example on the Anti-HTS side, see Bryan Bender, Efforts to aid US roil anthropology: Some object to project on Iraq, Afghanistan, Boston Globe, October 8, 2007, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/10/08/efforts_to_aid_us_roil_anthropology/
[3] See Tyrrell, Marc W.D. The First Culture Turn: ethnographic knowledge in the Romano-Byzantine military tradition, paper presented at the 2008 Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Royal Military College, Kingston, November 2008 available at http://marctyrrell.com/uploads/TFCT.pdf
[4] J. Kipp, L. Grau, K. Prinslow and D. Smith The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st century, Military Review, September-October 2006, available at http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20061031_art005.pdf
[5] December 22nd, 2008, blog entry “Evaluating… What?” available at http://marctyrrell.com/2008/12/22/evaluating-what/ NB: the original listing of points, quoted here, assumed a certain level of comfort with military acronyms. I have expanded several of these in endnotes for those who are not familiar with them.
[6] COIN: COunterINsurgency
[7] TTP: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
[8] Today, I would also call for a point by point comparison with other programs dealing with socio-cultural knowledge.
[9] Title 32, CFR, Part 219 Protection of Human Subjects available at http://www.dtic.mil/biosys/downloads/32cfr219.pdf or http://www.tricare.mil/hpae/_docs/32cfr219.pdf
[10] AAA: American Anthropology Association. The AAA’s Code of Ethics is available at http://www.aaanet.org/committees/ethics/ethcode.htm
[11] NB: part of the reasoning for this goes back to the basic question asked earlier of who these advisers would be and how they would operate. The issue of ethics and ethical conflicts is one of the major points of contention with Anthropologists working within the HTS.
[13] Yvette Clinton, Virginia Foran-Cain, Julia Voelker McQuaid, Catherine E. Norman and William H Sims, “Congressionally Directed Assessment of the Human Terrain System” [CDA-HTS], Center for Naval Analysis, November, 2010 available at http://info.publicintelligence.net/CNA-HTS.pdf
[14] See CDA-HTS, op. Cit. Appendix B
[15] COL Hamilton has, since here appointment as HTS program manager, moved the entire program to be more in line with other organizations under TRADOC. In a recent interview with InsideDefense.com, she noted that “What it [the CDA-HTS report] really reinforced was that we truly were an organization that needs to switch from an entrepreneurial approach to a more established institutional approach, which means you put standards and processes in place so that you do have recurring actions, so that you do have normalcy with how you handle administrative processes.” Army Increasing Number Of Human Terrain Teams; Advising Allies, January 28, 2012, available at http://defensenewsstand.com/NewsStand-General/The-INSIDER-Free-Article/army-increasing-number-of-human-terrain-teams-advising-allies/menu-id-720.html
[16] The issues surrounding the use of contractors in the HTS are part and parcel of the human resources problems mentioned in the CDA-HTS report. An adequate examination of the use of contractors would require a separate article.
[17] See http://cryptome.org/0001/hts-stanton.htm for a listing of Stanton’s articles. In many ways, Stanton became the preferred venue for people inside the HTS to communicate problems with the program.
[18] It should also be noted that even Stanton’s reporting tended to be dismissed and ignored by many in the U.S. military in part because of its tone.
[19] AAA Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Communities (CEAUSSIC), “Final Report on The Army’s Human Terrain System Proof of Concept Program” (Submitted to the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association October 14, 2009) available at http://www.aaanet.org/cmtes/commissions/CEAUSSIC/upload/CEAUSSIC_HTS_Final_Report.pdf
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7 Comments
Marc:
Great article as usual. A few comments on issues I would like to see addressed in future HTS-related commentary. Full disclosure: I was part of the March 2009 exodus from HTS, so my experiences are dated
1. Is there an established SOP for how HTTs integrate with their brigades, or is it still ad hoc?
2. Has HTS management implemented a best practices/lessons learned community among current and former HTT members? This didn’t exist in 2009 (as noted in your article, after three years of the program’s existance). Seems like a no-brainer to me.
3. I would like to see some discussion of how the non-OEF HTS programs are implementing their efforts, with even basic information such as are the AFRICOM/PACOM programs (SCRATs)being run by the same office that manages the CENTCOM program?
It might surprise you to know that I fully endorse much of what is argued in your article. Obviously, we have a few differences of opinion and I would like to address those first but I would like to end with the aspects of your article in which we are in violent agreement. I have to caveat this reply by noting I will be unable to detail portions of my response as I have a forthcoming article in Parameters and I do not want to divulge too much from the article prior to its publication as this would be rude. The article is slated for publication in the Autumn 2011 issue and I checked my life-size replica of the Mayan calendar to ensure that while it is late, we still have plenty of time for the article to come out prior to the world ending.
I find it rather amusing when a scholar attempts to marginalize another scholar’s argument by asserting an argument is out of date. Really? Has the issue of clashing moralities has been dealt with in multiple venues before the way I address it? As far as I can tell, the morality debate usually consists of the cultural/social anthropologists asserting that anthropological ethics trumps anything and proponents of the importance of human terrain counter with and argument that ethics does not trump national security (Montgomery McFate is probably the most notable example of this line of argumentation). George R. Lucas, Jr. seems to come closest to my line of argumentation when he equates the use of anthropologists in war with the use of people in the medical profession providing medical aid to both sides in a conflict (in Anthropologists in Arms, 2009). But I do not feel it is appropriate here to get too far into this line of argumentation as this would shortchange my forthcoming article.
Even if many more people than I can imagine have made a similar argument, your assertion of a “rhetorical dead horse” leads one to believe the debate has been settled. Perhaps you would be so kind as to elucidate for the readers who won the debate. Was it the cultural anthropologists or the moral warriors?
You are also absolutely correct in your assertion that HTS is not the first attempt by the US military in understanding the human terrain. In fairness though, I did not assert that either. I chose to focus my commentary on HTS: a) because I was asked to by an e-IR editor to do so and b) that is the organization that has drawn the most ire from cultural anthropologists. However, the resolution from the AAA, which you cite, is a threat to all the human terrain efforts you note. That is the main point of my e-IR article and the forthcoming Parameters article.
Interestingly, you claim that there are many “better” military organizations that are aimed at understanding the human terrain than HTS (FAOs, SO alpha teams, and the Marin Corps Intelligence Center). Yet you spend most of your article arguing that no one has adequately studied the efficacy of HTS. I am just a simple college doc from Kansas but it seems like these two claims are incompatible. Perhaps, you could explain how they are not. Also, since HTS is inferior to these other programs, perhaps you could explain where you divined this.
To deny that HTS is fundamentally a different attempt to understand the human terrain in warfare from efforts conducted by Civil Affairs, SO ODAs, FAOs, the Marine Corps Intelligence Center, and others is pretty unfair. I cannot go into detail here but HTS is the first attempt to develop a unique human terrain team whose sole purpose is to advise and assist military commanders in their understanding of the human terrain. I hate being forced to defend the HTS program here but I feel that I have to at least attempt to correct your assertions. My purpose is not to defend HTS. Instead, I am attempting to do what it appears you are doing in the last half of your article: defend the right of the US military to understand the human terrain. When you assert that “he [I] merely shows his inability to produce an actual argument in favour of HTS.” You are correct. But it was not my intent to write an article defending HTS. Maybe a re-reading of my article is warranted.
But let us not focus on our differences. Instead, let us build a bridge of scholarly collegiality reveling in our similarities. You are absolutely correct to assert that there were organizational difficulties early on in the HTS program. I think the documentation of these problems is solid and the concern is well-founded. But that should lead to a call for reform (as I think you are calling for) not derision and dismissal as so many other cultural anthropologists have argued. Again, I have no dog in this fight. The only thing I will continue to insist upon is that if HTS closes its doors tomorrow, I would hope someone in the US military would start a new, very similar program from the ground up. We seem to agree that understanding the human terrain is integral to just and effective warfare and we are only quibbling on the means and I am not wedded to any single avenue of understanding.
In fact, part of my research focuses on the stunning success of Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). The Special Operations Forces (SOF) not only took the time to understand their operating environment but all aspects of the local culture which has led to a stunning success there as a small number of SOF forces have been able to work by, with, and through, their Filipino counterparts and the local population to produce an end state beneficial to all. So I will be the last person to argue one approach toward understanding the human terrain is superior to another. But I will assert that all are important in order to gain a complete understanding of Clifford Geertz’s cultural web. In fact, Jamshid Gharajedaghi argues that only through iterations of searching, mapping, and telling the story can a truly comprehensive picture of the whole system be developed.
One of the most important points you make is that there is a stunning lack of evidence of the effectiveness of HTS. Since I agree HTS got off to a wobbly start and yet is one of the integral organizations studying the human terrain, I too am interested in tracking its progress or lack thereof. In fact, I am attempting to conduct a comprehensive study of the effectiveness of HTS but I have to admit that the going has been slow and laborious. Perhaps the leadership in HTS could be a little more forthcoming with information.
In the end, I think we agree more than we disagree but the dismissive nature of the first quarter of your article was certainly off-putting. I honestly think you misinterpreted what I was attempting to accomplish with my article but I am simple Midwestern professor so I may not be so good with the fancified words and new-fangled concepts you city-slickers are contemplating.
Dan G. Cox
*The comments and arguments presented here represent the author and do not in any way represent the US Army, the School of Advanced Miltiary Studies, the US Department of Defense or any otehr US governmental agency.
Hi Dan,
“It might surprise you to know that I fully endorse much of what is argued in your article. Obviously, we have a few differences of opinion and I would like to address those first but I would like to end with the aspects of your article in which we are in violent agreement. I have to caveat this reply by noting I will be unable to detail portions of my response as I have a forthcoming article in Parameters and I do not want to divulge too much from the article prior to its publication as this would be rude.”
I think we both have caveats in our articles . Mine are, in general, focused on the criterion of “publically available” which, I must admit, has seriously hampered what I can say.
“I find it rather amusing when a scholar attempts to marginalize another scholar’s argument by asserting an argument is out of date. Really? Has the issue of clashing moralities has been dealt with in multiple venues before the way I address it? As far as I can tell, the morality debate usually consists of the cultural/social anthropologists asserting that anthropological ethics trumps anything and proponents of the importance of human terrain counter with and argument that ethics does not trump national security (Montgomery McFate is probably the most notable example of this line of argumentation).”
Actually, large amounts of the debate have been argued out, especially between myself and Max Forte in our respective blogs. In general, you are correct that those are the positions but, in all honesty, I did not see much, if any, difference between your argument and those made by others on the same side. Believe me when I say that I am not trying to white wash the Anthropology side of it either: the only people who I have seen who have followed the logic of their ethical positions through are David Price and Max Forte, although there may be others.
“Even if many more people than I can imagine have made a similar argument, your assertion of a “rhetorical dead horse” leads one to believe the debate has been settled. Perhaps you would be so kind as to elucidate for the readers who won the debate. Was it the cultural anthropologists or the moral warriors?”
I never said that the “debate” had been settled or that there was a “winner”. What I said was that the style of the debate was a rhetorical dead horse, primarily because both of the sides involved appeared to refuse to agree upon certain obvious situational realities. On the pro-HTS side, this was most often expressed in an almost salvific rhetoric surrounding the program, as if it was the only program available. On the anti-HTS side, this was often expressed by an adamant, anti-military stance; a “knee-jerk reaction” if you will. Both “sides” appeared to focus solely on the HTS without recognizing previous engagements (David Price being a notable exception), and both “sides” also appeared to be unable to distinguish between an existential war such as WW II and a volitional war such as Iraq. Leaving out those structural parameters is, IMHO, a recipe for lots of “sound and fury, signifying nothing” to quote the Bard. In other words, a “rhetorical dead horse”.
“You are also absolutely correct in your assertion that HTS is not the first attempt by the US military in understanding the human terrain. In fairness though, I did not assert that either. I chose to focus my commentary on HTS: a) because I was asked to by an e-IR editor to do so and b) that is the organization that has drawn the most ire from cultural anthropologists. However, the resolution from the AAA, which you cite, is a threat to all the human terrain efforts you note. That is the main point of my e-IR article and the forthcoming Parameters article.”
Hmmm, okay, I can see that. You may not have asserted it but, by exclusion, you did imply it [wry grin]. At any rate, why do you believe that the AAA resolution is “a threat to all the human terrain efforts”? Honestly, let’s get serious: it only effects members of the AAA, and I don’t think that anyone at SOCOM or MCIA is a member and, if they are, they can always choose to resign. I think you are over-stating the effects of the AAA resolution.
“Interestingly, you claim that there are many “better” military organizations that are aimed at understanding the human terrain than HTS (FAOs, SO alpha teams, and the Marin Corps Intelligence Center). Yet you spend most of your article arguing that no one has adequately studied the efficacy of HTS. I am just a simple college doc from Kansas but it seems like these two claims are incompatible. Perhaps, you could explain how they are not. Also, since HTS is inferior to these other programs, perhaps you could explain where you divined this.”
Why do you view them as incompatible? The three I mentioned are aimed at specific missions and, within the confines of those missions, they are much more effective than HTS. It’s not a question of “divining” anything, it is merely a question of talking with the people involved and getting feedback from them – basic Anthropology. The mission of the HTS is aimed primarily at the operational level, but with tactical level implications as well. This focus, coupled with a whole of structural problems, meant that the HTS just couldn’t meet the efficiancy of other programs.
“To deny that HTS is fundamentally a different attempt to understand the human terrain in warfare from efforts conducted by Civil Affairs, SO ODAs, FAOs, the Marine Corps Intelligence Center, and others is pretty unfair. I cannot go into detail here but HTS is the first attempt to develop a unique human terrain team whose sole purpose is to advise and assist military commanders in their understanding of the human terrain. I hate being forced to defend the HTS program here but I feel that I have to at least attempt to correct your assertions. My purpose is not to defend HTS. Instead, I am attempting to do what it appears you are doing in the last half of your article: defend the right of the US military to understand the human terrain. When you assert that “he [I] merely shows his inability to produce an actual argument in favour of HTS.” You are correct. But it was not my intent to write an article defending HTS. Maybe a re-reading of my article is warranted.”
I have no problem with the idea that the US military will use socio-cultural knowledge. That has nothing to do with “rights” and everything to do with reality. But, honestly, you are incorrect in your assertion that the HTS is the first such program to “assist military in their understanding of the human terrain”. Have you read Ruth Benedict’s “The Chrysanthemum and the Sword”? Check out where it came from and, while you are at it, take a look at “Montaignard Tribal Groups of the Republic of Vietnam” (U.S. Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, N.C. (1964) just to name a few. My “assertions” are based in the historical record. As to re-reading your article, I find it difficult to interpret what you wrote in a manner that does not defend the HTS.
“You are absolutely correct to assert that there were organizational difficulties early on in the HTS program. I think the documentation of these problems is solid and the concern is well-founded. But that should lead to a call for reform (as I think you are calling for) not derision and dismissal as so many other cultural anthropologists have argued. Again, I have no dog in this fight. The only thing I will continue to insist upon is that if HTS closes its doors tomorrow, I would hope someone in the US military would start a new, very similar program from the ground up.”
I would agree that the non-public documentation of program problems is solid, and there certainly have been modifications made to the program since COL Hamilton took over. What is not a part of the public record is what effects at reform have come out as a result of her changes. If we are going to engage in a public debate, then we really must rely on publically accessible data and information.
As to the “derision and dismissal” you note, yes, I do agree with you – that isn’t a decent basis for a public debate, it’s another dead rhetorical horse. When I noted that one of the central questions should be “who will do this” (paraphrased), that was getting at what I consider to be a key point: can Anthropologists do this within the moral framework of the AAA? My suspicion is that the answer is “no” but, that being said, the question was “who” not “should”. As for closing the HTS’ doors and starting a new program, I honestly can’t say since I don’t have publically available data on it.
“We seem to agree that understanding the human terrain is integral to just and effective warfare and we are only quibbling on the means and I am not wedded to any single avenue of understanding.”
I would certainly agree that it is integral to the effective prosecution of certain types of military missions – FID, SFA, occupations, COIN, stability operations, etc. I also believe that it is a critical component of certain forms and types of intelligence activity as well. That said, I would not use the term “just warfare” since I have absolutely no interest, and little patience, with St. Augustine and, in any event, he and his arguments are irrelevant in a multi-cultural, globalized sphere of conflict where the majority of actual and potential opponents do not accept his world view.
“In fact, part of my research focuses on the stunning success of Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). The Special Operations Forces (SOF) not only took the time to understand their operating environment but all aspects of the local culture which has led to a stunning success there as a small number of SOF forces have been able to work by, with, and through, their Filipino counterparts and the local population to produce an end state beneficial to all. So I will be the last person to argue one approach toward understanding the human terrain is superior to another.”
Interesting how our research foci are parallel [grin].
“But I will assert that all are important in order to gain a complete understanding of Clifford Geertz’s cultural web. In fact, Jamshid Gharajedaghi argues that only through iterations of searching, mapping, and telling the story can a truly comprehensive picture of the whole system be developed.
One of the most important points you make is that there is a stunning lack of evidence of the effectiveness of HTS. Since I agree HTS got off to a wobbly start and yet is one of the integral organizations studying the human terrain, I too am interested in tracking its progress or lack thereof. In fact, I am attempting to conduct a comprehensive study of the effectiveness of HTS but I have to admit that the going has been slow and laborious. Perhaps the leadership in HTS could be a little more forthcoming with information.”
I would like to see that as well. At the same time, I think it is important to note that one of the central assumptions in gathering socio-cultural knowledge is that it will be shared and communicated. I suspect we could both agree that such communication has been, to be charitable, “poor”.
“In the end, I think we agree more than we disagree but the dismissive nature of the first quarter of your article was certainly off-putting. I honestly think you misinterpreted what I was attempting to accomplish with my article but I am simple Midwestern professor so I may not be so good with the fancified words and new-fangled concepts you city-slickers are contemplating.”
[snort] Nice rhetorical, “down-home boy” turn [evil grin]. Maybe I did misinterpret your intentions, that is certainly possible. But after five years of being involved in these debates, I found it difficult to interpret your article in any other way.
Let’s get back, for the nonce, to your study of the effectiveness of the HTS. Have you contacted COL Hamilton about field access? Given the recent slew of inetrviews and videos she has been involved with, I suspect she would be open to the idea of a good study of HTS effectiveness.
Cheers,
Marc
Marc,
Wow. It is amazing how much congruence there is once we cut through each other’s arguments. I still think the moral argument I am making ultimately ends up being a bit unique but I cannot defend that very well until after the article comes out. It is absolutely fascinating we are both interested in pretty much the same research topics.
Maybe you should visit sometime and hook into SAMS and HTS. I still wish we could entice the Max Fortes of the world to engage. Perhaps here is where the “dead horse” argument carries the most weight as the opposing side seems to have given up.
Yours,
Dan
Hi Dan,
Apologies for the late reply – I had to go and meet with an ex-student who has been off doing work in Tanzania.
Honestly, I’m looking forward to your piece in Parameters. It’s too bad that it won’t be out for another 9 months or so [wry grin]. I’ve blogged a bit on ethics issues (vs. morality), and you might be interested in this particular one http://marctyrrell.com/2009/02/21/information-intelligence-and-ethics/
As for getting Max to engage, he already is [GRIN]. Max and I disagree on a number of things, but I do have the highest respect for his ethical position, which he states clearly, consistently and follows through logically. In all fairness, I should also note that we have sent students to each other and recommended each others work, even though we do disagree.
To my mind, Max answers one of those core questions “who should do this” with a resounding “Not Anthropologists”. Okay, that’s fair and he makes a good case for it. Let’s face it, working in a situation that can and, probably will, lead to people dying is going to eat at the souls of most good cultural Anthropologists. This isn’t because we are in any way “better” than military people but, rather, because our training and emotional stances are aimed at empathizing with the people we are “studying”. Believing that our work leads to their deaths kills part of us. The decision, by an Anthropologist, to work with a military force requires some pretty serious ethical (i.e. individual vs. “moral” or collective) soul searching. Personally, I think that that type of soul searching is incredibly useful, but I seem to be in the minority (again ;-) ).
As to going down to visit SAMS and the HTS, I’d love to [GRIN].
Cheers,
Marc
Just a quick note that Dan Cox’s Parameters article is now available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/2011autumn/Cox.pdf
As a recently departed member of the HTS “inner circle,” I feel comfortable addressing many of the challenges that organization faced, or is facing. The reality of looming defense cutbacks, makes the term “proof of concept” moot. Many programs that have not pulled their share of the load, or deemed expensive, embarassing or just redundant, will have to go. Having said this, there is a slim chance that the HTS concept can survive, albiet, not in its current state.