“Everywhere I go, there are portraits of fallen female soldiers on the walls. Over and over again at that conference, the chant ‘jin jiyan azadi’ [woman, life, freedom] morphs into the more aggressive ‘şehîd namirin’ [martyrs never die]” – Natasha Walter, reporting from Rojava, 2025 (Walter 09.02.2025).
Despite the important contributions of women, their role in warfare and insurgency has been historically marginalized in academic discourse. From direct combat, front-line intelligence, and medical support to logistics and political leadership, women have actively participated in violent non-state actors and organizations (VNSAs). However, the degree and nature of women’s participation, particularly in combat roles, varies considerably across different violent political organizations. This raises the critical question: Why does female combatant participation in VNSAs differ?
This essay addresses above question by examining the two contrasting case studies of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). It argues that organizational and strategic factors offer a more robust explanation for variations in female participation than ideology alone. To support this argument, the essay is structured in two main sections. First the two theoretical approaches – ideology and organizational-strategic considerations – will be outlined. The second part applies these frameworks to the empirical analysis of the PYD and ISIS, ultimately advancing the claim that strategic and organizational considerations play a more decisive role in shaping women’s combat participation in violent political groups.
Theoretical framework
Women’s participation in violent political groups is driven by a complex interplay of factors, ranging from personal and societal factors such as revenge and family pressure to broader ideological and institutional influences. Academic discourse typically distinguishes between supply-side and demand-side explanations for women’s participation in violent non-state actors and organizations (VNSAs). Supply-side factors operate at the micro-level and focus on individual motivations for joining and participating in such groups, most notably “revenge, representation and social role fulfillment” (Thomas and Bond 2015, 489). Consequently, these personal or societal motivations can constitute important drivers for women to participate in violent insurgency (Bloom 2005; Cunningham 2003; Wood 2008). However, as Thomas and Bond (2015) point out, such considerations are not unique to women but can equally be observed among male participants. Thus, supply-side explanations alone are inadequate for fully understanding female participation in VNSAs. In contrast, the second explanation – demand-side factors – considers the meso-level, examining how organizational, ideological and strategic elements within VNSAs shape women’s participation and roles. These group-level dynamics reveal significant differences in how female combatants are incorporated into different organizations.
Given the prevalence of demand-side factors, this essay considers two theoretical arguments focusing on group-level explanations for the variations of participation of female combatants in violent political groups. First, Wood and Thomas (2017) emphasize the important role ideology plays for women’s participation in violent rebellion. Second, Thomas and Bond (2015) focus on how organizational structure and strategic imperatives influence the participation of women as combatants. Applying these theoretical frameworks to the two case studies of the PYD and ISIS in northeastern Syria and Iraq, the organizational-strategic considerations outlined by Thomas and Bond (2015) emerge as more compelling in explaining female combatant participation. Ultimately, this highlights the importance of demand-side factors for analyzing the role of female fighters in VNSAs.
Rebel group ideology
The central argument of the ideology explanation is that the extent of women’s participation in VNSAs, particularly in combat roles, is determined by the political ideology of the rebel group. Seeking to explain the variation in the specific roles women play in violent political groups ranging from supportive positions to active combat, Wood and Thomas (2017) argue that political ideology plays a central role. Specifically, they posit that the different “beliefs about gender hierarchies and gender-based divisions of labor” (Wood and Thomas 2017, 32) of the adopted ideologies influence the extent of female participation in VNSAs.
Political ideology in this context can be understood in three dimensions. First, it represents a set of ideas or beliefs associated with a specific group’s grievances. Second, it outlines the group’s political and social goals. Finally, ideology provides a concrete plan for achieving these objectives (Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014). Political ideology thus affects both the micro-level motivations and meso-level decision making of group leaders. Female individuals may be more prone to participate in violent political groups whose political, social, and religious beliefs align with their own. At the same time, a group’s leadership are more likely to allow women to engage in combat if this is consistent with the group’s ideological conviction rather than contradictory (Wood and Thomas 2017).
Despite the intertwined nature of political ideologies, Wood and Thomas (2017) identify distinct ideological groups that influence the likelihood of female combat participation. At one end of the spectrum are leftist and Marxist ideologies, which typically seek to transform traditional social structures in favor of women’s rights and participation. Rooted in class struggle and the liberation of oppressed societal groups, these ideologies aim to fundamentally reshape social hierarchies, opening avenues for gender equality and non-discrimination. At the other end of the spectrum are radical Islamist organizations that strive to reassert traditional, patriarchal social and political orders. Drawing on classical interpretations of the Qur’an and Sharia law, these groups promote reactionary norms and values, including traditional gender roles.
In their quantitative analysis, the authors show that armed groups adopting leftist and Marxist political ideologies are significantly more likely to employ female fighters. Islamist organizations, in turn, are less likely to allow women to participate in active combat roles. Therefore, these findings strongly support the argument that political ideology is a key factor influencing the participation of women as combatants.
While Wood and Thomas (2017) recognize the strategic value that female fighters can bring to VNSAs, they note that this is only relevant in specific cases, such as the use of women as suicide bombers in Islamist organizations. For example, the Fatah-affiliated Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade began to use women in such roles for tactical purposes (Fletcher 2005). However, these cases are seen as exceptions rather than a reflection of a change in the group’s broader ideological stance. Even when Islamist groups do allow female fighters, these employments are in small numbers and quite limited functions. For broader combat participation of women in violent political groups, the authors maintain that political ideology remains the “central explanatory factor for cross-group variation in the prevalence of female fighters” (Wood and Thomas 2017, 43).
Organizational and strategic factors
The second theoretical explanation focuses on organizational and strategic factors to explain the variation in women’s participation across VNSAs. Challenging the existing academic focus on individual, supply-side reasons for women to participate in violence Thomas and Bond (2015) highlight the importance of meso-level, demand-side considerations. Their central argument is that the extent of female participation is largely shaped by the structural opportunities created within the organization. Thus, for women to engage as combatants, the group’s leadership must actively establish and maintain spaces that facilitate their inclusion (Thomas and Bond 2015).
Women’s involvement, therefore, hinges not only on individual motivations but also on the organizational characteristics and strategic choices made by the group and its leadership. Thomas and Bond (2015) identify five key organizational attributes that influence the demand for female combat participation. First, the size of the violent political group. Larger organizations tend to be more internally diverse and are often better equipped to absorb the perceived risks of including women in combat roles. Their broader operational needs may also prompt more inclusive recruitment. The type and scale of recruitment as well as the demand for members constitute the second factor. Groups that have broader recruitment mechanisms, such as forced recruitment, often develop a more divers membership base, including women. Third, the group’s tactical preferences, in particular whether the VNSA relies on terrorist attacks or not, also play a significant role. In some contexts, women are strategically valued for tasks like suicide bombings, where their perceived inconspicuousness can provide tactical advantages (Bloom 2005). The fourth element the authors consider is the ideological inclusivity of a group. Organizations that adopt political agendas explicitly promoting gender equality tend to foster more welcoming environments to female fighters. Moreover, in such groups gender inclusion is often institutionalized as part of the group’s broader political agenda. Finally, the level of competition with rival VNSAs in the same geographic or political space may also affect decisions around female participation. However, Thomas and Bond’s (2015) quantitative analysis finds that this factor – unlike the other organizational variables discussed – does not have a statistically significant effect.
Beyond these organizational characteristics, strategic considerations also shape the prevalence of women in combat roles. VNSA leaders are assumed to act rationally, seeking to balance potential benefits – such as increased manpower, symbolic value, and operational factors – against possible costs, including internal conflicts or challenges tied to managing a more gender-divers force. These strategic decisions are therefore context-dependent, influenced by the timing, objectives, and constraints facing the VNSA at any given moment (Thomas and Bond 2015).
Ultimately, Thomas and Bond’s (2015) framework broadens the scope of analysis by integrating ideological considerations, as emphasized by Wood and Thomas (2017), within a more comprehensive understanding of organizational and strategic dynamics. This approach underscores that while ideology remains a significant factor, it operates alongside strategic decisions and institutional and organizational elements that collectively shape the extent and nature of women’s participation in VNSAs.
Case studies
The two case studies examined in the following analysis are the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) between 2011 and 2019. Geographically, both organizations operated primarily in northwestern Syria and Iraq. Each represents a violent non-state actor that, during specific periods, assumed state-like authority and functions within its respective territory. The PYD has governed the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, commonly known as Rojava, since gaining de facto autonomy in 2012 (Khalaf 2016). ISIS, on the other hand, proclaimed its caliphate in 2014, seizing substantial territories in northwestern Iraq and eastern Syria before losing its territorial control by 2019. Both the PYD and ISIS developed into sizable military organizations. The PYD’s armed wings, the People’s Defence Units (YPG) and the Women’s Defence Units (YPJ), have been estimated to include up to 100,000 fighters (Rashid 2018). Similarly, estimates for ISIS’s strength at its peak range between 35,000 and 100,000 fighters (Jeffrey 2019). Ideologically, the PYD aligns with a left-wing political vision rooted in democratic confederalism and gender equality, while ISIS represents a radical Islamist ideology grounded in Salafi-jihadist principles.
Despite their starkly opposing views on gender roles, both organizations have incorporated female fighters into their ranks. This surprising parallel, despite ideological divergence, makes the PYD and ISIS particularly compelling comparative case studies for applying the theoretical frameworks discussed.
The Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD)
Founded in 2003, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) is the Syrian affiliate of the Marxist-Leninist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The PYD rose to prominence in 2011, capitalizing on the power vacuum created by the Syrian civil war. Over the following years, it consolidated control over northeastern Syria, establishing a de facto autonomous administration. By 2015, the PYD’s military forces, as part of the broader Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – a US supported coalition of Kurdish and allied militias – played a central role in the fight against ISIS, ultimately contributing to the group’s territorial defeat in Syria in 2019 (Khalaf 2016; Jeffrey 2019).
The PYD’s ideology is based on the decentralized framework of democratic confederalism inspired by the ideas of imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. Emphasizing local self-governance and empowerment, sustainability, and pluralism and inclusion, the group’s ideology is pragmatic and participatory (Tank 2017). Crucially, gender equality is a central pillar. This commitment is embodied in jineoloji – often translated as the “science of women” – a distinctive feminist framework developed within the Kurdish freedom movement. At its core lies Öcalan’s (2013, 7) assertion that “a country can’t be free unless the women are free”, linking women’s freedoms with the society’s overall level of freedom. Jineoloji not only challenges patriarchal norms but also critiques Western feminism’s entanglement with capitalism and state-centric structures, advocating instead for a communal, anti-statist, and ecologically conscious model of liberation (Öcalan 2013).
In practice, this ideological commitment is reflected in gender-inclusive governance and military organization. Political institutions under the PYD mandate co-leadership by one man and one woman, ensuring equal representation (Walter 09.02.2025). Militarily, the PYD institutionalized women’s participation in combat through the formation of the YPJ in 2013. This all-female militia included by 2017 reportedly up to 24,000 female fighters. The YPJ became an important force within the SDF in the armed struggle against ISIS.
The PYD case clearly illustrates the interplay between ideological and organizational-strategic factors. The group’s political ideology, particularly its commitment to jineoloji, actively promotes the inclusion of women in combat. Simultaneously, its institutional structures and strategic integration of female fighters enabled this ideological vision to materialize in practice, thus reinforcing the relevance of both theoretical frameworks.
The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as Da’esh, is a jihadist extremist organization with the objective to establish a global caliphate. Its political ideology is based on radical Salafi jihadism, characterized by a strict and literal interpretation of Islamic laws.
Traditionally, ISIS’s ideological framework imposed rigid, patriarchal norms, confining women to domestic roles centered on marriage, motherhood, and religious education (Vale 2019; Margolin 2019). Female involvement in public or political life was heavily restricted, reflecting the group’s commitment to maintaining traditional gender hierarchies. Although women did take on certain strategic roles, such as in the al-Khansa Brigade, an all-female morality police unit, these positions were limited in scope and number, and combat roles were explicitly prohibited (Vale 2019). This supports the ideology explanation that Islamist organizations are less inclined to allow female participation in combat roles.
However, this fundamentally changed in 2017. As ISIS faced mounting military pressure from the US-led coalition around the SDF, the group found itself in a state of crisis (Winter and Margolin 2017). With its territorial holdings collapsing and its supply of male fighters decreasing, ISIS reinterpreted its position on female combatants. Drawing on the concept of defensive jihad, which according to Islamist ideologue Abdullah Azzam is “a personal duty for all Muslims, men and women” (Winter 2018, 5), ISIS began to justify women’s participation in combat. This ideological shift was first reflected subtly in ISIS propaganda, which began to suggest the necessity of female fighters. By early 2018, the group openly showcased female fighters, thus “unambiguously stating that it had lifted the moratorium on female combatants” (Winter 2018, 11).
Although the actual the number of women who fought for ISIS remained relatively small, and their combat roles were likely limited compared to those within the PYD, this development marked a significant departure from the group’s original ideological stance. The ISIS case study demonstrates that, in certain contexts, strategic necessity can override even deeply entrenched ideological positions, making the more comprehensive organizational-strategic framework more effective in explaining women’s combat participation in VNSAs.
Conclusion
The variation in women’s participation in VNSAs, particularly in active combat roles, has been explained through two key theoretical frameworks: the ideology-focused approach and the more comprehensive organizational-strategic model. The ideological perspective emphasizes the foundational role that a group’s political and religious beliefs play in shaping gender roles and determining the extent to which women are allowed to engage in violence. In contrast, the organizational-strategic framework incorporates not only ideology but also a range of demand-side factors – such as group structure, recruitment needs, and strategic and tactical considerations – that influence the inclusion of female fighters.
The empirical comparative analysis of the PYD and ISIS demonstrates the greater explanatory power of the organizational-strategic approach. While both theoretical arguments help account for the PYD’s integration of women into combat, only the organizational-strategic perspective adequately explains ISIS’s eventual shift toward permitting women in combat roles. This shift occurred not due to a fundamental change in ideological beliefs, but as a pragmatic response to battlefield pressures and strategic necessity. Thus, although ideology remains an important factor, a more comprehensive understanding of female participation in VNSAs requires attention to the organizational and strategic contexts in which these groups operate.
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Further Reading on E-International Relations
- Women at War in the Middle East: Gendered Dynamics of ISIS and the Kurdish YPJ
- ISIS, Radicalization and the Gendered Online Jihad
- Double Agency? On the Role of LTTE and FARC Female Fighters in War and Peace
- What Does Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’s Death Mean for the Future of ISIS?
- ISIS’ Use of Sexual Violence as a Strategy of Terrorism in Iraq
- North Korean Female Defectors in China: Human Trafficking and Exploitation
