The Korea-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (KSFTA), signed in 2005 and entering into force in 2006, poses a compelling empirical puzzle: How did South Korea, a chaebol-influenced democracy, and Singapore, a state-led technocracy, successfully negotiate a coherent and mutually advantageous FTA despite their contrasting political and economic systems? International Political Economy (IPE) scholarship has typically stressed the importance of regime type, institutional design, and domestic interest groups in shaping trade outcomes (Moravcsik, 1998; Milner, 1997). Yet the KSFTA challenges assumptions that systemic congruence is a prerequisite for economic cooperation. Understanding its negotiation reveals how structurally distinct states can collaborate to design innovative trade frameworks within a complex regional and global context. This dissertation asks the following question: How did South Korea and Singapore, with differing political and economic systems, collaborate to negotiate a mutually beneficial Free Trade Agreement? The KSFTA is examined not simply as a bilateral accord but as a strategic case study in cross-system economic diplomacy, reflecting broader trends in Asia-Pacific trade governance, institutional innovation, and FTA design in the early twenty-first century.

The significance of this case lies in its embodiment of both strategic pragmatism and institutional innovation. Official documents from both governments emphasise the KSFTA’s role in strengthening regional economic ties after the Asian Financial Crisis and establishing a foundation for future cooperation (Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore, 2006; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea, 2005). For South Korea, it provided a low-risk opportunity to gain FTA experience while sidestepping politically sensitive sectors (Dr Sohyun Zoe Lee, interview by author, April 2025). For Singapore, it reinforced its status as a hub for trade and services liberalisation, strategically positioned between Northeast and Southeast Asia (Kesavapany and Sen, 2007).

By analysing this underexamined agreement, the dissertation contributes both empirically to regional trade diplomacy and theoretically to IPE debates. While many studies treat systemic similarity or asymmetry as barriers, the KSFTA demonstrates how strategic institutional flexibility and sectoral alignment can enable convergence between structurally divergent partners.

Theoretically, the analysis draws on two complementary IPE frameworks: the Ricardo-Viner and Heckscher-Ohlin models. Ricardo-Viner highlights sector-specific interests, showing how industries reliant on immobile capital lobby differently from those with mobile factors (Alt et al., 1996). This model is well-suited to analysing the chaebol-driven industrial lobbies that shaped South Korea’s negotiation posture. Heckscher-Ohlin, by contrast, focuses on national factor endowments and explains Singapore’s macroeconomic tilt toward services and capital mobility. Together, these frameworks offer a layered lens to examine how domestic preferences were formed, articulated, and embedded in the KSFTA.

Methodologically, the dissertation adopts a qualitative comparative case study approach with process-tracing techniques (George and Bennett, 2005). This design is apt for uncovering causal mechanisms across divergent systems, especially where controlled comparison isn’t viable. Primary sources provide the empirical foundation: the KSFTA legal text, official statements, negotiation-era media, and elite interview material from Lee (Lee, 2025). The KSFTA is examined both as a legal text and as a strategic outcome shaped by domestic and international negotiation dynamics

The structure of the dissertation follows a logical progression from conceptual framing to empirical process-tracing and analytical synthesis. Chapter 2 critically reviews existing literature on FTA design, negotiation behaviour, sectoral lobbying, and governance styles, highlighting the underexplored nexus between structural divergence and negotiation convergence. Chapter 3 outlines the methodology, justifying case selection, the process-tracing approach, and integration of primary sources. Chapter 4 sets the political-economic context by comparing South Korea’s chaebol-industrial model with Singapore’s state-led technocracy, drawing on Ricardo-Viner and Heckscher-Ohlin insights.

An embedded contextual insert incorporates key findings from the elite interview with Dr Lee, offering insider perspectives on strategic motivation, bureaucratic leadership, and the limited domestic opposition (Lee, 2025). Chapter 5 reconstructs the negotiation process, tracing sectoral priorities and unpacking the technical design of Rules of Origin (RoO) as critical instruments. Chapter 6 applies the theoretical frameworks to evaluate whether structurally divergent systems yielded convergent or asymmetrical outcomes, drawing causal inferences from the process-tracing evidence. Chapter 7 explores broader theoretical and policy implications for FTAs between asymmetric partners, while Chapter 8 concludes by synthesising key findings, acknowledging limitations, and proposing avenues for future research, including on the evolving Korea-Singapore digital trade agenda.

By examining the Korea-Singapore case, this dissertation fills a key gap in the literature on asymmetric FTA negotiations and offers broader insights into evolving economic diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific. It advances understanding of how structurally diverse states can transcend institutional differences to forge strategic partnerships amid a rapidly fragmenting global trade order.

CHAPTER 2: Literature Review

Thematic Overview

The negotiation and design of the Korea-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (KSFTA) lie at the intersection of key debates in International Political Economy (IPE) and Free Trade Agreement (FTA) studies. This dissertation explores how structurally divergent political economies shape negotiation behaviour in FTA construction. While scholars recognise that trade agreements are embedded within domestic institutions and sectoral interests, few studies have integrated sectoral lobbying, state-capitalist models, and negotiation strategies to analyse agreements between fundamentally different governance systems, a gap this dissertation addresses.

Survey of Key Fields

1. FTA Design and Governance

The design of FTAs has attracted growing attention in IPE, with scholars emphasising that agreements are shaped not only by economic considerations but also by domestic political constraints. Mansfield and Milner (2012) argue that the number of veto players within domestic institutions strongly influences a state’s ability to conclude trade deals. Applied to the KSFTA, this suggests that Singapore’s one-party dominance and Korea’s strong presidential system likely facilitated negotiation by limiting internal obstacles.

Putnam’s (1988) “two-level game” framework further reveals how international negotiations are constrained by domestic constituencies. His model is key to understanding how Korea and Singapore each had to reconcile internal sectoral demands with external bargaining imperatives, seeking overlapping win-sets.

Elsig and Dupont (2012) offer a principal-agent model, showing how trade bureaucracies can use delegated autonomy to shape negotiations. This enriches the KSFTA analysis by suggesting that Singapore’s Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) and Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) may have wielded considerable discretion, shielded from sectional pressures.

However, principal-agent dynamics likely diverged across the two systems: Singapore’s centralised technocracy empowered the MTI with high autonomy, while Korea’s chaebol-bureaucratic entanglements generated more complex intra-state bargaining, a distinction underexplored in existing FTA literature.

2. Rules of Origin as Instruments of Compromise and Gatekeeping

Once considered peripheral, RoO have become central strategic tools in trade agreements. Estevadeordal and Suominen describe them as “gatekeepers of commerce” (2009, p. 4), mediating sectoral protection while preserving formal liberalisation. Their insight supports this dissertation’s argument that RoO in the KSFTA were designed as compromises, balancing domestic sectoral pressures without derailing the broader liberalisation agenda.

Chase (2008) shows that RoO are often tailored to appease domestic industries, with more restrictive provisions appearing in politically sensitive sectors or those benefitting from economies of scale. In the KSFTA, the stringency or leniency of specific RoO clauses likely reflected underlying sector-specific lobbying in Korea and Singapore.

3. Sector-Based vs. Factor-Based Theories of Trade Preferences

Trade preference formation theories provide key analytical frameworks. The Ricardo-Viner model explains preferences at the sectoral level, arguing that industries with immobile assets lobby for protection or liberalisation based on their exposure (Alt et al., 1996). In the KSFTA, sectors such as electronics in Singapore or automobiles in Korea likely influenced negotiation stances based on embedded interests.

In contrast, the Heckscher-Ohlin framework predicts preference formation along factor lines, with capital and labour aligning according to abundance or scarcity (Rogowski, 1989). This broader logic helps explain how national factor endowments shaped each country’s liberalisation agenda.

Hiscox (2001) bridges the two models, showing that the degree of inter-industry factor mobility determines whether cleavages form along class or industry lines. His findings justify the dissertation’s dual-framework approach: Korea’s chaebol-dominated economy reflects Ricardo-Viner dynamics, while Singapore’s fluid capital-labour mobility aligns more closely with Heckscher-Ohlin predictions.

4. Institutional Mediation in Economic Diplomacy

Domestic institutions play a critical role in shaping trade policy. Katzenstein (1985; 2003, pp. 11–12) argues that small states develop centralised, technocratic institutions to manage international vulnerability. Singapore exemplifies this model through its proactive, top-down trade policy, with the MTI leading FTA negotiations, including the KSFTA.

Rodan (2008) complicates this picture, showing how Singapore maintains technocratic liberalism in trade while limiting political pluralism through institutional mechanisms that consolidate executive dominance. This context enabled credible commitments to deep liberalisation without significant domestic resistance.

In contrast, South Korea’s developmental state model combined bureaucratic autonomy with close coordination with conglomerates. Woo-Cumings (1999) describes this as an insulated bureaucracy intertwined with chaebol influence, while Kohli (1999) characterises Korea as a cohesive-capitalist state marked by strong state-business alignment. Korean negotiators likely faced pressure from export-oriented conglomerates, pushing for liberalisation in competitive sectors and protection in vulnerable ones.

Dent (2001) offers a broader strategic perspective, portraying Singapore’s foreign economic policy as a quest for economic security through diversified market access, supporting the view of the KSFTA as part of this wider strategy. Sally and Sen (2005) situate Singapore’s early, ambitious FTA pursuit within a broader regional proliferation, aimed at pre-empting exclusion and locking in strategic gains.

While these studies illuminate the dual liberalising and protectionist roles of RoO, they often overlook how institutional divergence shapes their negotiation and deployment, a critically under-theorised dimension this dissertation seeks to address.

Gap Identification

Despite important scholarly advances, two critical gaps remain. First, the strategic use of RoO as compromise instruments in structurally divergent FTA negotiations is under-theorised. Second, dominant models largely overlook how domestic institutional variation mediates negotiation preferences, especially in cross-system contexts like the KSFTA.

Although RoO are increasingly seen as strategic tools, their role as active sites of compromise balancing sectoral pressures hasn’t been sufficiently developed. Estevadeordal and Suominen’s (2009) framing of RoO as gatekeepers points toward this, but cross-system applications remain limited. This dissertation addresses these gaps by tracing how Korea and Singapore used RoO to reconcile internal demands while advancing a shared liberalisation agenda.

Theoretical Framework Justification

To address these gaps, the dissertation applies a complementary framework combining Ricardo-Viner and Heckscher-Ohlin models. Ricardo-Viner is essential for analysing sectoral lobbying dynamics (Alt et al., 1996), particularly in Korea’s chaebol-driven sectors and Singapore’s strategic clusters, explaining why negotiations reflected sector-specific stakes. Heckscher-Ohlin adds a macro-structural lens, showing how factor endowments shaped each country’s liberalisation preferences (Rogowski, 1989). Singapore’s capital and skilled labour abundance encouraged openness, while Korea’s sectoral disparities produced more complex internal bargaining. Hiscox (2001) combines the two, arguing that low inter-industry mobility fosters sectoral cleavages, while high mobility supports class-based coalitions. This justifies the dual framework: Korea aligns with Ricardo-Viner, Singapore with Heckscher-Ohlin.

This approach enables analysis of both micro-level (sectoral) and macro-level (factoral) dynamics in KSFTA negotiations. Operationalisation strategies will be detailed in Chapter 3 and applied in Chapters 5 and 6, where Ricardo-Viner informs process reconstruction and Heckscher-Ohlin underpins the evaluation of outcome convergence, ensuring systematic coverage of structural influences.

Synthesis and Theoretical Positioning

The literature on FTA design, RoO negotiation, trade preference formation, and institutional mediation provides essential scaffolding for this dissertation. However, gaps remain in explaining how structurally divergent political economies shape negotiation behaviour and RoO design. By combining Ricardo-Viner and Heckscher-Ohlin frameworks, this study illuminates the domestic-international linkages that structured the KSFTA, offering a more nuanced understanding of cross-system FTA negotiations.

CHAPTER 3: Methodology

This chapter outlines the dissertation’s methodological framework, explaining the rationale for a structured comparative case study design combined with theory-testing process-tracing. It also details the data strategy, case selection, scope conditions, and ethical considerations.

Methodological Justification

This study adopts a structured comparative case study approach to examine how South Korea and Singapore, two politically and economically divergent states, negotiated the Korea-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (KSFTA). Comparative case studies allow researchers to investigate complex causal relationships in context-rich settings, offering insights unattainable through large-N statistical methods (Gerring, 2007). They are particularly valuable when controlled experimentation is infeasible, as they focus on causal mechanisms rather than mere correlation.

This logic aligns with Robert Yin’s framework, which emphasises methodological rigour across six dimensions: planning, design, preparation, data collection, analysis, and reporting. As Hollweck notes in her review of Yin’s work, these elements are underpinned by a concern for “rigour, validity, and reliability” (Hollweck, 2016, pp. 2–3). This dissertation prioritises multiple sources of evidence to strengthen construct validity and formulates clear theoretical propositions to enhance internal validity.

A structured-focused comparison, following George and Bennett (2005), enables systematic analysis across defined dimensions while attending to case-specific detail. This is particularly suitable for bilateral FTAs, where interactions between distinct systems must be traced through comparable thematic areas (e.g., RoO design, sectoral lobbying).

While case study methods face critiques around generalisability and selection bias (Gerring, 2007), these risks are mitigated through strict scope delimitation and empirical triangulation. The study also draws on Odell’s triadic model, market conditions, negotiator beliefs, and domestic politics, as a conceptual scaffold for analysing how internal political economies shaped external bargaining behaviour (Odell, in Dupont, 2002).

Process-Tracing Logic

Process-tracing is employed alongside case study analysis to strengthen causal inference. This dissertation adopts theory-testing process-tracing, following Beach and Pedersen’s typology (2013), to evaluate whether hypothesised causal mechanisms linking sectoral preferences, state structures, and negotiation outcomes can be empirically verified within the KSFTA process.

Defined as the analysis of mechanisms linking independent variables to outcomes, process-tracing allows researchers to “open […] up the black box of causality” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 39). Unlike congruence methods, which focus on correlation, process-tracing targets the causal links themselves (pp. 4–5).

In this study, causal-process observations are drawn from the KSFTA negotiation timeline, including sectoral consultations, bargaining rounds, and legal drafting stages. Observable implications derived from Ricardo-Viner and Heckscher-Ohlin frameworks are tested against empirical data to determine whether mechanisms such as chaebol lobbying or bureaucratic coordination operated as theorised.

These observations are interpreted through Bayesian logic and triangulated using case-specific knowledge. Bayesian reasoning enables confidence in a causal explanation to increase as new evidence emerges, especially when the evidence would be unlikely to appear unless the mechanism were valid (Beach and Pedersen, 2013).

Data Sources and Triangulation

This dissertation draws on four primary data sources:
KSFTA Legal Text: Analysis of specific chapters and annexes identifies sectoral concessions, RoO provisions, and institutional arrangements.
Government Documents: Policy papers, negotiation statements, and public releases from Korean and Singaporean ministries provide insight into negotiating objectives and domestic constraints.
Media Reports: Korean and Singaporean press coverage from the negotiation period offers context on sectoral lobbying, political framing, and public narratives.
Interview Material: An elite interview with Lee, an expert on South Korea’s trade policy and the KSFTA, provides first-hand insight into negotiation dynamics (Lee, 2025).

Triangulating these sources mitigates bias, enhances empirical robustness, and supports the validity of causal-process observations (Yin, 2014, as cited in Hollweck, 2016; Gerring, 2007).

Case Selection and Scope Conditions

South Korea and Singapore were selected based on the “divergent systems” logic of structured comparison. Korea represents a corporate-driven economy dominated by chaebols, while Singapore exemplifies a state-led technocracy. Their successful negotiation of the KSFTA offers an ideal case to examine how differing domestic structures shaped external bargaining strategies.

The temporal scope spans from the initiation of feasibility studies (2002) to the signing of the agreement (2005). Post-signing implementation is excluded to maintain focus on negotiation dynamics, in line with the research question. Scope conditions are clearly defined to avoid overextending causal claims beyond bilateral FTA negotiations between systemically divergent but economically complementary partners.

Ethical Considerations

Ethical standards are rigorously upheld throughout the project. The interview with Dr Lee was conducted in accordance with UCL ethics guidelines, with full informed consent obtained (Lee, 2025). Anonymity was offered but declined. Data is securely stored, and direct quotations are transparently indicated.

Ethical procedures for elite interviews follow best practices (Mosley, 2013), emphasising transparency of purpose, voluntary participation, and accurate representation. Tansey (2007) argues that elite interviewing isn’t only appropriate but often essential for process-tracing, allowing researchers to pose probing, theory-informed questions and access causal insights unavailable in written records. When rigorously triangulated, such interviews contribute meaningfully to both theory development and testing. Government and media sources are drawn exclusively from publicly accessible documents, ensuring transparency and replicability.

CHAPTER 4: Political Economy Background

This chapter establishes the structural and institutional foundations underlying South Korea and Singapore’s negotiation behaviour in the KSFTA. While earlier chapters introduced the dissertation’s core theoretical frameworks, Ricardo-Viner and Heckscher-Ohlin, and outlined the comparative process-tracing methodology, this chapter serves a distinct purpose: to systematically compare each state’s domestic political economy and assess how structural conditions shaped trade preferences. This comparison forms the empirical backdrop for interpreting sectoral prioritisation and bargaining strategies in Chapter 5.

South Korea’s Political-Economic Configuration

South Korea’s post-war development followed a distinctive model of state capitalism, marked by a mutually reinforcing relationship between the state and large family-owned conglomerates, or chaebols. Often characterised as a developmental state, this model featured targeted industrial policy, export orientation, and tightly coordinated credit and regulatory regimes (Liou, 2008). Korea’s export-driven trajectory evolved into outward-oriented trade diplomacy, particularly after the 1997–98 financial crisis (Kim, 2004). The state’s support for core industries, automobiles, electronics, shipbuilding, and petrochemicals, produced a structure in which sectoral lobbying power became highly concentrated.

Chaebols emerged as both dominant economic actors and privileged political interlocutors. While formal policymaking rested with ministries, strategic sectors often saw close collaboration between bureaucrats and business, especially where Korea’s global competitiveness was at stake (Kim and Kim, 2021).

Though technically proficient, the bureaucratic system remained porous to chaebol influence, particularly in sectors with high sunk costs and asset specificity, conditions that closely reflect Ricardo-Viner predictions. As outlined in Chapter 2, this model suggests that immobile capital sectors are more politically mobilised. In Korea, this translated into assertive lobbying by capital-intensive exporters (Kim and Kim, 2021).

During the KSFTA’s pre-signing phase, electronics and automotive sectors were prioritised due to their integration into global value chains and reliance on preferential market access. Expert insights confirm that chaebols exerted significant pressure in influencing the country’s trade direction (Lee, 2025), securing favourable Rules of Origin and tariff liberalisation. This reflected both Korea’s export profile and the institutional pathways through which trade demands were channelled. Similar dynamics were evident in the Korea-United States FTA (KORUS), where chaebol-led sectors influenced tariff and investment provisions (Kim, 2011).

Empirical studies further confirm this pattern. Park and Hwang (2022) show that low interindustry capital mobility reduces sectoral conflict and increases support for FTAs, reinforcing the link between structural rigidity and lobbying intensity.

Singapore’s Political-Economic Configuration

In contrast to Korea, Singapore’s political economy is characterised by technocratic governance and state-led economic coordination. The state plays a central role in both designing and executing long-term development strategies through the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI), Economic Development Board (EDB), and International Enterprise Singapore, which form a tightly integrated apparatus prioritising national competitiveness over sectoral lobbying (Siddique & Kumar, 2010).

Public-private coordination occurs within a tightly regulated ecosystem where state-owned enterprises, statutory boards, and multinational firms align with state-defined goals. This institutional alliance supports both inward investment and outward-oriented export growth, particularly in services and capital-intensive industries (Siddique & Kumar, 2010). The state actively orchestrates sectoral clusters, especially in logistics, Information and Communication Technology (ICT), and biomedicine, rather than merely facilitating them.

The absence of large, politically entrenched conglomerates and the government’s dominant ownership role create a trade policymaking environment relatively insulated from bottom-up pressures. Instead, priorities are set through top-down assessments of comparative advantage, global trends, and technological shifts (World Trade Organization, 2008). Strategies in ICT, biopharmaceuticals, and logistics stem from factor endowment analysis and strategic foresight, aligning with the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade specialisation based on resource abundance.

Singapore’s FTAs reflect this broader strategy of embedding itself into global production and services networks. Thangavelu and Toh (2005) argue that FTAs serve forward-looking goals, securing not only market access but also regulatory harmonisation and investment facilitation. This explains Singapore’s preference for comprehensive coverage and binding commitments, even in areas beyond WTO obligations, such as intellectual property and competition policy.

Singapore’s elite-driven negotiation style is supported by institutional agility and inter-agency coherence. This allows rapid adaptation to new trade opportunities and a preference for legally robust and investor-friendly FTAs that reinforce the city-state’s role as a services and trade hub (World Trade Organization, 2008).

Shin (2005) contrasts this agility with Korea’s business-embedded model, arguing that Singapore’s globalisation-compatible structures facilitated more responsive FTA engagement. This is evident in the KSFTA’s design, where Singapore advocated comprehensive coverage, transparent dispute settlement, and services liberalisation beyond its immediate comparative advantage.

Comparative Analysis

A structured comparison reveals key divergences in institutional configurations, sectoral alignment, and negotiation agency design. While Korea exhibits a form of embedded autonomy, where the state maintains capacity but remains responsive to chaebol lobbying, Singapore operates within a more centralised, depoliticised trade apparatus.

Table 1 synthesises the institutional and strategic divergences between South Korea and Singapore, highlighting how domestic structures shaped negotiation logic and theoretical alignment. These differences shape not only negotiation styles but also strategic preferences in the KSFTA. Korea prioritised industry-specific concessions and the defence of sensitive sectors, reflecting the influence of entrenched export champions and a political economy defined by asset immobility.

World Bank data from 2005 further underscores this divergence: trade in services accounted for nearly 79% of Singapore’s GDP, compared to just 12% for Korea. Meanwhile, Korea’s merchandise exports were dominated by manufacturing-intensive capital and intermediate goods, with capital goods alone comprising over 52% of total merchandise exports. This contrast reflects the institutionalised orientation of each country’s trade strategy, Singapore’s towards services and global logistics, and Korea’s towards goods-based manufacturing sectors (World Bank, 2006a; World Bank, 2006b). Singapore’s push for broad liberalisation and legally robust frameworks stems from its forward-looking strategy and institutional negotiation capacity.

These dynamics validate the dual-theoretical lens: Ricardo-Viner explains Korea’s sector-specific mobilisation, while Heckscher-Ohlin captures Singapore’s factor-based optimisation. This framework underpins the structured comparison in Chapter 5, which traces sectoral positioning, RoO preferences, and negotiation asymmetries through process-tracing.

Comparative Insights and Analytical Implications

This chapter has shown that Korea’s chaebol-industrial model fosters sector-specific lobbying, while Singapore’s state-led technocracy enables strategic, factor-based trade planning. These structural divergences shape both the articulation of trade interests and the mechanisms through which they are translated into negotiation mandates.

Chapter 5 builds on these insights by reconstructing the KSFTA negotiation process. Sectoral demands, offer sequencing, and institutional roles are best interpreted through the political economy foundations established here.

CHAPTER 5: Negotiation Process and Priorities

This chapter reconstructs the negotiation process of the Korea–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (KSFTA), tracing how sectoral preferences, institutional structures, and political economy logics were embedded in sequencing strategies and legal design. It applies the Ricardo-Viner and Heckscher-Ohlin frameworks introduced earlier to interpret negotiation behaviour, with particular attention to the strategic design of RoO. Drawing on primary sources and process-tracing methods, the chapter links domestic economic configurations to external bargaining dynamics, laying the groundwork for the causal evaluation in Chapter 6.

Framing the Negotiation Process

This section outlines the analytical logic used to trace causal mechanisms within the KSFTA negotiations. Rather than offering a purely chronological narrative, the chapter adopts a theory-guided process-tracing approach to assess how domestic structures, particularly sectoral lobbying and factor endowments, influenced offer sequencing, legal design, and the deployment of RoO.

Ricardo-Viner expectations guide the analysis of Korea’s negotiation posture, highlighting how capital-intensive sectors with immobile assets mobilised for favourable RoO and tariff concessions. Heckscher-Ohlin assumptions frame Singapore’s liberalisation strategy, rooted in national factor abundance and capital mobility. These theoretical mechanisms are translated into empirical indicators, such as RoO provisions, negotiation timelines, and sectoral concessions, analysed in Chapter 5.

Timeline and Strategic Phases

Formal negotiations for the KSFTA began in January 2004, following recommendations from the Korea-Singapore Joint Study Group (JSG), which met throughout 2003 (Kim, 2004). The JSG concluded that an FTA would enhance competitiveness, expand market access, and strengthen strategic ties. Its call for a comprehensive, WTO-plus agreement set the agenda (MTI & MOFAT, 2003).

Three phases structured the process:
Initiation Phase (2002–2003): Discussions began with alignment between Korea’s MOFAT and Singapore’s MTI. Joint communiqués in March and September 2003 outlined a shared vision of expedited, low-friction negotiations (MOFAT, 2003; MTI & MOFAT, 2003).
Bargaining Phase (2004): Offers were exchanged across multiple chapters. While goods and services progressed early, investment and intellectual property remained contentious near the fifth round, briefly stalling talks (Kim Ji-soo, 2004).
Finalisation Phase (late 2004–2005): A breakthrough at the ASEAN+3 Summit in November 2004 led to initialling in April 2005 and signing in August (Channel News Asia, 2005; MOFAT, 2004). Final speeches hailed the KSFTA as a “stepping stone” for deeper regional integration and mutual prosperity (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea, 2005).

Sectoral Priorities and Lobbying Dynamics

Korea’s defensive interests lie primarily in goods trade. The Joint Study Group flagged manufacturing, particularly electronics, automotive components, and steel, as a core concern (Kim, 2004). These sectors benefited from delayed liberalisation and stringent Rules of Origin, especially to protect upstream inputs. The KSFTA combined product-specific Change in Tariff Classification (CTC) requirements with Regional Value Content (RVC) thresholds, set out in Article 4.5. RVC rules enabled goods to qualify as originating if sufficient value was added within the FTA area, thus preserving Korean competitiveness in integrated value chains (Republic of Korea & Republic of Singapore, 2005: Articles 4.2, 4.5; Annex 4A).

Singapore’s priorities focused on services, investment, and digital trade. The MTI (2005) outlines goals to strengthen its role as a regional services hub, especially in finance, education, telecommunications, and e-commerce. In return for conceding to Korea’s tight RoO, Singapore secured liberalisation in these sectors. The Straits Times (2005) noted that 75% of Singapore’s exports received duty-free access on Day 1, with the remaining items phased in over five to ten years.

These divergent interests were reconciled through sequencing: Korea front-loaded concessions in politically less sensitive areas, while Singapore delivered broad liberalisation in exchange for RoO provisions accommodating Korean concerns.

Rules of Origin: Design and Strategic Compromise

RoO were a central vector of negotiation in the KSFTA. Chapter 4 of the legal text (2005) defines originating goods (Republic of Korea & Republic of Singapore, 2005: Chapter 4), while Annex 4A outlines the operational criteria in detail (Republic of Korea & Republic of Singapore, 2005: Annex 4A). Article 4.2 establishes two core tests for origin: goods must either be wholly obtained or undergo substantial transformation, as measured by either a change in tariff classification (CTC) or the regional value content (RVC) method. The RVC method applies a base threshold of 40% in most cases, though specific product lines may diverge. Annex 4A details product-specific RoO criteria, with certain strategic sectors, such as petrochemicals, electronics, and food processing, requiring higher RVC thresholds or alternative transformation tests, reflecting the political economy trade-offs embedded in the negotiation (Republic of Korea & Republic of Singapore, 2005: Annex 4A). Singapore’s negotiators accepted the inclusion of CTC rules to accommodate Korea’s upstream industrial structure, while Korea accepted cumulation clauses and flexible content thresholds to support Singapore’s re-export model.

The parties agreed to bilateral cumulation (Article 4.9) and established a certificate-based origin verification regime designed to balance administrative feasibility with protectionist safeguards (Annex 5B). Under Article 5.2, exporters are required to obtain a certificate of origin from designated national authorities, with procedural details set out in Annexes 5A and 5B (Republic of Korea & Republic of Singapore, 2005: Articles 4.9, 5.2; Annexes 5A–5B).

According to the Ministry of Trade and Industry (2005), the certificate-based verification system enhanced transparency by ensuring only certified originating goods benefited from preferential treatment, thereby preventing third-country circumvention. Simultaneously, the product-specific RoO design allowed for discretion and flexibility in origin assessment, accommodating unique manufacturing processes. This approach was particularly important for sectors such as electronics and precision engineering, where complex cross-border production required tailored compliance rules (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2005).

One notable innovation was the inclusion of goods processed in the Kaeseong Industrial Complex in North Korea as qualifying for South Korean origin status (MOFAT, 2004; Young, 2009). This clause exemplifies the KSFTA’s asymmetrical trade-offs: while economically negligible for Singapore, given its low applied tariffs, the provision allowed Korea to secure a symbolically powerful concession that advanced inter-Korean economic integration. The decision reflects the interplay between Korea’s nationalist trade strategy and Singapore’s liberal trade posture, reinforcing how domestic political priorities shaped specific rule configurations.

Jeon and Ryu (2004) emphasise that RoO were the most contentious issue during the seven KSFTA negotiation rounds, reflecting their strategic centrality to the agreement’s final design. While RoO were structured to regulate which goods would qualify for preferential treatment, thereby aligning with Korea’s interest in shielding domestic industries from liberalisation spillovers, they also preserved Singapore’s commitment to trade facilitation by enabling clarity and consistency in origin determination.

Alignment with Structural Models

The RoO outcomes and sequencing strategies mirror each country’s structural political economy. Korea’s preferences were shaped by sector-specific lobbying and trade ministry coordination. Its insistence on strict RoO, especially for electronics and chemicals, aligns with Ricardo-Viner predictions: capital-intensive sectors with high sunk costs seek protection from competitive erosion. The high local content thresholds in Annex 4A reflect political accommodation of key industrial interests within Korea’s export-led strategy.

Singapore’s liberalisation approach embodies Heckscher-Ohlin logic, grounded in its abundant capital and skilled labour. As Kesavapany and Sen (2007) note, Singapore pursued WTO-plus FTAs to deepen services trade, prioritising finance and ICT. Its posture combined expansive liberalisation in these areas with flexibility in goods chapters to protect its re-export model and institutional structure.

The asymmetry was strategic, not hierarchical: Singapore used its flexibility to build credibility and secure market access, while Korea employed legal instruments like RoO to manage domestic exposure. As Dr Lee observes, the KSFTA’s low politicisation enabled such technocratic compromise, allowing innovation to reflect divergent structural imperatives (Lee, 2025).

From Negotiation Dynamics to Structural Outcomes

This chapter has demonstrated how the KSFTA negotiation translated system-based preferences into legal provisions, most notably through Rules of Origin. Strategic sequencing, institutional insulation, and sectoral asymmetries enabled both countries to liberalise ambitiously while protecting core interests.

The next chapter assesses whether these outcomes indicate systemic convergence or functional asymmetry, whether the KSFTA reflects mutual adaptation or persistent structural divergence within a cooperative legal framework.

CHAPTER 6: Analysis—Divergent Systems, Convergent Outcomes?

This chapter examines whether South Korea’s sector-driven chaebol-industrial model and Singapore’s technocratic, capital-intensive regime, despite structural divergence, nonetheless produced convergent outcomes in the Korea-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (KSFTA). Building on Chapter 5’s reconstruction of sectoral priorities and negotiation dynamics, it applies the Ricardo-Viner and Heckscher-Ohlin models to evaluate the causal forces shaping agreement design. It argues that convergence wasn’t structurally determined but institutionally manufactured, through elite agency, WTO-norm alignment, and strategic partner selection, refining theoretical understandings of how convergence occurs under institutional divergence and highlighting the scope and limits of dominant IPE frameworks in explaining FTA design.

Korea’s Sectoral Bargaining and Ricardo-Viner Cleavage

South Korea’s KSFTA negotiation behaviour was shaped by entrenched sectoral interests, especially export-oriented chaebols and import-competing agricultural producers. Tariff reduction and RoO reflected a dual strategy: liberalising globally competitive sectors such as automobiles and electronics through phased tariff elimination, while simultaneously safeguarding domestic value chains via stringent RoO. Politically sensitive sectors like agriculture, by contrast, were protected outright through exclusion lists and restrictive origin rules. This aligns with the Ricardo-Viner model, which links trade preferences to sector-specific factor immobility and lobbying pressures.

Korea’s earlier experience with the Chile FTA illustrates this logic. Strong agricultural opposition, especially from grape and kiwi farmers, nearly derailed that agreement, prompting state-led compensation efforts (Sohn, 2001). In contrast, KSFTA negotiations were choreographed to avoid such friction. Singapore’s negligible agricultural sector reduced the salience of farm-sector concessions.

The KSFTA’s RoO regime reflected sharp sectoral cleavages. Sensitive goods were protected by high domestic value content thresholds and strict transformation rules. Industrial sectors enjoyed more flexible terms, notably the bilateral accumulation clause (Article 4.9), allowing Singaporean inputs to count as Korean origin, enabling global value chain (GVC) integration while minimising domestic opposition (Republic of Korea & Republic of Singapore, 2005: Chapter 4; Annex 3A).

RoO also served geopolitical ends. The inclusion of the Kaesong Industrial Zone permitted limited use of North Korean inputs under specific conditions, allowing cost advantages without breaching formal origin rules, again reflecting politically backed sectoral preferences (Jeon and Ryu, 2004).

Korea’s official trade policy confirms this dual-track approach: leveraging FTAs for market access while restructuring and cautiously liberalising sensitive sectors (WTO, 2008a, para. 3). In sum, Korea’s KSFTA strategy exemplifies Ricardo-Viner dynamics, sectoral lobbying translated into tailored legal provisions to balance liberalisation with domestic insulation.

Singapore’s Technocratic Flexibility and Heckscher-Ohlin Alignment

The 2003 U.S.-Singapore FTA set a precedent for high-quality, WTO-plus liberalisation in services, featuring strong commitments on market access, regulatory transparency, and national treatment (Congressional Research Service, 2003). Building on this template, Singapore entered the KSFTA with a liberalisation-friendly posture, largely unimpeded by defensive sectoral lobbies.

Its comprehensive negative-list scheduling in services (Appendix 16A.2, Schedule 2) exemplifies this: liberalisation was bound across nearly all sectors, enabling maximal coverage with minimal friction. Similarly, Singapore accepted Korea’s RoO proposals with little resistance, as seen in the detailed transformation criteria in Annex 4A. This reflected its limited manufacturing base and priority to preserve seamless investment flows and service exports (Republic of Korea & Republic of Singapore, 2005). The strategy aligned with high factor mobility: a capital-rich, low-agriculture economy allowed swift adjustment and net sectoral gains from RoO compliance.

This liberal orientation was institutionally embedded. The WTO Trade Policy Review (2008b) described Singapore’s trade regime as exceptionally open, with negligible tariffs and a strategic reliance on FTAs to expand services and investment access. Technocratic insulation from populist pressures enabled fast, strategic negotiation. The KSFTA was negotiated and concluded in under a year, with no reported domestic opposition (Kesavapany and Sen, 2007; Fiori, 2008).

Singapore’s factor-based liberalisation strategy, anchored in Heckscher-Ohlin logic, wasn’t only theoretically coherent but administratively facilitated. It prioritised comparative advantage and sectoral agility, ensuring that liberal commitments aligned with national development objectives. The KSFTA’s outcome thus reveals how institutional capacity and structural endowments jointly produced a frictionless liberalisation agenda.

Strategic Convergence through Institutional and Learning Dynamics

Despite structural divergence, Korea and Singapore converged on a WTO-plus FTA architecture prioritising services, investment liberalisation, and regulatory transparency. This was no accident. The KSFTA Joint Study Group explicitly recommended WTO-plus and GATS-plus (General Agreement on Trade in Services) commitments, pushing both sides toward high-standard outcomes (Jeon and Ryu, 2004).

Korea’s alignment with Singaporean liberalism stemmed from bureaucratic learning and strategic experimentation. The KSFTA served as a pilot for Korea’s broader FTA roadmap (Lee, 2022), smoothing the path for later deals such as the Korea-ASEAN and Korea-EU FTAs. Sectoral resistance remained subdued, not only due to Singapore’s low-risk profile, but also because Korean negotiators were empowered by top-down presidential authority (Lee, 2021).

Singapore viewed Korea as a strategic middle-power partner and Northeast Asian gateway. This mutual interest in regional integration, especially via ASEAN-fostered alignment on digital trade, competition policy, and procurement standards (Republic of Korea & Republic of Singapore, 2005, Chapters 14–16; Annex 16A; Appendix 16A.2).

This functional convergence, driven by elite coordination and aligned economic interests, demonstrates that systemic divergence does not preclude negotiated compatibility. Instead, when shared goals are pursued through institutional insulation and learning, convergence can be strategically manufactured.

Table 2 synthesises the sectoral priorities of South Korea and Singapore and the mechanisms through which these preferences were operationalised in the KSFTA’s design, particularly via RoO, liberalisation timelines, and sectoral coverage.

Manufactured Convergence and the Limits of Structural Determinism

The convergence observed in the KSFTA wasn’t driven by structural similarities, but manufactured through elite agency and strategic partner selection. Korea’s choice of Singapore as its first ASEAN FTA partner reflected a calculated preference for a high-standard, outward-oriented economy with low political risk and shared regional ambitions (Kesavapany & Sen, 2007).

Interview insights support this. As Dr Lee explained, “Initially, the South Korean president exercised significant discretion in selecting FTA negotiation partners,” highlighting the top-down nature of Korea’s early FTA strategy. She further noted that the “KSFTA didn’t involve much domestic opposition,” underscoring its low political salience and minimal parliamentary scrutiny (Lee, 2025).

Comparative evidence reinforces this claim. Korea’s FTA with Chile faced intense agricultural backlash, delaying ratification (Sohn, 2001). In contrast, the KSFTA proceeded smoothly, aided by partner choice and institutional insulation. Singapore’s prior experience with the U.S.–Singapore FTA, regarded as a model agreement in digital trade, competition policy, and procurement, also smoothed regulatory alignment (Congressional Research Service, 2003).

Korea’s evolving diplomatic posture signalled a deliberate effort to diversify regional partnerships, reflecting a shift toward strategic asymmetry management. As Lee (2023) argues, Korea’s ASEAN FTAs increasingly involve middle-power signalling and calculated hedging, evidence that convergence isn’t structural inevitability but learned alignment.

Ultimately, while Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner frameworks illuminate key dynamics, the KSFTA’s outcome was hybrid: sectoral accommodation by Korea, factor-driven liberalisation by Singapore, and a deliberately cultivated institutional fit shaped by WTO norms and elite negotiation.

Refining IPE Frameworks: Complementary or Incomplete?

This analysis shows that while Ricardo-Viner and Heckscher-Ohlin offer complementary insights, neither alone explains the KSFTA’s design. Korea’s sectoral lobbying and phased liberalisation fit Ricardo-Viner logic; Singapore’s factor-based liberalism aligns with Heckscher-Ohlin. Yet the outcome, a high-standard, low-friction FTA, was made possible by political leadership, sequencing, and WTO-norm convergence, elements under-theorised in both models.

As outlined in Chapter 2, these frameworks benefit from supplementation from institutionalist and ideational approaches. The KSFTA demonstrates that convergence can emerge through, not despite, institutional divergence, when elite agency, structural insulation, and global norms intersect. This affirms the process-tracing method’s value (Chapter 3) in capturing contingent, actor-driven outcomes.

Conclusion of Findings and Pathway to Theoretical Generalisation

Chapter 6 displayed that despite divergent political-economic systems, Korea and Singapore produced a strategically convergent FTA architecture through elite-led negotiation, sectoral management, and liberalisation alignment. The KSFTA’s outcome cannot be fully captured by structural models alone; instead, convergence was institutionally mediated and politically orchestrated. Chapter 7 explores the broader implications for trade theory, regional integration, and the evolving practice of economic diplomacy.

CHAPTER 7: Discussion—Implications for Theory and Practice

This chapter synthesises the dissertation’s empirical and theoretical findings, evaluating the broader implications of the Korea-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (KSFTA) for International Political Economy (IPE) theory and FTA negotiation under institutional asymmetry. The central puzzle, how structurally divergent states negotiated a mutually beneficial FTA without collapse, serves as a launching point for theoretical generalisation, policy inference, and reflection on the conditions enabling convergence.

Generalisability: Beyond the KSFTA

The findings of this study extend beyond the KSFTA. While grounded in the Asia-Pacific, the case demonstrates that structurally divergent states, differing in liberalisation levels, governance models, or factor mobility, can negotiate functional FTAs when institutional mechanisms align with sectoral priorities and elite preferences.

As Chapters 4 and 5 show, Korea’s chaebol-industrial model and Singapore’s state-led technocracy occupy opposite ends of the political-economic spectrum. Yet their KSFTA negotiation achieved alignment through strategic sequencing, elite insulation, and flexible legal tools such as RoO, not case-specific anomalies, but a transferable design logic, especially in low-politicisation contexts with strong bureaucratic autonomy.

Chapter 6 further illustrates that asymmetrical partners can negotiate deep integration agreements by leveraging institutional design and sequencing. Instead of gridlock, Korea and Singapore engineered convergence through RoO calibration, phased liberalisation, and sectoral targeting.

This reflects Korea’s strategic entry into ASEAN-centred FTA diplomacy, as Kesavapany and Sen (2007) note, positioning the KSFTA as a foundational agreement for institutional confidence-building and East Asian community-building. Similarly, Singapore’s early FTAs, such as with the United States, demonstrated a consistent preference for legal precision, broad liberalisation, and WTO-plus norms (Congressional Research Service, 2003), shaping the KSFTA’s legal architecture.

Thus, this design logic is generalisable under conditions of elite control, sectoral insulation, and phased liberalisation, especially where the comparatively smaller party enjoys institutional coherence and technocratic capacity, as in the case of Singapore.

Policy Lessons

1. RoO Design in Divergent Contexts

In this dissertation, RoO emerged not as mere technicalities, but as core instruments of strategic compromise. As Chapter 5 demonstrated, RoO served dual purposes: they defined product eligibility for preferential treatment and acted as institutional filters for managing political economy constraints.

In asymmetrical contexts, RoO design should be considered a political economy tool. For Korea, restrictive RoO preserved policy space for sensitive sectors, aligning with chaebol interests and Ricardo-Viner dynamics. For Singapore, flexible cumulation and transformation rules reflected Heckscher-Ohlin logics of capital mobility and services liberalisation.

Negotiators should therefore treat RoO as mechanisms for embedding domestic compromise into the legal fabric of FTAs. Product-specific RoO criteria and the use of cumulation (Republic of Korea & Republic of Singapore, 2005: Annex 4A; Article 4.9) allow for micro-level policy targeting, while origin verification systems (Republic of Korea & Republic of Singapore, 2005: Article 5.2; Annex 5B) help prevent circumvention without imposing prohibitive administrative burdens.

2. Avoiding Deadlock under Asymmetry

The KSFTA avoided collapse despite structural divergence due to three factors: elite insulation, phased liberalisation, and sectoral compromise. First, both governments insulated negotiations from political contestation. As Chapter 6 noted, Singapore’s bureaucratic autonomy and Korea’s presidential leadership empowered technocrats to proceed without populist interference (Lee, 2025). Second, liberalisation was strategically sequenced: Korea delayed concessions in sensitive sectors (e.g., food, steel), while Singapore front-loaded service commitments (Chapter 5), easing ratification pressures. Third, RoO-embedded sectoral compromise enabled convergence: Korea secured protections where needed; Singapore achieved liberalisation where possible. These outcomes suggest that asymmetry can be managed when institutional frameworks allow selective rigidity and targeted accommodation.

3. Theoretical Contributions

This dissertation contributes to IPE in three key ways. First, it demonstrates the value of combining Ricardo-Viner and Heckscher-Ohlin frameworks. As Chapter 2 outlined, each explains a different dimension of trade preference formation. Their joint application in Chapter 6 shows how Korea’s sectoral lobbying demanded protection, while Singapore’s capital-rich structure enabled liberalisation.

Second, it challenges the assumption that FTAs between asymmetric partners must be shallow or hegemonically imposed. The KSFTA illustrates how sequencing, elite insulation, and legal design can yield deep agreements without structural similarity, reframing FTAs as sites of experimental governance rather than neoliberal diffusion.

Third, it argues that preference formation alone cannot explain outcomes. As Chapters 3 and 6 show, institutional mediation shapes not just which preferences emerge, but also how they are implemented, with bureaucratic insulation, timing strategies, and veto dynamics conditioning translation into negotiated text. This confirms Chapter 2’s critique of under-theorised institutional pathways and affirms process-tracing’s value in revealing the contingent logics behind coherent trade designs (Beach and Pedersen, 2013).

From Analysis to Synthesis: Reflections and Research Horizons

This chapter argued that convergence in FTA outcomes can be strategically manufactured, even amid structural divergence. It also demonstrated that RoO function as instruments of institutional compromise, not mere technicalities. The final chapter consolidates these insights, revisiting theoretical and empirical contributions, and proposing future research, especially on digital trade between Korea and Singapore, where similar asymmetry-management dynamics may resurface.

CHAPTER 8: Conclusion

This dissertation set out to answer a central puzzle: How did South Korea and Singapore, despite their sharply divergent political-economic systems, manage to negotiate a mutually beneficial FTA? Through a process-tracing case study of the KSFTA, anchored in Ricardo-Viner and Heckscher-Ohlin frameworks, the analysis has shown that convergence in trade policy design can be strategically manufactured through institutional mechanisms, elite agency, and sectoral calibration, even where structural divergence persists.

The findings affirm that the KSFTA’s success wasn’t rooted in systemic similarity, but in strategic sequencing, technocratic insulation, and flexible legal architecture. Chapters 4 and 5 traced how South Korea’s chaebol-industrial configuration, operating through sector-specific lobbying, shaped defensive but calculated trade positions, particularly on RoO. Singapore’s technocratic, capital-rich model enabled a liberal services agenda and institutional coherence in negotiation. The outcome, examined in Chapter 6, was not structural convergence per se, but functional compatibility: a WTO-plus agreement that satisfied both states’ priority sectors and strategic preferences.

Ricardo-Viner and Heckscher-Ohlin theories were applied complementarily to interpret these dynamics. Korea’s defensive stance on upstream manufacturing sectors aligned with Ricardo-Viner logics of immobile capital and sectoral protection. Singapore’s embrace of liberalisation in services and investment reflected Heckscher-Ohlin expectations of factor-abundance alignment. But as the analysis showed, these structural predispositions alone do not account for the KSFTA’s architecture. Instead, elite agency, especially the Korean president’s discretion in partner selection and Singapore’s bureaucratic leadership, was critical in shaping a low-friction negotiation process (Lee, 2025).

The KSFTA demonstrates that strategic convergence under institutional divergence isn’t only possible, but replicable under the right conditions. As Chapter 7 argued, three variables appear decisive: (1) elite insulation from politicised veto players, (2) sequencing mechanisms to manage liberalisation asymmetries, and (3) legal design tools (like RoO) that embed sectoral compromise within the agreement itself. Together, these mechanisms offset structural asymmetries and enable functionally equivalent commitments to emerge.

This case contributes three insights to the literature. First, it affirms the analytical value of combining sector-based and factor-based IPE models, especially when mediated through institutional analysis. Second, it challenges deterministic readings of structural divergence by foregrounding the contingent, strategic, and agent-driven pathways to FTA formation. Third, it positions RoO not as technicalities but as political economy tools for shaping distributive outcomes and minimising domestic resistance.

At the policy level, the KSFTA offers a design logic for future FTAs between structurally asymmetric partners, particularly in the Global South. It suggests that legal flexibility, institutional coherence, and elite-led coordination are not merely administrative details but strategic assets. For states seeking to deepen trade integration without sacrificing policy autonomy, the KSFTA provides a model of calibrated liberalisation.

Nevertheless, limitations remain. This dissertation focused on the negotiation phase, excluding post-ratification implementation and compliance. Future research could examine the extent the strategic convergence identified here has translated into sustainable economic outcomes. Moreover, as Korea and Singapore have since entered the era of digital trade, their experience with RoO calibration may offer templates for governance in newer, more intangible domains.

Ultimately, the KSFTA case reveals that while systemic divergence may condition negotiation behaviour, it does not preclude agreement. Through institutional adroitness and strategic calibration, structurally distinct states can forge legally robust, mutually beneficial trade partnerships. The broader implication is clear: Divergence is not destiny.

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Tables

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