The Gaza War presents a conundrum for the international community that evades straightforward answer. A cease-fire remains elusive; news overage deepens public angst and outrage, competing parties resist any possible bargain with opponents, and, most distressingly, there is no plan for a post-Gaza War, even if a lasting cease-fire could be achieved. The Israeli government seems determined to consolidate control in the strip for the foreseeable future; a hobbled Hamas persists as a player, intending to maintain political sway despite the withering military efforts of the IDF, and the Palestine Authority appears sclerotic and incapable of offering a significant leadership role. For a moment, President Trump seemed to suggest, as a post-war solution, the expulsion of all two million Palestinians to make way for a beachfront high-end development to attract wealthy tourists. By early August 2025, the U.S. administration had joined with the Israeli government in touting an “All or nothing” ultimatum, demanding full release of all hostages and a complete Hamas disarmament, while setting as its goal a completed occupation of Gaza by Israeli forces.
The situation regarding a post-war Gaza strategy, is, frankly, static and bleak. We believe that an imaginable answer to the challenge rests with the United Nations, and we recommend using the example of the UN’s peacekeeping efforts in Timor-Leste, one of the organization’s most successful operations, launched at the end of the last century.
Timor-Leste, a small country on the eastern half of the island of Timor in Southeast Asia, was long ruled by Portugal. When the Portuguese disbanded their colonial empire in 1975, Indonesia invaded, annexed, and occupied the area for the next quarter of a century. The Timorese were consistently resistant. Indonesia’s militias and armed forces responded with what human rights organizations called atrocities. When President B. J. Habibie announced in January 1999 that he would grant independence to East Timor if that was the judgment of a scheduled referendum later in the year, reactionary pro-integration militias, backed by the Indonesian military, began a violent attack on pro-independence Timorese and their suspected supporters.
By spring 1999, Indonesia and Portugal both acceded to a UN-administered referendum. The referendum confirmed overwhelming support for independence. In late September, a sixteen-member multi-national force led by Australia, under UN auspices, began the difficult task of restoring order. In October, the UN Security Council authorized intercession by the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), headed by the Secretary General’s Special Representative Sérgio Vieira de Mello. That UN mission set up a muscular peacekeeping operation, eventually reaching 10,000 personnel at its height including a large international police force. The Security Council approved additional missions with enlarged mandates, including reconstructing financial, political, judicial, and commercial institutions.
UN missions directly administered the territory, coordinated relief assistance, facilitated emergency rehabilitation of physical infrastructure (the World Bank estimated that Indonesian militia and armed forces had demolished or rendered damaged beyond use almost 70 percent of East Timor’s physical infrastructure), created structures for sustainable governance, and conducted elections. Apropos the task that lies ahead in Gaza, the UN missions in Timor-Leste made a special effort to identify local leaders who could organize and lead a stable government. The UN remained in the country until 2012. Timor-Leste, now a member of the UN, has made considerable progress in securing lasting peace and political stability.
Could such a comparable effort work in Gaza? Several obstacles would need to be overcome. First, eventual Palestinian governance in Gaza will depend on the identification of leaders acceptable to the populace, to Israel, and to the international community. Right now, there are no obvious choices for leadership as there were in Timor-Leste, in the persons of José Ramos-Horta and José “Xanana” Gusmão, longtime Timorese resistance leaders. However, there is reason to hope that a younger, educated Palestinian population may provide the requisite talent.
Second, the five permanent members of the Security Council would have to agree on such a mission. While tensions exist between China and Russia on the one hand and the Western permanent members on the other, the Security Council has, surprisingly, agreed recently on some serious resolutions, including, in March 2024, a ceasefire in Gaza accompanied by unconditional release of hostages (U.S. abstaining), a demand in January 2024 that the Houthis in Yemen immediately cease attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, and, in October 2023, establishment of a Security Support Mission in Haiti (China and Russia abstaining). Unlike the bleakest days of the Cold War, the Security Council has witnessed, if infrequently, passage of significant resolutions. Could that happen with a Gaza mission?
This may be a propitious moment to leverage events in favor of a peacekeeping mission. In early March 2025 Egypt unveiled what it described as “a comprehensive vision for rebuilding Gaza while ensuring Palestinians remain on their land.” The plan outlined a technocratic Palestinian interim administration of the territory, assisted by international peacekeepers. The Arab League and some countries in the European Union evinced support for the plan, though it has remained under the radar of news coverage. Meantime, the war cabinet in Jerusalem seemed to be fracturing by 2024 with a peace plan wing emerging, led by opposition leader, Benny Gantz, and there is some evidence that the Israeli population is wearying of the war and the Gaza vexation. Even Prime Minister Netanyahu, when announcing his government’s intention to occupy all of Gaza, said that that occupation would not be permanent but should give way to some type of Arab administration of the territory. Thus, the Egyptian plan offers an interesting provisory scheme to fit into the larger proposal made here.
The details of a UN resolution would need to be skillfully drawn. Australia led the intervention in Timor-Leste. Key Arab states, likely Jordan and Egypt, which have not broken their peace treaties with Israel despite the current crisis, would need to take leadership roles in the mission, joined by troops from neutral countries. Confederates of Israel or Hamas would be excluded. Existing political, social, security, and humanitarian structures in Gaza would have to be placed under the full command and control of the UN mission. That would include UNRWA (UN Relief and Works Agency), despised by Israel, even if crucial for providing humanitarian relief. The mission’s mandate should be robust and broad, as was the case in Timor-Leste. The aim should go beyond policing residual violence in Gaza to restoring and stabilizing civic life there. For the foreseeable future, Gaza’s governance should rest with the mission, again as was the case in Timor-Leste.
More expanded goals — such as a two-state solution, etc. — must be put on the back burner. Israel, which must agree to this process, will balk at a proposal leading to a two-state solution. The Israeli Defense Forces probably want to establish at least an outpost in northern Gaza; and some members of Israel’s government want to re-annex all of Gaza. These goals are clearly unacceptable, and the mission’s mandate would have to understand them while denying them. This will require the most delicate diplomacy, with the appreciable involvement of a supportive United States, promising security for all sides. One possibility to resolve this tricky issue would be again to follow the diplomatic model pursued by the new government in Timor-Leste. Timorese president Horta proposed a “Zone of Peace” on both sides of the border with the Indonesian western portion of the island. Such a concept, including demilitarization and UN inspections, could be a vehicle to help calm/settle border conflict between Gaza and southern Israel.
Our proposal is not a resolution of the crisis in the Middle East. It is an important step back from where we are now. Maybe, if the international community can stop this war and rescue Gaza, savvy diplomats can gently, if too often imperceptibly, reverse the current perilous descent. Then, perhaps, we can revive the difficult pursuit for a more comprehensive Middle East solution.
Further Reading on E-International Relations
- Opinion – America’s Strategic Maneuver on Gaza at the United Nations
- Gaza First: The Centrality of Gaza in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Resolution
- Opinion – Assessing the Legality of Ousting Hamas
- Opinion – The West’s Approach to Gaza: A Self-Imposed Existential Crisis?
- Gaza: A Dark History Shared by Israelis and Palestinians
- Opinion – The International Community Should End the Israel-Hamas War
