The purpose of this article is to contrast a range of historical writings on the League of Nations, both during the interwar years (1919-1939) and in more contemporary times, to uncover why certain commentators accounted for the spectacular failure of the organisation with the outbreak of the Second World War. Upon researching the wealth of scholarship on this issue, it became clear that a definite contrast could be observed between academic opinions published in the interwar years during the life of the League of Nations, and subsequent research written some time after World War Two with the benefit of hindsight. Virtually all commentary on the League draws focus to its problems and contradictions; however, the similarities end there. The pre 1940 scholarship surveyed generally exudes a reliably stable, but diminishing optimism for the success of the League and the hope that despite the crises it faced, it would adapt and cement its place in history. However, the post 1945 research is united in condemning the League to a certain failure due to institutional inadequacy and poor response to international events, if not from its inception certainly from the early 1930’s. The discrepancy between the two approaches and the reasons for this apparently polar opposite before and after approach will form the bulk of this study. E.H. Carr will count as the main exception to the format mentioned above. It was important to uncover a source that did not fit the mould set by other academics, and Carr sits in contrast to his contemporaries and seems placed almost totally alone and ahead of his time. Consequently, this article will address the important issue of how Carr was able to see the failure of the League and its incompatibility with the power structures that governed the interwar years whilst his contemporaries needed the benefit of hindsight to reach the same conclusions.
The Interwar Years, 1919-1939
A relevant place to start is with a brief examination of the background to the philosophy that gave birth to the League itself. D.F Fleming traces the rise of the idea to unite the world under a definite political structure back to early Seventeenth Century France; developing through to the more idealistic framework of Kant, who called for a federation of rulers, not people, in 1795. Certain American idealists adopted this philosophy, principally Theodore Roosevelt in 1906 proclaiming ‘the great powers had the force necessary to prevent war as well as make it’[i] and ‘certain immortality awaited the statesman who could inaugurate a League of Peace’.[ii] This idealism was adopted by President Wilson in the aftermath of World War One and provision for setting up such a ‘League of Peace’ was proclaimed in his famous 14 points. Fleming accredits the reason for the adoption of these utopian ideals by the American idealists due to the key provision of the United States Constitution of each state guaranteeing protection from invasion through confederation and the mutual protection of ‘elemental rights.’[iii] It is therefore, contrary to many analysts who focus on the isolationism of American politics during that period, seemingly understandable that certain American visionaries would seek to extend this idiom to the larger world. The premise of Roosevelt’s League of Peace was agreement of the members ‘not only to abide by the decisions of a common tribunal, but to back with force the decision of that common tribunal.’[iv] In practice however, the League of Nations would turn out much differently. The scene was set for idealism versus reality and power politics, who would triumph?
The early American academic scholarship reflects the political elite opinion on the League whilst dissecting the structure of the organisation closely. Harriman writing in 1927 is optimistic for the future of the league, but understands that the ‘executive side (of) the League is quite imperfectly developed’.[v] Referencing the factor of the establishment of international laws for the first time Harriman notes that ‘all members of the League are bound to obey the law of the League’, seemingly replicating Roosevelt’s premise of a united and enfranchised common tribunal. On the other hand, as the analysis of the inner workings of the League develops a different perspective emerges: ‘it is true that the Court does not have compulsory jurisdiction over all the members of the League, and that the great powers have refused to submit to such compulsory jurisdiction.’[vi] This is a major indicator of trouble for the League, there is an acute lack of central authority and ‘the duty of enforcing the laws of the League is left to the individual members.’[vii] Despite this early indicator of institutional weakness and contradiction, Harriman concludes that the League is ‘one of the most important events in all history.’[viii] He fully expects that the League will naturally evolve into a rudimentary superstate and will iron out its problems as the goal of an international utopian world united in peace is too great to let fail.
Potter, writing five years later in 1932 is more subdued in his optimism for the League, perhaps the passage of time and the rising instability occurring in this period economically and politically are accountable for this. He comments at length on the inherent problems and need to reshape and strengthen the League to facilitate the joining of the United States, which he regards as the act that will secure completion of the League. Potter acknowledges that the organisation had been less successful than was hoped ‘to a certain degree, weak, disunited, ineffective and uncertain’[ix], but remains optimistic for the future of the organisation, as any future without an international organisation is absurd. Potter acknowledges that ‘the League has proven less successful than was hoped’[x], drawing attention to the ‘almost valueless’[xi] Covenant and the immediate need for legislative strengthening. Nevertheless, the fact remains that there is no mention of life without the League. All future aspiration centres squarely around the new international system. It seems fair to say that amongst American scholars through this period idealism and a guarded optimism is visible. There is certainly no assertion or contemplation that failure of the League is even possible, never mind inevitable.
Scholars in Great Britain in the interwar years are similarly idealistic and in favour of the League of Nations. N.C. Smith and J.C. Maxwell Garnett writing in the same year as Potter (1932) come to the conclusion that the presence and future of the League is both essential and indispensable as modern life is ‘too busy for the governments of 55 states not to bind themselves’.[xii] Such a statement as the League of Nations’ Covenant is ‘as much part of the British Constitution or the law of the land as any other legal enactment’[xiii] is clearly idealistic and naïve in historical context, but it highlights well the idealism of many historians of the day. In fact this thesis is unbearably, almost completely inaccurate stating that democracy and nationalism will be regarded as a 19th century ‘Victorian delusions’ and the League will be ‘equally famous and have an even wider scope’[xiv] than the United States Constitution! With such uninhibited enthusiasm as this coming from the academic community it is easy to understand the mood of the times being so vociferously pro League. It may not be entirely wrong to suggest at this point that a healthy dose of propaganda was being employed by the idealist writers of the time in order to patchwork the institutional problems of the League. One writer, E.H Carr, would certainly adopt such a stance.
E.H. Carr: A scholar head of his time
It would not be until near the outbreak of The Second World War that E.H. Carr would break the mould and publish his frustration and determination at this utopian optimism dispelling it as ‘hollow and without substance.’[xv] In The Twenty Years Crisis Carr outlined that all attempts to place optimism in the League of Nations are fundamentally flawed. He labels the post-war international idealism as a hasty utopian scheme based on pure aspiration with no basis in political science. His quote ‘the founders of the League of Nations, some of whom were men of political experience and political understanding’[xvi] sums up his contempt for the founders of the project succinctly, labelling them with scorn with ‘a peculiar combination of platitude and falseness’[xvii] His argument rests on the basis that the nineteenth century elite notion of liberalism was outdated. The principles behind the League, not the individuals or the lack of American membership caused the organisation to fail effectively before its birth. The world would continue in reality outside this utopian fantasy, as it had before, in an international anarchical system based on balance of power relations. He relies on the fact that war (which the League sought to relegate to history) was often, and remained, very profitable. For instance, many newly formed sovereign nations such as Czechoslovakia, owed their very existence to war itself.[xviii]
Carr asserts that nationalism was always superior to the propaganda of world utopia. This inevitably resulted in the League being used as a tool, or a cloak, for national interests. Power cannot be divorced from politics in Carr’s analysis and the very set up of the League, with its great power domination, reflected this acutely and guaranteed its inevitable failure. The League, in Carr’s analysis was no more than an example of a treaty based on international ethics, not law. Carr draws to our attention that ‘a state whose interests were adversely affected by a treaty commonly repudiated it as soon as it could do so with impunity’[xix], and a treaty therefore has no authority ‘other than the power relationships of the parties to it.’[xx] Carr believes strongly that there is no foundation in the context in which he wrote for a successful League of Peace, as power remained the dominant aspect of the international order. Smith and Garnett provide statistical evidence that the world was an interdependent community before World War One and would disagree here citing economic and financial ties.[xxi] Despite these developments however, as the events leading up to war unfolded, it seems Carr had a valid outlook. A commentary on Carr shines light on why he took such an unfamiliar stance for his time and place regarding the League. Focusing on the effects of the depression and the seeming end of the golden years of liberalism Carr looked without hesitance to strong leaders like Stalin and Hitler as inspirations, they did not succumb to weak utopian visions, which Carr felt belonged in another time.[xxii] His thesis was ‘the product of bitter disillusionment with the liberal world order and all that went with it.’[xxiii]
Although Carr’s thesis remained unsupported by his academic peers there was a constant detectable opposition to the League and its principles coming chiefly in American political circles. ‘The Irreconcilables’ were a group of 16 American Senators, mainly Republicans, who fought determinedly for a complete rejection of Versailles and the League of Nations. The premise of a League of Nations denied the validity of the Monroe Doctrine (no entangling alliances) and raised the point of why the United States should use its soldiers and finances in disputes that ‘have little bearing on its own security’[xxiv]. This ‘highly dubious’[xxv] proposal from Wilson and his utopian backers aroused furious debates in the Senate and elsewhere as the propaganda campaigns raged across the country. Fleming concludes that Wilson’s defeat in the Senate was more a party political struggle than opposition in principle to the League of Nations; ‘people dread change’[xxvi], and Wilson was perhaps proposing too much change too soon for his contemporaries. Senator William Borah, considered the original Irreconcilable, compared the United States joining the League as ‘the lion and the lamb lying down together’[xxvii] with ‘the gathered scum of the nations.’[xxviii] Like Carr, Borah was a realist; ‘there is no such thing as friendship between nations as we speak of friendship between individuals.’[xxix] In analysing the importance of the Irreconcilables Ralph Stone, with the benefit of hindsight, notes that on many issues their concerns were accurate. Addressing their recognition of the harsh treatment of Germany and the inevitable ineffective nature of the League, ‘they were right to question it as the panacea claimed by so many of its defenders’.[xxx] Stone even goes so far as to say that even with American membership an effective League was only ‘possible though not probable’.[xxxi]
Stone’s thesis is one that will repeat ad infinitum through the post 1945 historiography, that the collapse of the League was inevitable from the outset or became inevitable after a series of events early in its life. A noteworthy addition to this prescribed fate is expressed by Donald S. Birn, writing principally about ‘The League of Nations Union’, an organisation set up in Britain to promote the League ideals. Despite the views of the Irreconcilables, the vast majority of political mood, both elite and in the citizenry remained decisively pro League. Birn states that common perception amongst the union members only recognised the possibility of the failure of the League itself when Japan and China declared open war with each other and the outbreak of World War Two was imminent.[xxxii] Again, the apparent blind hope is startling and something that would be dismissed and dissected by virtually all future historians looking back on the course of events. It remains striking that only one revisionist thinker and a small group of American Senators ever really made any impact on what was a tidal wave of utopian sentiment seemingly riddled with ‘intellectual failure’.[xxxiii]
The Post 1945 Perspective
As the war finally broke out the criticism of the League began in earnest. Duncan and Elizabeth Wilson writing in 1940 highlighted the apparent lack of an executive power in the organisation, which of course had been noted earlier by other scholars such as Potter. However, they develop their argument labelling the League as an ‘impotent’[xxxiv] body interfering in the affairs of great powers. There is no hope expressed here for development and improvement of the organisational structure of the League like Harriman, for example, foresaw in 1927. Tradition and diplomacy were well established before the League, and the authors were convinced that as the League was continually bypassed for more traditional and direct channels between members, through the course of its existence the League was doomed.[xxxv] The final nail in the coffin was the withdrawal and/or non-involvement of crucial global players such as Germany and America. In a conclusion similar to that of Carr, the balance of power relations and national sovereignty are seen as unshakable forces that the League was ill equipped to replace or challenge effectively. Of course, at the time of this study, war had already broken out and this was much more acutely observable.
Moving on to the modern dissection of the League and its quandaries, Raffo offers a historical blow-by-blow account of the organisation and the significant events concerning it. He immediately addresses the point of the League being more a ‘League of victors’ collectivising to protect the status quo than one of equal nations.[xxxvi] Raffo holds little hope for its survival. The problems faced by the League were a mixture of bad luck and a series of poor judgements exacerbated by non-response to a series of landmark events. Through such events, from the departure of Germany and Japan from the League in 1933 to the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 the League was tested, and failed to rise to the challenge. By 1937, ‘all heart for collective action had gone out of the league.’[xxxvii] Raffo dissects the Abyssinian crisis further and notes the haphazard deliberations over whether or not to impose sanctions on Italy for its aggressive actions, concluding that ‘the League of Nations has not been tried and found wanting; it has been found inconvenient and not tried’[xxxviii] and worse still, ‘the League was an ineffective safeguard of the peace of the world.’[xxxix] The failure to deal with Italy cohesively was ‘the death rattle of a dying organisation.’[xl] The observations of Raffo are clearly at odds with the academic writers of the period he is addressing. His interwar peers addressed the inadequacies of the League with optimistic expectations for improvement, but Raffo raises the important point that although early tests on the League were less serious, they were dealt with so badly a foundation was laid on which paralysis was the inevitable outcome. Rather than Carr, who condemned the League at its inception, Raffo concludes that the League in effect killed itself and by 1934 had become ‘a futile exercise.’[xli]
F.S. Northedge addresses the same concerns as Raffo ‘there was general agreement that the League had failed because it lacked teeth, or the means of enforcing its will.’[xlii] However far from condemn the League as an inevitable failure; Northedge maintains that it had hope even after Hitler’s takeover of Germany in 1933. Northedge laments over the possibility that if the great powers had allowed Germany its ‘place in the sun’ when it was a liberal democracy the League would have possibly been able to unite and control the volatile international situation during the 1930’s.[xliii] Pointing to the contradictions of the League Convention, Northedge shines some light on the inner illogicality of the organisation. Article 10 of the League, for example, was established to preserve the status quo, whilst Article 19 was concerned with review of the status quo. In interpreting these contradicting articles, two groups emerged within the League and their opposing demands and expectations amounted to a time bomb that eventually became exponentially more pronounced and resulted in open war.[xliv] The fall of the League was then increasing in likelihood as time and events took their toll on the organisation. Northedge does not conclude with a doomsday legacy for the League however, an important precedent was set for institutional balances and checks on power and war. The ‘consciousness’ of the world was raised sufficiently to enable a future organisation to be moulded, although this organisation ‘would need to be crafted on vastly different lines.’[xlv]
The most scathing post mortem of the League amongst the literature identified was put forward by Ruth Henig in 1984. Henig asserts that far from the League being doomed from day one, the entire philosophy of the post-war settlement encapsulated in the Versailles Treaty was misplaced and the contributing factor to the outbreak of World War Two. Henig states, ‘given the unstable and impoverished condition of large parts of Europe after 1919, and the growing antagonism between Britain and France it is hardly surprising that the League…should have failed to make a significant political impact.’[xlvi] The focus of criticism thus far has drawn attention to the actions of Germany, Japan and smaller players aggrieved with the status quo, but in addressing the lack of unity of the two crucial members; Britain and France, Henig opens up a whole new perspective. Put simply, the League had too many inputs and points of disagreement and no rigid framework to resolve this. Britain wanted the League ‘less onerous and more flexible’, whilst the French ‘sought to strengthen League obligations and make them more binding on member states.’[xlvii] This was a recipe for disaster from the start.
Taking an early case study of the Italian seizure of Corfu in 1923 after the assassination of several of its military personnel who were stationed in the Greek-controlled region of the island, Henig highlights how the League was inept at dealing with problems it was supposedly set up to resolve. Following this incident the major powers, rather than unite and address the aggression of a fellow League member, reverted to their own national interests. France needed continued Italian support and did not want to alienate Mussolini, and Britain contemplated naval and economic sanctions but eventually decided independently not to proceed. Mussolini himself paid little attention to the League and his eventual retreat from Corfu was settled outside of the framework of the League. In conclusion, ‘the failure of the League to deal effectively with deliberate acts of aggression could hardly inspire confidence for the future.’[xlviii] The institutional impotence over a relatively small matter such as the Corfu occupation would no doubt have disseminated the message to national leaders that they could potentially get away unchecked with acts of aggression and conquest in the future. Many nations were bitterly unhappy with the status quo, after Versailles had crudely redrawn the real estate of Europe, and it seems viscerally obvious that aggrieved players would make plays for a redress of the international spoils in the absence of an equal opposing force. With Henig’s analysis in mind, perhaps Carr was indeed correct when he wrote with scorn, ‘the metaphysicians of Geneva found it difficult to believe that an accumulation of ingenious texts prohibiting war was not a barrier against war itself.’[xlix] The League was certainly idealistic in a revolutionary way, but the intent and execution of those ideals was clearly absent in any coherent sense.
A study by Sandra Wilson on the Manchurian Crisis of 1931-1933 adds further weight to Henig’s observations. Wilson seeks to counter the general perception of Japan being a regional aggressor, maintaining that an overemphasis on right wing groups and the rise of the army obscured a balanced vision of Japanese motives. A concerted Japanese academic output is identified by Wilson promoting the viewpoint that Japanese interests in Manchuria were legitimate, as China ‘never really controlled the area.’[l] Manchuria simply qualified as a viable source for raw materials and trade and was ‘the unavoidable requisite of the industrialisation of Japan.’[li] Again, the idiom of the problem of the status quo comes into play, as Japan was clearly unhappy with its settlement. The American phrase ‘manifest destiny’ was used to encapsulate the culmination of the process of the expansion of the early American nation into Florida, California and Texas; the Japanese harnessed this philosophy voicing their ‘biological necessity’ to expand.[lii] The League, despite the Japanese propaganda offensive called for a peaceful settlement of the Manchurian occupation, but no firm action was taken to back this up. Britain was waiting for American support for sanctions, which was not forthcoming and France, already stretched militarily, was not keen on being engaged so far from home.[liii] The end result, perhaps not surprisingly was Japanese withdrawal from the League and by 1933 direct Japanese occupation of Manchuria. Wilson describes the reasoning for the Japanese withdrawal from the League as a backlash against the traditional powers; ‘Britain had invaded all the countries it needed, and therefore sought now to preserve the status quo.’[liv] Simply, maintaining the peace contained in the League was not good for Japan and in that sense nor was it good for Germany, Italy and many other nations – though it was perceived as good for countries such as Britain who had seemingly a good position to rest upon. Indeed, it is even more striking that withdrawal from the League was not a negative event for Japan; trade did not suffer and there was no immediate evidence of isolation from the wider international community.[lv] Carr would undoubtedly support Wilson’s interpretation as the treaties that Japan were apparently violating in its aggression ‘lack moral validity’[lvi] in the sense that treaties are used as a weapon by strong nations to maintain supremacy over weaker nations. The strong states will insist on the validity of treaties that concur with their national interests, whilst emerging powers, like Japan, will renounce those treaties when they feel the climate allows them to do so. It all centres on national interest and by 1933 it is painfully obvious that the League was incapable of acting as a bulwark to power politics.
Christopher Thorne develops the theme of the hypocrisy of the Great Powers’ ‘vital interests’ in Africa and South America and their opposition to Japan exercising imperial ambitions. However, Thorne clearly asserts, that the events of 1931-1933 did not cause the downfall of the League. Thorne places more emphasis on the rise of Hitler and his selfish determination to conquer territory as a key cause of the outbreak of war.[lvii] For Thorne, this is not the fault of the League, although he addresses three ‘formidable questions’ the League failed to answer: Firstly the ‘crippling absence’ of America; secondly ‘the inherent conservatism in a world of rapid change’; and thirdly ‘the essentially Western assumptions…at a time of declining Western supremacy.’[lviii] Perhaps uncovering the major paradox in the League itself, Thorne states ‘collective security cannot work unless states disarm. But states will not disarm until collective security has clearly shown that it merits confidence’[lix] The Manchurian crisis proved this observation acutely, and it was an indicator trouble was ahead for the League as more power plays were undertaken by Italy and Germany later in the decade. To borrow the words of Marx to sum up this issue; ‘impotence is a single expression: the maintenance of the status quo.’[lx] This was certainly a viewpoint felt acutely by many nations during this time period.
An investigation into the disarmament issue by Andrew Webster significantly expands on the issues mentioned above. ‘The pursuit of disarmament was central to the work of the League of Nations throughout its existence’, but it ‘was never able to overcome the more powerful imperatives of national self-interest.’[lxi] It is a bitter post mortem for an institution set up to promote disarmament, as expressed in Article 8 of the League Covenant to instead oversee an eventual escalation in arms build up culminating in another world war. Webster points out that the League ‘failed to achieve either quantitative disarmament, through substantial reductions in the military forces of states, or qualitative disarmament, through regulation of the production and use of certain types of weapon.’[lxii] An abject failure, one that is incrementally tied to the prevailing focus on national interest and the discontent many nations felt with their share of the status quo. It seems reasonable at this point to accuse the League of existing in the wrong climate. The ideals it espoused were simply unmatched to the world in which it existed. Webster investigates further the claim of the existence of a ‘League spirit’ helping opposing nations overcome their own differences and self interest, but concludes this expectation ‘went mostly unfulfilled.’[lxiii] Lord Robert Cecil speaking at the final session of the League Assembly in April 1946 reminisced of the ‘atmosphere of Geneva’, however in reality that spirit did not manifest into a new international community. ‘The atmosphere of Geneva still never induced the delegates charged with carrying it out to forget the nation whence they came’[lxiv] If the League had come into existence in a situation where there was little discontent, less oppression and no imperial ambition then disarmament and unity of purpose may have been possible. Sovereignty and nationalism cannot co-exist with such an ideal; indeed some commentators go even further suggesting the utopian conception that gave birth to the League ‘is impracticable at any time.’[lxv]
The accusation of institutional failure of the League due to the loyalty of the important players being placed elsewhere, principally with their countries, is an interesting further point of analysis. James Barros offers a unique insight into the inner workings of the League and particularly the Secretary General between 1933-1940: Joseph Avenol. These years were critical for the League with the Manchurian Crisis; the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the departure of Germany. Barros is severely critical of Avenol’s leadership remarking that despite the continual failure of the League to act cohesively and effectively, Avenol ‘was somewhat partial to League reform.’[lxvi] Despite having ‘a burning interest in saving the League’, he had ‘no plan’ other than leaving issues to be resolved by the Great Powers themselves.[lxvii] Barros labels Avenol a mere ‘Great Power agent’[lxviii] who was concerned curiously with depoliticising the League and instead focusing on agreement and relation building amongst members. The study is damning of Avenol in the sense that he had no foresight to the problems that were developing, rather believing that negotiation between the great powers would solve the issues and the League could get on with fostering an environment of peace. This irony, coupled with Avenol’s disregard for reform and strengthening of the League makes for pessimistic reading in light of the fate of the League. If the delegates remained unable to engender a spirit that surpassed their national loyalties, and the Secretary General was incapable of reforming the League in the light of acutely pronounced institutional failure and paralysis, then what hope could the League possibly have had to succeed?
It is a major school of thought that gave birth to the philosophy of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, an idealistic view of a future that involves the nations of the world working together rather than being at perpetual war with one another. In the context of the peace settlement of the First World War, it is perfectly understandable that commentators would be swept up in the utopian visions espoused by the elite statesmen of the day. It was no doubt seen as a duty, an investment, to promote these ideals, as the horrors of another great war were too gruesome to be repeated. Of course, this is a noble outlook, but the dose of reality that E.H. Carr dealt to the idealists was significant and timely. It was blatantly obvious to Carr, and to the historians looking back on the events, predominantly of the 1930’s, that the League was failing and the march to a serious conflict was underway. The work of Carr is not as it first appears bitter and negative. Carr wishes himself for a successful League of Peace and a future without war and conflict, but recognises that ‘those elegant structures must wait until some progress has been made in digging the foundations’.[lxix] The League was doomed to fail simply because it was a noble idea that was hatched too soon. There was simply too many major problems and grievances left unresolved. Furthermore, the status quo that the League presided over was seen as greatly unfair to many nations, such as Germany and Japan. It is intriguing that this was only seen clearly with the benefit of hindsight (with the exception of Carr). Perhaps the optimism for the League in the interwar years was itself a symptom of the very idealism that Carr bemoaned – an optimism that maintained faith in the League despite its deep flaws and continued inept performance – as the alternative to its failure was too desperate to contemplate.
[i] Denna F. Fleming, The United States and the League of Nations 1918-1920, (London, 1932), p. 5.
[ii] Fleming, The United States and the League of Nations 1918-1920, p. 5.
[iii] Fleming, The United States and the League of Nations 1918-1920, p. 8.
[iv] Fleming, The United States and the League of Nations 1918-1920, p. 5.
[v] Edward A. Harriman, ‘The League of Nations a Rudimentary Superstate’, The American Political Science Review, 21, 1 (1927), p. 138.
[vi] Harriman, ‘The League of Nations a Rudimentary Superstate’, p. 138.
[vii] Harriman, ‘The League of Nations a Rudimentary Superstate’, p. 139.
[viii] Harriman, ‘The League of Nations a Rudimentary Superstate’, p. 140.
[ix] Pitman B. Potter, ‘The Present Status of the Question of Membership of the United States in the League of Nations’, The American Journal of International Law, 26, 2 (1932), p. 360.
[x] Potter, ‘The Present Status of the Question of Membership of the United States in the League of Nations’, p. 360
[xi] Potter, ‘The Present Status of the Question of Membership of the United States in the League of Nations’, p. 360.
[xii] N.C. Smith and J.C. Garnett, The Dawn of World Order: An Introduction to the Study of the League of Nations, (London, 1932), p. 1.
[xiii] Smith and Garnett, The Dawn of World Order, p. 2.
[xiv] Smith and Garnett, The Dawn of World Order, p. 25.
[xv] Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, (London, 1940), p. 287.
[xvi] Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939, p. 38.
[xvii] Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939, p.69.
[xviii] Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939, pp. 66-67.
[xix] Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939, p. 233.
[xx] Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939, p. 234.
[xxi] Smith and Garnett, The Dawn of World Order, pp. 35-36.
[xxii] Johnathan Haslam, ‘E.H. Carr’s Search or Meaning, 1892-1982’, in Michael Cox (ed.), E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal, (Houndmills, 2000), p. 25.
[xxiii] Haslam, ‘E.H. Carr’s search for meaning, 1892-1982’, p. 27.
[xxiv] Ralph Stone, The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations, (Kentucky, 1970), p. 17.
[xxv] Stone, The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations, p. 17.
[xxvi] Fleming, The United States and the League of Nations 1918-1920, p. 8.
[xxvii] Stone, The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations, p. 41.
[xxviii] Stone, The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations, p. 42.
[xxix] Stone, The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations, p. 43.
[xxx] Stone, The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations, p. 182.
[xxxi] Stone, The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations, p. 182.
[xxxii] Donald S. Birn, The League of Nations Union 1918-1945, (Oxford, 1981). pp. 106-107.
[xxxiii] Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939, p. 12.
[xxxiv] Duncan and Elizabeth Wilson, Federation and World Order, (London, 1940), p. 34.
[xxxv] Duncan and Elizabeth Wilson, Federation and World Order, p. 34.
[xxxvi] P. Raffo, The League of Nations, (London, 1974). p. 1.
[xxxvii] Raffo, The League of Nations, p. 4.
[xxxviii] Raffo, The League of Nations, p. 8.
[xxxix] Raffo, The League of Nations, p. 24.
[xl] Raffo, The League of Nations, p. 18.
[xli] Raffo, The League of Nations, p. 22.
[xlii] F.S. Northedge, The League of Nations: Its Life and Times 1920-1946, (Leicester, 1986), p. 279.
[xliii] Northedge, The League of Nations: Its Life and Times 1920-1946, p. 287.
[xliv] Northedge, The League of Nations: Its Life and Times 1920-1946, p. 287-291.
[xlv] Northedge, The League of Nations: Its Life and Times 1920-1946, p. 278.
[xlvi] Ruth Henig, Versailles and After 1919-1933, (London, 1984), p. 41.
[xlvii] Henig, Versailles and After 1919-1933, p. 41.
[xlviii] Henig, Versailles and After 1919-1933, p. 43
[xlix] Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939, p. 41.
[l] Sandra Wilson, Pro Western Intellectuals and the Manchurian Crisis of 1931-1933, (Oxford, 1987), p. 22.
[li] Wilson, Pro Western Intellectuals and the Manchurian Crisis of 1931-1933, p. 23.
[lii] Wilson, Pro Western Intellectuals and the Manchurian Crisis of 1931-1933, p. 24.
[liii] Henig, Versailles and After 1919-1933, p.43.
[liv] Wilson, Pro Western Intellectuals and the Manchurian Crisis of 1931-1933, p. 31.
[lv] Wilson, Pro Western Intellectuals and the Manchurian Crisis of 1931-1933, p. 37.
[lvi] Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939, p. 239.
[lvii] Christopher Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933, (London, 1972), p. 408.
[lviii] Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy, p. 410.
[lix] Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy, p. 408.
[lx] Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939, p. 264.
[lxi] Andrew Webster, ‘The Transnational Dream: Politicians, Diplomats and Soldiers in the League of Nations’ Pursuit of International Disarmament, 1920-1938.’, Contemporary European History, 14,4 (2005), p. 493.
[lxii] Webster, ‘The Transnational Dream: Politicians, Diplomats and Soldiers in the League of Nations’, p. 495.
[lxiii] Webster, ‘The Transnational Dream: Politicians, Diplomats and Soldiers in the League of Nations’, p. 494.
[lxiv] Webster, ‘The Transnational Dream: Politicians, Diplomats and Soldiers in the League of Nations’, p. 518.
[lxv] F.H. Hindsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, (Cambridge, 1967), p. 321.
[lxvi] James Barros, Betrayal from Within: Joseph Avenol, Secretary-General of the League of Nations, 1933-1940, (New Haven, 1969), p. 27.
[lxvii] Barros, Betrayal from Within, p. 27.
[lxviii] Barros, Betrayal from Within, p. 260.
[lxix] Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939, p. 307.