Election observation has become a staple of “credibility-assurance” in international relations. Formal poll watching is almost as old as democratic elections themselves. Indeed, some of our less than democratic states meticulously exude a reassuring illusion of transparency, however inevitable the results. Inexperienced volunteers have sometimes been so impressed by the minutiae of election administration and CCTV deployment in countries with a less than democratic reputation that their reports read with deceptive positivity. There was (for example) a brief experimentation with national pilot CCTV observation of Russian elections after 2010, but this did nothing to improve international credibility. Moreover, newcomers oftentimes miscalculate that cameras can also be infringements on democracy.
Election observation has become an integral part of the democratic process, and where it genuinely works, aims to comprehensively evaluate the integrity and fairness of electoral systems. As representative democracy faces increasing scrutiny, election observation has a pivotal role in restoring “voter trust”. The ongoing debates around who observes elections, and their motivations and methodologies, are key features of IR literature. However, recent studies underscore the importance of understanding the varied profiles and catalysts shaping observers, international organizations and monitoring of specific elections or countries. Furthermore, the rise of “fake” election observation missions raises questions about authenticity and effectiveness.
This article does not offer space to elaborate on the specialisms of observer organisations or their prerequisites and training. Likewise, decision-making on specific elections is fraught with complex political considerations. Final decisions may follow from a miscellaneous bundle of diverse cooperations with emerging democracies. Here, we focus primarily on a growing problem in the election observation landscape, namely the rise in organized “fake” election observation. It may appear that use of this pejorative may prejudice particular organisations, well-intended amateurism, or even soft-touch “regional neighbourliness”. There was a time when the likes of the Commonwealth, the Organization of American States (OAS) or AU might have automatically been classified as “less professional” than say the UN, EU, or he Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Increasingly, with common agreements on election law, methodology and training, these impressions are seldom justified.
This article was written in the context of widespread disappointment concerning recent events in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia, which was the subject of a specific European Platform for Democratic Elections (EPDE) report. Not only was the OSCE impeded from organising an Election Observation Mission (EOM) in 2025 due to a combination of late and restricted invitation, but the 2025 Georgian elections themselves demonstrated that fake observers had developed increasing traction.
To quote the EPDE spokesperson:
The European Platform for Democratic Elections (EPDE) continues to fight the phenomenon of “politically biased observation”. A new EPDE publication shows how politically-motivated election observation tries to mislead the public around the globe. Politically biased or fake observation involves election monitoring by groups and individuals who lack independent credibility and methodology. These missions often align with non-democratic regimes and issue favourable reports, even when elections have evident irregularities. They aim to legitimize flawed elections and undermine electoral institutions and democratic elections. Fake observers’ missions seek to neutralize criticism from credible organizations… and independent domestic election observers, predominantly by propaganda in the host country. Unlike legitimate observers, these groups offer little transparency and ignore international standards and election observation methodologies. Per EPDE’s experience, fake observers focus on creating a false sense of legitimacy for non-democratic regimes, undermining efforts to ensure fair and democratic elections.
The Election Integrity Project has, however emphasized the ubiquitous dangers of misinformation. We now also have organisations exercising targeted “quality control” that might identify fake observers. One notes in particular the expertise of the European Platform for Democratic Elections (EPDE), which was established in December 2012. Commencing in Warsaw with thirteen independent European citizen election observation organizations, it includes Stefan Batory Foundation in Poland, Sweden’s SUILC Institute, Germany’s European Exchange, and the Norwegian Helsinki Committee. Its close working relationship with key election partners such as the UN, EU, OSCE, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and Transparency International further strengthens its meticulous oversight of electoral democracy.
A spokesperson for EPDE describes its mission thus:
The aim of EPDE is to support citizen election observation and to contribute to democratic election processes throughout Europe. EPDE improves the professional quality of its member organizations through peer-learning, training, and expert missions, and informs internationally about the findings of its member organizations. EPDE encourages, trains, and supports experts and citizens who stand up for transparent and equal suffrage wherever it is at risk in Europe. EPDE is a signatory of the Declaration of Global Principles for Nonpartisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations and the Code of Conduct for Nonpartisan Election Observation. EPDE also is a member of the Global Network of Domestic Election Monitors (GNDEM).
The reader might ponder what definitions or methodologies organisations like EPDE deploy to spot “fake observation”. Here, the spokesperson’s clarification is particularly valuable:
EPDE defines fake observers as individuals who participate in election observation as accredited or non-accredited observers; they fail to denounce the elections as short of meeting democratic standards despite ODIHR/OSCE PA monitoring missions or independent domestic election observers deeming them such. They make statements or comments that lend legitimacy to the elections, contradicting the assessments of the aforementioned observation reports. They are likely to have political, economic, or other conflicts of interest that would interfere with conducting observations impartially. Their activities are restricted to short-term or isolated observations without clear and public acknowledgement of the limited scope of their work or conclusions. They fail to issue public reports on their findings and do not inform publicly about their methodology. They are likely to have travel and/or accommodation costs paid by governments, domestic politicians, or other domestic political actors or by individuals or organizations related to those individuals.
EPDE’s database incorporates rigorous scoping techniques to identify fake observers. He continues:
Our research on fake observers focuses primarily on OSCE region elections. Our methodology is based on OSINT (open-source intelligence), which means the data used for the research is publicly accessible and open-source. Due to the detailed nature of local authoritarian propaganda, EPDE accepts Russian, Belarusian, and Azerbaijani state media as reliable sources solely for confirming the presence of fake observers. If the research team identifies doubts about an individual’s statement or presence, they will be contacted to provide a counterstatement. In 2018, biased observation missions “monitored”, among others, the presidential election and the regional elections in Russia, the illegitimate presidential election in Crimea, the elections in Cambodia and Zimbabwe and the illegitimate “general elections” in the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics.
Politically-biased or fake-observation involves election monitoring by groups and individuals who lack independent credibility and methodology. These missions often align with non-democratic regimes and issue favourable reports in the face of evidence. They aim to legitimize flawed elections and undermine electoral institutions and democratic elections. EPDE’s work is also supported by research undertaken by the global Frontiers Group on the phenomenon of ‘fake’ missions. On 18 October 2025, EPDE issued the following statement to the Central Election Commission (CEC) of Georgia:
Georgia lacked comprehensive, long-term international observation because the OSCE/ODIHR was invited too late to deploy credibly, a fact contemporaneously reported by reputable outlets. In parallel, the Georgian election observation organization (ISFED) declined to mount a mission, citing that core Venice Commission preconditions were “largely not met.” Other major watchdogs, including GYLA and Transparency International Georgia, likewise chose not to deploy full observation missions. The 2025 local elections marked the first time in more than two decades that neither international nor domestic observers were able to monitor elections in Georgia. This alone created an unusually high risk environment where any ad-hoc or partial observation could be over-interpreted as a substitute for credible scrutiny.
On the specific matter of “fake observation”, it states:
When officials of election management bodies, government institutions, or elected officials are invited as “international observers” outside a recognized, standards-based mission, their institutional authority can be misconstrued as professional validation of the overall process, especially in the absence of OSCE/ODIHR and full domestic monitoring. If such delegates issue public assessments that diverge from those of credible missions in comparable elections, this gap demands explanation. Our assessments are case-based and grounded in our published methodology. We did not label all foreign observers as fake. We identified only those individuals who meet our definition of fake observation. For each listed person, we can provide the specific public statement….that triggered the listing. Some individuals have prior instances of such activity; others were listed based on their conduct during this cycle. Our assessment concerns verifiable behaviour and methodological independence, not nationality, job title, or institutional affiliation.
The CEC in Georgia had sought to counter-argue that the EPDE were biased against certain countries and their observers. EPDE’s experience in Georgia and elsewhere shines attention on a prescient phenomenon in the election observation landscape, namely the increasing subversion of the professional observation process by countries and organisations seeking to undermine international election standards. We must be vigilant in the face of disinformation campaigns and abuse of AI. This is a rallying call for international organisations to redouble their efforts to support a forensic analysis of the voting process in support of international democracy.
Further Reading on E-International Relations
- Opinion – Voices from Moldova’s 2025 Parliamentary Election
- Exploring the World of the International Election Observer
- Mimicking Democracy Promotion: How Parallel Observers Undermine OSCE Election Monitoring
- Opinion – Georgia Can Win Democracy
- Opinion – Georgia’s Democracy Still in Peril
- Opinion – Georgia’s Embrace of Discrimination
